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ABSTRACT, i.
A l t h o u g h  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t i m e  i s  i m m e d i a t e l y  
f a m i l i a r  t o  u s  a l l , a  number  o f  d i f f i c u l t  and  v e r y  i m p o r t ­
a n t  p r o b l e m s  a r e  r a i s e d  by i t . O n  e x a m i n a t i o n  some o f  t h e s e  
a r e  f o u n d  t o  be  l o g i c a l , some p s y c h o l o g i c a l , s o m e  p h y s i c a l ;  
b u t  u n d e r l y i n g  t h e s e  and  p r e s u p p o s e d  by t h e m , t h e r e  r e m a i n s  
a num ber  o f  q u e s t i o n s  w h i c h  a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  m e t a p h y s i c a l .  
T he s e  q u e s t i o n s  h a v e  be en  t r e a t e d  f rom v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  by 
d i f f e r e n t  p h i l o s o p h e r s . A S  i t  would  be  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  c o n ­
s i d e r  a l l  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n t  v i e w s , t h o s e  o f  K a n t , B e r g s o n ,  
A l e x a n d e r , M o T a g g a r t , a n d  Dunne h a v e  b e e n  t a k e n  a s  r e p r e s e n t ­
a t i v e  f o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  e x p o s i t i o n  a n d  c r i t i c i s m . T h i s  
c o m p r i s e s  t h e  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  t h e  t h e s i s .
The s e c o n d  p a r t  c o n t a i n s  an  a t t e m p t  t o  c o o r d i n a t e  t h e  
c o n c l u s i o n s  r e a c h e d  e a r l i e r , a n d  t o  s k e t c h  a t h e o r y  o f  t i m e .  
P r e d i c t i o n , i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y , a n d  t h e  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  f u t u r e  a r e  
d i s c u s s e d . l t  i s  shown t h a t  t i m e  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a s y m m e t r i c a l  
and  i r r e d u c i b l e  t o  l o g i c a l  t e r m s ; a n d  i t  i s  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  
i t  i s  i t s e l f  t h e  a l o g i c a l  e l e m e n t  i n  t h e  u n i v e r s e , a s  t h e  
c o n d i t i o n  o f  c h a n g e , c o n t i n g e n c y , a n d  n o v e l t y . F i n a l l y , t h e  
r e a l i t y  o f  t i m e  i s  c o n s i d e r e d . T i m e  i s  u n s t a b l e , a n d  c a n n o t  
y i e l d  a b s o l u t e  p e r f e c t i o n ; y e t  o n l y  i n  t i m e  i s  p r o g r e s s  
t o w a r d s  t h e  i d e a l  p o s s i b l e . W e  mus t  n o t  e m p h a s i z e  t h e  
t r a n s i e n c e  o f  t i m e , a n d  f o r g e t  i t s  c r e a t i v e n e s s .
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IFTRODUCTIQIT.
One c a n n o t  r o a d  much m e t a p h y s i c s ,  e i t h e r  o f  t h i s  
age  o r  o f  any  o t h e r ,  w i t h o u t  f i n d i n g  f r e q u e n t  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  
" t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  t i m e . "  At  f i r s t  s i g h t  t h i s  may seem r a t h e r  
a b s u r d .  F o r  wha t  c an  be more f a m i l i a r  t h a n  t i m e ?  E v e r y o n e ,  
h o w e v e r  yo u ng ,  u n t h i n k i n g ,  o r  i m p a t i e n t  o f  " m e t a p h y s i c a l  
m o o n s h i n e , "  h a s  i m m e d ia t e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t e m p o r a l  s u c c e s s i o n :  
n e a r l y  e v e r y b o d y  i n  t h i s  e n l i g h t e n e d  and  c i v i l i s e d  l a n d  can  
" t e l l  t h e  t im e "  a n d  i n f o r m  u s  t h a t  an  h o u r  h a s  e l a p s e d ;  and  
e v e n  t h e  mo s t  u n r e f l e c t i v e  o f  t h e s e  have  a  dim s u s p i c i o n  t h a t  
t h i s  e l a p s e  i s  i n  some q u e e r  way f i n a l ,  t h a t  t h e  p a s t  h o u r  
w i l l  " n e v e r "  r e t u r n ,  b u t  t h a t  i t  w i l l  r e m a i n  * f o r  e v e r ’ i n  
a  k i n d  o f  w a s t a - p a p e r  b a s k e t  c a l l e d  The P a s t ,  a l o n g  w i t h  a l l  
t h e  o t h e r  h o u r s  t h a t  have  e v e r  b e e n ,  an d  a l l  t h e  o t h e r  e v e n t s  
t h a t  have  e v e r  h a p p e n e d  ’ i n ’ t hem .  The t r a n s i t o r i n e s s  o f  
human e x p e r i e n c e  h a s  be en  an  a l l - t o o - a b i d i n g  (we a r e  some­
t i m e s  t e m p t e d  t o  t h i n k )  theme i n  l i t e r a t u r e  f r o m  v e r y  e a r l i ­
e s t  t i m e s .  -
"The re  i s  no r emembrance  o f  t h e  w i se  more t h a n  o f  
t h e  f o o l  f o r  e v e r :  s e e i n g  t h a t  w h i c h  now i s  i n  t h e  days  t o
come s h a l l  a l l  be f o r g o t t e n . "
"As soo n  a s  t h o u  s c a t t e r e s t  t hem,  t h e y  a r e  even  
a s  a  s l e e p ,  and  f a d e  away s u d d e n l y  l i k e  t h e  g r a s s . . .  Though
2a  man be so  s t r o n g  t h a t  he  come t o  f o u r s c o r e  y e a r s ,  y e t  h i s
e n d  i s  b u t  l a b o u r  a n d  s o r r o w ,  so  s o o n  p a s s e t h  i t  aw ay  a n d  
we a r e  g o n e . "
" G a t h e r  ye  r o s e b u d s  w h i l e  ye  may 
O l d  t i m e  i s  s t i l l  a - f l y i n g  
And t h a t  same f l o w e r  t h a t  s m i l e s  t o d a y  
Tomor row w i l l  be d y i n g . "
" G o l d e n  l a d s  a n d  g i r l s  a l l  m u s t  
As c h i m n e y  s w e e p e r s ,  come t o  d u s t . "
" I  carnie l i k e  w a t e r ,  a n d  l i k e  w i n d  I  g o . "
"iüven s u c h  i s  t i m e ,  t h a t  t a k e s  i n  t r u s t ,
Our  y o u t h ,  o u r  j o y s ,  o u r  a l l  we h a v e ,
And p a y s  u s  b u t  w i t h  e a r t h  a n d  d u s t .
Who i n  t h e  d a r k  a n d  s i l e n t  g r a v e  
When we h a v e  w a n d e r e d  a l l  o u r  w a y s .
S h u t s  up  t h e  c o r n e r s  o f  o u r  d a y s . "
-  B u t  i t  i s  n e e d l e s s  t o  q u o t e  f u r t h e r ,  s i n c e  e v e n  
w i t h o u t  t h e  a i d  o f  l i t e r a t u r e ,  we c a n  a l l  r e c o g n i s e  t h e  
c o m p l a c e n t  k n o w l e d g e  o f  a n d  f a m i l i a r i t y  ( e v e n  t o  t h e  p o i n t  
o f  c o n t e m p t  wh en  a n  u n w a r y  m e t a p h y s i c i a n  d a r e s  t o  h i n t  t h a t  
t h a t  k n o w l e d g e  i s  " r i d d l e d  w i t h  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s " ) w i t h  t h e  
n o t i o n  o f  t i m e .  How, t h e n ,  c a n  w h a t  i s  s o  b l a t a n t l y  o b v i o u s  
t o  co mm on se n se  be a  c e n t r e  o f  p e r p l e x i t y  i n  m e t a p h y s i c s ?
The r e a s o n  i s ,  t h a t  m e t a p h y s i c a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  o i  a  d i i -  
f e r e n t  o r d e r  f r o m  t h e  ’ e x p l a n a t i o n ’ w h i c h  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  
p r a c t i c a l  m a n .  He i s  s a t i s f i e d  i f  he  c a n  l i n k  up  t h e  
p h e n o m e n a  t o  be e x p l a i n e d  w i t h  h i s  e v e r y d a y  e x p e r i e n c e s :  
h i s  s t a n d a r d  i s  f a m i l i a r i t y .  F r o m  h i s  p o i n t  o f  v i e w ,  t h e n ,  
t e m p o r a l  s u c c e s s i o n  i s  n o t  e v e n  t h o u g h t  o l  a s  n e e d i n g
3e x p l a n a t i o n ,  f o r  i t  i s  so  a b s u r d l y  f a m i l i a r  -  a n  u n s e p a r a t e d  
a n d  p e r h a p s  i n s e p a r a b l e  i n g t e d i e n t  o f  a l l  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e .
Bu t  t h e  m e t a p h y s i c i a n  h a s  no s u c h  p r a c t i c a l  a i m :  he  d e s i r e s  
m e r e l y  t o  u n d e r s t a n d ,  a n d  t h i s  d e s i r e  i s  c o n s t a n t l y  f r u s t r a t e d  
b y  t h o s e  e l e m e n t s  o f  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e  w h i c h  a r e  t e m p o r a l .  I t  
i s  now g e n e r a l l y  a g r e e d  t h a t  w h a t  i s  l o g i c a l l y  p r i o r  may be ,  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l ^ ^  i a r  i r o m  o b v i o u s ,  w h i l e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  
w h a t  i s  ’ g i v e n ’ t o  e x p e r i e n c e  may b e ,  l o g i c a l l y ,  o f  a n  a l ­
m o s t  u n m a n a g e a b l e  c o m p l e x i t y *  S u c h  w o u l d  s eem t o  be t h e  c a s e  
w i t h  t i m e .  F a m i l i a r  t h o u g h  t h e  n o t i o n  i s  t o  u s ,  a s  s o o n  a s  
we a t t e m p t  t o  p e n e t r a t e  b e n e a t h  t h e  s u r f a c e  we b e c o m e ,  i n
B e r k e l e y ’ s  p i c t u r e s q u e  p h r a s e ,  " l o s t  a n d  e m b r a n g l e d  i n  i n -
1
e x t r i c a b l e  d i f f i c u l t i e s . "  The commonsense  v i e w  s i m p l y  w i l l  
n o t  s t a n d  l o g i c a l  a n a l y s i s .
What  do we mean  by ’ e l j ^ ^ s e d ’ ? To s a y  t h a t  a n  h o u r  
h a s  e l a p s e d  s i m p l y  p r e s u p p o s e s  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  t i m e :  i t  i s  a  
m e r e  r e - s t a t e m e n t  o f  one o f  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o i  t i m e  
t h a t  i s  m o s t  i n  n e e d  o f  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  i t s  " p a s s i n g  a w a y . "
To s a y  t h a t  i t  h a s  e l a p s e d  m ea n s  o n l y  t h a t  i t  h a s  g o n e ,  
b u t  how o r  why o r  w h e r e ,  we a r e  none  t h e  w i s e r ,  a n d  t h e  
m e r s  i n v e n t i o n  o f  a  new w o r d  d o e s  n o t  c l e a r  t h e  i s s u e .
1 .  " P r i n c i p l e s  o f  Human K n o w l e d g e " ,  ^ 9 8 .
2 .  I  do n o t  m ea n  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  commonsense  c o n s i d e r s  t h a t  
t h i s  i s  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n :  t h e  p o i n t  i s ,  t h a t  commonsense  t a k e s  
t h e  n o t i o n  f o r  g r a n t e d ,  w i t h o u t  s t o p p i n g  t o  i n q u i r e  i n t o  i  s 
c o m p l e x i t y ,  a n d  w h e t h e r  i t - n e e d s  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  -  a s  i t  d o e s .
4i j iVerybody w o u l d  a g r e e  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  t e n s e s  i n  a  s t a t e m e n t  
i a  t e m p o r a l  a n d  t h a t  t h e r e  w o u l d  be no . s e n s e  i n  u s i n g  t e n s e  
e x p r e s s i o n s  i n  a  t i m e l e s s  w o r l d .  To s a y ,  th^en,  t h a t  t h e  p a s t  
i s  w h a t  w i l l  n o t  r e t u r n ,  i s ,  t o  p u t  i t  m i l d l y ,  u n i n t e l l i g i b l e , 
a n d  t h e  p o s i t i o n  i s  n o t  i m p r o v e d ,  r a t h e r  t h e  r e v e r s e ,  i f  we 
s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  ’ n o t ’ , ’ n e v e r ’ , s i n c e  ’ n e v e r ’ h a s  i t s e l f  
t e m p o r a l  c o n n e c t i o n s .
"The  P a s t "  i s  a  c u r i o u s  e n t i t y ,  w i t h  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s  t h a t  a r e  more  t h a n  c u r i o u s ,  d o w n r i g h t  c o n t r a d i c t o r y . 
A l t h o u g h  c h a n g e l e s s  ( s e e  O m a r .Khayyam)  a n d  u n c o m p r o m i s i n g l y  
c l o s e d  t o  o u r  r e p e n t a n c e  ( s e e  a l m o s t  a n y  m o r a l  t a l e )  i t  y e t  
h a s  a  p e c u l i a r  h a b i t  o f  g r o w i n g .  Wow, t h e  w a s t e p a p e r  b a s k e t  
i s  f u l l e r  t h a t  i t  was  a  c e n t u r y  a g o :  a  c e n t u r y  h e n c e  i t  w i l l  
be  s t i l l  f u l l e r .  T h i s  i s  a n  o b v i o u s l y  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  c o n ­
c e p t i o n .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  we a r e  l i a b l e ,  i n  u n g u a r d e d  
m o m e n t s ,  t o  s a y  t h a t  i t  d o e s  c h a n g e ,  i n  t h a t  i t  i s  c o n t i n u a l ­
l y  g r o w i n g ;  a n d  t h i s ,  i f  i t  i s  n o t  t o  be c o n t r a d i c t o r y  t o  
t h e  o r i g i n a l  v i e w  t h a t  t h e  p a s t  d o e s  n o t  c h a n g e , r e q u i r e s  a  
t h o r o u g h  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  ways  i n  w h i c h  ’ c h a n g e ’ i s  u s e d ,  
t o  s e e  w h e t h e r  t h e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i s  more  t h a n  v e r b a l  -  a n d  
t h i s  i m p l i e s  m e t a p h y s i c s .  S e c o n d l y ,  t h e r e  i s  a n  i m p l i e d  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i n  t h a t  The P a s t  d o e s  n o t  s t a y  p u t ,  b u t  c o n ­
t i n u a l l y  e n c r o a c h e s  on  The P r e s e n t  a n d  The F u t u r e . What  
now p a s t ,  was  o n c e  P r e s e n t :  w h a t  i ^  F u t u r e ,  w i l l  ^  P r e s e n t .  
I t  i s  o b v i o u s ,  t h a t  a  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t i m e  i s  n o t  y e t
e l i m i n a t e d ;  a n d  e v a n  more  o b v i o u s ,  t h a t  a  l o g i c a l  e x p l a n a ­
t i o n ,  s o  f a r  f r o m  l y i n g  on  t h e  s u r f a c e ,  r e c e d e s  f u r t h e r  a n d  
f u r t h e r  a w a y ,  t h e  more  we p r o b e .  T h i r d l y ,  t h e  w a s t e p a p e r  
b a s k e t  c o n c e p t i o n  i s  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  i n  t h a t  i t  t r e a t s  t h e  
P a s t  a s  a n  a b s t r a c t  a n d  s e p a r a t e l y  e x i s t i n g  c o n t a i n e r  j u s t  
w a i t i n g  f o r  c a s t - o f f  e v e n t s  t o  be p o p p e d  i n t o  i t .  Bu t  a s  i t  
i s  a l s o  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  h a v e  some h a n d  i t s e l f  i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  
b y  w h i c h  e v e n t s  become c a s t  o f f  ( C h r o n o s  d e v o u r i n g  h i s  c h i l ­
d r e n )  we may be e x c u s e d  a  l i t t l e  b e w i l d e r m e n t .
A p a r t  f r o m  t h e  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  t h e s e  two v i e w s  
i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  p a s t ,  t h e  c o n t a i n e r  v i e w  o f  Time i n  g e n ­
e r a l  i s  o p e n  t o  t h e  f u r t h e r  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  i t  i s  a n  u n d e s i r ­
a b l e  h y p o s t a t i s a t i o n  o f  ’ Time ’ i n - t o  a  ’ t h i n g i n  i t s e l f ’ 
( s y m b o l i s e d  by  c a p i t a l  l e t t e r s ) ,  w h e r e a s  t i m e  i s  n e v e r  g i v e n  
a p a r t  f r o m  e x p e r i e n c e .  P a s t ,  P r e s e n t  a n d  F u t u r e  c o n s i d e r e d  
a s  e n t i t i e s  a p a r t  f r o m  e v e n t s , a r e  d e c i d e d  a b s t r a c t i o n s .  
R e a l l y ,  t h e  p l a i n  man i s  b e c o m i n g  q u i t e  m e t a p h y s i c a l i  And 
b a d  m e t a p h y s i c s  i t  i s ,  t o o ,  t o  s a y  t h a t  e v e n t s  a r e  ’ i n ’ 
t i m e ,  a n d  t o  imp&y t h a t  t h e y  a r e  i n  t i m e  i n  a  s e n s e  a n a l o g ­
o u s  t o  t h a t  i n  w h i c h  a  c h a i r  i s  ’ i n ’ a  r o o m .  S u c h  a  v i e w ,  
f o r  t h e  p l a i n  man ,  i s  a  c u r i o u s  o n e ,  s i n c e  i t  i s  one  w h i c h  
i s  c e r t a i n l y  n o t  g i v e n  b y  e x p e r i e n c e ,  b u t  i s  a  d o u b l e  a b ­
s t r a c t i o n  f r o m  i t .  ?/e e x p e r i e n c e  e v e n t s :  f r o m  t h e s e ,  we 
i n f e r  t e m p o r a l  s u c c e s s i o n  s t r e t c h i n g  f r o m  t h e  r e m o t e  p a s t
6t o  t h e  r e m o t e  f u t u r e  . So f a r ,  so  g o o d ,  b u t  when  we p r o c e e d  t o  
make a  s e c o n d  i n f e r e n c e ,  t h a t  t h i s  t e m p o r a l  s u c c e s s i o n ,  o r ,  
a s  we now p r e f e r  t o  c a l l  i t ,  T im e ,  i s  s o m e t h i n g  w h i c h  e x i s t s  
so  t h a t  e v e n t s  a r e  c o n t a i n e d  i n  Time ( w i t h  t h e  p r o b a b l e  
c o n s e q u e n c e  t h a t  we l o o k  u p o n  Time a s  s o m e t h i n g  h a v i n g  a n  
i n d e p e n d e n t  e x i s t e n c e )  we a r e  d o i n g  s o m e t h i n g  t h a t  h a s  n o t  
t h e  s l i g h t e s t  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  i n  e x p e r i e n c e .  I t  may o r  may n o t  
by j u s t i f i e d  on  o t h e r  g r o u n d s :  t h e  v i e w  o f  t i m e  a s  a  k i n d  o f  
a b s t r a c t  m e t r o n o m e  t h a t  w o u l d  go on  t i c k i n g  e v e n  i f  t h e r e  
w e r e  n o t h i n g  e l s e  i n  t h e  w o r l d ,  may be a  g o o d  o r  a  b a d  o n e .
I  t h i n k  t h a t  i t  i s  a  b a d  o n e :  b u t  t h e  p o i n t  h e r e  i s  t h a t  i t  
i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  m e t a p h y s i c a l .
The l a s t  c r i t i c i s m  I  w i s h  t o  make a b o u t  t h e  com­
m o n s e n s e  v i e w  o f  t i m e  c o n c e r n s  i t s  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  s t a t u s  
o f  P a s t  a n d  F u t u r e . Commonsense  i s  v e r y  e x e r c i s e d  on  t h i s  
m a t t e r ,  a n d  c e r t a i n l y  i t  i s  a  d i f f i c u l t  one  -  a n d  n o t  im ­
p r o v e d  b y  t h e  h y p o s t a t i s i n g  t e n d e n c i e s  o f  c o m m o n s e n s e .  T he r e  
i s  a n  o b v i o u s  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  o u r  a t t i t u d e  t o  t h e  p a s t  a n d  t o  
t h e  f u t u r e .  W i t h o u t  g o i n g  i n t o  t h e  c o n t r o v e r s y ,  w h i c h  i s  a n y ­
way f a r  r e m o v e d  f r o m  t h e  s p h e r e  o f  t h e  p l a i n  man ,  o f  w h e t h e r  
o r  n o t  we h a v e  d i r e c t  memory o f  p a s t  e v e n t s ,  n o b o d y  w o u l d  
d e n y  t h a t  we h a v e  k n o w l e d g e  o f  p a s t  e v e n t s  i n  a  s e n s e  i n  
w h i c h  we h a v e  n o t  k n o w I d d g e  o f  f u t u r e  e v e n t s .  S e c o n d l y ,  t h e  
p r e s e n t  i s ,  v e r y  e v i d e n t l y ,  i n  a  p r i v i l e g e d  p o s i t i o n ,  s i n c e
i t  i s  o n l y  t h e  p r e s e n t  t h a t  i s  o p e n  t o  o u r  a c t i v i t y .  T h i r d l y ,  
we t h i n k  o l  o u r  a c t i v i t i e s  now a s  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  f u t u r e ,  b u t  
n o t  a s  i n f l u e n c i n g  ( t h o u g h  p o s s i b l y  i n f l u e n c e d  t h e  p a s t ,  
w h i c h  i s  l o o k e d  u p o n  a s  u n c h a n g i n g  i n  t h a t  s e n s e .  ( T h e s e  
f a c t s  a r e  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t ,  a n d  w i l l  n e e d  t o  be c o n s i d e r e d  i n  
d e t a i l  l a t e r ,  b u t  h e r e  we a r e  o n l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  t h e  p l a i n  
m a n ’ s a c c o u n t  o f  t h e m . )  I t  i s  h e r e  t h a t  t h e  p l a i n  man be co m es  
o p e n l y  a n d  u n a s h a m e d l y  m e t a p h y s i c a l .  H i s  a c c o u n t  i s  p o s i t i v e l y  
s p a t t e r e d  w i t h  ’ r e a l ’ a n d  ’ e x i s t s ’ a n d  ’ u n r e a l ’ , a n d  t h e  
o n t o l o g i c a l  a r g u m e n t  c l a i m s  many v i c t i m s .  On t h e  one  h a n d ,  
o n l y  t h e  p r e s e n t  ’ i s ’ , t h a t  i s  ’ e x i s t s ’ , t h a t  i s  ’ i s  r e a l ’ : 
by  p a r i t y  o f  r e a s o n i n g ,  t h e  p a s t  a n d  t h e  f u t u r e , w h i c h  a r e  
n o t  now,  do n o t  e x i s t ,  a n d  so  c a n n o t  be ’ r e a l . ’ On t h e  o t h e r  
h a n d ,  t h e r e  i s  s o m e t h i n g  s o l i d  a n d  s u b s t a n t i a l  a b o u t  a  
( s u i t a b l y  h y p o s t a t i s e d )  P a s t  a n d  F u t u r e :  t h e y  s t r e t c h  b a c k ­
w a r d s  a n d  f o r w a r d s ,  i f  n o t  t o  i n f i n i t y ,  a t  l e a s t  a s  n e a r  a s  
d o e s n ’ t  m a t t e r .  W h e r e a s  t h e  p r e s e n t  i s  m e r e l y  a  t e n u o u s ,  
d i m e n s i o n l e s s  l i m i t  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  s a t i s f y i n g  b l o c k s  -  a n d  i t  
d o e s n ’ t  e v e n  ’ s t a y  p u t . ’ How, t h e n ,  c a n  be ’ r e a l ’ ?
And t o  c o m p l i c a t e  m a t t e r s  s t i l l  f u r t h e r ,  t h e  
d e c i s i o n  i s  n o t  e v e n  b e t w e e n  a n  u n r e a l  p a s t  a n d  f u t u r e  a n d  a  
r e a l  p r e s e n t ,  a n d  a  r e a l  p a s t  a n d  f u t u r e  a n d  a n  u n r e a l  p r e ­
s e n t ,  f o r  t h e  p a s t  a n d  t h e  f u t u r e  a r e ,  a s  we h a v e  s e e n ,  n o t  
on  t h e  same c o g n i t i v e  l e v e l .  T h i s  i s  t h e  l a s t  s t r a w :  t h e
8p l a i n  man d o e s  n o t  s t o p  t o  c o n s i d e r  w h e t h e r  p a s t  a n d  f u t u r e  
c o u l d  h a v e , o n t o l o g i c a l l y , t h e  sam$ s t a t u s ,  e v e n  t h o u g h  t h e r e  
a r e  o b v i o u s  c o g n i t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e s  b e t w e e n  t h e m ,  b u t ,  w i t h  
h i s  a d m i r a b l e  p r a c t i c a l  a n d  m o r a l  b i a s ,  he  c o n c e n t r a t e s  on  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a c t i v i t y  i s  c o n f i n e d  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  a n d  i n ­
f l u e n c e s  o n l y  t h e  f u t u r e ,  a n d  d r a g s  j o y f u l l y  i n  t h e  q u e s t i o n  
o f  f r e e  w i l l  -  w h i c h  i s  h a r d l y  c a l c u l a t e d  t o  e l u c i d a t e  t h e  
d i s c u s s i o n .
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A u g u s t i n e ,  i n  h i s  " C o n f e s s i o n s , s a i d  -  "What  i s  
t i m e ?  Who c a n  s i m p l y  a n d  b r i e f l y  e x p l a i n  i t ?  . . .  Y e t  w h a t  i s  
more  f a m i l i a r  a n d  w e l l - k n o w n  i n  c o n v e r s a t i o n  t h a n  t i m e ?  . . .  
W h a t ,  t h e n ,  i s  t i m e ?  -  i f  n o b o d y  a s k s  me,  I  know:  b u t  i f  I  
t r y  t o  e x p l a i n  i t  t o  one who a s k s  me,  I  do n o t  k n o w . "
A f t e r  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  a t t e m p t s  t o  e x t r a c t  a  c o h e r e n t  
m e a n i n g  o u t  o f  t h e  commonsense  v i e w s  o f  t i m e , t h e  s t a t e m e n t  
t h a t  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  t i m e  i s  one  o f  t h e  h a r d e s t  w i t h  w h i c h  
t h e  p h i l o s o p h e r  h a s  t o  d e a l ,  may no l o n g e r  e l i c i t  c o n t e m p t ­
u o u s  j e e r s  f r o m  t h e  p l a i n  m a n .  A u g u s t i n e ’ s r e m a r k  i s  o n l y  
t o o  t r u e .  T h ou g h  we manage  t o  g e t  a l o n g  i n  p r a c t i c a l  l i f e  
w i t h  s u c h  n o t i o n s  o f  t i m e  a s  we h a v e ,  we f i n d  i t  e x t r a o r d i n ­
a r i l y  d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  n o t  i m p o s s i b l e , t o  g i v e  a  c o h e r e n t  a c c o u n t  
o f  t h e m .  I  do n o t  mean  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  commonsense  i s  t o  be  
b l a m e d  f o r  t h i s  -  t o  do so  w o u l d  be t o  j u d g e  i t  by  s t a n d a r d s  
w h i c h  i t  d o e s  n o t  r e c o g n i s e ,  a n d  a s  l o n g  a s  i t  i s  a d e q u a t e
1 .  X I ,  1 4 .
9f o r  p r a c t i c a l  c o n c e r n s ,  t h a t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  i t .  B u t  my 
p o i n t  h a s  b e e n  t h a t  m e t a p h y s i c a l  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  p r o b l e m  
o f  t i m e  c a n n o t  be c a l l e d  o t i o s e ,  a n d  m o r e ,  t h a t  a  m e t a p h y s i c a l  
b a c k g r o u n d  i s  p r e s u p p o s e d  by  many commonsense  c o n c e p t i o n s .
The p h i l o s o p h e r  i s  a  p l a i n  man h a l f  h i s  t i m e ,  a n d  t h e  p l a i n  
man o f t e n  a s k s  q u e s t i o n s  w h i c h  a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  m e t a p h y s i c a l .  
M e t a p h y s i c a l  q u e s t i o n s  a s  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t i m e  a r e  by no 
m e a n s  p u r e l y  a c a d e m i c .
G r a n t e d ,  t h e n ,  t h a t  t i m e  i s  a  q u e s t i o n  w i t h  v / h i c h  
m e t a p h y s i c s  i s  r i g h t l y  c o n c e r n e d ,  i s  i t  a  s u f f i c i e n t l y  im­
p o r t a n t  one t o  j u s t i f y  m e t a p h y s i c s  i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  i t ?  I t  i s  
i m p o r t a n t  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  t o  i t s  d i f f i c u l t y ,  a n d  i t  l i e s  a t  t h e  
c e n t r e  o f  some o f  t h e  m o s t  d i f f i c u l t  p r o b l e m s  i n  p h i l o s o p h y ,  
w h i c h  c a n n o t  be a n s w e r e d ,  i f  a t  a l l ,  u n t i l  we h a v e  f i r s t  g o t  
a  s a t i s f a c t o r y  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t i m e . The i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t i m e  i n
m e t a p h y s i c s  i s  more  f u l l y  r e a l i s e d  a t  p r e s e n t  t h a n  e v e r
b e f o r e ,  a n d  a s  A l e x a n d e r  s a y s ,  t h e  m o s t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
f e a t u r e  o f  t h e  t h o u g h t  o f  t h e  l a s t  t w e n t y - f i v e  y e a r s  i s  t h e
d i s c o v e r y  o f  t i m e .  T h i s  d o e s  n o t  m e a n ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  n o b o d y  
u n t i l  t h e  l a s t  f e w  y e a r s  h a d  s p e c u l a t e d  a b o u t  t i m e  -  on t h e  
c o n t r a r y  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  p r o b l e m  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  t e m ­
p o r a l  f l u x  a n d  e t e r n a l  a b i d i n g n e s s ,  b e t w e e n  B e i n g  a n d  B e c o m i n g ,  
i s  f u l l y  r e c o g n i s e d  a s  f a r  b a c k  a s  t h e  V e d a s ,  a n d ,  i n  G r e e k
1 .  " S p i n o z a  a n d  T i m e , "  p . l .
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p h i l o s o p h y ,  by  H e r a c l i t u s  a n d  P a r m e n i d e s .  Wha t  i s  m e a n t  i s  
t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n t  a g e  i s  more  c o n s c i o u s l y  a w a r e  o f  t h e  d i f ­
f i c u l t i e s  a n d  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t i m e ,  a s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  q u o t a t i o n s  
w i l l  s h o w ; -  "Ho q u e s t i o n  h a s  b e e n  more  n e g l e c t e d  b y  p h i l o ­
s o p h e r s  t h a n  t h a t  o f  t i m e , y e t  a l l  a g r e e  i n  d e c l a r i n g  i t  v i t a l V
2
"The  Ke y  o f  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  p r o b l e m s  i s  t h e r e . "
"To r e a l i s e  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t i m e  a s  s u c h  i s  t h e  g a t e  o f  
3
w i s d o m . "  And f i n a l l y ,  e v e n  f r o m  t h e  i d e a l i s t  s i d e  comes  t h e
a d m i s s i o n  t h a t  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  t i m e  " i s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  c r u x  o f  
4
s p e c u l a t i o n . "
Time i s  i m p o r t a n t ,  t h e n ,  b e c a u s e ,  t h o u g h  a p p a r e n t l y  
a  s i m p l e  ’ g i v e n ’ i n  e x p e r i e n c e ,  i t  i n v o l v e s  a  g r e a t  n u m b e r  o f  
d i f f i c u l t  q u e s t i o n s .  Some o f  t h e s e ,  a s  we s a w ,  a p p e a r e d  a s  
s o o n  a s  we e v e n  b e g a n  t o  s c r a t b h  t h e  s u r f a c e  o f  com m ons en se  
n o t i o n s ;  o t h e r s  a p p e a r  a t  mor e  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  l e v e l s .  Some 
a p p l y  t o  c h a r a c t e r s  w h i c h  a r e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t e m p o r a l :  o t h e r s  
a r e  o n l y  i n c i d e n t a l ,  i n  t h a t  t h e i r  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  e q u a l l y  
f e l t  i n  o t h e r  q u e s t i o n s .  Some ,  a g a i n ,  a r e  e s s e n t i a l  d i f ­
f i c u l t i e s ,  w h i c h  a n y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  t h e o r y  o f  t i m e  m u s t  a t t e m p t  
t o  a n s w e r :  o t h e r s  a r e  i r r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  m e t a p h y s i c a l  q u e s t i o n  
o f  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t i m e .  O t h e r s  r e s t  u p o n  l o g i c a l  c o n f u s i o n s ,  
s u c h  a s  a m b i g u o u s  l a n g u a g e  a n d  f a l l a c i e s  o f  s u b s t a n t i a l i s a -  
t i o n ,  u p o n  i n s u f f i c i e n t l y  g r o u n d e d  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  g e n e r a l ­
i s a t i o n s ,  a n d  l a s t l y  a n d  w o r s t  o f  a l l ,  u p o n  t h e  i n d i s c r i m i n a t e
1 & 2 .  " D u r é e  e t  S i m u l t a n é i t é , "  B e r g s o n ,  p p . v i i  & v i i i •
3 .  A l e x a n d e r ,  " S p a c e ,  T i m e ,  a n d  D e i t y , "  I .  p . 36  n o t e .
4 .  B o s a n q u e t ,  " M e e t i n g  o f  E x t r e m e s , "  p . 1 2 5 .
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a n d  a m b i g u o u s  u s e  i n  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t e x t s  o f  ’ r e a l ’ a n d  ’u n r e a l . »  
A s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  a t  
p r e s e n t :  t h e y  w i l l  n e e d  t o  be a n a l y s e d  i n  d e t a i l  l a t e r .
I t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  a g r e e d  t h a t  t i m e  a n d  c h a n g e  a r e  
c l o s e l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  e a c h  o t h e r ,  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  a  r e l a t i o n  
o f  i m p l i c a t i o n  h o l d s  b e t w e e n  t h e m .  Cha nge  i s  a  d i f f i c u l t ,  
a n d ,  a s  many b e l i e v e  f r o m  P a r m e n i d e s  down t o  H e g e l  a n d  B r a d ­
l e y ,  a  s e I f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y  n o t i o n .  To s a y  "A h a s  t h e  p r o p e r t y  
x "  i s  o b v i o u s l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  t o  "A h a s  n o t  x " : t o  p u t  t h e  
two t o g e t h e r  a n d  s a y  "A h a s  x  a n d  t& e n  A h a s  n o t  x "  i s  i n  
i t s e l f  u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . How c a n  i t  be t h a t  two  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  
s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  a s s e r t e d  t o g e t h e r ?  To a n s w e r  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i n  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  a s  a  w h o l e  b e c a u s e  A h a s  
c h a n g e d  i n  t h e  m e a n t i m e ,  i s ,  I  s u b m i t ,  t h e  me r e  a d d i t i o n  o f  
a  new w o r d  f o r  a  n o t i o n  w h i c h  m u s t  r e m a i n  f o r  e v e r  i n e x p l i c ­
a b l e  t o  p u r e  l o g i c .  I f  s u c h  a r e  t h e  d i s r e p u t a b l e  a s s o c i a t e s  
o f  t i m e , t h e  a d h e r e n t  o f  l o g i c  may w e l l  d e s p a i r  o f  s a t i s ­
f a c t i o n  .
The s e c o n d  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  t h e  t a s k  o f  r e c o n c i l i n g  
t i m e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a  sum o f  d i s c r e t e  ’ n o w s ’ , w i t h  t i m e  
c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a  h o m o g e n e o u s  c o n t i n u u m .  Z e n o ’ s p a r a d o x e s  
i l l u s t r a t e d  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y ,  a n d  a c c o r d i n g  t o  h i m ,  t h e  two 
v i e w s  w e r e  i n c o m p a t i b l e . T h e r e  c a n  be no d o u b t  t h a t  t h e  c l e a v ­
a g e  h e  r e m a r k e d  u p o n  h a s  p e r s i s t e d  up  t o  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  a n d ,  
i n B . A .  B u r t t ’ s  w o r d s ,  "The  s c i e n t i f i c  n o t i o n  o f  t i m e  h a s  
a l m o s t  e n t i r e l y  l o s t  t o u c h  w i t h  d u r a t i o n  a s  i m m e d i a t e l y
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e x p e r i e n c e d .  U n t i l  a  c l o s e r  r e l a t i o n  i s  r e g a i n e d ,  i t  i s  
p r o b a b l e  t h a t  s c i e n c e  w i l l  n e v e r  r e a c h  a  v e r y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  t i m e . "
T h i r d l y ,  i t  may be  o b j e c t e d  t h a t  t i m e  i s  ’ s u b ­
j e c t i v e . ’ An h o u r ,  a s  m e a s u r e d  by  a  c l o c k ,  may s e e m  l o n g  t o  
one  o b s e r v e r  a n d  s h o r t  t o  a n o t h e r ,  a s  S h a k e s p e a r e  l o n g  ago  
p o i n t e d  o u t .  Wha t  i s  m o r e ,  àn  i n t e r v a l  t h a t  i s  ’ f i l l e d ’ w i t h  
e v e n t s  s e e m s  s h o r t  i n  p a s s i n g  a n d  l o n g  i n  r e t r o s p e c t :  t h u s  
a n  h o u r  on  a  w a l k  i n  t h e  h i l l s  s o o n  g o e s ,  w h e r e a s  t h e  n e x t  
h o u r ,  s p e n t  i n  w a i t i n g  on  a  c o u n t r y  p l a t f o r m  w i t h  t h e  know­
l e d g e  t h a t  t h e  e a r l i e r  t r a i n  c a n  o n l y  h a v e  b e e n  m i s s e d  by  a  
f e w  m i n u t e s ,  i s  i n t o l e r a b l y  l o n g .  B u t ,  i n  memo ry ,  t h e  h o u r  
s p e n t  i n  w a l k i n g  b e c o m e s  much  l o n g e r  t h a n  t h e  h o u r  o f  w a i t i n g  
W h a t , t h e n ,  c a n  be ’ t i m e ’ , s i n c e  i t  a p p e a r s  d i f f e r e n t  t o  
d i f f e r e n t  o b s e r v e r s ,  a n d  t o  t h e  same o b s e r v e r  a t  d i f f e r e n t  
’ t i m e s ’ ?
B u t  e v e n ( s o - c a l l e d ) ’ o b j e c t i v e ’ t i m e  i s  n o t  f r e e  
f r o m  d i f f i c u l t y .  Time i s  m e a s u r e d  by  m e a n s  o f  m o t i o n :  b u t  
m o t i o n  p r e s u p p o s e s  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  t i m e  : how c a n  we e x p l a i n
aw ay  t h e  c i r c u l a r i t y ?
A g a i n ,  i s  t h e r e  a n  a b s o l u t e  t i m e ,  a s  He wton  h e l d ,  
o r  i s  w h a t  we c a l l  ’ t i m e ’ o n l y  a  name f o r  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  
e v e n t s ?  I f  t h e  l a t t e r ,  i s  t h e r e  a n  i n f i n i t e  n u m b e r  o i  t i m e -
1 .  " M e t a p h y s i c a l  F o u n d a t i o n s  o f  M od e rn  S c i e n c e , "  p . 2 6 2 .
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s e r i e s ?  F o l l o w i n g  on  f r o m  t h i s ,  come new q u e s t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  
t h e o r y  o i  r e l a t i v i t y  h a s  i n t r o d u c e d .  W ha t  e x a c t l y  c a n  be 
m e a n t  by  t h e  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  a  c e r t a i n  v e l o c i t y ,  t h e  v e l o c i t y  
o f  l i g h t ,  i s  c r i t i c a l  i n  s u c h  a  way  t h a t  t h e  o r d i n a r y  a d ­
d i t i o n  a n d  s u b t r a c t i o n  o f  r e l a t i v e  v e l o c i t i e s  no  l o n g e r  h o l d s ?  
a n d  w h a t  i s  i t s  e f f e c t  on  t h e  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t i m e  a s  r e l a t i v e ?
Ha s  t i m e  a  b e g i n n i n g  a n d  a n  e n d ?  a n d  w h a t  i s  i t s  
c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  e t e r n i t y ?  I s  t h e r e  a n y  s e n s e  i n  t h e  , t h e o r y  
t h a t  a f t e r  a  c e r t a i n  n u m b e r  o f  y e a r s ,  no m a t t e r  how g r e a t ,
’ t h e  s a m e ’ c o l l o c a t i o n s  d f  e v e n t s ,  down t o  t h e  t i n i e s t  
d e t a i l ,  w i l l  r e c u r ?
To come f r o m  t h i s  c o s m i c  g r a n d e u r  t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t ­
i e s  o f  t o d a y ,  how c a n  we e x p l a i n  t h e  ’p a s s i n g ’ o f  t i m e ?  A t  
p r e s e n t  I  am w r i t i n g  t h i s  s e n t e n c e  x ,  b u t  f i v e  m i n u t e s  a go  
I  wa s  w r i t i n g  q u i t e  a  d i f f e r e n t  s e n t e n c e  y ,  a n d  f i v e  m i n u t e s  
h e n c e  i t  w i l l  be no l o n g e r  t r u e  t o  s a y ,  " I  am now w r i t i n g  x . "  
P u t  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  we c a n n o t  d i s t i n g u i s h  b e t w e e n  p a s t ,  p r e s e n t  
a n d  f u t u r e ,  i n  s u c h  a  way  t h a t  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  s h a l l  ’ a l w a y s  
r e m a i n .  On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  w h a t  was  p r e s e n t  b e co m es  p a s t ,  
a n c ^ h a t  i s  f u t u r e  w i l l  be p r e s e n t .  G i v e n  t h r e e  e v e n t s .  A,
B ,  C,  I - c a n  s a y  t h a t  A i s  p a s t ,  B p r e s e n t ,  a n d  G f u t u r e ,  
a n d  i n  s o  d o i n g  I  h a v e  s u f f i c i e n t l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  t h e m  -  
f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t .  B u t  t h e r e  was  a  t i m e  wh e n  A was  p r e s e n t ,  
a n d  B a n d  C b o t h  f u t u r e :  a n d  t h e r e  w i l l  ^  a  t i m e  when  A
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a n d  B a r e  b o t h  p a s t  a n d  C i s  p r e s e n t .  How, t h e n ,  c a n  I  d i s ­
t i n g u i s h  b e t w e e n  A,  B a n d  C, s i n c e  n o ne  o f  t h e m  p o s s e s s e s  
t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  p r e s e n t n e s s  by d i v i n e  r r i g h t ?  As B r o a d  
p u t  i t ,  we m u s t  d i s t i n g u i s h  b e t w e e n  c h a n g e s  o f  t i m e  a n d  
c h a n g e s  i j i  t i m e  : we c a n n o t  a n a l y s e  t h e  f o r m e r  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  
l a t t e r ,  s i n c e  t i m e  w o u l d  t h e n  n e e d  a n o t h e r  t i m e  t o  c h a n g e  i n ,  
a n d  so  on  a d  i n f i n i t u m .  O r ,  more  f o r c i b l y ,  p a s t ,  p r e s e n t ,  a n d  
f u t u r e  a r e  i n c o m p a t i b l e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  Y e t  e v e r y  e v e n t  h a s  
t h e m  a l l .
Can  w e ,  o r  c a n  we n o t ,  g e t  o u t  o f  t h i s  d i f f i c u l t y  
b y  s a y i n g  t h a t  t h e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  a r e  n o t  i n c o m p a t i b l e ,  
b e c a u s e  e v e r y  e v e n t  h a s  t h e m  ^  d i f f e r e n t  t i m e s ?  I f  we d i d ,  
we s h o u l d  s t i l l  h a v e  t o  e x p l a i n  w h a t  we m e a n t  by  ’ a t  d i f f e r e n t  
t i m e s , ’ a n d  i t  h a s  b e e n  d e n i e d  ( b y  M c T a g g a r t )  t h a t  we c a n  
a v o i d  a n  i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s ,  e x c e p t  by v i c i o u s  c i r c u l a r i t y .
A g a i n ,  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  a r i s e s  a b o u t  t h e  r e l a t i o n  
b e t w e e n  t i m e  a n d  e v e n t s .  I s  t i m e  s o m e t h i n g  t h a t  c o u l d  go on 
e v e n  i f  t h e r e  w e r e  no e v e n t s :  o r  i s  i t  m e r e l y  a n  a b s t r a c t i o n ,  
a n d  a  v i c i o u s  one  a t  t h a t ,  f r o m  e v e n t s ,  o r  i s  t h e r e  a  m i d d l e  
way  b e t w e e n  t h e s e  two o p p o s e d  c o n c e p t i o n s ?  S u p p o s i n g  we w e r e  
t o  d e n y  t h a t  t i m e  c o u l d  e x i s t  i n  v a c u o ,  t h e  p r o b l e m  s t i l l  
r e m a i n s  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  w o u l d  be t i m e  i n  a  m i n d l e s s  u n i v e r s e .
As h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  s a i d ,  t h e r e  i s  a n  e s s e n t i a l  
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  o u r  c o g n i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s  t o  p a s t  a n d  f u t u r e .  I s
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i t ,  o r  i s  i t  n o t ,  v a l i d  t o  i n f e r  f r o m  t h i s  t h a t  . t h e y  h a v e  a  
d i f f e r e n t  o n t o l o g i c a l  s t a t u s ?
L a s t l y ,  p e r h a p s  t h e  m o s t è o ' b v i o u s  t h i n g  a b o u t  t i m e  
a s  g i v e n  i n  e x p e r i e n c e ,  a n d  t h e  c h a r a g t e r i s t i c  w h i c h  m a k e s  
i t  u n l i k e  a n y t h i n g  e l s e ,  i s  i t s  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y .  I s  t h i s  a n  
a c c i d e n t ,  o r  i s  i t  i n h e r e n t  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t i m e ?  a n d  s e c o n d ­
l y  , i f  i t  i s  i n h e r e n t ,  hov; do we p r o p o s e  t o  e x p l a i n  i t ?  C e r ­
t a i n l y  n o t  by  l o g i c ,  f o r  t h e  l a w s  o f  l o g i c  h a v e  no c o g n i s a n c e  
o f  i r r e v e r s i b l e  p r o c e s s ,  b u t  how e l s e ?
S u c h  a r e  some o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w h i c h  h a v e  
a c c u m u l a t e d  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t i m e , a n d  w h i c h  a n y  m e t a p h y s i c a l  
t h e o r y  o f  t i m e  m u s t  e i t h e r  e x p l a i n  o r  e x p l a i n  a w a y .  S h o u l d  
t h e  l i s t  s e e m  t o o  s h o r t ,  i t  c a n  be i n d e f i n t e l y  i n c r e a s e d  
b y  t h e  a d d i t i o n  o f  c a u s a l i t y ,  f r e e  w i l l ,  d e t e r m i n i s m ,  s i n c e  
t h e  m o s t  d i f f i c u l t  a s p e c t s  o f  t h e s e  a r e  t h o s e  i n t o  w h i c h  
t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t i m e  e n t e r s .
C o n f r o n t e d  by  a l l  t h e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  w h a t  i s  t o  
be d o n e ?  One v e r y  s i m p l e  a n d  o b v i o u s  way  o u t ,  a n d  one  w h i c h  
h a s  b e e n  p o p u l a r  w i t h  i d e a l i s t s  o f  a l l  a g e s  -  P a r m e n i d e s ,  
P l a t o ,  S p i n o z a ,  K e g e l ,  B r a d l e y  a n d  M c T a g g a r t  -  i s  t o  s a y  
t h a t  t i m e  i s  r i d d l e d  t h r o u g h  a n d  t h r o u g h  w i t h  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , 
a n d  h e n c e  c a n n o t  be  r e a l .  The m a j o r  p r e m i s e  o f  t h e  a r g u m e n t  
i s  t h a t  t h e  R e a l  ( n o t e  t h e  c a p i t a l )  c a n n o t  be  s e l f - c o n t r a ­
d i c t o r y ,  o r  p o s s e s s  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  c h a r a c t e r s .  I t  i s  a  sum­
m a r y  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y ,  a n d  one  f o r  w h i c h  t h e r e  i s
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much j u s t i f i c a t i o n .  H o bo d y  who h a s  c o n t e m p l a t e d  t h e  a w e - i n s p i r -  
i n g  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  p r o b l e m s  g i v e n  a b o v e  c a n  be  o u t  o f  sym­
p a t h y  w i t h  i t .  B u t  ^ r e l y  t o  s a y  t h a t  b e c a u s e  t i m e  i s  s e l f -  
c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,  i t  m u s t  be  a p p e a r a n c e  o n l y ,  i s ,  s o  f a r  f r o m  
s o l v i n g  t h e  p r o b l e m s ,  n o t  e v e n  a n  a n s w e r  t o  t h e m .  I t  i s  d o u b t ­
l e s s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  know t h a t  t i m e  i s  n o t  r e a l ,  b u t  o n l y  
a p p a r e n t ,  b u t  i t  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t .  The d e n i a l  o f  r e a l i t y  t o  
t i m e  a v o i d s  t h e  m a i n  p r o b l e m ,  f o r  y o u  h a v e  s t i l l  t o  e x p l a i n  
t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  t i m e . M c T a g g a r t  i s  a l m o s t  a l o n e  among i d e a l ­
i s t s  i n  r e a l i s i n g  t h i s .
I  do n o t  m ean  t o  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  i d e a l i s t  h a s  n o t ,  
a t  f i r s t  s i g h t  a t  a n y  r a t e ,  a  g o o d  c a s e  f o r  r e j e c t i n g  t i m e  
f r o m  a  R e a l i t y  i n  w h i c h  no c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  r e m a i n ,  n o r  t h a t  
he  d o e s  n o t  f r e q u e n t l y  make v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  r e m a r k s  a b o u t  
t i m e  -  s u c h ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a s  a r e  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  " T i m a e u s . "  
B u t  I  c a n n o t  s e e  t h a t  we g e t  much  f u r t h e r  i n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t i m e  -  t h o u g h  p o s s i b l y ,  i n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  R e a l i t y ,  s i n c e  we now know t h e  n e g a t i v e  f a c t  t h a t  
t e m p o r a l  e x p e r i e n c e  i s  n o t  a  p a r t  o f  r e a l i t y , -  when  we s a y  
t h a t  t i m e  i s  n o t  r e a l .  R e a l  o r  n o t  r e a l ,  t h e  f a c t s  o i  t e m ­
p o r a l  e x p e r i e n c e  r e m a i n ,  a n d  a n y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  m e t a p h y s i c s
1 .  I  a g r e e  t h a t  i n  so  f a r  a s  t h e  a i m  o f  i d e a l i s t  m e t a p h y s i c ­
i a n s  i s  t o  a p p r e h e n d  t h e  R e a l ,  i t  i s  n o t  l a i r  t o  c r i t i c i s e  
t h e m  f o r  h a v i n g  f a i l e d  t o  e l u c i d a t e  t h e  n a t u r e  o i  some­
t h i n g  w h i c h  t o  t h e m  i s  a p p e a r a n c e ;  my p o i n t ^ i s , t h a t  f o r  
a  m e t a p h y s i c a l  t h e o r y  o f  t i m e , i t  i s  n o t  s u i i i c i e n t  t o  
d i s m i s s  t i m e  a s  m e r e  a p p e a r a n c e ,  w i t h o u t  d i s c u s s i n g  how 
i t  i s  t h a t  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  a r i s e s .
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o i  t i m e  m u s t  t a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e m  *
M o r e o v e r ,  ’ r e a l ’ i s  a  t e r r i b l y  a m b i g u o u s  w o r d ,  a n d  
I t s  p r e s e n c e  i n  a n y  d i s c u s s i o n ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  t h e  e a r l y  s t a g e s ,  
i s  more  l i k e l y  t o  be a  s o u r c e  o f  c o n f u s i o n  t h a n  a  h e l p .  We 
m ay ,  a n d  p r o b a b l y  s h a l l ,  h a v e  f i n a l l y  t o  make up  o u r  m i n d s  
w h e t h e r  t i m e  h a s  a n y  m e a n i n g  a p a r t  f r o m  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e :  
w h e t h e r  i t  i s  m e r e l y  a  c o n d i t i o n  o f  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e ,  o f  a l l  
p o s s i b l e  e x p e r i e n c e ,  o r  h a s  a  s e p a r a t e  a n d  i n d e p e n d e n t  s u b ­
s i s t e n c e  o f  i t s  own .  T h i s  i s  a  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n ,  a n d  
t o  e a c h  o f  t h e s e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  c o r r e s p o n d s  a  p o s s i b l e  m e a n i n g  
o f  ’ r e a l ’ , b u t  i t  i s  n o t  a  q u e s t i o n  t o  s t a r t  w i t h .  A g a i n ,  
we s a w  i n  o u r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  common s e n s e  n o t i o n s  t h a t  i n  one 
s e n s e  t h e  p r e s e n t  i s  more  ’ r e a l ’ t h a n  t h e  p a s t  a n d  f u t u r e ,  
w h i l e  i n  a n o t h e r  s e n s e  t h e y  a r e  more  ’ r e a l ’ t h a n  t h e  p r e s e n t .  
O r ,  t o  t a k e  a n  e x a m p l e  f r o m  a n o t h e r  f i e l d ,  t h e  p l a i n  man 
u s u a l l y  s a y s  t h a t  w h a t  he  c a n  s e e ,  h e a r ,  t o u c h  i s  ’ r e a l ’ .
B u t  t h e n  D e s c a r t e s  t e l l s  h£m t h a t  s e c o n d a r y  q u a l i t i e s  a r e  
’ u n r e a l ’ a n d  t h a t  o n l y  e x t e n s i o n  i s  ’ r e a l ’ . A f t e r  w h i c h ,  
a l o n g  comes  B e r k e l e y  a n d  show s  t h a t  p r i m a r y  q u a l i t i e s  a r d  
on  t h e  same f o o t i n g  a s  s e c o n d a r y  o n e s ,  a n d  so  t h e  w h o l e  l o t  
a i e  c o n d e m n e d  a s  n o t  b e l o n g i n g  t o  R e a l i t y .  E v i d e n t l y , t h e n ,  
’ r e a l ’ i s  u s e d  i n  a  v a r i e t y  o f  d i f f e r e n t  s e n s e s .  G r a n t e d ,  
t h a t  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  ’ r e a l i t y ’ m u s t  i n  thar e n d  be  b r o u g h t
1 .  " C a l l i n g  a  t h i n g  a n  i l l u s i o n  d o e s n ’ t  f r e e  u s  f r o m  t h e  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  a c c o u n t i n g  f o r  how a n  e t e r n a l ,  s t a t i c  
s y s t e m  c o u l d  p r o d u c e  t h e  i l l u s i o n  o r  a p p e a r a n c e . "  ( B o o d i n ,  
"Time  a n d  R e a l i t y " , p . 6 5 . )
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i n ,  a n d  t h a t  t h i s  i s  u l t i m a t e l y  a n  i n d e f i n a b l e  n o t i o n :  y e t  
i t  s e e m s  a d v i s a b l e  n o t  t o  i n t r o d u c e  i t  t o o  s i r g n ,  o r  t o  d e f i n e  
i t  wh en  we d o .  ( T h i s  i s  n o t  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  f o r  t h o u g h  
’ r e a l i t y ’ , a s  u l t i m a t e ,  i s  i n d e f i n a b l e ,  t h e r e  a r e  p l e n t y  o f  
l o o s e  u s a g e s  w h i c h  w o u l d  be a l l  t h e  b e t t e r  f o r  b e i n g  d e f i n e d . )
My l a s t  o b j e c t i o n  t o  t h e  i n d i s c r i m i n a t e  u s e  o f  ’ r e a l ’ 
i s  t h a t  i t  i s  e x c e e d i n g l y  e m o t i v e  -  a s  i s  shown by  t h e  c u s t o m ­
a r y  a p p e l l a t i o n  o f  a p p e a r a n c e  a s  ’m e r e . ’ G r a n t e d  t h a t  t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  w h a t  a p p e a r s  t o  be  a n d  w h a t  r e a l l y  i s ,  
i s  f o r  many  p u r p o s e s  a  u s e f u l  o n e ,  i t  i s  a l s o  d a n g e r o u s ,  s i n c e
i t  i s  l i a b l e  t o  l e a d  t o  a n  a b s o l u t e  d i c h o t o m y  i n  w h i c h  w h a t
a p p e a r s  i s  o p p o s e d  t o  w h a t  i s .  H e n ce  t h e  u n d e s i r a b l e  a n d  u n -  
v e r i f i a b l e  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  w h a t e v e r  i s  g i v e n  -  ’ a p p e a r s ’ i n  
t h a t  s e n s e  -  i s  a l s o  ’ a p p e a r a n c e ’ , a s  o p p o s e d  t o  r e a l i t y .
To s a y ,  t h e n ,  o f  t i m e  t h a t  i t  i s  ’ n o t  u l t i m a t e l y  
r e a l ’ i n  i t s e l f  e x p l a i n s  n o t h i n g :  w h a t  we h a v e  t o  do i s  f i r s t  
t o  a n a l y s e  t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  t i m e ,  a n d  o n l y  s e c o n d l y ,  t o  d i s c u s s  
w h e r e i n  i s  i t s  p l a c e  i n  t h e  U l t i m a t e  Scheme  o f  T h i n g s .  I t  may 
be t h a t  a t  t h e  e n d  we s h a l l  a g r e e  t h a t  f u n d a m e n t a l l y ,  t i m e  
i s  o n l y  a n  a p p e a r a n c e ,  a  p h e n o m e n o n ,  a n  i m p e r f e c t  c o p y ,  a  
’ m o v i n g  i m a g e ’ o f  a  c h a n g e l e s s  B e i n g ;  b u t  t o  s t a r t  f r o m  t h i s  
p o i n t  i s  n o t  t o  h a v e  r e n d e r e d  u n n e c e s s a r y  a n  a n a l y s i s  o f  t i m e ,
r a t h e r  i s  i t  t o  h a v e  b e g g e d  t h e  q u e s t i o n .
\
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To t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e n ,  we m u s t  now p r o c e e d ,  
a f t e r  b r i e f l y  i n d i c a t i n g  t h e  s c o p e  o f  w h a t  f o l l o w s .  B e f o r e  
we c a n  h o p e  t o  a n a l y s e  t h e  g e n u i n e  m e t a p h y s i c a l  p r o b l e m s  
t h a t  h a v e  b e e n  r a i s e d ,  i t  i s  f i r s t  n e c e s s a r y  t o  c o n s i d e r  
t h e  v a r i o u s  o t h e r  a s p e c t s  -  p s y c h o l o g i c a l ,  p h y s i c a l ,  l o g i c a l  
f r o m  w h i c h  t i m e  h a s  b e e n  d i s c u s s e d .  I t  w i l l  be shown t h a t  a  
t r e a t m e n t  f r o m  t h e s e  p o i n t s  o f  v i e w  i s  n o t  e n o u g h ,  a n d  t h a t  
m e t a p h y s i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  a r e  a l w a y s  p r e s u p p o s e d .  Some,  
b u t  b y  no m e a n s  a l l ,  o f  t h e  p o s s i b l e  m e t a p h y s i c a l  p o s i t i o n s  
w i l l  t h e n  be d i s c u s s e d ,  a n d  a n  a t t e m p t  made t o  e v a l u a t e  
t h e m .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  s e c o n d  p a r t  w i l l  c o n t a d n  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  
c o - o r d i n a t e  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  r e a c h e d  i n  t h e  f i r s t  p a r t .
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GHAPTdiR I .  PSYCHOLOGY.
I t  i s  by  now a  t r u i s m  t h a t  w h a t  i s  i m m e d i a t e l y  
g i v e n  i n  e x p e r i e n c e  -  i s  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  s i m p l e ,  i n  t h a t  i t  
i s  f a m i l i a r  -  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y ,  n o t  e v e n  u s u a l l y ,  l o g i c a l l y  
a n d  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l l y  s i m p l e .  W h e t h e r  we f o l l o w  W i l l i a m  
J a m e s  a n d  s a y  t h a t  t o  t h e  v e r y  y o u n g  c h i l d  t h e  w o r l d  i s  a  
b l o o m i n g  b u z z i n g  c o n f u s i o n ,  o r  w h e t h e r  we h o l d  t h a t  t h e  
c h i l d ’ s w o r l d  i s  l o g i c a l l y  s i m p l e r  a n d  t h a t  t h e  c o m p l e x ­
i t i e s  a r e  o n l y  g r a d u a l l y  i n t r o d u c e d  by c r i s s - c r o s s i n g  a n d  
i r r a t i o n a l  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  t h e r e  i s  a t  l e a s t  g e n e r a l  a g r e e m e n t  
t h a t  by  t h e  t i m e  we become a d u l t  o u r  w o r l d  i s  e x c e e d i n g l y  
c o m p l e x .  And ,  ( s i n c e ,  f o r t u n a t e l y  o r  u n f o r t u n a t e l y , we do 
n o t  n o r m a l l y  i n d u l g e  i n  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  i n t r o s p e c t i o n s  a t  a  
t e n d e r  a g e ) , i t  i s  f r o m  t h i s  c o m p l e x i t y  t h a t  p s y c h o l o g y  
m u s t  a t a r t .
I n  a n y  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  a n a l y s i s  we a r e  f a c e d  w i t h  
t h r e e  m a i n  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h o s e  p e c u l i a r  t o  t h e  
s u b j e c t - m a t t e r  ( i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t i m e  a s  i t  i s  g i v e n  i n  e x ­
p e r i e n c e  ) .
The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  we a r e  s e e k i n g  t o  e x p r e s s  t h e  
f a m i l i a r ,  b u t  l o g i c a l l y  c o m p l e x ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  u n i a m i l i a r ,  
w h i c h  i s  y e t  l o g i c a l l y  s i m p l e r .  The p s y c h o l o g i s t ,  d e a l i n g  w i t h  
s e n s e - p e r c e p t i o n , d o e s  n o t  r e s t  s a t i s i i e d  w i t h  my d e s c r i p t i o n  
o f  w h a t  I  s e e  wh e n  I  l o o k  up  -  a  g a r d e n ,  f i e l d s ,  t r e e s ,  two
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h o u s e s ,  s e e n  t h r o u g h  a  w i n d o w  -  a l t h o u g h  my r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  
t h e m  i s  i m m e d i a t e #  I n s t e a d ,  he  t e l l s  me t h a t  my s e e i n g  t h e s e  
—  h o u s e s  e t c . ,  i s  n o t  o r i g i n a l ,  b u t  r e q u i r e s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  : 
w h a t  I  ’ s e e '  i s  a n  i r r e g u l a r  p a t t e r n  o f  d i f f e r e n t  c o l o u r s ,  
t o  w h i c h ,  w i t h  t h e  h e l p  o f  p a s t  e x p e r i e n c e ,  I  a t t r i b u t e  a  
m e a n i n g . On r e i l e c t i o n ,  I  may a g r e e .  Bu t  he  g o e s  f u r t h e r  -  
h e  t a l k s  o f  p r o c e s s e s  o f  w h i c h  I  am,  a n d  m u s t  b e ,  u n c o n s c i o u s :  
he  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  b e t w e e n  ’ s e n s a t i o n ’ a n d  ’p e r c e p t i o n ’ a n d  
t a l k s  a b o u t  p u r e  s e n s a t i o n ,  w h i c h  no one  e v e r  h a s  a f t e r  t h e  
f i r s t  moment  o f  h i s  l i f e ,  i f  t h e n .  A l t h o u g h  l o g i c a l l y  s i m p l e r  
t h a n  o u r  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  ’ o b j e c t s ) ,  t h e  c l e a r l y  d e f i n e d  c o n ­
c e p t s  w h i c h  he  u s e s  a r e  much  l e s s  f a m i l i a r .
The s e c o n d  d i f f i c u l t y  f o l l o w s  on  f r o m  t h i s .  I t  i s  
t h a t  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i s t  s e e k s  t o  e x p r e s s  e x p l i c i t l y  w h a t  i s  
h e l d  i m p l i c i t l y .  The v a r y  f a m i l i a r i t y  o f  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e s  
w i t h  w h i c h  he  d e a l s  h a m p e r s  h i m ,  s i n c e  f a m i l i a r i t y  b e g e t s  
l a c k  o f  i n t e r e s t  an d  t h e  t e n d e n c y  t o  ’ t a k e  f o r  g r a n t e d ’ 
w h i c h  i s  f a t a l  t o  e n q u i r y .  He i s  f o r c e d  t o  b e g i n  b y  m a k i n g  
d i v i s i o n s  a n d  d i s t i n c t i o n s ,  s u c h  a s  ’ e m o t i o n ’ , ’ c o n a t i o n ’ ,
’ s e n s a t i o n ’ . ( T h e s e  d i v i s i o n s ,  i f  t a k e n  t o o  s e r i o u s l y ,  a r e  
t h e m s e l v e s  a  s o u r c e  o f  s t u m b l i n g ,  f o r  t h e y  l e a d  t o  t h e  
f a l l a c i e s  o f  a  t o o - a t o m i s t i c  c o n c e p t i o n . )  A t  f i r s t  h e  g e t s  
on  w e l l .  Some o f  t h e  ’ e l e m e n t s ’ w h i c h  he  c h o o s e s  a r e  e a s y  
t o  s e p a r a t e  f r o m  t h e  r e s t :  b u t  s o o n e r  o r  l a t e r  he  f i n d s
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h i m s e l f  h a n d i c a p p e d  by  t h e  i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  
e l e m e n t s  t h a t  he  u s e s ,  a n d  by  t h e  c o m p l a c e n t  f a m i l i a r i t y  
w h i c h  p r e c l u d e s  t h e i r  u n r a v e l l i n g .  I m p o r t a n c e  a n d  e a s e  o f  
e x p l i c i t  s t a t e m e n t  a r e  a l m o s t  i n  i n v e r s e  v a r i a t i o n ,  f o r  t h e  
m ore  i m p o r t a n t  a n  e l e m e n t  i s ,  t h e  mo re  i t  b e c o m e s  t a n g l e d  
u p  a n d  i n t e r w o v e n  w i t h  o t h e r s .  To u s e  a  d u b i o u s  m e t a p h o r ,  
w h i c h  h o w e v e r  i s  h a r m l e s s  i f  n o t  t a k e n  t o o  s e r i o u s l y ,  a  
t h r e a d  w h i c h  comes  o u t  e a s i l y  i s  o f  l i t t l e  i m p o r t a n c e .  T h i s  
d i f f i c u l t y  i s  o f  s p e c i a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t i m e ,  
w h i c h  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a  f o r m  o f  t h e  c o n n e c t i v i t y  o f  e x p e r i ­
e n c e  a n d  so  c a n  h a r d l y  be e x p e c t e d  t o  be  e a s i l y  u n r a v e l l e d .
The t h i r d  d i f f i c u l t y  c o n c e r n s  t h e  ’ i r r a t i o n a l ’ 
a c c r e t i o n s  t o  e x p e r i e n c e  f r o m  h a l f - f o r g o t t e n  a s s o c i a t i o n s ,  
m o d i f i c a t i o n s  o f  p a s t  e v e n t s ,  a n d  t h e  l i k e .  How f a r  a r e  we 
t o  a d m i t  t h i s  i r r a t i o n a l i t y ?  On t h e  one  h a n d ,  we m u s t  d i s ­
t i n g u i s h  t h e  r e a l  c o r e  f r o m  n o n - e s s e n t i a l  a n d  s u b j e c t i v e  
w r a p p i n g s :  on  t h e  o t h e r ,  we m u s t  r e m e m b e r  t h e  o p p o s i t e  
d a n g e r  o f  p e e l i n g  t h e  o n i o n  u n t i l  t h e r e  i s  n e x t  t o  n o t h i n g  
l e f t ,  a n d  o f  w h i t t l i n g  down t h e  r i c h  a n d  v a r i e d  c o n t e n t  o f  
e x p e r i e n c e  t o  a  t e n u o u s  ’ r a t i o n a l ’ e l e m e n t .  ? o r  i t  i s  a  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  s t a t i c ,  b u t  i s  
m o d i f i e d  b y ,  a n d  c o n s t r u c t e d  o u t  o f ,  p a s t  e v e n t s :  h o w e v e r  
i r r a t i o n a l  some o f  t h e s e  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  may a p p e a r ,  we s h o u l d  
be g r a v e l y  a t  f a u l t  i f  we i g n o r e d  t h e m  a l t o g e t h e r  a n d  b e g a n  
w i t h  some a b s t r a c t  p r o p r i e t y .
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How i s  t i m e  g i v e n  i n  e x p e r i e n c e ?  T h i n k  o f  t h e  
t e m p o r a l  n o t i o n s  w h i c h  we u s e  s o  g l i b l y  -  p a s t ,  p r e s e n t ,  
l u t u r e ,  t h e  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  o f  t i m e ,  t h e  f l i g h t  o f  t i m e ,  
e t e r n i t y .  Wha t  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  b a s i s  h a v e  t h e y ?
The p r e s e n t ,  t h e  i m m e d i a t e l y  g i v e n ,  t h e  w h o l e  o f  
p r e s e n t  e x p e r i e n c e  ( n o t e  t h e  v e r b a l  c i r c u l a r i t y )  n e e d s  no
i n t r o d u c t i o n • Wq know t h a t  i t  i n c l u d a s  d i f f é r a n t  s e n s e -  
1
i m p r e s s i o n s  -  o f  s i g h t  a n d  h e a r i n g  a n d  t o u c h  a n d  i n t e r n a l  
s e n s a t i o n s  -  a n d  a l s o  e m o t i o n s ,  s u c h  a s  a n g e r  o r  f e a r ,  
a l t h o u g h  n o t  a l l  may he c o n s c i o u s l y  p e r c e i v e d .  "We a r e  c o n ­
s t a n t l y  r e c e i v i n g  i n n u m e r a b l e  i m p r e s s i o n s  f r o m  t h i n g s  
w i t h o u t  u s  a n d  f r o m  t h e  v a r y i n g  s t a t e s  o f  o u r  i n t e r n a l
o r g a n s .  . . .  S u p p o s e  t h a t  I  am r e a d i n g  a  b o o k  by t h e  l i g h t  
*
o f  a  c a n d l e  s t a n d i n g  i m m e d i a t e l y  b e s i d e  me on  t h e  t a b l e .
The o b j e c t  w i t h  w h i c h  my m i n d  i s  o c c u p i e d  a t  t h a t  moment  
i s  t h e  t o p i c  t r e a t e d  o f  i n  t h e  b o o k ;  my m i n d  i s  o c c u p i e d  
w i t h  t h i s  o b j e c t  u n d e r  t h e  s p a t i a l  a s p e c t  i n  w h i c h  i t  i s  
p r e s e n t e d  by  t h e  s e n t e n c e  I  am f o l l o w i n g  w i t h  my e y e s .  I  
t a k e  no n o t i c e  o f  t h e  l i n e s  on  t h e  o p p o s i t e  p a g e ,  o r  o f  
o t h e r  l i n e s  on  t h e  same p a g e ,  o r  o f  t h e  m a r g i n  o i  t h e  p a g e ,  
o r  o f  t h e  c a n d l e  f l a m e ,  a s  s u c h ,  o r  o f  t h e  s u r f a c e  o f  t h e  
t a b l e ,  o r  o f  t h e  c l o t h e s  i n  c o n t a c t  w i t h  my s k i n ,  o r  o f
1 .  " D a n s  u n e  m a s s e  a b s o l u m e n t  h om oge ne  r i e n  ne p o u r r a i t
m :: : : \ :% : :% e \e r ü k e ^ :a ^ n ïY ': f %
" G s n è s c  de l ’ I d e c  de T e m p s " ,  p . 2 0 . )
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t h e  c l o c k  w h i c h  i s  t i c k i n g  b e h i n d  m e .  Y e t  a l l  t h e s e  t h i n g s  
a r e  p r o d u c i n g  i m p r e s s i o n s  on  my s e n s e s ,  s o  a s  t o  a f f e c t  my 
c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i n  s p e c i f i c  w a y s . "
B u t  t h i s  c o m p l e x  w h o l e  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  a l s o  i n c l u d e s
s o m e t h i n g  e l s e ,  o f  e x t r e m e  i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  t h e  p r e s e n t  t o p i c  -
i t  a l s o  i n c l u d e s  t h e  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  m o v e m e n t ,  n o t  m e r e l y  t h e
p e r c e p t i o n  t h a t  a  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  v i s u a l  ( o r  t a c t u a l )  p a t t e r n
2
h a s  o c c u r r e d ,  b u t  t h a t  i t  ^  o c c u r r i n g . B i r d s  f l y  a c r o s s  t h e  
g a r d e n :  t h e  s y c a m o r e s  move i n  t h e  w i n d ;  a  d e a d  l e a f  f l o a t s  
g e n t l y  down:  my h a n d  m o ve s  o v e r  t h e  p a p e r .  B o r  t h e  p s y c h o ­
l o g i c a l  p r e s e n t  ( i n  W i l d o n  C a r r ’ s p h r a s e ,  t h e  moment  o f  e x ­
p e r i e n c e :  o r  i n  W i l l i a m  J a m e s ’ p h r a s e ,  t h e  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t ) ,  
i s  n o t  a n  e x t e n s i o n l e s s , p h o t o g r a p h i c  g l i m p s e  o f  t h e  w o r l d  
’ a t  a n  i n s t a n t . ’ T h a t  t h i s  i s  n o t  so  i s  sho wn  by t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  we c a n  a c t u a l l y  s e e  c h a n g e s  o c c u r r i n g  w i t h i n  one  moment
1 .  S t o u t ,  " M a n u a l  o f  P s y c h o l o g y " ,  4 t h  e d . ,  p . 1 6 2 .
2 .  "The  b a r e  f a c t  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  c h a n g e  i s  i n  i t s e l f  i r ­
r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  t i m e - p e r c e p t i o n . The e s e n t i a l  
p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  i n v o l v e s  a  p e c u l i a r  i m m e d i a t e  
expe r i e n c e  w h i c h  we may c a l l  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  t r a n s i e n c e . 
When we a r e  i n  t h e  d a r k n e s s  a n d  t h e  e l e c t r i c  l i g h t  i s  
s u d d e n l y  t u r n e d  o n ,  i t  i s  q u i t e  a n  i n a d e q u a t e  a c c o u n t  o f  
w h a t  h a s  t a k e n  p l a c e  i n  u s  m e r e l y  t o  s a y  t h a t  f i r s t  we 
h a v e  d a r k n e s s  s e n s a t i o n  a n d  t h a t  i m m e d i a t e l y  f o l l o w i n g  
t h i s  we h a v e  l i g h t  s e n s a t i o n .  I t  m u s t  be a d d e d  t h a t  t h e  
t r a n s i t i o n  i t s e l f  f r o m  t h e  one  t o  t h e  o t h e r  i s  e x p e r i e n c e d  
i n  a  p e c u l i a r  w a y . "  S t o u t ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 4 9 6 .  Compare  a l s o
p .  1 3 2 .  (The  f i r s t  s e n t e n c e  d o e s  n o t  m e a n ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h a t  
c h a n g e  i s  i r r e l e v a n t  t o  t i m e  -  b u t  t h a t  a  c h a n g e  h a v i n g  
o c c u r r e d  c a n n o t  g i v e  u s  a n y  c l u e  t o  t i m e - p e r c e p t i o n . B o r  
t h i s  we n e e d  f u r t h e r  t h e  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  o f  a  c h a n g e  wx a s  
o c c u r r i n g . )
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o f  e x p e r i e n c e .  B u t  a l l  c h a n g e  t a k e s  ’ t i m e ’ ; t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e
1
moment  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  m u s t  l a s t  f o r  a  f i n i t e  ’ t i m e  ’ 2 U s i n g  
t h e  more  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t i m e  a s  a  l i n e  -  
w h e t h e r  t h i s  i s  l e g i t i m a t e  w i l l  be d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r  -  t h e  
moment  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  i s  n o t  a  m e r e  d u r a t i o n l e s s  p o i n t :  i t  i s  
a  f i n i t e  l e n g t h  o f  t h e  l i n e ,  h o w e v e r  s m a l l .  The d u r a t i o n l e s s  
p o i n t  -  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  many  a n t i n o m i e s  c o n c e r n i n g  c o n t i n u i t y  -  
i s  a n  a b s t r a c t i o n :  i t  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  n o t h i n g  i n  e x p e r i e n c e .
As W i l d o n  C a r r  p u t s  i t :  "The  moment  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  h a s  no d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  o f  p a s t  a n d  p r e s e n t ,  b u t  i t  h a s  d i s t i n c t i o n  o f  b e f o r e  
2
a n d  a f t e r . "
The s e c o n d  p o i n t ,  e l u c i d a t e d  by J a m e s ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  
c o n t e n t  o f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i s  n o t  c o n s t a n t  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  s p e c i o u s  
p r e s e n t :  t h e r e  i s  a  maximum i n t e n s i t y ,  b e t w e e n  tv/o m i n i m a  a t  
b e g i n n i n g  a n d  e n d .  The s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t  i s  ; "no  k n i f e - e d g e ,  
b u t  a  s a d d l e - b a c k ,  w i t h  a  c e r t a i n  b r e a d t h  o f  i t s  own on w h i c h  
we s i t  p e r c h e d  a n d  f r o m  w h i c h  we l o o k  i n  two d i r e c t i o n s  i n t o  
t i m e . The u n i t  o f  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  o u r  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t i m e  i s  a
1 .  I  n e e d  h a r d l y  d r a w  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  u s e  o f  t h e  
w o r d  ’ t i m e ’ h e r e .  W h e t h e r  s u c h  a  u s e  i s  j u s t i f i e d  i n  
e l u c i d a t i n g  t h e  p r i m a r y  o r i g i n  o f  o u r  n o t i o n s  o f  t i m e  m u s t  
be  d i s c u s s e d  l a t e r .
2 .  W i l d o n  C a r r ,  "A T h e o r y  o f  M o n a d s " ,  p . 1 3 3 .  The w h o l e  o f  t h e  
c h a p t e r  i s  r e l e v a n t .
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d u r a t i o n ,  w i t h  a  bow a n d  a  s t e r n ,  a s  i t  w e r e  -  a  r e a r w a r d
1
a n d  a  f o r w a r d - l o o k i n g  e n d . "
L a s t l y ,  i n  a d m i t t i n g  t h a t  c h a n g e  c a n  t a k e  p l a c e  
w i t h i n  t h e  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t ,  we a r e  i n  e f f e c t  a d m i t t i n g  t h a t  
we c a n  h a v e  d i r e c t  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  o f  s o m e t h i n g  w h i c h  i s  no 
l o n g e r  h a p p e n i n g ,  t h a t  i s ,  o f  t h e  i m m e d i a t e  p a s t .  I f  I  am c o n ­
s c i o u s  o f  'X m o v i n g  f r o m  A t o  B’ w i t h i n  one moment  o f  e x p e r i ­
e n c e ,  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  I  am c o n s c i o u s  o f  ’X ’ s b e i n g  a t  A’ when
2
X i s  no l o n g e r  a t  A,  t h a t  i s ,  whe n  ’X ’ s b e i n g  a t  A ’ i s  p a s t .
T h i s  i s  o f  t h e  v e r y  l a s t  i m p o r t a n c e  i n  t h e  g e n e s i s  o f  o u r  
c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  p a s t ,  s i n c e  i t  p r o v i d e s  t h e  b a s i s  o f  o u r  
k n o w l e d g e  n o t  o n l y  o f  a n  e v e n t  B ( X ’ s  b e i n g  a t  A) a s  b e i n g  
p a s t ,  b u t  a l s o  o f  i t s  b e i n g  p r e s e n t , a n d  t h e n  b e c o m i n g  p a s t . 
i i j x p r e s s e d  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  t h e  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t  c o n t a i n s  b o t h  im­
m e d i a t e  p e r c e p t i o n  a n d  i m m e d i a t e  memory ;  more  t h a n  t h a t ,  i n  
i t s  w e l d i n g  o f  t h e  two  i t  s h ow s  a l s o  how t h e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  a t  
one  i n s t a n t  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  a  p r e v i o u s  i n ­
s t a n t ,  a n d  p r o v i d e s  t h e  u l t i m a t e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  m y s t e r i o u s  way i n  
w h i c h  t h e  p r e s e n t  ( a s  we s a y )  b e c o m e s  t h e  p a s t .
( T h i s  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  moment  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  i s  a  s k e t c h y  
a n d  i n a d e q u a t e  o n e .  I t  i s  n o t  t r e a t e d  i n  d e t a i l ,  b e c a u s e  on
1 .  ' ^ P r i n c i p l e s  o f  P s y c h o l o g y " ,  v o l .  I .  p . 6 0 9 .  See  a l s o ,
H o d g s o n ’ s d i s c u s s i o n  i n  t h e  f i r s t  v o l u m e  o f  t h e  " M e t a p h y s i c  
o f  d l x p e r i e n c e " , a n d  S t r o n g ’ s a r t i c l e  on  " C o n s c i o u s n e s s  a n d  
T im e"  i n  t h e  " P s y c h o l o g i c a l  R e v i e w " ,  189 6  (Are r i c a n ) .
2 .  B u t ,  a s  P o u i d e e  i n s i s t s :  "La  s u c c e s s i o n  d a n s  l a  p e n s é e  n ’ e s t  
p a s  p a r  e l l e -m êm e  l a  p e n s é e  de l a  s u c c e s s i o n . "  ( T s y c h o l o g i e  
d e s  I d é e s - B o r c e s " , p . 9 4 . )
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t h e  one  h a n d ,  w h a t  we i m m e d i a t e l y  e x p e r i e n c e  c a n  b e s t  be
s t u d i e d  by  e a c h  f o r  h i m s e l f :  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e  w o r k  o f
J a m e s  a n d  W i l d o n  C a r r  h a s  made a n y  a t t e m p t  h e r e  a t  e x h a u s t i v e  
a n a l y s i s  u n n e c e s s a r y . )
B e y o n d  t h e  w a v e r i n g  i n d i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s p e c i o u s
p r e s e n t ,  ’ p a s t ’ a n d  ’ f u t u r e ’ o r i g i n a t e  f r o m  e x t r a p o l a t i o n .
"The  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  p a s t ,  p r e s e n t ,  a n d  f u t u r e  c a n  be
a p p r e h e n d e d  o n l y  i n  a  r u d i m e n t a r y  way  a t  t h e  p e r c e p t u a l  l e v e l
B u t  t h e r e  i s ,  e v e n  a t  t h i s  l e v e l ,  w h a t  we may c a l l  a  ’ n o t -
y e t ’ c o n s c i o u s n e s s  a n d  a  ’ n o - m o r e ’ c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  The ’ n o t -
y e t ’ c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  a t t i t u d e
o f  a t t e n t i o n  -  i n  t h e  p r e - a d a p t a t i o n  f o r  w h a t  i s  t o  come
w h i c h  i t  i n v o l v e s .  T h i s  ’ n o t - y e t ’ c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i s  e m p h a s i z e d
w h e n  c o n a t i o n  i s  d e l a y e d  o r  o b s t r u c t e d  . .  The ’ n o - m o r e ’
• c o n s c i o u s n e s s  e m e r g e s  m o s t  d i s t i n c t l y  wh e n  c o n a t i o n  i s  a b r u p t -
1
l y  d i s a p p o i n t e d  o r  f r u s t r a t e d . "  L e t  u s  d e a l  w i t h  t h e  p a s t  
f i r s t .  S u p p o s e  t h a t  I  am l i s t e n i n g  t o  so m e b o d y  who s a y s  t o  
me:  " M a t h e m a t i c s  i s  t h e  s c i e n c e  i n  w h i c h  we do n o t  know 
w h a t  we a r e  t a l k i n g  a b o u t ,  n o r  w h e t h e r  w h a t  we s a y  i s  t r u e . "  
I t  i s  a  c o n v e n t i o n  o f  t h e  E n g l i s h  l a n g u a g e  t h a t  w o r d s  s h a l l  
be  a r r a n g e d  i n  a  c e r t a i n  o r d e r ,  a n d  a  c h a n g e  i n  o r d e r  may 
i n v o l v e  c h a n g e  o f  m e a n i n g  ( c o m p a r e  ’ I s  m a t h e m a t i c s ? ’ a n d  
’M a t h e m a t i c s  i s . ’ ) The w o r d  ’ i s ’ p r e c e d e s  t h e  w o r d  ’ t h e ’ :
1 .  S t o u t ,  o p . c i t .  p . 4 9 9 .
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h e n c e  w h e n  my  i n f o r m a n t  s a y s  ' t h e ' ,  h i s  s a y i n g  o f  ' i s '  i s
a l r e a d y  i n  t h e  p a s t .  B u t  we h a v e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  s p e c i o u s
p r e s e n t  may be e x t e n d e d  t o  c o v e r  tv/o s e n s a t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  n o t  
1
s i m u l t a n e o u s ,  s u c h  a s  ' i s '  a n d  ' t h e . '  ' I s '  f a d e s  i n t o  t h e
p a s t :  o u r  moment  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  now i n c l u d e s  ' t h e '  a n d  ' s c i -  
2
e n c e ' ;  a n d  so  o n .  T h u s  t h e r e  i s  a  c o n t i n u a l  l i n k i n g  t o ­
g e t h e r  o f  w o r d s  v / i t h i n  t h e  s e n t e n c e  i n t o  s u b o r d i n a t e  a n d
e v e r - c h a n g i n g  g r o u p s *  I t  i s  t h i s  g r o u p i n g  w h i c h  h e l p s  t o
make memory  p o s s i b l e  -  t h o u g h  i t  d o e s  n o t  e n s u r e  t h a t  we
3
s h o u l d ,  f a c t , h a v e  memory o f  w h a t  we h e a r .  By t h i s
1 .  H o t  o n l y  i n  t h e  s t r i c t  m a t h e m a t i c a l  s e n s e .  I  w o u l d  a l s o  
a g r e e  t o  t h a t  f r o m  i n t r o s p e c t i o n .
2 .  S t r i c t l y ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t  w o u l d  i n c l u d e  
more  t h a n  two w o r d s ,  s p o k e n  q u i c k l y .  A b e t t e r  e x a m p l e  i s  
t h a t  o f  J a m e s  -  " I f  t h e  p r e s e n t  t h o u g h t  i s  o f  ABCBjîBG,  t h e  
n e x t  one  w i l l  be o f  BGMBGH, a n d  t h e  one  a f t e r  t h a t  o f  
GDjJFGHI -  t h e  l i n g e r i i i g s  o f  t h e  p a s t  d r o p p i n g  s u c c e s s i v e l y  
a w a y ,  a n d  t h e  i n c o m i n g s  o f  t h e  f u t u r e  m a k i n g  u p  t h e  l o s s .  
T h e s e  l i n g e r i n g s  o f  o l d  o b j e c t s ,  t h e s e  i n c o m i n g s  o f  new ,  
a r e  t h e  g e r m s  o f  memory  a n d  e x p e c t a t i o n ,  t h e  r e t r o s p e c t i v e  
a n d  t h e  p r o s p e c t i v e  s e n s e  o f  t i m e . "  J a m e s ,  o p . c i t .  p . 6 0 6 .  
The l e n g t h  o f  t h e  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t  s e e m s  t o  be c o n n e c t e d  
w i t h  t h e  s p a n  o f  a p p r e h e n s i o n .
3 .  T h a t  we s h o u l d  r e m e m b e r  w h a t  i s  p a s t  c a n ,  I  t h i n k ,  n o t  be  
e x p l a i n e d  b y  a n y  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  t h e o r y  o f  t h e  s p e c i o u s  
p r e s e n t .  I t  r e m a i n s  u l t i m a t e  a n d  i r r e d u c i b l e  -  a  m i r a c l e ,  
a s  f a r  a s  t h e  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t  i s  c o n c e r n e d .  B o r ,  t h a t  
p a s t  a n d  p r e s e n t  s h o u l d  be l i n k e d  t o g e t h e r  i n  t h e  s p e c i o u s  
p r e s e n t ,  d o e s  n o t  e x p l a i n  t h e  f u r t h e r ,  a n d  q u i t e  d i s t i n c t ,  
f a c t  t h a t  t h e  p a s t  c a n  be r e m e m b e r e d  wh e n  i t  i s  a l s o  ' p a s t '  
t o  t h e  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t .
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u n e x p l a i n e d  p h e n o m e n o n  w h i c h  we c o n v e n i e n t l y  c a l l  ' m e m o r y , '  
wé r e m e m b e r  t h a t  ' i s '  was  o n c e  c o n j o i n e d  i n  a  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t  
w i t h  ' t h e \ , w h i l e  ' t h e '  a n d  ' s c i e n c e '  a r e  now i n c l u d e d  i n  one  
s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t .  T h a t  i s  t h e  b a s i s  of* t h e  p r o c e s s ;  i n  p r a c ­
t i c e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  memory  i s  much  mo re  i m m e d i a t e  t h a n  t h a t ,  
m a k i n g  i t s  i n t e g r a t i o n s  d i r e c t l y  f r o m  t h e  e l e m e n t s  w h i c h  
s e n s a t i o n  a f f o r d s ,  a n d  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  by  wa y  o f  t h e  p r i o r  
i n t e g r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t .  B u t  t h a t  t h e  p h e n o n m e n a  
o f  memory  c a n n o t  be r e d u c e d  t o  t h e  e x t e n d e d  i n f l u e n c e  o f  a  
n u m b e r  o f  s p a c i o u s  p r e s e n t s ,  d o e s  n o t  mean  t h a t  t h e y  m u s t  be 
c o n s i d e r e d  a s  f u n d a m e n t a l l y  d i s s i m i l a r .  I t  may b e ,  on  t h e  
c o n t r a r y ,  t h a t  t h e  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t  c o n t a i n s  w h a t  i s  e s s e n t i a l ­
l y  a  d i r e c t  a n d  i m m e d i a t e  a c t  o f  memory  -  a  s p e c i a l  c a s e  o f  
t h e  g e n e r a l  i n t e g r a t o r .  Brom v / h i c h  w o u l d  a r i s e  t h e  i n t e r e s t ­
i n g  q u e s t i o n  a s  t o  t h e  p r e c i s e  d i s t i n c t i o n  t o  be d r a w n  b e ­
t w e e n  p e r c e p t i o n  a n d  mem or y ,  ( e s p e  c i a l l y  i n  c a s e s  s u c h  a s  
t h e  o f t - q u o t e d  one  o f  M o z a r t ,  w h e r e  t h e  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t  i s  
a b n o r m a l l y  g r e a t ) . T h i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  i s  s p e c u l a t i o n  -  w h a t  i s  
c e r t a i n  i s  t h a t  b y  mem or y ,  we a r e  e n a b l e d  t o  e x t r a p o l a t e ,  
a n d  t o  ' a d d  o n '  t o  w h a t  i s  a c t u a l l y  g i v e n  t o  u s  i n  p r e s e n t
1 .  As  t h e  C r i t i c a l  R e a l i s t s  p o i n t  o u t ,  i n  memory  t h e  o b j e c t  
known  c a n n o t  be  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  i d e a  o f  i t  w h i c h  t h e  
s u b j e c t  h a s  b e f o r e  h i s  m i n d  w h e n  h e  r e m e m b e r s .  We m u s t  
a l s o  b e a r  i n  m i n d  t h a t  p o i n t  on  w h i c h  J a m e s  i n s i s t e d  
( o p . c i t .  p p . 6 2 7 - 6 3 1 )  t h a t  t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  p a s t  t i m e  i s  a  
p r e s e n t  f e e l i n g .  I t  w o u l d  be i n j u d i c i o u s  t o  d r a w  t o o  s h a r p  
a  l i n e  b e t w e e n  p e r c e p t i o n  a n d  m e m o r y .  B o r  a  g e n e r a l  d i s ­
c u s s i o n  o f  mem ory ,  c o m p a r e  P i e r r e  J a n e t ' s  " j j v o l u t i o n  de 
l a  M é m o i r e . "
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e x p e r i e n c e .  F r o m  t h i s  p o i n t ,  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  i n t o  a  f u l l y -  
f l e d g e d  c o n c e p t  'T h e  P a s t '  -  b o a s t i n g  a  c a p i t a l  l e t t e r  a n d  
o f  d u b i o u s  m e t a p h y s i c a l  s t a t u s  -  i s  e a s y  t o  t r a c e .  I  w i l l  n o t  
t r a c e  i t ,  b u t  w i l l  a d d  o n l y  two more  r e m a r k s . The f i r s t  i s ,  
t h a t  we m u s t  b e w a r e  o f  o v e r - h y p o s t a t i s i n g  ' m e m o r y ' , o f  t u r n ­
i n g  i t  i n t o  a  ' f a c u l t y '  w i t h  a n  o c c u l t  ' p o w e r ' , h o w e v e r  i m -  
p o r t a n t  i t  may  s a s m .  S a o o n d l y ,  memory  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  c o n ­
f i n e d  t o  c o n s c i o u s  p r o c e s s e s ,  t h o u g h  f o r  t h e  s a k e  o f  s i m p l i c ­
i t y  I  h a v e  s p o k e n  a s  i f  i t  w e r e .  T h e o r i e s  o f  ' t r a c e s '  p o s t u l ­
a t e  t h a t  a n  o r g a n i s m  c a n  r e t a i n  e f f e c t s  w i t h o u t  b e i n g  a w a r e
o f  i t :  t h e n ,  t o o ,  t h e r e  a r e  t h e o r i e s  s u c h  a s  B u t l e r ' s  o f
1
' r a c e - m e m o r y ' .
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h e  f u t u r e ,  t h a t  i s  a n  e x t r a p o l a t i o n
b a s e d  u l t i m a t e l y  on  t h e  i m m e d i a t e  i n t u i t i o n  o f  p r o c e s s ,  o f
c o n t i n u a l  b e c o m i n g  w i t h i n  t h e  moment  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  i t s e l f ,
a n d  p r o x i m a t e l y  on  a n  a n a l o g y  w i t h  t h e  p a s t . The p a s t  i s  t h e
s u m - t o t a l  o f  a l l  t h e  ' i m m e d i a t e l y - g i v e n s ' t h a t  h a v e  b e e n :
2
t h e  f u t u r e  i s  t h e  s u r a - t o t a l  o f  a l l  t h a t  w i l l  b e .  Of c o u r s e  
t h e  a n a l o g y  i s  n o t  e x a c t :  we h a v e ,  t h r o u g h  m e m o r y , i i  n o t  a  
d i r e c t ,  a t  t h e  v e r y  l e a s t ,  a  r e a s o n a b l y  e x a c t  k n o w l e d g e  o i  
t h e  p a s t ,  w h i c h  i s  a l t o g e t h e r  l a c k i n g  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  
f u t u r e .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  t h e  f u t u r e  u s u a l l y  o c c u p i e s  a  s u b ­
o r d i n a t e  p l a c e  i n  p s y c h o l o g y ,  e v e n  a s  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h e  p a s t
! •  S e e  B u t l e r ,  " L i f e  a n d  H a b i t " .  W a r d ,  " P s y c h o l o g i c a l  P r i n ­
c i p l e s  . "
2 .  I  a p o l o g i s e  f o r  t h e  l a n g u a g e  : t h e r e  i s  no c u r e  f o r  i t  
s h o r t  o f  m e t a p h y s i c s .
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( i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  p o s s i b l e  t o  i n t r o s p e c t  o u r  m e m o r i e s  I ) The 
e x c e p t i o n s  a r e  t h o s e  p s y c h o l o g i e s  t h a t  l a y  t h e  c h i e f  e m p h a s i s  
on  c o n a t i o n ,  a n d  on  t h e  e n d  t o  be a c h i e v e d ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  on  
t h e  a c t i on  by  w h i c h  i t  i s  b r o u g h t  a b o u t .  On t h e  o & h e r  h a n d ,  
t h e  p s y c h o l o g i s t  may v e r y  w e l l  s e e k  t o  e x p l a i n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
i n s t i n c t ,  b y  t h r o w i n g  t h e  e m p h a s i s  b a c k  on  t h e  p a s t  w i t h  
t h e o r i e s  o f  r a c e - m e m o r y ,  i n s t e a d  o f  on  t h e  f u t u r e  o b j e c t  o f  
t h e  c o m p l i c a t e d  s e t  o f  a c t i o n s .
P a s t ,  p r e s e n t  a n d  f u t u r e .  We b e g i n  v / i t h  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  
t h e  i m m e d i a t e l y  g i v e n :  f r o m  i t ,  we i n f e r  a n d  c o n s t r u c t  t h e  
p a s t  a n d  t h e  f u t u r e  . B u t  I  am now g o i n g  t o  make w h a t  i s  p e r i l ­
o u s l y  n e a r  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n :  a t  a n y  r a t e  i t  i s  a  p a r a d o x .  I t
1 .  S t o u t  s a y s  ( o p . c i t .  p p . 4 1 5 - 6 ) : -  " I n  e a r l y  s t a g e s  o f  m e n t a l  
d e v e l o p m e n t ,  o w i n g  t o  t h e  d o m i n a n c e  o f  d i r e c t  p r a c t i c a l  
i n t e r e s t ,  t h e  m i n d  i s  p r e o c c u p i e d  w i t h  c o n t i n u a t i o n  i n t o  
t h e  f u t u r e  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n t o  t h e  p a s t .  S u c h  r e f e r e n c e  t o  
t h e  f u t u r e  s e e m s  i n v o l v e d  e v e n  i n  t h e  m o s t  r u d i m e n t a r y  
f o r m s  o f  t h e  a t t e n t i o n - p r o c e s s  a s  i n d i c a t e d  b y  t h e  b e ­
h a v i o u r  o f  a n i m a l s  a n d  c h i l d r e n ,  ü v e n  t h e  m o s t  p r i m i t i v e  
a t t e n t i o n  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  p r o s p e c t i v e :  i t  i s  a  w a i t i n g  o r  
w a t c h i n g ,  a  b e i n g  on  t h e  a l e r t  f o r  w h a t  i s  t o  c o m e .  The 
g i v e n  s i t u a t i o n  h a s  f o r  i t  a  t r a n s i t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r :  i t  i s  
n o t  s o m e t h i n g  w h i c h  m e r e l y  i s ,  b u t  s o m e t h i n g  w h i c h  i s  t o  
b e .  O n l y  on  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  i s  t h e r e  a  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
a p p r e h e n d i n g  i t  a s  a l t e r a b l e  o r  o f  w a n t i n g  i t  a l t e r e d  i n  
h o w e v e r  v a g u e  a  w a y .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  
f u t u r e  m u s t  be  a s  p r i m i t i v e  a s  c o n a t i v e  c o n s c i o u s n e s s . "
B o r  t h e  o p p o s i t e  v i e w  o f  t h e  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  p r i o r i t y  o f  
t h e  p a s t , " s e e  S t u r t ,  "The  P s y c h o l o g y  o f  T i m e " ,  p . 4 4 .
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i s ,  t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  i n  t h e  t e m p o r a l  s e n s e  o f  p r e s e n t ,  t h e  
’ n o w ' ,  i s  n o t  p r i o r  i n  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  t o  p a s t  a n d  f u t u r e .  On 
t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  we a r e  r a r e l y  d i r e c t l y  c o n s c i o u s  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  
M  p r e s e n t ,  e x c e p t  i n  c o n t r a s t i n g  i t  w i t h  p a s t  a n d  f u t u r e .
An e x a m p l e  may make t h i s  c l e a r e r .  M os t  o f  u s  l i v e  o u r  l i v e s  
i n  a  r o u t i n e :  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a  p a r t i c u l a r l y  c i r c u m s c r i b e d  
o n e ,  b u t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  w h a t  we a r e  d o i n g  on  a  c e r t a i n  w e e k d a y  
e v e n i n g ,  s a y  T u e s d a y ,  i n  p r a c t i c e  v a r i e s  w i t h i n  c e r t a i n  l i m i t s  
o n l y .  I  may s t a y  a t  home a n d  r e a d ,  o r  p l a y  b r i d g e ,  o r  w r i t e  
l e t t e r s ,  o r  I  may go  t o  v i s i t  f r i e n d s ,  o r  t o  a  t h e a t r e ,  o r  t o  
a  m e e t i n g :  t h e r e  a r e  f i f t y  d i f f e r e n t  t h i n g s  t h a t  I  may do *
B u t ,  i t  b e i n g  a n  e v e n i n g  i n  t h e  m i d d l e  o f  t h e  w e e k ,  I  am u n ­
l i k e l y  t o  be a n y w h e r e  more  t h a n  f i f t y  m i l e s  aw ay  f r o m  home 
a n d  t h i s  u n l i k e l i h o o d  i n c r e a s e s  w i t h  t h e  d i s t a n c e .
How s u p p o s e  t h a t  my h o l i d a y s  h a v e  j u s t  b e g u n ,  a n d  
t h a t  I  am a  h u n d r e d  m i l e s  f r o m  h o m e . The p l a c e  n e e d  n o t  be  
u n f a m i l i a r ;  I  may know i t  f r o m  w e e k - e n d  v i s i t s .  Bu t  t h e r e  i s  
a  s e n s e  o f  s t r a n g e n e s s ,  o f  g e t t i n g  aw ay  I r o m  h a b i t u a l  r o u t i n e ,  
o f  p l e a s a n t  i n s e c u r i t y .  We a l l  know t h e  f e e l i n g  -  a  k i n d  o f  
p e r p e t u a l  e x c l a m a t i o n ,  "How f u n n y  t h a t  I  s h o u l d  be  h e r e  n o w l " 
a n d  I  am s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  p a r t  o f  i t s  s t r a n g e n e s s  i s  d u e ,  n o t  
o n l y  t o  t h e  b r e a k  i n  r o u t i n e ,  b u t  a l s o  t o  i t s  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  
t h e  u n u s u a l  c o n s c i o u s  e m p h a s i s  on  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  i n s t e a d  o f  i t s
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b e i n g  i m p l i c i t  a n d  u n c o n s c i o u s .
A n o t h e r  e x a m p l e ,  t o  show t h e  q u e e r  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  p r e s e n t  i n  c o n s c i o u s n e s s #  We h a v e  l o o k e d '  f o r w a r d  t o  -  o r ,  
a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  d r e a d e d  -  s o m e t h i n g  f o r  some t i m e .  We know 
q u i t e  a  l o t  a b o u t  i t  -  t h e  d a y  a n d  t h e  h o u r ,  t h e  a p p r o x i m a t e  
t i m e  i t  w i l l  l a s t ,  t h e  t r a i n  we m u s t  c a t c h  t o  g e t  t h e r e  i n  
t i m e ,  a n d  so  o n .  Once i n  t h e  t r a i n ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e a l i s e  
t h a t  t h i s  ^  t h e  o u t i n g  t o  w h i c h  we h a v e  s o  l o o k e d  f o r w a r d .
B o t h i n g  v e r y  e x c i t i n g  i s  h a p p e n i n g ;  y e t  e v e r y  m i n u t e  t h a t  
p a s s e s  i s  t a k i n g  a w a y  s o m e t h i n g  o f  t h e  s p l e n d i d  w h o l e .  I t  i s  
t h e  f e e l i n g  o f  a  c h i l d  a t  s e v e n  p . m .  on  i t s  b i r t h d a y ,  w i t h  
t h e  k n o w l e d g e  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  o n l y  a n o t h e r  h o u r  l e f t  b e f o r e  b e d ­
t i m e ,  a n d  t h a t  t o m o r r o w  w i l l  be  l i k e  a n y  o t h e r  d a y .  We may 
f e e l  c u r i o u s l y  f l a t ,  a n d  d i s a p p o i n t e d .  Or  we may be p u z z l e d  
a t  t h e  d i s a p p e a r a n c e  i n t o  a  t e n u o u s  ' now'  o f  w h a t  h a d  b e e n  so  
l o n g  e x p e c t e d ,  a n d  w i t h  a  s h o c k  o f  s u r p r i s e  -  a m o u n t i n g  a l m o s t  
t o  t e r r o r  s o m e t i m e s  -  we r e a l i s e  t h a t  w h a t  we c a l l  ' now'  i s  
t o  u s  a n  u n k n o w n ,  m a s q u e r a d i n g  i n  a  g u i s e  o f  e a s y  c o n v e n t i o n  
a n d  e v e r y d a y  f a m i l i a r i t y .  (Brom t h i s  s h o c k  may come metaphys^** 
i c a l  s p e c u l a t i o n s  a s  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t i m e )  -  b u t  t h e  p o i n t  I  
am t r y i n g  t o  make h e r e  i s  a  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  o n e .  We know l e s s  o i  
t h e  p r e s e n t  t h a n  we do o f  p a s t  a n d  f u t u r e ,  a n d  we do n o t
1 .  e x c e p t  by  a  c o n s c i o u s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  e f f o r t  ( a s  when  we 
a r e  e n g a g e d  i n  m e t a p h y s i c a l  s p e c u l a t i o n s )
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t h i n k  o f  w h a t  i s  p r e s e n t  ( t h a t  i s ,  g i v e n  t o  c o n s c i o u s n e s s )  
a s  b e i n g  p r e s e n t  ( t h a t  i s ,  t e m p o r a l l y  p r e s e n t )  e x c e p t  b y  
c o n t r a s t i n g  i t  w i t h  o u r  h a b i t u a l  r o u t i n e  -  t h e  p a s t ,  o r  o u r  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  -  t h e  f u t u r e  . I  c a n  o n l y  a p p e a l  t o  y o u r  i n t r o ­
s p e c t i o n s ,  w h e t h e r  y o u  h a v e ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h a t  f e e l i n g  o f  i n ­
s t a b i l i t y  a n d  u n f a m i l i a r i t y  i n  s u c h  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  a s  I  h a v e  
s k e t c h e d .  I f  s o ,  I  w o u l d  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  i n s t a b i l i t y  i s  due  
t o  t h e  s t r a i n  i n v o l v e d  i n  c o n s i d e r i n g  e x p l i c i t l y  w h a t  i s  
n o r m a l l y  u n c o n s i d e r e d .
To s o l v e  t h e  a p p a r e n t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  ( t h a t  we s t a r t  
f r o m  ' t h e  p r e s e n t ' ,  a n d  y e t  t h a t  i t  i s  d e r i v e d ) ,  I  w i s h  t o  
d i s t i n g u i s h ,  p r o v i s i o n a l l y , b e t w e e n  ' p r e s e n t ' a s  m e a n i n g  
' s p a t i a l l y  p r e s e n t ' ,  ( o r ,  more  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y ,  b e c a u s e  n o t  
i m p o s i n g  u n n e c e s s a r y  s p a t i a l  l i m i t s ,  ' g i v e n  t o  i m m e d i a t e  e x ­
p e r i e n c e ' )  a n d  ' p r e s e n t '  a s  m e a n i n g  ' t e m p o r a l l y  p r e s e n t ' .  I  
w i l l  c a l l  t h e  f o r m e r  ' t h e  g i v e n '  a n d  t h e  l a t t e r  ' t h e  n o w ' .
^ I t  m u s t  be e m p h a s i z e d  t h a t  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  o n l y  p r o v i s ­
i o n a l ,  a n d  c a n n o t  be made a b s o l u t e .  O b v i o u s l y  t h e  ' n o w '  i s  
o n l y  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  ' g i v e n '  i n  i t s  t e m p o r a l  a s p e c t ,  a n d  t h e  
' g i v e n '  i s  w h a t  i s  g i v e n  n o w .)  B u t  I  s u b m i t  t h a t  i t  i s  a  v a l i d  
d i s t i n c t i o n  no n e  t h e  l e s s .  I t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  c o n s i s t e n t  t o  h o l d  
t h a t  we m u s t  s t a r t  f r o m  t h e  g i v e n ,  a n d  t h a t  i t  i s  p s y c h o l o g ­
i c a l l y  p r i o r  t o  a l l  c o n s t r u e t i o n s  w h i c h  may be  b a s e d  u p o n  i t^,
1 .  Compare  a l s o  t h e  r e m a r k  o f  W a r d : -  "The  p r i m a r y  m e a n i n g
o f  p r e s e n t  i s  ' h e r e '  r a t h e r  tha ln-  ' n o w '  . ( O p .  c i t .  p . 2 1 2 . )
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a n d  y a t  t o  h o l d  a l s o  t h a t  wé  a r e  v e r y  r a r e l y  c o n s c i o u s  o f  i t
—  a s p e c t  e x c e p t  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n s
p a s t  a n d  f u t u r e .
I  w o u l d  a d d ,  a l s o ,  t h a t  t o  s a y  o f  t h e  ' n o w '  t h a t  
i t  r a r e l y  e n t e r s  e x p l i c i t  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i s  n o t  t o  b e l i t t l e  
i t s  l o g i c a l , i f  n o t  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  i m p o r t a n c e .  We b e g a n  by  
s a y i n g  t h a t  w h a t  i s  m o s t  f a m i l i a r  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  on  t h a t  
a c c o u n t  a l s o  l o g i c a l l y  p r i o r :  s o  i n  d e n y i n g  t o  t h e  ' now '  t h e  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l  p r i o r i t y  w h i c h  i s  u s u a l l y  a c c o r d e d  t o  i t ,  we 
h a v e  s a i d  n o t h i n g  a t  a l l  t o  p r e j u d i c e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  i t s  
l o g i c a l  i m p o r t a n c e .
The p s y c h o l o g i c a l  b a s i s  o f  o u r  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  
' f l i g h t '  o f  t i m e  a n d  t h e  ' i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y '  o f  t i m e  i s  n o t  f a r  
t o  s e e k :  i t  i s  t o  be f o u n d  u l t i m a t e l y  i n  t h e  moment  o f  e x p e r ­
i e n c e ,  w i t h  i t s  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  p r e s e n t  t o  p a s t .  W ar d  h o l d s  
t h a t  " i t  d e p e n d s ,  ( l )  u p o n  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  s i n k i n g  o f  t h e  
p r i m a r y  m e m o r y - i m a g e s  on  t h e  one  s i d e ,  a n d  t h e  c o n t i n u o u s  
r i s i n g  o f  t h e  o r d i n a r y  i m a g e s  on  t h e  o t h e r  s i d e ,  o f  t h a t  
member  o f  a  s e r i e s  o f  p e r c e p t s  t h e n  r e p e a t i n g  w h i c h  i s  a c t u a l  
a t  t h e  m o m e n t :  a n d  (2 )  on  t h e  p r e v e n i e n t  a d j u s t m e n t s  o i  
a t t e n t i o n ,  t o  w h i c h  s u c h  w o r d s  a s  ' e x p e c t '  , ' a v / a i t ' , ' a n t i ­
c i p a t e ' ,  a l l  t e s t i f y  by  t h e i r  e t y m o l o g y .  T h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  
i n  t u r n  w i l l  be f o u n d  t o  d e p e n d  u p o n  a l l  t h a t  i s  i m p l i e d  i n  
t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  m e m o r y - t r a i n  a n d  u p o n  t h a t  r e c u r r e n c e
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o f  l i k e  s e r i e s  o f  i m p r e s s i o n s  w h i c h  we a t t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  
' u n i f o r m i t y  o f  n a t u r e ' . "
B o r  i m m e d i a t e  e x p e r i e n c e ,  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  d i r e c t i o n
i s  I r o m  p r e s e n t  t o  p a s t  — we t h i n k  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  r e c e d i n g
i n t o  t h e  p a s t ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  o f  t h e  p a s t  g r o w i n g  o n ,  a n d  
s w a l l o w i n g  u p ,  t h e  p r e s e n t .  C o n s e q u e n t l y  t h e  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  
o f  t h e  p r i m i t i v e  i n t u i t i o n  o f  p r o c e s s  i n t o  a  d e f i n i t e  c o n ­
c e p t  o f  ' T i m e '  i n  w h i c h  t h e  p r e s e n t  ' m o v e s  a l o n g '  f r o m  p a s t
t o  f u t u r e  i n v o l v e s  a l s o  a  c h a n g e  o f  e m p h a s i s ;  a n d  a n y  t h e o r y
a s  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t  m u s t  t a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  
t h i s . I  w o u l d  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  k e y  t o  t h e  c h a n g e  i s  t o  be
f o u n d  i n  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  t h a t  i s  e a r l y  made b e t w e e n  ' s e l f
2
a n d  v /h a t  i s  n o t  ' s e l f ' »  we a t t r i b u t e  t o  o u r s e l v e s  t h e  em­
p h a s i s  on  ' p r e s e n t n e s s - b e c o m i n g - p a s t ' ,  a t  t h e  same t i m e  a d ­
m i t t i n g  t h a t ,  o b j e c t i v e l y ,  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e  way  o f  r e g a r d i n g  
i t  may be  more  f u n d a m e n t a l .  T h i s  p o i n t  h a s  b e e n  v e r y  w e l l  
b r o u g h t  o u t  by  ü . A .  B u r t t  i n  a n  a r t i c l e  e n t i t l e d  ' R e a l  a n d  
A b s t r a c t  E v o l u t i o n ' , w h i c h  wa s  p u b l i s h e d  i n  t h e  P r o c e e d i n g s
3
o f  t h e  S i x t h  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  C o n g r e s s  o f  P h i l o s o p h y .  He s a y s :  
" . . .  E m p i r i c a l l y  t h e  p a s t  a l w a y s  e m e r g e s  o u t  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  p r e s e n t  o u t  o f  t h e  p a s t . . .  The w o r l d  a s  
e m p i r i c a l l y  r e v e a l e d  a l w a y s  b e g i n s  i n  t h e  p r e s e n t ,  a n d
1 .  W a r d ,  o p . c i t .  p . 2 1 1 .
2 .  B o r  a n  a c c o u n t  o f  t h i s ,  s e e  S t p u t ,  o p . c i t .  ( B k . I l l . P t . l l ,  
c h a p t e r s  I  & I I  ; a n d  B k .  I V ,  c h a p . V ) .
3 .  L o g . c i t .  p . 1 7 2 .
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r e m a i n s  w i t h i n  i t  w h i l e  e x p a n d i n g  i n t o  t h e  p a s t  a n d  t h e  
f u t u r e #  T h i s  may s o u n d  s t a r t l i n g l y  p a r a d o x i c a l  -  t h e  o p p o s i n g  
v i e w  w o u l d  h o w e v e r  he much  more  s t a r t l i n g  i f  i t  w e r e  n o t  so  
f u l l y  e n g r a i n e d  i n  o u r  t h o u g h t - h a b i t s  t h a t  we n e v e r  d r e a m  o f  
q u e s t i o n i n g  i t #  # # A p p e a l  t o  f a c t  on  s u c h  a  m a t t e r  may be 
u n c o n v e n t i o n a l  a n d  e m b a r r a s s i n g ,  y e t  I  b e g  o f  y o u  t o  c o n s i d e r  
w h e t h e r  t h e  w o r l d  a s  a c t u a l l y  r e v e a l e d  t o  a n y  o f  y o u  b e g a n  
i n  a  r e m o t e  p a s t  w i t h  S p a c e - T i m e  o r  e l e c t r o n s ,  o r  w h e t h e r  
t h e s e  t h i n g s  d i d  n o t  e m e r g e  a f t e r  t h e  w o r l d  h a d  g o n e  t h r o u g h  
m any  a d v e n t u r e s  a n d  a s s u m e d  many s h a p e s #  • • •  R e a l  e v o l u t i o n ,  
t h a t  i s ,  e v o l u t i o n  a s  e m p i r i c a l l y  d i s c o v e r e d ,  i s  n o t  a  m o v e ­
m e n t  f r o m  p a s t  t h r o u g h  p r e s e n t  t o  f u t u r e  ( s u c h  a  p r o c e s s  i s  
i t s e l f  a n  e m e r g e n t  a b s t r a c t i o n  f r o m  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  r e a l  e v o l ­
u t i o n )  , i t  i s  e v o l u t i o n  f r o m  t h e  p r e s e n t  i n t o  b o t h  p a s t  a n d  
f u t u r e .  The w o r l d  a l w a y s  t a k e s  s h a p e  f r o m  t h e  p r e s e n t  o u t ­
w a r d s .  I t  e x p a n d s  i n t o  t h e  p a s t  a s  k n o w l e d g e  o f  t h e  p a s t  i s  
n e e d e d  t o  s a t i s f y  p r e s e n t  d e s i r e s :  i t  e x p a n d s  i n t o  t h e  f u t u r e
a s  g r a s p  o f  r e c u r r e n t  r e g u l a r i t i e s  p e r m i t s  a n t i c i p a t i o n ,
1
p r e d i c t i o n ,  a n d  i n t e l l i g e n t  p u r p o s e . "  B u t  w h e t h e r  we s t a t e  
t h e  p a s s a g e  o f  t i m e  w i t h  t h e  e m p h a s i s  on  t h e  r e c e s s i o n  o f  a  
g i v e n  e v e n t  f r o m  t h e  f u t u r e  t h r o u g h  t h e  p r e s e n t  t o  t h e  mo re  
a n d  more  r e m o t e  p a s t ,  o r  w i t h  t h e  e m p h a s i s  on  ' t h e  p r e s e n t '  
m o v i n g  a l o n g  c o n t i n u a l l y  i n t o  t h e  f u t u r e ,  i n  e i t h e r  c a s e  we 
a r e  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  r e s u l t a n t  m o v em en t  a s  u n i d i r e c t i o n a l .
1 .  Compare  a l s o  C u y a u ' s  r e m a r k :  " L ' a y e n i r  n ' e s t  p a s  ^
v i e n t  v e r s  n o u s ,  m a i s  £ e  v e r s  q u o i  n o u s  a l l o n s  ( G e n e se  
da f  I  dee  de Temps " . p .  33"}!
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( T h i s  w i l l  he s e e n  i f  we s l i d e  two r u l e r s ,  t h e  i n c h  e d g e  o f
one  r e p r e s e n t i n g  e v e n t s , t h e  c e n t i m e t r e  e d g e  o f  t h e  o t h e r
r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  p a s t - p r e s e n t - f u t u r e  s e r i e s ,  a l o n g  e a c h  o t h e r .
W h e t h e r  we s l i d e  r u l e r  R a l o n g  r u l e r  S o r  v i c e  v e r s a ,  m a k e s
1
no d i f f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  p r o c e s s .  ) I r ­
r e v e r s i b i l i t y  i s  a n  e m p i r i c a l  n e c e s s i t y :  c o n s t i t u t e d  a s  we 
a r e ,  i t  i s  a  b r u t e  f a c t  w h i c h  c a n n o t  be g a i n s a i d  t h a t  t h e
p r o c e s s  o f  w h i c h  we a r e  i m m e d i a t e l y  a w a r e  i n  t h e  moment  o f
e x p e r i e n c e  i s  n o t  ( ' c a n n o t '  i s  a n o t h e r  m a t t e r ,  o u t s i d e  p s y ­
c h o l o g y )  r e v e r s i b l e .
E t e r n i t y ,  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  a n  e n d l e s s  a b i d i n g ,  o f  a n
e s c a p e  f r o m  t h e  f l u x  o f  t i m e , a d d s  p o i n t  a n d  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e
f o r m e r  n o t i o n s .  I t  may be s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  i t  o r i g i n a t e s  f r o m
t h a t  c o n t r a s t ,  o r  f r o m  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  e x t e n s i o n  t o  i n f i n i t y
2
o f  a n  i m m o b i l i s e d  i n s t a n t  -  i t s e l f  a n  a b s t r a c t i o n  -  b u t  t h e  
w i d e s p r e a d  u s e  o f  t h i s  c o n c e p t  a t  a n  e a r l y  e r a  w o u l d  s e em t o  
show t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  m e r e l y  a  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  b a s e d  on t e m p o r a l  
n o t i o n s ,  b u t  a n  o r i g i n a l  t e n d e n c y  o f  o u r  n a t u r e .  I n  P a r m e n i d e s '  
v i e w ,  " w h a t  i s ,  i s  u n c r e a t e d  a n d  i n d i v i s i b l e :  f o r  i t  i s  com­
p l e t e ,  i m m o v a b l e ,  a n d  w i t h o u t  e n d .  H o r  w a s  i t  e v e r ,  n o r  w i l l
1 .  Of c o u r s e  b o t h  t h e  l a n g u a g e  a n d  t h e  a n a l o g y  a r e  o p e n  t o
c r i t i c i s m .  B u t ,  a t  t h i s  l e v e l ,  t h a t  c a n n o t  be  h e l p e d .  See
a l s o  M c T a g g a r t ,  "Ha t u  r e  o f  . j î x i s t e n c e  " , i i ,  p . 10  n .
2 .  C f .  E r i k s e n ,  " G o n s c i o u s n e s s , L i f e ,  a n d  t h e  F o u r t h  D i m e n s i o n "  
p . 1 4 0 .
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1
i t  b e ;  f o r  now i_t a l l  a t  o n c e ,  a  c o n t i n u o u s  o n e " ,
2
P l a t o ,  t o o ,  i n  a  c e l e b r a t e d  p a s s a g e  t e l l s  how God " d e v i s e d  t h e  
m a k i n g  o f  a  m o v i n g  l i k e n e s s  o f  e v e r l a s t i n g n e s s . "  B u t  p s y c h o ­
l o g i s t s ,  a s  d i s t i n c t  f r o m  p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  h a v e  f o r  t h e  m o s t  p a r t  
f o u n d  l i t t l e  t o  s a y  a b o u t  e t e r n i t y ,  p r e f e r r i n g  t o  c o n c e n t r a t e  
on  more  i m m e d i a t e  m a n i f e s t a t i o n s .
The f o r e g o i n g  p a g e s  a r e  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  s k e t c h ,  v e r y
b r i e f l y ,  t h e  e x p e r i e n t i a l  b a s i s  on  w h i c h  t h e  t e m p o r a l  n o t i o n s
3
w h i c h  we u s e  so  l i g h t - h e a r t e d l y  a r e  f o u n d e d .  I t  i s  e v i d e n t  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a  c o n s i d e r a b l e  g a p  b e t w e e n  t h e m .  B u t  b e f o r e  we \
go  on  t o  t h e  p o i n t s  o f  d i f f e r e n c e , t h e r e  i s  a  s e c o n d  a s p e c t  
o f  t i m e , c o n s i d e r e d  f r o m  t h e  p o i n t  o f  v i e w  o f  e x p e r i e n c e ,  
w h i c h  n e e d s  d i s c u s s i o n .  T h i s  c o n c e r n s  s u b j e c t i v e  m e a s u r e s  o f  
d u r a t i o n .
1 1 .
We may d e f i n e  d u r a t i o n ,  a s  i t  i s  u s e d  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  
a s  b e i n g  t h e  t e m p o r a l  e x t e n s i o n  o f  a n  e v e n t  o r  e v e n t s  i n  t h e  
e x p e r i e n c e  o f  a  s u b j e c t .  T h u s ,  t h o u g h  I  am n o t  i m m e d i a t e l y  
a w a r e  o f  s u c c e s s i v e  e v e n t s  w i t h i n  a  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t  a s  t a k i n g  
t i m e  ( t h e  k n o w l e d g e  t h a t  t h e y  m u s t  do so  i s  a  l a t e r  a d d i t i o n ,  
t h e  r e s u l t  o f  i n f e r e n c e ,  a n d  o f  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  o f  w h a t  we mean  
b y  ' m o m e n t a r y  e v e n t s ’ ) ,  I  am a w a r e  t h a t  l o n g e r  e v e n t s , s u c h  a s
1 .  B u r n e t ,  " E a r l y  G r e e k  P h i l o s o p h y " ,  p . 1 7 4 .
2 .  " T i m a e u s " ,  3 7 c .  ,
3 .  R e f e r e n c e  may a l s o  be  made t o  t h e  g o o d  d i s c u s s i o n  i n  u u n n  s
" P r o b l e m  o f  T i m e " ,  p p . 3 7 6 - 3 9 5 .
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h e a r i n g  t h e  c o m p l e t e  s e n t e n c e ,  " t î a t h e m a t i c s  i s  t h e  s c i e n c e
w h e r e  n o b o d y  kn ow s  w h a t  he  i s  t a l k i n g  a b o u t ,  n o r  w h e t h e r
w h a t  he  s a y s  i s  t r u e " , h a v e  some t e m p o r a l  e x t e n s i o n .  As S t o u t
p u t s  i t ,  "When we a r e  l i s t e n i n g  t o  a  s o u n d ,  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e  i s
d i f f e r e n t  a t  t h e  e n d  o f  one  m i n u t e  f r o m  w h a t  i t  i s  a t  t h e
e n d  o f  two  m i n u t e s ,  a l t h o u g h  t h e  s o u n d  i t s e l f  may n o t  h a v e
a l t e r e d  i n  q u a l i t y .  T h i s  e x p e r i e n c e  i s  u n i q u e  i n  k i n d ,  a n d  i t
c e r t a i n l y  d o e s  n o t  c o n s i s t  i n  h a v i n g  t h e  p a r t s  o f  t h e  s o u n d -
s e n s a t i o n ,  a s  t h e y  s u c c e s s i v e l y  o c c u r ,  s p r e a d  o u t  b e f o r e  u s
1
i n  a  s o r t  o f  d u r a t i o n - l i n e  o r  d u r a t i o n - b l o c k . "
P r o b a b l y ,  t h e  a w a r e n e s s  o f  e v e n t s  a s  ’ t a k i n g  t i m e ' 
i s  a t  f i r s t  i m p l i c i t :  i t  o n l y  b e c o m e s  e x p l i c i t  i f  we h a v e  
o t h e r  r e a s o n s  t o  c o n c e r n  o u r s e l v e s  w i t h  t i m e - l a p s e ,  f o r  i n ­
s t a n c e , ,  s e n s a t i o n s  o f  h u n g e r ,  f e e l i n g s  o f  b o r e d o m  o c c a s i o n e d  
by  a  t o o - l o n g  s p e e c h ,  o r  d e f i n i t e  a t t e m p t s  a t  i n t r o s p e c t i o n . 
n e v e r t h e l e s s  t h e r e  i s  no  q u e s t i o n  t h a t  w i t h  t h e  p r o g r e s s  o f  
c i v i l i s a t i o n  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  t i m e - l a p s e  b e c o m e s  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t .  
W h a t  i s  m o r e ,  we a r e  n o t  m e r e l y  a w a r e  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  a n  
e v e n t  E ’ t a k e s  t i m e ’ : we c a n  t o  a  c e r t a i n  e x t e n t  c o r r e l a t e  
a n d  c o m p a r e  i t  w i t h  a n o t h e r  e v e n t  F i n  r e s p e c t  o f  t h e  ’ l e n g t h ’ 
o f  t i m e  i t  o c c u p i e s .  Our  s t a n d a r d  f o r  s u c h  c o m p a r i s o n  i s  a  
p u r e l y  s u b j e c t i v e  o n e , a n d  i s  p r o b a b l y  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  
f e e l i n g s  a n d  i d e a s  w h i c h  t h e  e v e n t s  e v o k e  i n  u s ,  a s  h a s  b e e n
1 .  S t o u t ,  o p . c i t .  p . 5 0 1 .
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r e c o g n i s e d  s i n c e  t h e  t i m e  o f  L o c k e . "We h a v e  no p e r c e p t i o n
o f  d u r a t i o n  b u t  by  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  t r a i n  o f  i d e a s  t h a t  t a k e
t h e i r  t u r n s  i n  o u r  u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . "  I t  i s  b y  now a  t r u i s m ,
h o w e y e r ,  t h a t  o u r  s u b j e c t i v e  e s t i m a t e s  o f  d u r a t i o n  do n o t
2
a g r e e ,  a n d  t h a t  w h a t  i s  o b j e c t i v e l y  ’ t h e  s a m e ’ i n t e r v a l  may
a p p e a r  o f  d i f f e r e n t  d u r a t i o n  t o  d i f f e r e n t  o b s e r v e r s ,  a n d  t o
t h e  same o b s e r v e r  a t  d i f f e r e n t  t i m e s .  S h a k e s p e a r e  g a v e  c l a s s i c
e x p r e s s i o n  t o  t h i s  wh en  he s a i d ,  "Time  t r a v e l s  i n  d i v e r s
p a c e s  w i t h  d i v e r s  p e r s o n s .  I ’ l l  t e l l  you  who Time a m b l e s
w i t h a l ,  who Time t r o t s  w i t h a l ,  who Time g a l l o p s  w i t h a l ,  a n d
3
who he  s t a n d s  s t i l l  w i t h a l . "  Wha t  i s  more  n o t e w o r t h y  t h a n  
t h e  m er e  s t a t e m e n t  o f  s u b j e c t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  e s t i m a t i o n  
i s ,  t h a t  he  a t t e m p t e d  t o  g i v e  r e a s o n s  why t h e  c o n d e m n e d  man 
s h o u l d  f i n d  t i m e  p a s s  more  q u i c k l y  t h a n  t h e  l o v e r .  I n  r e c e n t  
t i m e s ,  t h i s  a n d  c o n n e c t e d  p r o b l e m s  h a v e  r e c e i v e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
a t t e n t i o n  f r o m  p s y c h o l o g i s t s ,  a n d  much  w o r k  h a s  b e e n  d o n e ,  
t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  w h i c h  may be b r i e f l y  s u m m a r i s e d  h e r e .
1 .  L o c k e , J î s s a y ,  B k .  I I .  c h a p .  XIV,  s e c . 4 .
2 .  W h a t  i s  m e a n t  b y  t h e  ’ o b j e c t i v e  m e a s u r e m e n t  o f  d u r a t i o n ’ , 
a n d  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  a  common s t a n d a r d  o u t  o f  t h e  v a r y i n g
e s t i m a t e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p e o p l e  i s  n o t  d e a l t  w i t h  u n t i l  t h e
n e x t  c h a p t e r ,  a s  a l s o  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  ’ a c c u r a c y ’ . F o r  t h e  
p r é s e n t  I  r e l y  on  t h e  1 a m i l i a r i t y  o f  t h e s e  n o t i o n s .
3 .  "As You L i k e  I t " ,  I I I .  2 .  1 . 3 2 6 .
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W i t h o u t  i n  a n y  way  p r e j u d g i n g  t h e  m e t a p h y s i c a l
q u e s t i o n  o f  w h e t h e r  t i m e  i s  a n y t h i n g  i n  i t s e l f  a p a r t  f r o m
e v e n t s ,  i t  i s  e x c e e d i n g l y  u s e f u l  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  b e t w e e n
e m p t y  a n d  f i l l e d  p e r i o d s  o f  t i m e  -  a s  l o n g  a s  we r e m e m b e r
t h a t  ' e m p t y  t i m e ' i s  o n l y  r e l a t i v e l y  e m p t y .  F o r  t h e  a c c u r a c y
w i t h  w h i c h  t i m e  i n t e r v a l s  c a n  be e s t i m a t e d  v a r i e s  w i t h  t h e
c o n t e n t  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  d u r i n g  t h a t  i n t e r v a l .  I t  i s  a t  f i r s t
s i g h t  p a r a d o x i c a l  t h a t  t h e  mo re  we d e l i b e r a t e l y  s e t  o u r s e l v e s
t o  n o t e  t h e  p a s s a g e  o f  t i m e ,  t h e  h a r d e r  i t  i s  t o  e s t i m a t e .
We a l l  know how l o n g  a  m i n u t e  c a n  be i f  we w a t c h  t h e  f i n g e r
o f  a  s t o p - w a t c h  g o i n g  r o u n d .  I t  i s ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  i m p o s s i b l e
t o  n o t e  ' t h e  p a s s a g e  o f  t i m e ' f o r  l o n g .  I n  s p i t e  o f  o u r s e l v e s ,
o u r  m i n d s  w a n d e r :  we f e e l  b o r e d :  i t  i s  w i t h  a n  e f f o r t  t h a t
we r e - c o n c e n t r a t e  : o u r  a t t e n t i o n  s l a c k e n s  a g a i n :  we f i n d  o u r -
2
s e l v e s  c o u n t i n g  t h e  t i c k s .  I t  i s  a n  e v i d e n t l y  a r t i f i c i a l  
p r o c e d u r e :  c o n s e q u e n t l y  m o s t  e x p e r i m e n t s  on  t i m e - e s t i m a t i o n  
h a v e  d e a l t ,  r i g h t l y ,  w i t h  f i l l e d  i n t e r v a l s .  T h o s e  who a d h e r e  
t o  t h e  B e r g s o n i a n  v i e w  o f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  h a v e  a n  a d d e d  r e a s o n  
f o r  t h i s .  P r o f e s s o r  E d g e l l ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  s a y s : -  " . . .  f o r  
p s y c h o l o g y ,  D u r a t i o n  b e l o n g s  o n l y  t o  t h e  d y n a m i c  v i e w  o f  
C o n s c i o u s n e s s  -  C o n s c i o u s n e s s  v i e w e d  a s  a  s t r e a m ,  a s  a  L i f e  
o f  c o n n e c t e d  p r o c e s s e s .  To p r e  d ic^-e  d u r â t  i o n  o f  a n  i s o l a t e d
1 .  a c c u r a c y ,  t h a t  i s ,  a s  m e a s u r e d  ' p u b l i c l y '  b y  c l o c k s  ^ 
a  s u b j e c t  t h a t  w i l l  be d e a l t  w i t h  i n  t h e  n e x t  h h a p t e r .
2 .  Compare  J a m e s ,  o p - c i t .  p . 6 2 6 .
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s e n s a t i o n  i s  • • •  u n t h i n k a b l e • • • •  I t  i s  t h e  m e t a p h y s i c a l  
s t a n d p o i n t  w h i c h  m a k e s  u s  p r e d i c a t e  t i m e  o f  t h e  e l e m e n t  w h i c h  
we a r e  a v o w e d l y  c o n s i d e r i n g  i n  t h e  a b s t r a c t .  . . . I t  i s £ t h e  
D yn a m ic  v i e w  o f  C o n s c i o u s n e s s  t h a t  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  t h e
1
p h e n o m e n a  o f  o v e r -  a n d  u n d e r - e s t i m a t i o n  s h o u l d  be s o u g h t . "
S e v e r a l  f a c t o r s  a p p e a r  t o  i n f l u e n c e  a c c u r a c y  o f  
e s t i m a t i o n :  a s  u s u a l ,  f a t i g u e ,  i n t e r e s t ,  p r a c t i c e  a n d  i n d i v i d ­
u a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  p l a y  t h e i r  p a r t .  More p e c u l i a r l y  r e l e v a n t  t o
t h e  s u b j e c t  o f  t i m e - e s t i m a t i o n ,  t h o u g h ,  i s  t h e  way i n  w h i c h
2
t h e  i n t e r v a l  i s  f i l l e d  -  w h e t h e r  w i t h  one  r e l a t i v e l y  u n c h a n g ­
i n g  e v e n t ,  o r  w i t h  s u c c e s s i v e  w e l l - m a r k e d  c h a n g e s .
C h a n g e s  w h i c h  t a k e  p l a c e  t o o  r a p i d l y ,  o r  on  no 
a p p a r e n t  p l a n  ( l i k e  t h e  g r o u p i n g s  o f  a  K a l e i d o s c o p e )  s o o n  
i n d u c e  f a t i g u e :  on  t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t o o  s l o w  a  p r o c e d u r e  r e ­
s u l t s  i n  b o r e d o m .  A p a r t  f r o m  t h e  d i s t u r b i n g  e f f e c t s  o f  f a t i g u e ,
a n  i n t e r v a l  i n  w h i c h  t h e r e  a r e  many  i d e a s  p a s s e s  q u i c k l y ;
3
b u t  i t  i s  l o n g  i n  r e t r o s p e c t .  The c h i l d  who i s  t a k e n  f o r  a  
t r e a t  t o  t h e  t h e a t r e  f i n d s  s o m e t h i n g  new a n d  e x c i t i n g  e a c h  
m i n u t e  -  t h e  j o u r n e y  t o  t h e  t o w n ,  t h e  m a r v e l l o u s  t r a m s ,  t h e  
c r o w d s  a n d  s h o p s  a n d  t r a f f i c ,  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  h a v i n g  a  r e a l  
g r o w n - u p  l u n c h ,  t h e  t h r i l l  o f  g e t t i n g  s e a t e d ,  t h e  t u n i n g - u p
1 .  " A m e r i c a n  J o u r n a l  o f  P s y c h o l o g y " , 1 9 0 3 ,  p . 4 3 4 .
? .  S t e r n  s a y s : -  " D e r  O p t i m a l w e r t  i s t  i n  hohem M a ss e  a b h a n g i g  
v o Y l m  I n h a l t  d e s  B e w u s s t s e i n s ( " Z e i t s c h r i f  t  f « r  P s y -
c h o l o g i e " ,  1 8 9 7 ,  p . 3 4 3 . )  . . _
3 .  T h i s  s t a t e m e n t ,  g e n e r a l l y  a c c e p t e d ,  i s  q u e s t i o n e d  by 
M i s s  S t u r t  ( " P s y c h o l o g y  o f  T i m e " ,  p . 1 0 2 ) .
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o f  t h e  o r c h e s t r a ,  t h e  r i s i n g  o f  t h e  c u r t a i n  -  a n d  i t  a l l  
p a s s e s  much  t o o  q u i c k l y .  B u t  a f t e r w a r d s ,  g o i n g  home,  i t  seems 
i n c r e d i b l e  t h a t  so  much c o u l d  h a v e  h a p p e n e d  i n  one  d a y ,  a n d  
’ t h i s  m o r n i n g ’ s e e m s  a g e s  a g o .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  w h e r e  t h e  
s u c c e s s i o n  o f  i d e a s  i s  s l o w ,  t h e  t i m e  d r a g s :  b u t  w h e n  we l o o k  
b a c k  on  i t  we h a v e  l i t t l e  t o  r e m e m b e r  i t  b y ,  a n d  s o  i t  i s  f o r e  
s h o r t e n e d ,  j u s t  a s ,  i n  l o o k i n g  a l o n g  a  f l a t ,  s t r a i g h t  r o a d ,  
we n o t i c e  t h e  l a n d m a r k  a t  t h e  e n d ,  a n d  t e n d  t o  u n d e r e s t i m a t e  
t h e  i n t e r v e n i n g  d i s t a n c e .
We m u s t  d i s t i n g u i s h ,  t h e n ,  b e t w e e n  e v e n t s  i n  t h e i r  
p a s s i n g ,  a n d  i n  r e t r o s p e c t ,  a n d  b e t w e e n  d u l l  a n d  e v e n t f u l  
p e r i o d s :  a n d  we m u s t  a l s o  r e m e m b e r  t h a t  f u r t h e r  c o m p l i c a t i o n s  
may be  i n t r o d u c e d  by  t h e i r  a f f e c t i v e  t o n e  ( p a i n f u l ,  o r  b o r i n g ,  
o r  u n s e t t l i n g ,  o r  a n n o y i n g ) . I n  g e n e r a l ,  i t  may be s a i d ,  t h a t  
w h e r e v e r  o u r  a t t e n t i o n  i s  e x p l i c i t l y  c a l l e d  t o  t h e  p a s s a g e  
o f  t i m e  -  t h e  " O h ’, t h a t  t h i s  w e r e  o v e r "  o f  b o r e d o m  o r  p a i n ,  
t h e  "Wha t  a  l o n g  t i m e  t h e  t r a i n  i s "  o f  i m p a t i e n c e ,  t h e  " C a r p e  
d i e m "  .of a n  e n j o y m e n t  o p p r e s s e d  b y  t r a n s i e n c e  -  t h e r e  we h a v e  
a n  a p p r o x i m a t i o n  t o  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  e m p t y  t i m e ,  a n d  c o n ­
s e q u e n t  a b e r r a t i o n s  o f  j u d g m e n t .  I t  s e e m s  a  p a r a d o x  t o  s a y
1 .  Compare  t h e  p a s s a g e  i n  M e r e d i t h ’ s " V i t t o r i a "  w h e r e  W i l f r i d  
a n d  R i n a l d o  G u i d a s c a r p i  a r e  r e l e a s e d  f r o m  i m p r i s o n m e n t  i n  
a  d u n g e o n :  "A t h u n d e r  wa s  r o l l e d  i n  h i s  e a r s  when  h e  h e a r d  
o f  t h e  f l i g h t  o f  two m o n t h s  a t  a  b o u n d .  Two b i g  mo^nths l  
He w o u l d  h a v e  g u e s s e d ,  a. t  f a r t h e s t , two  w e e k s . "  ( M e m o r i a l  
E d i t i o n ,  V o l . I I . ,  p . 3 8 2 . )
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t h a t  whan  wa a r e  e x p l i c i t l y  n o t i n g  t h e  p a s s i n g  o f  t i m e  we 
a r e  more  l i k e l y  t o  make m i s t a k e s  t h a n  a t  o t h e r  t i m e s ,  b u t  I  
t h i n k  t h a t  i t  i s  s o .  L o o k i n g  up  a f t e r  a n  i n t e r v a l  s p e n t  i n  
w r i t i n g ,  I  h a v e  a  p r e t t y  g o o d  i d e a  how l o n g  i t  i s  s i n c e  I  l a s t  
l o o k e d  a t  my w a t c h ;  b u t  I  h a v e  n e v e r  y e t  s u c c e e d e d  i n  b o i l i n g  
a n  e g g  p r o p e r l y  w i t h o u t  some k i n d  o f  c l o c k .  I n  some e x p e r i ­
m e n t s  on t h i s  p o i n t  I  f o u n d  t h a t  " t e l l  me whe n  you  t h i n k  x  
m i n u t e s  a r e  u p "  g a v e  p o o r e r  r e s u l t s  t h a n  "how l o n g  i s  i t  s i n c e  
50 a n d  so  h a p p e n e d ? "  The d i s t i n c t i o n  may s e em  a  f i n e  o n e ,  b u t  
I  w o u l d  t e n t a t i v e l y  s u g g e s t ,  i f  p r o p e r l y  s u b s t a n t i a t e d  e x ­
p e r i m e n t s  p r o v e  i r  v a l i d ,  t h a t  i t  may be r e l a t e d  t o  B e r g s o n ’ s  
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t i m e  p a s s e d  a n d  t i m e  p a s s i n g .  When i t  h a s  
p a s s e d ,  we may e s t i m a t e  t h e  l a p s e  o f  t i m e :  b u t  we f a i l  u t t e r l y  
w i t h  t i m e  i n  i t s  p a s s a g e .
B u t  a p a r t  f r o m  a l l  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  
a c c u r a c y  o f .  o u r  e s t i m a t i o n  o f  t i m e - i n t e r v a , l s , t h e r e  s t i l l  
r e m a i n  c o n s i d e r a b l e  v a r i a t i o n s ,  w h i c h  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  a c c o u n t e d  
f o r  by  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  i n t e r v a l s ,  o t h e r  t h i n g s  
b e i n g  e q u a l ,  f a v o u r  a c c u r a t e  e s t i m a t i o n .  Many e x p e r i m e n t s ,  
m a i n l y  b y  Ge r m a n  p s y c h o l o g i s t s ,  h a v e  shown  t h a t  t h i s  b e s t  
i n t e r v a l ,  o r  " o p t i m u m  t i m e "  a s  i t  i s  u s u a l l y  c a l l e d ,  i s  
a b o u t  . 75  s e c o n d s ,  t h o u g h  d i f f e r e n t  p e o p l e  v a r y  t o  some e x ­
t e n t .  S h o r t e r  i n t e r v a l s  t h a n  t h i s  t e n d  t o  be o v e r - e s t i m a t e d ,
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l o n g e r  o n e s  t o  be u n d e r e s t i m a t e d .  I t  i s  a l s o  a s s e r t e d ,  i n  
s u p p o r t  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  a n  ’ o p t i m u m  t i m e ’ , t h a t  t h e  
a c c u r a c y  o f  e s t i m a t i o n  s h o w s  a  c e r t a i n  p e r i o d i c i t y ,  a n d  
i l u c t u a t e s  w i t h  t h e  m u l t i p l e s  o f  t h e  o p t i m u m  t i m e .
F o r  r e a s o n s  w h i c h  w i l l  be g i v e n  i n  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r ,  
I  am r a t h e r  s c e p t i c a l  a b o u t  t h e  v a l u e  o f  t h i s  t y p e  o f  e x ­
p e r i m e n t ,  a s  t h e r e  i s  a  s u s p i c i o n  o f  c i r c u l a r i t y  a b o u t  i t .
B u t  i f  i t  i s  r e g a r d e d  m e r e l y  a s  a  b a s i s  f o r  a  p h y s i o l o g i c a l  
t h e o r y  o f  t i m e  e s t i m a t i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  no h a r m  i n  i t .  The 
p o s i t i o n  may be e x p r e s s e d  h e r e  s h o r t l y  a s  f o l l o w s A l l  
m e a s u r e m e n t  d e p e n d s  u l t i m a t e l y  on  a  d i r e c t  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  
e q u a l i t y  a n d  i n e q u a l i t y .  H e n c e  i t  s h o u l d  n o t  be a  m a t t e r  o f  
w o n d e r  a n d  s e l f - c o n g r a t u l a t i o n ,  a s  i t  i s  t o p  t o o  m any  p s y ­
c h o l o g i s t s ,  w h e n  t h e y ’ d i s c o v e r ’ a n  i n t e r v a l  t h a t  c a n  be 
’ e s t i m a t e d ’ ’ w i t h  g r e a t  a c c u r a c y . ’ B u t  t h a t  o u r  p r i m i t i v e
p e r c e p t i o n  o f  e q u a l i t y  i s  b a s e d  u p o n  p h y s i o l o g i c a l  r h y t h m s ,
2
s u c h  a s  b r e a t h i n g ,  i s  a  d i f f e r e n t  m a t t e r ,  a n d  one  w h i c h ,
1 .  O r i g i n a l  a r t i c l e s  on  t h i s  s u b j e c t  by  W u n d t ,  K o l l e r t ,  E s t e l ,  
M e h n e r ,  S c h u m a n n ,  a n d  o t h e r s  a r e  t o  be f o u n d  i n  t h e  
" Z e i t s c h r i f t  f ü r  P s y c h o l o g i e " ,  a n d  W u n d t ’ s " P h i l o s o p h i s c h e  
S t u d i e n . "  An e x c e l l e n t  h i s t o r i c a l  a c c o u n t ,  a n d  a n  a t t e m p t  
t o  r e n d e r  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  e x p e r i m e n t e r s  c o n ­
s i s t e n t ,  i s  t o  be f o u n d  i n  M ü n s t e r b e r g ’ s  " B e i t r d g e  z u r  
E x p  r i m e n t e l l e n  P s y c h o l o g i e . "  S e e  a l s o  V i e r o r d t , " P e r  
Z e i t s i n n "  a n d  S t e v e n s  ( " M i n d " ,  1 8 8 6 ) ,  t h e  l a t t e r  o f  whom 
r e a c h e s  r e s u l t s  i n  c o n f l i c t  w à t h  m o s t  o f  t h e  o t h e r s .
2 .  S e e  M t i n s t e r b e r g ,  o p . c i t . , f o r  t h i s  v i e w ,  a n d  F o u i l l é e ’ s 
c r i t i c i s m s  o f  i t  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  v o l u m e  o f  h i s  " P s y c h o ­
l o g i e  d e s  I d é e s - F o r c e s . "
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i f  s u b s t a n t i a t e d ,  w o u l d  be i m p o r t a n t .  T h i s  t o p i c ,  o f  t h e
i m p o r t a n c e  o f  r h y t h m ,  w i l l  be r e t u r n e d  t o  l a t e r  o n ,  wh e n
o t h e r  a s p e c t s  o f  o u r  a p p r e h e n s i o n  o f  t i m e  h a v e  b e e n  c o n -  
s i d e  r e d .
1
O t h e r  e x p e r i m e n t e r s  h a v e  a t t e m p t e d  t o  a s c e r t a i n  
t h e  d u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t ,  a n d  i t s  v a r i a t i o n s  
u n d e r  a b n o r m a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  s u c h  a s  i n  d r e a m s ,  d r u g - t a k i n g ,  
a n d  m o m e n t s  o f  e x c i t e m e n t . De Q u i n c e y ,  i n  h i s  ’ Opium j J a t e r ’ , 
t e l l s  how e v e r y t h i n g  f o r  h i m  t o o k  p l a c e  s l o w l y ,  ( s o  t h a t  o n »  
i d e a  w a s  s p r e a d  o v e r  s e v e r a l  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t s )  : ’’S p a c e  
s w e l l e d ,  a n d  was  a m p l i f i e d - t o  a n  e x t e n t  o f  u n u t t e r a b l e  i n ­
f i n i t y .  T h i s ,  h o w e v e r ,  d i d  n o t  d i s t u r b  me so  m uch  a s  t h e  
v a s t  e x p a n s i o n  o f  t i m e :  I  s o m e t i m e s  s e e m e d  t o  h a v e  l i v e d  f o r  
s e v e n t y  t o  a  h u n d r e d  y e a r s  i n  one  n i g h t :  n a y ,  s o m e t i m e s  h a d  
f e e l i n g s  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  a  m i l l e n n i u m  p a s s é d  i n  t h a t  t i m e ,
o r ,  h o w e v e r ,  o f  a  d u r a t i o n  f a r  b e y o n d  t h e  l i m i t s  o f  a n y
2
human  e x p e r i e n c e . ” M r .  M o r l e y  R o b e r t s  t e l l s  o f  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e s  
o f  a  man s h o r t l y  b e f o r e  a  s e r i o u s  o p e r a t i o n : " H i s  m i n d  was  
m a n y - c o l o u r e d ,  r a p i d  i n  m o t i o n ,  m a g i c a l .  S t i m u l i  p l a y e d  u p o n  
h i m  f r o m  w i t h o u t  a n d  w i t h i n ,  a n d  h e  a n s w e r e d  w i t h  i n c o n c e i v ­
a b l e  r a p i d i t y .  He t h o u g h t  n o t  o f  one  t h i n g  a t  a  t i m e ,  b u t  o f  
a l l  t h i n g s  a t  o n c e .  The c o m p l e x e s  o f  h i s  l i f e  a n d  c h a r a c t e r  
i n t e r p e n e t r a t e d  e a c h  o t h e r . T h e y  w e r e  l i k e  n e t s  l a i d  on  n e t s :
1 .  S u c h  a s  S t e r n ,  l o c .  c i t . ;  S t r o n g  ( ’’M i n d ” , 1 9 2 6 ) .
2 .  R d i t e d  S a i n t s b u r y  ( C o n s t a b l e  1 9 2 7 ) ,  p . 1 1 4 - 5 .
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t h e y  w e r e  i n f i n i t e l y  r e t i c u l a t e d . .  I n  t h e  t i m e  he  t o o k  t o  
move one  s t e p  he  s e e m e d  t o  h a v e  t i m e  f o r  e t e r n a l  t h o u g h t .
T ime  i n  h i s  p r o c e s s e s  w a s  s l a c k e n i n g # • • •  He h e a r d  h i s  own 
p h y s i c i a n  s p e a k  -  " H u l l o ,  W a r i n g I ” He h a d  known H e a t h c o t e  f o r  
m any  y e a r s .  B u t  W a r i n g  f o u n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  t o  a n s w e r .  I t  
s e e m e d  t o  h i m  t h a t  h e  h a d  n o t  o p e n e d  h i s  m o u t h  f o r  a  v e r y  l o n g  
t i m e . "
On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  M i s s  S t u r t  o u o t e s  t h e  e x a m p l e
2
o f  a  s o l d i e r ,  t o  whom a  d a y  p a s s e d  l i k e  h a l f  a n  h o u r :  a n d
t h e r e  a r e  a l s o  t h e  s t o r i e s  o f  d r o w n i n g  p e o p l e ,  w h o s e  w h o l e  
l i v e s  p a s s e d  b e f o r e  t h e m  i n  a  m i n u t e ,  a n d  o f  M o z a r t ,  who 
’ h e a r d ’ h i s  m u s i c  a l l  a t  o n c e ,  a n d  o f  d r e a m e r s  who go  t h r o u g h  
l o n g  a n d  c o m p l i c a t e d  a d v e n t u r e s  i n  a  f e w  s e c o n d s .  T O a t  w o u l d  
t h e i r  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t  b e ,  c o m p a r e d  w i t h  De Q u i n c e y ’ s  o r  
’M r .  W a r i n g ’ s ’ ?  S t e r n ,  i n  t h e  a r t i c l e  q u o t e d  e a r l i e r ,  r i g h t l y  
i n s i s t s  t h a t  t h e  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t  h a s  n o t h i n g  t o  do w i t h  t h e  
d u r a t i o n  o f  a  p r e s e n t a t i o n ,  a n d  h e  c r i t i c i s e s  J a m e s  f o r  
e q u a t i n g  t h e s e .  B u t  l i t t l e  i s  kno wn  b e y o n d  t h i s  n e g a t i v e  
c r i t i c i s m ,  a n d  b e y o n d  t h e  g e n e r a l  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e  s p e c i o u s  
p r e s e n t  i s  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  s u c c e s s i o n  o f  i d e a s  i n  o u r  
m i n d s .  H e n c e  a n y t h i n g  w h i c h  r e t a r d s  t h i s  s u c c e s s i o n ,  s u c h  a s  
a  b o r i n g  o c c u p a t i o n ,  m e a n s  t h a t  one  i d e a  i s ,  s o  t o  s p e a k ,
’ s p r e a d  o v e r ’ m any  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t s ,  a n d  t i m e  p a s s e s  a b ­
n o r m a l l y  s l o w l y .
1 .  "T im e  a n d  Thomas  W a r i n g " ,  p p .  1 6 - 1 7 .
2 .  O p . c i t .  p . 9 0 .
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T h e r e  w o u l d  s e e m  t o  be two m a i n  f a c t o r s  i n f l u e n c i n g  
o u r  a p p r e h e n s i o n  o i  t i m e , w h i c h  h a v e  n o t  a l w a y s  b e e n  s u f f i c ­
i e n t l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  I  t h i n k  t h a t  i n  t h e i r  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  t o  
be f o u n d  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  some o f  t h e  p a r a d o x e s  o f  t i m e -  
p e r c e p t i o n .
F i r s t  t h e r e  i s  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t e m p o ,  a n d  t h i s  i s  
c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  t h e  p h e n o m e n a  o f  o p t i m u m  t i m e , a n d  t h e  r h y t h m s  
o f  p h y s i o l o g i c a l  p r o c e s s e s .
On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  s u c c e s s i o n  o f  i d e a s
i n  o u r  m i n d s . I n  n o r m a l  l i f e ,  t h e s e  two  a r e  c o n n e c t e d :  t h u s
a  q u i c k  s u c c e s s i o n  o f  i d e a s ,  a n d  a n  a t t e m p t  t o  t r a n s l a t e  t h e m
i n t o  a c t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y  t o o  r a p i d  f o r  u s ,  l e a d
t o  f a t i g u e ,  a n d  u l t i m a t e l y  t o  a  b r e a k d o w n .  B u t  u n d e r  c e r t a i n
c o n d i t i o n s  t h e y  may be d i s s o c i a t e d .  I n  s l e e p ,  we a r e  n o t  u n d e r
t h e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  t r a n s l a t i n g  o u r  t h o u g h t s  i n t o  a c t i o n s :  a
s u c c e s s i o n  w h i c h ,  i f  we h a d  t o  do i t ,  w o u l d  be much  t o o  r a p i d ,
1
c a u s e s  u s  no i n c o n v e n i e n c e • W ha t  w o u l d  t a k e  two h o u r s  do 
may o c c u r  i n  a  d r e a m  o f  a  f e w  m i n u t e s *  d u r a t i o n ,  a n d  i f  we a r e  
t o l d  how l o n g  o u r  d r e a m  " r e a l l y  w a s " ,  we a r e ' f r a n k l y  i n c r e d ­
u l o u s  -  b e c a u s e  we j u d g e  t h e  d r e a m  b y  t h e  s t a n d a r d s  o f  o r d i n a r y  
l i f e . On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  w h e n  a l l  o u r  a t t e n t i o n  i s  a c t i v e l y
1 .  "The  s p e e d  o f  t h o u g h t "  i s  a  f a m i l i a r  p h r a s e .  When o u r  a t ­
t e n t i o n  i s  c a l l e d  t o  i t  ( w h i c h  i s  n o t  o f t e n )  we a r e  a m a z e d  
how many  t h o u g h t s  come i n  a  s h o r t  i n t e r v a l  o f  t i ^ e . A 
c y c l i s t  s e e s  d a n g e r :  he  s w e r v e s  a n d  b r a k e s ,  b u t  s e e s  a  
c r a s h  t o  be i n e v i t a b l e :  a f t e r  h e  h a s  d o n e  e v e r y t h i n g  h e  c a n  
d o ,  a n d  b e f o r e  t h e  c r a s h  comes  ( a n  i n t e r v a l  o f  p e r h a p s  two
s e c o n d s )  m any  i d e a s  p a s s  t h r o u g h  h i s  m i n d .
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e n g a g e d  on  w h a t  we a r e  d o i n g  -  a s  i n  M i s s  S t u r t ’ s e x a m p l e  o f  
a  s o l d i e r  -  we h a v e  ’ no  t i m e  t o  t h i n k ’ , a n d  one  i d e a  o n l y  
o c c u p i e s  o u r  m i n d s ,  s o  t h a t  ( i f  we j u d g e  b y  o u r  t h o u g h t - c o n ­
t e n t  a n d  n o t  by  w h a t  we h a v e  d o n e )  t h e  t i m e  s e e m s  s h o r t e r  
t h a n  i t  r e a l l y  i s .  I f  t h e  s o l d i e r  a f t e r w a r d s  t h o u g h t  o f  a l l  
t h a t  he  h a d  d o n e , t h e  t i m e  w o u l d  s e e m  l o n g e r ,  n o r m a l l y  o u r  
t h o u g h t s  a n d  a c t i o n s  k e e p  p a c e  mor e  o r  l e s s ,  so  t h a t  i t  d o e s  
n o t  m a t t e r  w h i c h  we go  b y  i n  o u r  e s t i m a t i o n  -  we s h a l l  g e t  
t h e  same r e s u l t  i n  e i t h e r  c a s e .  I t  i s  o n l y  when  t h e  two become  
d i s s o c i a t e d  t h a t  we g e t  d i f f e r e n t  e s t i m a t e s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
w h i c h  we go  b y ,  a n d  h e n c e  p a r a d o x e s .  ( O f  c o u r s e  n o t  a l l  a b ­
n o r m a l  e s t i m a t i o n s  c a n  be e x p l a i n e d  l i k e  t h i s . The d r u g  w h i c h  
De Q u i n c e y  t o o k  a f f e c t e d  b o t h  h i s  t h o u g h t s  a n d  h i s  a c t s :  b o t h  
w e r e  s l o w e d  down ,  s o  t h a t  w h i c h e v e r  way  he  r e g a r d e d  i t ,  t i m e
w a s  l e n g t h e n e d . )  ^
L a s t l y ,  i t  h a s  b e e n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t ,  g r a n t e d  t h e
h y p o t h e s i s  o f  a n  i d e a l  ’ t e m p o ’ w h i c h  i s  m o s t  s a t i s f a c t o r y  t o
u s ,  t h e r e  i s  no  n e e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  t h a t  t h i s  t e m p o  i s  t h e  same
f o r  a l l  l i v i n g  c r e a t u r e s ,  b u t  t h a t  i t  may v a r y  b e t w e e n  d i f -
2
f e r e n t  s p e c i e s .  So t h a t ,  a s  J a m e s  p u t s  i t ,  c o m m e n t i n g  on  a  
s i m i l a r  s u g g e s t i o n  o f  Von E a e r & s  -  " S u p p o s e  we w e r e  a b l e ,  
w i t h i n  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  a  s e c o n d ,  t o  n o t e  1 0 , 0 0 0  e v e n t s  d i s  
t i n c t l y ,  i n s t e a d  o f  b a r e l y  1 0 ,  a s  now:  i f  o u r  l i f e  w e r e  t h e n
1 .  By H e r b e r t  S p e n c e r .  S e e  " P r i n c i p l e s  o f  P s y c h o l o g y "  s e c . 9 1 .
2 .  O p . c i t . , p . 3 6 9 .  I  h a v e  b e e n  u n a b l e  t o  c h e c k  t h e  r e f e r e n c e
t o  Von B a e r .
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d e s t i n e d  t o  h o l d  t h e  same n u m b e r  o f  i m p r e s s i o n s  i t  m i g h t  be 
a  1 0 0 0  t i m e s  a s  s h o r t . We s h o u l d  l i v e  l e s s  t h a n  a  m o n t h ,  a n d  
p e r s o n a l l y  know n o t h i n g  o f  t h e  c h a n g e  o f  s e a s o n s .  I f  b o r n  i n  
w i n t e r ,  we s h o u l d  b e l i e v e  i n  summer  a s  we now b e l i e v e  i n  t h e  
h e a t s  o f  t h e  C a r b o n i f e r o u s  e r a .  The m o t i o n s  o f - o r g a n i c  b e i n g s  
w o u l d  b e w s o  s l o w  t o  o u r  s e n s e s  a s  t o  be i n f e r r e d ,  n o t  s e e n .
The s u n  w o u l d  s t a n d  s t i l l  i n  t h e  s k y ,  t h e  moon be a l m o s t  f r e e  
f r o m  c h a n g e , a n d  s o  o n .  B u t  now r e v e r s e  t h e  h y p o t h e s i s  a n d  
s u p p o s e  a  b e i n g  t o  g e t  o n l y  one  t h o u s a n d t h  p a r t  o f  t h e  s e n s a ­
t i o n s  t h a t  we g e t  i n  a  g i v e n  t i m e ,  a n d  c o n s e q u e n t l y  t o  l i v e  
a  t h o u s a n d  t i m e s  a s  l o n g .  W i n t e r s  a n d  su m m er s  w i l l  be  t o  h i m  
l i k e  q u a r t e r s  o f  a n  h o u r .  M u s h r o o m s  a n d  t h e  s w i f t e r - g r o w i n g  
p l a n t s  w i l l  s h o o t  i n t o  b e i n g  s o  r a p i d l y  a s  t o  a p p e a r  i n s t a n t ­
a n e o u s  c r e a t i o n s :  a n n u a l  s h r u b s  w i l l  r i s e  a n d  f a l l  f r o m  t h e  
e a r t h  l i k e  r e s t l e s s l y  b o i l i n g  w a t e r s p r i n g s : t h e  m o t i o n s  o f  
a n i m a l s  w i l l  be i n v i s i b l e  a s  a r e  t o  u s  t h e  m o v e m e n t s  o f  b u l l e t s  
a n d  c a n n o n b a l l s :  t h e  s u n  w i l l  s c o u r  t h r o u g h  t h e .  s k y  l i k e  a  
m e t e o r ,  l e a v i n g  a  f i e r y  t r a i l  b e h i n d  h i m . "
I t  m i g h t  be  p o s s i b l e  t o  e x t e n d  t h e  s u g g e s t i o n ,  a n d  
t o  h o l d  t h a t  t h e  t e m p o  may v a r y  a l s o  i n  t h e  same i n d i v i d u a l  
a t  d i f f e r e n t  t i m e s  o f  h i s  l i f e ,  a n d  u n d e r  d i i i e r e n t  b o d i l y  
c o n d i t i o n s :  a n d  t h a t  w o u l d  a l l o w  f o r  t h e  a n o m a l y  l i r s t  p o i n t e d
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1
o u t  by  P a u l  J a n e t ,  how i t  i s  t h a t  t o  t h e  c h i l d  a  y e a r  i s  
l o n g e r  t h a n  i t  i s  t o  a n  a d u l t ,  a n d  a l s o  t h e  a g r e e d  f a c t  t h a t  
wh en  we i e e l  p a r t i c u l a r l y  a l e r t ,  we c a n  s t a n d  a  r a p i d  s u c c e s s ­
i o n  o f  e v e n t s  t h a t  w o u l d  u s u a l l y  t i r e  u s .  B u t  i t  c o u l d  o n l y  
be r e g a r d e d  a s  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  i n  t h e  v e r y  v a g u e  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e  
g e n e r a l  h y p o t h e s i s  o i  i d e a l  t e m p o s  a p p l i e s ;  i t  i s  no  p a r t i c u l a r  
e x p l a n a t i o n  o i  t h e  s p e c i a l  p r o b l e m  o f  J a n e t ,  a n d  f o r  t h i s  a  
more  d e f i n i t e  r e a s o n  i s  r e q u i r e d .  N e v e r t h e l e s s  i t  i s  w e l l  t o  
n o t e  t h a t  t h i s  h j / p o t h e s i s  a p p l i e s  h e r e  a s  w e l l  a s  i n  t h e  more  
o f t e n  q u o t e d  c a s e  o f  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  n o r m a l  l e n g t h  o f  l i f e  
o f  d i f f e r e n t  s p e c i e s .
B u t  b e s i d e s  b e i n g  v a g u e  a n d  n e e d i n g  s u b s t a n t i a t i o n ,  
t h e  t h e o r y  o f  t e m p o s  f a i l s  t o  e x p l a i n  t h e  p o w e r  t h a t  some
o e o p l e  p o s s e s s  o f  w a k i n g  a t  s e t  t i m e s ,  t h e  a p p a r e n t  d e v e l o p -
2
m e n t  o f  a  t i m e - s e n s e  i n  c h i l d r e n ,  a n d  a b o v e  a l l  t h e  e x t r a ­
o r d i n a r y  f e a t s  o f  h y p n o t i s e d  a n d  m e d i u m i s t i c  s u b j e c t s ,  w h i c h
%
h a v e  b e e n  r e p o r t e d  by  m e d i c a l  p s y c h o l o g i s t s .  T h e s e  f e a t s  a r e
1# " R e v u e  p h i l o s o p h i q u e "  v o l . I I I .  J a n e t ’ s own e x p l a n a t i o n ,  t h a t  
a  y e a r  r e p r e s e n t s  t o  a  c h i l d  a  much  l o n g e r  t i m e  i n  p r o p o r t i o n  
t o  t h e  r e s t  o f  i t s  l i f e  t h a n  i t  d o e s  t o  a n  a d u l t ,  h a s  n o t
0 » 7  )  l U c ^ r i Q
Guy a u  o p . c i ' u .  p .  1 1 0 .
2 .  S e e  M i s s  S t u r t  o p . c i t .  Ch .  I V ,  who c o n s i d e r s  t h a t  y o u n g  
c h i l d r e n  h a v e  a  v e r y  s k e t c h y  s e n s e  o f  t i m e .  F o r  t h e  o p p o s i t e  
v i e w  s e e  J a m e s ,  o p . c i t .  V o l . I .  p . 6 3 1 .
3 .  Se e  B r a m w e l l  " H y p n o t i s m " ,  a n d  T . W . M i t c h e l l  " M e d i c a l  P s y c h o ­
l o g y  a n d  S c i e n t i f i c  R e s e a r c h "  C h . I .  T h e s e  d e a l  w i t h  a b n o r m ­
a l l y  a c c u r a t e  e s t i m a t i o n s  o f  t i m e - l a p s e .  A l s o  O s t y ,  " S u p e r ­
n o r m a l  F a c u l t i e s  i n  M a n " ,  a n d  F l a m m a r i o n  " B e f o r e  D e a t h . "  
T h e s e  d e a l  w i t h  u n e x p l a i n e d  e x a m p l e s  o f  w h a t  i s  p o p u l a r l y  
known  a s  ’ s e c o n d  s i g h t ’ , i n c l u d i n g  e x a m p l e s  o f  p r e d i c t i o n s .
W o h lg e m u th
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w e l l - a u t h e n t i c a t e d ,  and i n  some cases  the  c i rc u m s tan c es  were
such as to  make " c a l c u l a t i o n - a n d - w a t c h i n g  the  c l o c k ’ im p o s s ib le .
As M i t c h e l l  r i g h t l y  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  c a l c u l a t i o n  and a p p r e c i a t i o n
of time a re  q u i t e  d i s t i n c t ,  and we cannot  assume the  l a t t e r
u n l e s s  we have ex c lu ded  the fo rm e r .  I t  would a lm os t  seem t h a t
th e re  i s  some obscure  and i m p e r f e c t l y  u n d e rs to o d  way of e s t im -
1
a t i n g  t i m e - i n t e r v a l s ,  d i s t i n c t  from o r d in a r y  methods, and in
n 2
t h i s  c o n n e c t io n  those  t h e o r i e s  ( su ch  as  Vol^ Cyon’ s ) which 
h o ld  t h a t  we have a d e f i n i t e  t im e - s e n s e ,  a re  i n t e r e s t i n g .  I t  
i s ,  however, d i f f i c u l t  to  see why i t  has tak en  us so long  to  
d i s c o v e r  t h a t  we have a d i r e c t  a p p re h e n s io n  of t im e ,  and a l s o ,  
such t h e o r i e s  a re  open to  the  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  th ey  r a i s e  meta­
p h y s i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  about  the r e l a t i o n  of  time and e v e n t s .
A g r e a t  d e a l  of work s t i l l  rem ains  to  be done on th e s e  t o p i c s  
b e fo re  any d e f i n i t e  c o n c lu s io n s  can be re a c h e d ,  and any psy ­
c h o l o g i c a l  t r e a tm e n t  o f  time f o r  many y e a r s  to  come must i n ­
e v i t a b l y  be l e f t  i n  an u n f i n i s h e d  and u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  s t a t e .
I I I .
The ’ t im e ’ of ex p e r ie n c e  has  one g r e a t  drawback in  
a g r e g a r io u s  w o r ld .  I t  i s  p r i v a t e ,  and v a r i e s  w ith  the  s u b j e c t .  
The c o n v e n t i o n a l i s i n g  o f  d u r a t io n  i s  i n e v i t a b l e  i f  we a r e  to  
l i v e  peaceably w i th  our f e l l o w s ,  to  p re v e n t  u n n ec es sa ry  d i s p u t e s
1. A good d i s c u s s i o n  i s  to  be found  i n  Bramwell, o p . c i t . p .402 
e t  s e q . , c o n t a in in g  c r i t i c i s m s  of the  e x p la n a t io n s  b rought  
fo rw ard  by B eaun is ,  D e lb o e u f , and Gurney.
2 .  3 .  von Cyon, ”1 ’O r e i l l e " ,  and C. V i e r o r d t ,  "Der Z e i t s i n n " .
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and u n c e r t a i n t i e s  and waste of t im e .  3dd ing to n  e x p r e s s e d  t h i s
n e a t l y  i n  h i s  im ag inary  m eeting  between the  Astronomer Royal
and M. Bergson.  " I  r a t h e r  t h i n k  t h a t  the p h i lo s o p h e r  would
have had the  b e s t  of the v e r b a l  a rgum ent.  A f t e r  showing t h a t
the  A stronom er-R oya l’ s id e a  of  time was q u i t e  n o n s e n s i c a l .
P r o f e s s o r  Bergson would p ro b a b ly  end th e  d i s c u s s i o n  by lo o k in g
a t  h i s  watch and ru s h in g  o f f  to  c a tc h  a t r a i n  which was s t a r t -
1
in g  by the  A s tronom er-R oya l’ s t im e ."
We s h a l l  be concerned  w i th  t h i s  t u r n in g  of  time i n t o  
a  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s  company in  the  n ex t  c h a p te r :  he re  we meed 
on ly  remark t h a t  a p ro p e r  s tu d y  of  time must o f  n e c e s s i t y  go 
beyond the  l i m i t s  of p sycho logy ,  a t  th e  b eh e s ts  of  p r a c t i c a l  
u t i l i t y .  And from the p o i n t  of view of  t h e o r e t i c a l  c o n s i s t e n c y  
to o ,  the  need i s  no l e s s  p r e s s i n g ,  f o r  by now the  l o g i c i a n  has  
many c o m p la in t s ,  and w i th  good r e a s o n .  He p o i n t s  out  the  i n ­
adequacy of  the  s u g g e s te d  ’p r e m i s e s ’ to  w a r ran t  a l l  t h a t  i s  
drawn from them: he s c o r n f u l l y  exposes  the  vagueness  and la c k  
o f  p r e c i s i o n  in  the terms u sed ,  and the  b l a t a n t l y  c i r c u l a r  
p ro ced u re  by which tem pora l  terms such as  ’ t r a n s i t i o n ’ , ’p r i o r ­
i t y ’ and ’p a s t ’ , a re  used  th ro u g h o u t ,  even i n  e l u c i d a t i n g  con­
c e p t s  on which th e y  them selves  depend. He says i n  e f f e c t  -  
g r a n te d  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i th  which you have to  d e a l ,  and 
e s p e c i a l l y  the d i f f i c u l t y  of d e a l in g  e x p l i c i t l y  and i n  i s o l a ­
t i o n  w i th  such an im p o r ta n t  concep t  as  time - g r a n te d  t h a t  i t  
i s  a lm os t  im p o ss ib le  no t  to  presuppose  time somewhere: I  s t i l l  
1 .  "Nature of the  P h y s i c a l  World",  p .3 6 .
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t h i n k  t h a t  you shou ld  have made a b e t t e r  jo b  of i t ^ h a n  you 
have done. You a t t e m p t  to  g ive  an e x p o s i t i o n  of the  deve lop­
ment of tem pora l  n o t i o n s ;  s t a r t i n g  from the a d m i t te d  complex­
i t y  and s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  of  these  n o t io n s  as  th e y  are. i n  c i v i l ­
i s e d  a d u l t s ,  you p o s t u l a t e  o r i g i n a l  u n e x p la in e d  m i r a c l e s  such 
as  ’memory’ and the  ’moment of e x p e r i e n c e ’ on which you base 
the  r e s t .  That does no t  m a t t e r  so much; what does m a t t e r  i s  
t h a t  i n  your s o - c a l l e d  e x p o s i t i o n  of  ’ the  r e s t ’ you use them 
i n d i s c r i m i n a t e l y  to  e x p l a i n  each o t h e r ,  and you c o n s t a n t l y  
r e f e r  back to  eve ryday  e x p e r i e n c e .  This  r e f e r e n c e ,  to  a much 
g r e a t e r  degree o f  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  t h a t  you p r o f e s s  to  a l lo w ,  
i s  i n v a l i d .
The p s y c h o l o g i s t , on the  o th e r  hand, p le a d s  ex trem ­
i t y ,  and u rg e s  t h a t  a  g e n e t i c  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  bound to  be i n  
terms of the h i g h e s t  l e v e l . Now whether  we adm it  the  c la im  
of the  l o g i c i a n  (and the m e ta p h y s ic ia n ,  w i th  a p p r o p r i a t e  
changes of d e t a i l )  to  s e t  the  p s y c h o l o g i s t ’ s house in  o r d e r ,  
o r  w hether  we a c c e p t  the  p s y c h o l o g i s t ’ s excuse ,  and leave  h i s  
competence u n q u e s t io n e d ,  one th in g  emerges d e f i n i t e l y .
I t  i s  t h a t  we cannot u l t i m a t e l y  remain s a t i s f i e d  
w i th  a p u r e ly  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  accoun t  of t i m e . Too many q u e s t io n s  
have been r a i s e d  t h a t  a re  unanswerable  by psychology  f o r  t h a t  
such q u e s t i o n s ,  f o r  example, as  - I s  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  e s s e n t i a l  
to  t im e ,  or  on ly  e m p i r i c a l l y  connec ted  w i th  i t ?  I s  th e r e  any 
sense in  t a l k i n g  about  ’ on ly  e m p i r i c a l l y ’ , and th u s  im ply ing
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t h a t  time may be something a p a r t  from e x p e r ie n c e ?  I s  th e re  
any way of ju d g in g  between d i f f e r e n t  t i m e - s e r i e s ,  and say ing  
t h a t  one p e r s o n ’ s e s t i m a t i o n s  a re  "more a c c u r a t e "  th an  an­
o t h e r ’ s? (Although psycho logy  u ses  the n o t i o n  of  a c cu rac y ,  
i t  nowhere e x p l a i n s  i t  ex cep t  i n  terms o f  n o t io n s  which them­
s e l v e s  p resuppose  i t . )
In  s h o r t ,  psycho logy  s to p s  j u s t  where t h i n g s  beg in
to  become i n t e r e s t i n g ;  i t s  acco u n t  g l o s s e s  over the d i s t i n c -
and bogus e n t i t i e s  
t i o n  between a c c r e d i t e d  e n t i t i e s ^ ( s u c h  as  ^the’ P a s t ) ,  and i t
p ro v id e s  no c r i t e r i o n  by which such may be judged ;  i t  i s  too
i n c l i n e d  t o  adop t  c i r c u l a r  p r o c e d u r e s .  Now th e s e  may, o r  may
n o t ,  be un av o id ab le  f o r  p sycho logy :  we are  no t  concerned  h e re
to  judge psycho logy ,  bu t  to  d i s c u s s  ’ t i m e . ’ And i f  we can go
f u r t h e r  o u t s id e  of psycho logy ,  we w i l l .
The p l a i n  man, i n  the  contempt born of o v e r - f a m i l ­
i a r i t y  w i th  tem pora l  f l u x ,  w i th  a bad g race  r e f e r r e d  us to  
p sych o lo g y .  But a l th o u g h  i t  cannot  be too  s t r o n g l y  emphasized 
t h a t  our f i n d i n g s  must be i n  agreement w i th  the  immediate 
e x p e r ie n c e  on which u l t i m a t e l y  a l l  our n o t io n s  of  time are  
based ,  p sycho logy  a lone  i s  n o t  enough.
R e s u l t i n g  from p r a c t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  th e r e  i s  
the development of  the  c o n c ep t io n  of a m easu rab le ,  conven­
t i o n a l ,  s t a n d a r d i z e d  t i m e - i n t e r v a l  i n  p h y s i c s . With t h i s  we 
s h a l l  nex t  be co n cerned .  On the  t h e o r e t i c a l  s i d e ,  an ex­
c u r s i o n  i n t o  l o g i c  and m etap hy s ics  i s  now i n e v i t a b l e .
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CHAPT3R I I . PHYSICS.
Although our ex p e r ien ce  of time i s  the  u l t im a t e  
datum from which we must o f  n e c e s s i t y  b eg in ,  i t  i s  open to  
c e r t a i n  obvious o b j e c t i o n s  i n  p r a c t i c a l  l i f e .  I t  i s  p r i v a t e  
and s u b j e c t i v e ;  my e s t i m a t i o n  of the d u r a t i o n  of  two i n t e r v a l s  
may no t  ag ree  w i th  y o u r s ,  and I  have no way of  showing you 
t h a t  mine i s  the  b e t t e r .  This  i s  v e ry  in c o n v e n ie n t  i f  we w ish  
a c c u r a t e l y  to  communicate the l e n g t h  o f  a c e r t a i n  i n t e r v a l :  
hence the  need of  f i n d i n g  an ’o b j e c t i v e ’ means of measuring 
i n t e r v a l s ,  one t h a t  s h a l l  be independen t  of  our i n d i v i d u a l  
e c o e n t r i c i t i e s .
I t  i s  im p o r ta n t  to  n o t i c e  t h a t  by ’o b j e c t i v e ’ here  
i s  meant o r i g i n a l l y ,  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  " a c c u ra te "  (a s  we of a  
h i g h l y  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  g e n e r a t i o n  would use the word) bu t  f i x e d  
i n  the  sense t h a t  i t  i s  common to  a l l .  Let  us suppose a ve ry  
pow erfu l  p r i m i t i v e  King who succeeded  i n  imposing on h i s  
s u b j e c t s  h i s  own p r i v a t e  re ck o n in g  o f  t im e .  This would be an 
advance on the form er s t a t e ,  i n  t h a t  a l l  would a g r e e ,  p e r f o r c e ,  
i n  the  e s t i m a t i o n  of a g iv en  i n t e r v a l .  But such a  system 
cou ld  no t  prove s a t i s f a c t o r y  in  the  comparing of d i f f e r e n t  
i n t e r v a l s :  and t h i s  i s  the  c h i e f  t h i n g .  F o r ,  as  Weber p e r ­
t i n e n t l y  p o i n t e d  ou t  i n  h i s  b r i l l i a n t  a r t i c l e  "The R e a l i t y  
of  Time and the  Autonomy of H i s t o r y " ,  when we c o n s id e r  the
1 .  "M onis t" ,  1927.
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m easurab le  a s p e c t  o f  time ( t h a t  i s ,  time as r a t e  of change)
i t  i s  no t  s u f f i c i e n t  t h a t  th e r e  should  be d i s c o n t in u o u s  u n i t s
such ,  f o r  example, as  our p r i m i t i v e  King would c a l l  a  s i n g l e
e v e n t  -  bu t  a l s o  two more c o n d i t i o n s  a re  n e c e s s a r y .  The f i r s t
i s  t h a t  these  d i s c o n t in u o u s  u n i t s  should  be eq u a l  to  each
o t h e r :  the second i s  t h a t  the r e p e t i t i o n  of " the  same time"
sh o u ld  be p o s s i b l e .
The f i r s t  s e c t i o n  of t h i s  c h a p te r  w i l l  be tak en  up
w i th  d i s c u s s i n g  how th e se  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  r e a l i s e d  i n  the
measurement of t im e :  but f i r s t  some remarks must be made on
1
measurement i n  g e n e r a l .
A l l  measurement, o f  w ha tever  k in d ,  depends on the  
use of  a s t a n d a r d  u n i t .  What t h i s  u n i t  i s ,  i s  l o g i c a l l y  i n ­
d i f f e r e n t :  the im p o r ta n t  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  i t  s h a l l  be c o n s t a n t .  
L e t  us take  th e  measurement of l e n g t h ,  a s  t h i s  i s  the  s im p le s t  
c a s e .  I  may measure a p ie c e  of c l o t h  w i th  my o u t - s t r e t c h e d  
f i n g e r - t i p s ,  and say  t h a t  i t  i s  f i v e  h a n d sb re ad th s  lo n g .  But 
you, doing the  same, say  t h a t  i t  i s  on ly  f o u r  and a h a l f .  
E v i d e n t l y ,  i f  n e i t h e r  of us has  made a m is ta k e ,  your hands a re  
b ig g e r  th a n  mine. We can q u ic k ly  check t h i s .  You f i n d  a p ie c e  
of wood the e x a c t  l e n g th  of  your hand and say ,  "This i s  what 
I  c a l l  a h a n d s b re a d th :  t h i s  c l o t h  i s  f o u r  and a h a l f  hands-
1 .  See a l s o  R i t c h i e ,  " S c i e n t i f i c  Method" Chap.V; Westaway, 
• • s c i e n t i f i c  Method" Chap. XXIV; Campbell,  "What i s  P h y s ic s  
Chap. VI; S te b b in g ,  "Logic" XVIII s e c . 5 .
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b re a d th s  lo n g ."  Then e i t h e r  I  can r e j e c t  your d e f i n i t i o n  
( i f  I  am f o o l i s h ) ,  which w i l l  mean t h a t  bo th  of  us w i l l  have 
to  c o r r e c t  each o t h e r ’ s e s t i m a t e s ,  w i th  o t h e r ,  and p ro b a b ly  
d i f f e r e n t  a g a in ,  c o r r e c t i o n s  f o r  t h i r d  p a r t i e s ,  o r  I  can 
ag ree  to  use your c o n v e n t io n .  O thers  ag ree  to o ,  u n t i l  f i n a l l y  
we have a  whole community meaning the  same th in g  by ’hands-  
b r e a d t h ’ o r  ’e l l ’ o r  ’m e t r e ’ or  w hatever  we c a l l  i t .
This i s  a l l  v e ry  f a m i l i a r :  and i t s  e x p l i c i t  s t a t e ­
ment may seem c h i l d i s h .  But i t s  v e ry  f a m i l i a r i t y  may b l in d  us 
to  the  p o s t u l a t e s  on which a l l  measurement i s  i m p l i c i t l y  
based  -  p o s t u l a t e s  which , though th ey  may be u n q u e s t io n e d ,  
a re  no t  on t h a t  a cco u n t  u n q u e s t i o n a b l e . And, when th ey  are  
b rough t  i n t o  ^the l i g h t ,  we o f t e n  f i n d  i t  h a r d  to  r a t i o n a l i s e  
them f u l l y  -  p e rhap s  because th ey  a re  so fu n d a m e n ta l .  Here 
th ey  a re
(l)*^  "Things which a re  e q u a l  to  the  same th in g  a re  
eq u a l  to  one a n o t h e r . "  I f  one o b j e c t  i s  tw ice  as long (o r  as 
heavy) as  my s t a n d a r d  u n i t ,  and a n o th e r  i s  f o u r  t im es  as long 
as  the  s t a n d a r d :  the fo rm er i s  e x a c t l y  h a l f  the  l a t t e r .  (But,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  the p l a i n  man does n o t  ap p e a l  to  the  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n  
i n  S u c l i d ’ s b e s t  manner: he a p p e a l s  to  h i s  c l o t h  and h ^  
s t a n d a r d .  I f  th ey  d id  n o t ,  i n  f a c t , t a l l y ,  t h e r e  would be 
no th e o ry  of measurement.  The ap p e a l  to  s e n s e -e x p e r ie n c e  
i s  a l l - i m p o r t a n t . )
1 .  Though th e r e  cou ld  s t i l l  be m a th em at ic s .
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(2) The m a t e r i a l  o f  which my s t a n d a r d  i s  made, 
and th e  l e n g t h  of i t ,  a re  l o g i c a l l y  i n d i f f e r e n t .  I  s u i t  my
own conven ience ,  and use a f l e x i b l e  tape-m easure  on some 
o c c a s io n s  and on o t h e r s  a  h a rd  p ie c e  of  wood. Then, too^we 
may make our measurements i i ^ i n c h e s ’ or  ’y a r d s ’ o r  ’m i l e s ’ : 
we would no t  measure the  d i s t a n c e  b e t ^ e n  two towns w i th  an 
i n c h - t a p e .  B u t , we are  bound to  show which u n i t  we a re  u s in g :  
i t  i s  u s e l e s s  to  say ,  "This  i s  36" w i th o u t  say ing  36 w h a t . 
Convention p l a y s  an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  i n  measurement, and i t  i s  
j u s t  because th e r e  i s  no d iv in e  r i g h t  i n  the u n i t s  which we 
choose ,  t h a t  we have to  make c l e a r  which one we are u s in g  on 
a  g iv en  o c c a s io n .
(3) But we have to  be a s su re d  t h a t  our s t a n d a r d  of 
l e n g t h  o r  w eigh t  or w ha tever  i t  i s  rem ains  c o n s t a n t .  A y a rd
s t i c k  t h a t  was tw ice  as  long on Monday as  i t  was on Tuesday 
would be u s e l e s s .  C onsequen t ly ,  though,  as  was s a i d  above, 
the e x a c t  m a t e r i a l  o f  our s t a n d a r d  i s  s t r i c t l y  i r r e l e v a n t ,  i n  
p r a c t i c e  we do no t  choose a  s t a n d a r d  t h a t  i s  l i a b l e  to  s t r e t c h ,  
c o n t r a c t ,  o r  be s e n s i b l y  a l t e r e d  by changes of t e m p e ra tu r e .^
1 .  I t  i s  bes id e  the  p o i n t  to  o b j e c t  he re  t h a t  a l l  p h y s i c a l  ^
bod ies  a re  a f f e c t e d  by t e m p e ra tu r e .  Such a g e n e r a l i s a t i o n  
can on ly  be reached  a f t e r  many measurements have been t a k e n .  
This i s  measurement h i g h l y  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  and very  d e l i c a t e ,  
bu t  i t  i s  measurement,  and cannot  w e l l  be used  as  an 
a rgum enT"against  the f i r s t  s t a g e s  of  the p ro c e s s  on which 
i t  i s  i t s e l f  b ased .
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A lso ,  WQ are bound to  assume t h a t  our y a r d - s t i c k  when c a r r i e d  
about  in  space remains of  a  c o n s ta n t  l e n g t h .
(4) But -  and here  i s  the  crux  of the q u e s t io n  - 
what i s  meant by "rem ains  c o n s ta n t " ?  How do we know t h a t  i t  
i s  c o n s ta n t?  I f  we doubted  the  r e l i a b i l i t y  of one p a r t i c u l a r
s t i c k ,  we would measure i t  a g a i n s t  a n o th e r  to  see whether i t
co in c id e d  or  n o t . But we cannot do t h a t  here  - i t  i s  the 
whole p ro c ess  which i s  i n  q u e s t i o n .  There i s  an i n e v i t a b l e
begging of the  q u e s t i o n  in  measurement, which i s  p a r t i a l l y
masked by the f a m i l i a r i t y  of the o p e r a t io n .  How do I  know 
t h a t  t h i s  i s  c o n s ta n t?  Not, in  the  l a s t  r e s o r t ,  by more 
measurement: u l t i m a t e l y  the only  answer I  can give (which the 
p l a i n  man would have g iv en  long ago) i s  -  Because I  do. We 
have a p r im i t iv e ^ ^ d i re c t  p e r c e p t io n  of  e q u a l i t y ,  and i t  i s  on 
t h i s  t h a t  the  whole of our measurement i s  based .  I  see t h a t  
th ese  two p i e c e s  of wood s e n s i b l y  c o in c id e :  I  f e e l  t h a t  the 
weight i n  my r i g h t  hand i s  s l i g h t l y  g r e a t e r  than  the  weight 
i n  my l e f t .  P s y c h o lo g i s t s  t a l k  of  ’o p t i c a l  i l l u s i o n s ’ , such 
as the converg ing  l i n e s  which are  shown by measurement to  be 
" r e a l l y ” the "same" l e n g t h :  but though measurement, i n  i t s  
developed form, may be more a c c u ra te  than  our eyes and ab le  ^ 
to  d i s c o v e r  sm all  d i f f e r e n c e s  im p e rc e p t ib le  to  the naked eye,
1 .  For example, the m arve l lous  f e a t s  of astronomy.
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we must n e v e r t h e l e s s  remember t h a t  i n  the  end measurement i s  
on ly  a g i g a n t i c  c i r c u l a r  s t r u c t u r e  w holly  dependent f o r  i t s  
v a l i d i t y  upon the v a l i d i t y  of  our d i r e c t  p e r c e p t io n  o f  e q u a l ­
i t y  and i n e q u a l i t y .
(5) A f a m i l i a r  p o se r  a t  p r e s e n t  i s  -  "Supposing, 
w hile  you were a s l e e p ,  e v e ry th in g  in  the world  were in c r e a s e d  
to  twice i t s  p r e s e n t  s i z e ,  how would you f i n d  out?  You cou ld  
no t  p e rc e iv e  the  d i f f e r e n c e  d i r e c t l y ,  s in ce  the r e t i n a s  of 
your eyes would be twice the s i z e  th ey  a re  now, and n e i t h e r  
cou ld  you p e rc e iv e  i t  i n d i r e c t l y  th rough  measurement, s ince  
your y a r d s t i c k s  would have in c r e a s e d  t o o . The answer i s ,  of 
c o u r se ,  t h a t  you would never  f i n d  i t  o u t ,  because e v e ry th in g  
would be i n  e x a c t l y  the same p ro p o r t i o n s  as  b e f o r e .
There i s  a moral to  t h i s  s t o r y .  I t  i s  t h a t  measure­
ment i s  concerned w i th  r e l a t i v e  p r o p o r t i o n s . Measurement does 
n o t  t e l l  you the l e n g th  of t h i s  p iece  of c l o t h  ( i f ,  indeed ,  
" the len g th "  has  any m ean ing ) ; what i t  t e l l s  you i s  " the 
l e n g th  r e l a t i v e l y  to  t h i s  tap e -m e a su re ."  When I say ,  " i t  i s  
th re e  y a rds  l o n g " , I  mean t h a t  i t s  p r o p o r t i o n  to  my s ta n d a rd  
i s  th re e  to one, and I  add the ’y a r d s ’ so t h a t  I can remember 
which s t a n d a r d  I  am u s in g .  Common language i s  i n c l i n e d  to 
h y p o s t a t i s e  (and,  in  p r a c t i c e ,  i t  i s  harm less  enough to  t a l k  
as i f  th e re  " r e a l l y  a re "  such th in g s  as  ya rds  and f e e t  and
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inches)  , but a t  bottom a l l  we a s s e r t  i s  a num erica l  c o r ­
r e l a t i o n .  Hence the  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of measurement i n  sc ien ce  
co r responds  to  the  i n c r e a s i n g  use of m athem atica l  methods.
We must now app ly  th ese  g e n e ra l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  to 
the s p e c i a l  case of  the measurement of i n t e r v a l s  of t im e , 
though here the q u e s t io n  i s  com pl ica ted  by the e s s e n t i a l  
c h a r a c t e r  of t im e ,  which i s  i t s  ’p a s s in g  away’ . I n t e r v a l s  of 
time cannot be p la c e d  s id e  by s id e  and d i r e c t l y  compared in  
r e s p e c t  of  t h e i r  d u r a t io n ,  because th ey  do no t  bo th  e x i s t  a t  
the same t im e .  (A more e x a c t  f o rm u la t io n  of t h i s  sen tence 
would r e v e a l  numerous d i f f i c u l t i e s  - indeed  i t  i s  h a r d ly  too 
much to say t h a t  the whole of the  m e tap h y s ica l  problem of 
time i s  in vo lved  -  bu t  here  we need no t  r a i s e  them, r e l y i n g  
on the f a c t ,  e lsew here  a h in d r a n c e , t h a t  the p a s s in g  away of 
time i s  i n s t a n t l y  f a m i l i a r ,  so t h a t  everyone knows what i s  
meant,  however d i f f i c u l t  i t  be to  fo rm u la te  i t  a c c u r a t e l y . )
Here a g a in  we have to  r e l y  on p r i m i t i v e  p e r c e p t io n  
and a l s o  on what may be c a l l e d  p r i m i t i v e  memory. Our ex­
p e r ie n c e  i s  n o t  atomic i n  the sense of  c o n s i s t i n g  of moment­
a ry  f l a s h e s ,  as has a l r e a d y  been s a i d .  On the  c o n t r a r y ,  p a s t  
and p r e s e n t  a re  co n t inu ou s ,  and the  p a s t  can be remembered- 
This i s  t rem endously  im p o r ta n t ,  s in ce  w i th o u t  i t  th e re  would 
be no ex p e r ien ce  of  t im e .  W ithout going i n t o  the co n t ro v e rsy  
whether or not we have d i r e c t  memory of  p a s t  e v e n t s ,  i t  i s
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n o t  too  much to  say  -  and in  suppor t  o f  t h i s  I can on ly  appea l  
to  your i n t r o s p e c t i o n  -  t h a t  w ith  re g a rd  to  c e r t a i n  very  s h o r t  
i n t e r v a l s  succeed ing  each  o th e r  w i th in  the sp ec io u s  p r e s e n t  
we liave an immediate and p r i m i t i v e  p e r c e p t io n  of  e q u a l i t y  
comparable to  t h a t  which we have i n  the  case of two c o - e x i s t e n t  
p e r c e p t i o n s .  This  p r i m i t i v e  p e r c e p t io n  i s  " o b je c t iv e "  i n  the 
sense t h a t  everyone does,  a s  a m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  agree  i n  t h e i r  
judgm ents .  I f  we cou ld  no t  a g r e e ,  we shou ld  have no way of  
comparing, o b j e c t i v e l y ,  two i n t e r v a l s  s e p a r a te d  in  t im e .  And 
i t  i s  s t r i c t l y  nonsense to  ask  of  t h i s  p r i m i t i v e  judgment, " I s  
i t  a c c u ra te ? "  f o r  i f  i t  were n o t ,  we shou ld  have no means of  
knowing. "Accuracy" i s  no t  the t e s t  of i t :  r a t h e r  i s  ^  the 
t e s t  of a c c u ra c y .  Hence the  f a i n t l y  comic f l a v o u r  when psy ­
c h o l o g i s t s ,  a f t e r  much r e s e a r c h ,  a s su re  us w ith  g r e a t  solemn­
i t y  t h a t  t h e re  i s  an ’ op t im a l  t im e ’ which can be e s t im a te d  
w i th  " s u r p r i s i n g  ac cu rac y " I  Of course  th e re  i s l
G ran ted ,  th en ,  t h a t  we have t h i s  d i r e c t  judgment, 
the  nex t  t h in g  i s  to  e r e c t ,  on the  b a s i s  of  i t ,  a  s t a n d a r d .  
Apar t  from ac cu rac y ,  what s t a n d a r d  we take i s ,  of cou rse ,  
l o g i c a l l y  i n d i f f e r e n t .  For i n s t a n c e ,  we might have taken
I ’ l v o n r p I f î u % i t l o r d i L % t r d r î " é % i l t r d e  d e u x \ n t e r -  
v a l l e s  de temps" ("La Valeur de l a  S c ie n c e " ,  p . 3 8 ) . I n ­
s t e a d ,  he makes th e  u l t im a te  b a s i s  of our measurement 
depend upon the p o s t u l a t e  t h a t  a s t ro n o m ic a l  phenomena are  
r e g u l a r .  I  cannot t h in k  t h a t  t h i s  i s  s o .
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p u l s e - r a t e ,  o r  the b e a t in g  of  the  h e a r t ,  o r  b r e a th in g  as  our
s t a n d a r d ,  eScep t  f o r  the  f a c t s  d i r e c t l y  observab le  t h a t ,  when
we are e x c i t e d  our b r e a th in g  i s  q u ic k e r ,  and t h a t  th e re  are
s l i g h t  i n d i v i d u a l  v a r i a t i o n s  in  h e a r t - b e a t ,  e t c . ,  w i th  age ,
s t a t e  o f  h e a l t h ,  e t c .  And s in ce  i t  would invo lve  a l o t  of
t ro u b le  as to  when a man i s ,  and i s  not  " e x c i t e d " ,  and which
of s e v e r a l  men i s  the  most "normal" ,  t h i s  s ta n d a rd  i s  no t
1
g e n e r a l l y  u sed ,  ( though a c c u ra te  f o r  s h o r t  i n t e r v a l s ,  as  the 
c e l e b r a t e d  t a l e  about G a l i l e o  show s)• The s im p le s t  way of 
g e t t i n g  a s t a n d a r d  t h a t  s h a l l  be " p u b l ic "  and exclude in d iv id u a l  
v a r i a t i o n s  i s  to  choose n a t u r a l  phenomena. The re cu r re n ce  of 
day and n ig h t  i s  an obvious example. On a l a r g e r  s c a le  th e re  
are  phases  of  the moon, se a so n s ,  and the  im p o r tan t  i n t e r v a l  
which we c a l l  a  ’y e a r ’ . Apart  from the week of seven days,  a l l  
the d i v i s i o n s  of  our c a le n d a r  from a day upwards have t h e i r  
o r i g i n  in  c y c le s  i n  n a t u r e .  But i t  was soon d isc o v e re d  t h a t  
those  c y c le s  had no common denom inator ,  hence came c e a s e le s s  
a t t e m p ts  a t  ’c o r r e c t i n g ’ the c a le n d a r .  I t  i s  very  p u z z l in g  to 
c h i l d r e n  why a y ea r  shou ld  be made up of days -  why the
q u a r t e r ?  Secondly ,  as  r e g a rd s  the  s u b d iv i s io n  of the  day, 
the Greeks d iv id e d  the  p e r io d  of d a y l i g h t  i n t o  a f i x e d
1. But t h a t  i s  not  to  say t h a t  such p h y s i o l o g i c a l  rhythms 
have no t  an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  to  p la y  in  the  development in  
us of a sense of t im e .  See p re v io u s  c h a p te r  f o r  r e f e r ­
ences  to those  who would sup p o r t  t h i s  view.
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number of  h o u r s .  But then  the hours  were lo ng er  i n  summer 
than  in  w i n t e r .  We, on the c o n t r a r y ,  keep the hours  c o n s t a n t ,  
so t h a t  i n  summer we have more than  twelve h o u r s ’ d a y l i g h t ,  
and in  w in te r  l e s s .
But i t  i s  obvious t h a t  i n  say ing  t h i s ,  by no means 
the l a s t  word has been s a i d  upon the s u b j e c t .  How do we know 
t h a t  to  the Greeks the hours  were " lo n g e r  in  summer than  in  
w in te r " ?  What do we mean by "keeping the  hours  of a c o n s ta n t  
l e n g th " ?  iSvidently  a r e f e r e n c e  to  more th an  a s t ro n o m ica l  
phenomena i s  r e q u i r e d :  o the rw ise  i t  would be nonsense to  say 
t h a t  one day i s  equa l  (o r  u n eq u a l ,  a s  th e  case may be) to  
a n o th e r  day . P u t  d i f f e r e n t l y  - the choice  of a s t ro n o m ica l  
phenomena as a s t a n d a r d  has the advantage ,  l i k e  the  p r i m i t i v e  
King in  the example a t  the beg inn ing  of the c h a p te r ,  of  r u l i n g  
ou t  d i s s e n t  as to  the d u r a t i o n  of a g iven  i n t e r v a l .  But i t  i s  
im p o r tan t  to see c l e a r l y  t h a t  the second and more fundamental  
C ond i t ion  of measurement - t h a t  the u n i t s  shou ld  be equa! - 
i s  l o g i c a l l y  e n t i r e l y  independen t  of t h i s .  I t  might be the 
case t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  a s t ro n o m ic a l  i n t e r v a l s  were not  a l l  of 
" the  same l e n g t h " ,  (and i t  i s ,  i n  f a c t ,  t r u e ,  as  the  p l a i n  
man a s s e r t s  w i th  the u tm ost  co n f id e n ce ,  t h a t  the n ig h t  i s  
s h o r t e r  on June 21 s t  than  on December 2 1 s t ) . This a p p a re n t ly  
simple s ta te m e n t  i s ,  however, l o g i c a l l y  of a h ig h  degree of
1. For f u l l e r  t r e a tm e n t ,  see N i l s s o n ,  " P r im i t iv e  Time-Reckon­
ing" ; Nordmann, "The Tyranny of Time"; S h o tw e l l ,  The 
D iscovery  of Time" ( J o u rn a l  of P h i lo sophy  1915).
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s o p h i s t i c a t i o n .  What i s  i t  t h a t  le a d s  us to  suppose t h a t  we 
can a t t a c h  a meaning to  the s ta te m e n t  t h a t  a summer’s day " i s  
lo ng er"  than  a w i n t e r ’ s one? E v id e n t ly  only  t h a t  we have some 
o th e r  s t a n d a r d  by which we compare them: o the rw ise  we cou ld  
never  ask  o u rs e lv e s  the q u e s t io n  "Are the w ell-m arked  i n t e r ­
v a l s  t h a t  astronomy g ives  us a l l  eq u a l  in  le n g th ?"  In  o th e r  
words, a s t ro n o m ic a l  phenomena p rov ide  a means of  c o r r e l a t i n g  
the ’p r i v a t e ’ e s t im a t io n s  of i n d i v i d u a l s :  they  do no t  them selves  
p rov ide  a s t a n d a rd  of a c c u ra te  measurement. How e l s e  may time 
be measured? F i r s t l y ,  by the simple d ev ice s  of w a te r  or  sand 
f low ing  th rough  a f u n n e l ,  o r  by the s u n ’ s shadow p a s s in g  over 
a marked board;  and second ly  by c locks  of v a r io u s  degrees  of 
ing en io u s  co m p lex i ty .  But the problem i s  the same in  e i t h e r  
ca se ,  and so i t  may w e l l  be taken on i t s  s im p le s t  l e v e l .  Gra ins  
of sand f a l l  th rough  an h o u r g l a s s .  How do we know t h a t  they  
f a l l  a t  the same " r a t e " ,  so t h a t  one emptying of the  h o u rg la s s  
i s  e q u iv a l e n t  to  a n o th e r?  N o t , o b v io u s ly ,  because each " tak e s  
an h o u r" ,  but because ,  i f  I watched c l o s e l y  enough, I  should  
see t h a t  x  g r a in s  f e l l  th rough  in  a c e r t a i n  s h o r t  i n t e r v a l ,  
and t h a t  in  ev e ry  s i m i l a r  i n t e r v a l  x g r a in s  f e l l  th rough ,  and 
because you and everybody e l s e  would agree  w i th  me on t h i s  
p o i n t .  S i m i l a r l y  in  the more com plica ted  mechanisms t h a t  modern
1. And s t i l l  more, S dd in g ton ’ s s ta te m e n t  t h a t  the  l e n g th  of 
day i s  i n c r e a s i n g  g r a d u a l ly  th roughou t  the  c e n t u r i e s .
68
i n g e n u i ty  has produced» the escapements a re  so a d ju s t e d  t h a t  
the  r a t e  of r o t a t i o n  of the f ly -w h e e ls  i s  c o n s ta n t  -  t h a t  i s ,  
t h a t  the^same number of  t e e t h  a re  engaged in  eq u a l  i n t e r v a l s  
of t im e .  I t  i s  u s e l e s s  to  th in k  t h a t  i n  o b j e c t i f y i n g  our 
s t a n d a r d  of m easuring  i n t e r v a l s ,  we are  e l i m in a t in g  the  p e r -  
so n a l  f a c t o r  e n t i r e l y :  i f  we d id ,  th e re  would be no measure­
ment a t  a l l ,  because the  u l t im a t e  r e fe re n c e  must be to  d i r e c t  
p e r c e p t io n  of the e q u a l i t y  of two i n t e r v a l s .  I t  has o f t e n  been 
s a i d  t h a t  the e s s e n t i a l  c i r c u l a r i t y  in v o lved  i n  a l l  measure­
ment i s  g r e a t e r  when d e a l in g  w i th  time than  i n  d e a l in g  w i th  
an y th in g  e l s e :  we make our s t a n d a r d  of measurement something 
t h a t  goes a t  a c o n s ta n t  " r a t e "  ( r e v o l u t i o n s  of the minute hand 
of a c lo c k ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ) , while  on the  o th e r  hand, a l l  t h a t  
we mean by r a t e  i s  t h a t  a c e r t a i n  d i s t a n c e  i s  covered  in  a 
c e r t a i n  t i m e . The p o in t  has been very  w e l l  pu t  by S ig w a r t : -  
" I f  we de f in e  a un ifo rm  motion as one in  which equa l  spaces  
are  t r a v e r s e d  i n  equa l  t im e s ,  then  i n  o rde r  to  know i t  as 
such we must suppose t h a t  we a re  ab le  to  measure d i r e c t l y  the 
e q u a l i t y  of two p e r io d s  of t i m e . Thus a l l  the means which we 
can employ f o r  measuring time depend upon assumptions which 
can never be s t r i c t l y  proved;  th ey  depend u l t i m a t e l y  upon the
1 . For d e t a i l e d  d e s c r i p t i o n s  of  the  v a r io u s  types  of mechan­
ism, see Berthoud, " H is t o i r e  de l a  Mesure de Temps ;
Gould, "The Marine Chronometer"; Cunynghame, Time ana 
C locks" ;  B o l ton ,  "Time-Measurement".
2 .  "Logic" (Sng. T ra n s . )  V o l . I I . ,  p . 240.
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assum ption  t h a t  the r o t a t i o n  of the e a r t h  i s  c o n s ta n t  in  
v e l o c i t y ,  and t h a t  the time between the  cu lm in a t io n  of  a 
f i x e d  s t a r  and a n o th e r  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a lw ays- the  same : and, 
a g a in ,  upon the assum ptions  t h a t  the o s c i l l a t i o n s  of  the 
pendulums r e g u l a t i n g  our c locks  a re  i s o c h ro n o u s .  . . .  Our con­
v i c t i o n  t h a t  i n  our c locks  and our a s t ro n o m ic a l  o b s e rv a t io n s  
we r e a l l y  measure equa l  t imes depends u l t i m a t e l y  upon no th ing  
more than  the agreement of those  motions which v a r io u s  phys­
i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s  l e a d  us to exp ec t  w i th  those  motions which 
we a c t u a l l y  o b s e r v e . ” The r e f e r e n c e  to  time cannot be e n t i r e l y  
e l i m in a t e d ,  and th e re  i s  an i n e v i t a b l e  c i r c u l a r i t y .  But i t  i s  
no t  a v i c i o u s  c i r c l e ,  I  t h i n k .  Granted  t h a t  the n o t io n  of  r a t e  
or  v e l o c i t y ,  which i s  used  to  measure d u r a t io n ,  i t s e l f  i n ­
v o lves  d u r a t i o n  befo re  i t  can be comprehended ( t h a t  i s ,  the 
n o t io n  of "d u ra t io n "  i s  l o g i c a l l y  p r i o r  to  t h a t  of " v e lo c i ty " )  
we can y e t  escape an e n d le s s  r e l a t i v i t y  by the  f a c t  t h a t  our 
o r i g i n a l  judgment of the  e q u a l i t y  of two i n t e r v a l s  i s  a d i r e c t  
one. Or, as  Cunningham p u ts  i t  i n  a s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  way, 
" M e t r ic a l  space and time are no t  independen t  and s e l f - c o n ­
t a i n e d  co n c ep ts ,  but a re  c o n d i t io n e d  by the very  phenomena
1. Reasons have been g iv en  above f o r  doubting  whether the 
r e f e r e n c e  to  a s t ro n o m ic a l  phenomena is. u l t i m a t e :  but here 
the p o in t  i s  r a t h e r  t h a t  some r e f e r e n c e  i s  r e q u i r e d  (what­
ev e r  i t  may b e ) , and t h a t  u l t i m a t e l y  our measurement oi 
time depends upon unproved a ssum ptions .
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which they  are  used to  d e s c r i b e . " \ h e  measurement of  t im e-  
i n t e r v a l s ,  l i k e  a l l  measurement, i s  u l t i m a t e l y  based én 
p r i m i t i v e  p e r c e p t i o n .
The o b je c t i v e  measurement of d u r a t i o n ,  or p h y s i c a l  
t im e ,  i s  t h e r e i o r e  an a b s t r a c t i o n  from l i v e d  d u r a t i o n ,  but 
because of  i t s  g r e a t e r  ( l o g i c a l )  s i m p l i c i t y ,  we o f t e n  exp ress  
the l a t t e r  i n  terms of  i t .  Thus we say ,  "The same i n t e r v a l  
may appear  of  d i f f e r e n t  l e n g th s  to  d i f f e r e n t  o b se rv e r s ,  and 
to  the same o b se rv e r  a t  d i f f e r e n t  t i m e s . ”
This r a i s e s  the l a s t  p o in t  about t ime-measurement -  
how i t  i s  t h a t  we can say ,  as  we do, t h a t  " the  same” i n t e r v a l  
i s  r e p e a t e d ,  f o r  t h i s  would ob v io u s ly  be nonsense i f  we had 
no "c o n v e n t io n a l  d u r a t i o n " .  What can be meant by the "same 
i n t e r v a l "  " a t  d i f f e r e n t  t im es"?  We have he re  the beg inning  of 
the crux  of  the  whole q u e s t io n  of p h y s i c a l  t im e ,  s in ce  w i th ­
out the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of t a l k i n g  of  " r e p e t i t i o n "  the o th e r  two 
c o n d i t io n s  which Weber mentioned would go f o r  n o th in g ,  and 
th e re  cou ld  be no measurement of  t im e .  There i s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  
passage  i n  Weyl, which shows how p h y s ic s  p o s t u l a t e s  r e p e t i t i o n  
and how t h i s  i s  r e l a t e d  to  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of c o n s t r u c t in g  
in s t ru m e n ts  f o r  measurement:-  " I f  an i s o l a t e d  p h y s i c a l  system
measure i t ,  and though i t  i s  measured by movement th rough 
sp ace ,  i t  may y e t  be independen t  of movement.
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r e y e r t s  tp  e x a c t l y  the same s t a t e  as t h a t  in  which i t  was a t  
some e a r l i e r  i n s t a n t ,  the same s u c c e s s io n  of s t a t e s  w i l l  he 
r e p e a t e d  in  t im e ,^an d  the  whole s e r i e s  w i l l  c o n s t i t u t e  a c y c le .  
This i s  a c lo c k . "  Hence p h y s ic a l  time i s  doubly an a b s t r a c t i o n ;  
no t  only  in  t h a t  i t  a b s t r a c t s  from the d i f f e r e n t  judgments of  
d u ra t io n  of i n d i v i d u a l s ,  but a l s o  i n  t h a t  i t  a b s t r a c t s  from 
the i r r e v o c a b i l i t y  and i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  of  time . What i s  the 
w i l d e s t  a b s u r d i t y  of dreams i s  m ere ly  a l t e r i n g  the s ig n  to  the 
p h y s i c i s t .  Take, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  the form ula  "s u t 4 - i  a t  " .
What s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  o rd in a ry  l i f e  i n  time i s  th e re  i n  the 
n o t io n  of  " t ime" m u l t i p l i e d  by " i n i t i a l  v e l o c i t y " ,  o r  ( s t i l l  
l e s s )  i n  "time squared"?  The ’ t ’ o^  p h y s ic s  i s  im proper ly  c a l l e d  
time ; i t  shou ld  be t i m e - i n t e r v a l  o r  " t im e - l i k e  s e p a r a t i o n . "
I t  i s  an a b s t r a c t i o n  from l i v e d  t im e ,  and in  the p ro c e s s ,  a l l  
t h a t  i s  d i s t i n c t i v e l y  tem poral  has been e l i m in a t e d .  P a s t ,  
p r e s e n t ,  and f u t u r e  have gone ; i n  t h e i r  s t e a d  remains only the 
l o g i c a l  r e l a t i o n  of befo re  and a f t e r ,  e x p re s se d  in  terms of 
numbers. And t h i s  i s  the fundamenta l  r e s u l t ;  i t  i s  the g r e a t  
t r iumph of those  who have sought to  measure time t h a t  they  
have succeeded i n  overcoming the g r e a t  o b s ta c le  of time as  
•going o n . ’ In  a b s t r a c t i n g  from t h i s ,  in  r e f u s i n g  to  c o n s id e r  
d i v e r s i t i e s  which, from t h e i r  p o in t  o f  view, a re  i r r e l e v a n t ,  
and in  c o n c e n t r a t i n g  on time as s e r i a l ,  as a homogeneous
1 .  "Space, Time, and M atter"  (3ng .  t r a n s .  p . 7 ) .
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continuum, they  have re n d e red  the  passage  of  time s u s c e p t i b l e
to  m a them atica l  t r e a tm e n t .  This  i s  a  l o s s ,  i n  t h a t  c e r t a i n
a s p e c t s  a re  ig n o re d ,  but i t  i s  a l s o  a g r e a t  g a in  in  t h a t  i t s
c l a r i t y  and s i m p l i c i t y  make f u r t h e r  development p o s s i b l e .  For,
as C i s a r  e x p re s se d  i t ,  "space" and "t ime" a re  i n s u s c e p t i b l e
to  moasuroment, and i t  i s  nonsense to t a l k  of measuring them -
what can be measured i s  exp e r ien ce  w i th  r e g a rd  to  i t s  o rd e r
in  r e s p e c t  o f  space or  t im e , and so p h y s ic s  i s  concerned w ith
2
them as s e r i a l  and o rd e re d .
”s=s ut-f*-^at^” . We should  f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  i n t e r ­
p r e t  t h i s :  but as long as we are concerned only w i th  the 
m a n ip u la t io n  of numbers and symbols, t h i s  form ula  may be of 
g r e a t  u t i l i t y .  But how do we know i t  i n  the f i r s t  p lace ?  i t  
may be a sked .  I t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  not  s e l f - e v i d e n t ,  and i t  sounds 
p e r i l o u s l y  n ea r  nonsense ,  in  o rd in a ry  sp e e c h , to t a l k  of *time 
s q u a re d ’ . But,  as  i t  occurs  in  the fo rm ula ,  we a re  no t  m u l t i ­
p ly in g  " t ime" by " t im e" ,  but  one number by an o th e r  number, and 
th e se  numbers happen to s t a n d  f o r  u n i t s  c l  t i m e • Ihey  happen
World", p . 22.
2 .  "Mind", 1924.
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thus  as the d i r e c t  r e s u l t  of combining two e q u a t io n s ,  which 
g r a n te d  the  n o t io n s  of  v e l o c i t y  ( in v o lv in g  d i s t a n c e  and t i m e ) , 
and a c c e l e r a t i o n  ( c o n s t a n t  in c re a s e  of v e l o c i t y )  a re  s e l f -  
e v id e n t  v^_u_+_a^. I f  the  moving body goes every  second 
’ a ’ f . p . s *  f a s t e r  th an  i t  d id  the  p reced in g  second, a f t e r  t  
seconds i t  goes a t  f . p . s .  f a s t e r  than  i t  d id  a t  f i r s t :  hence 
the f i n a l  v e l o c i t y  i s  the  i n i t i a l  v e l o c i t y  p lu s  the i n c r e a s e ,  
which must be p r o p o r t i o n a l  to  the  time ^)sa, HiZx t . The 
d i s t a n c e  t r a v e l l e d  i s  equa l  to v e l o c i t y  (which in  the  case of  
a c o n s t a n t l y  a c c e l e r a t i n g  body i s  the simple average of i n i t i a l  
and f i n a l  v e l o c i t i e s ) X  t im e .  I t  goes w i th o u t  s ay in g ,  t h a t  when 
we say ,  "The answer i s  %t f t *i we do not  mean t h a t  t ime,
by some c u r io u s  alchemy, i s  now ex p re s se d  i n  f e e t . On the 
c o n t r a r y ,  i t  i s  the  whole which i s  ex p ressed  i n  f e e t :  time has 
been e l im in a t e d  and a l l  t h a t  * t ’ s ta n d s  f o r  i s  a  c e r t a i n  
number. By p a r i t y  of r e a s o n in g ,  when we combine the two
2 ^
e q u a t io n s ,  and o b ta in  the f a r  from s e l f - e v i d e n t  " s -  ut4-|-at " 
we a re  no t  sq u a r ing  time or  doing an y th in g  s e n s a t i o n a l ;  we 
a re  m ere ly  m u l t i p ly in g  two numbers. The source of con fus ion  
i s  t h a t  ' f  i s  no t  " t ime" but  t  seco n d s , t h a t  i s ,  a number: 
and when » t ’ appears  i n  an e q u a t io n  a lo n e ,  the  «seconds'  
h av ing  d i s a p p e a re d  (as  th ey  do, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  when "time" i s  
m u l t i p l i e d  by 1%gtance _ v e l o c i t y )  i t  i s  j u s t  a  number l i k e  
any o th e r  number. That i t  o r i g i n a l l y  s tood  f o r  a time
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c o - o rd in a te  i s  n e i t h e r  here  nor t h e r e ,  because time has  been
e l im in a t e d :  j u s t  as i t  i s  n e i t h e r  here  nor th e re  whether the
44 f e e t  t h a t  appear  as ’ s ’ were o r i g i n a l l y  measured over the
f l o o r  of a boy’ s room, the course of a toy  t r a i n ,  or  a long  a
ra i lw a y  embankment, the course  of a r e a l  one. Hence we are  a t
p e r f e c t  l i b e r t y ,  as long as we conf ine  o u rse lv e s  to  m athem atics ,
to  i n t e r p r e t  our ’J ’ as we p l e a s e .  We may make i t  s t a n d  on i t s
head, or run  backwards, or  use in  our e q u a t io n s  t  , t  , o r
- t , to  our h e a r t ’ s c o n t e n t .  B u t , when we s t a r t  to  i n t e r p r e t
1
our r e s u l t s ,  the reckon ing  comes. A schoolboy, g iven  t h a t  a
c a r  i s  moving a t  30 f . p . s .  w i th  a c o n s ta n t  a c c e l e r a t i o n  of
4 f . p . s . ,  i s  asked to  c a l c u l a t e  how long i t  w i l l  take the ca r  
to  go 368 f e e t .  He s u b s t i t u t e s  c o r r e c t l y :  3 6 8 3 0 t 2 t  ^  
\ t " ^ 1 5 t - 1 8 4 -  0.
F a c t o r i s i n g ,  ( t  4h23) t t . .8 )  ^ 0 .
/.Time taken  i s  8 s e c o n d s , or  -23 se c o n d s .
How t h i s  i s  p e r f e c t l y  c o r r e c t .  But i f  the  boy were to  p r e s e n t  
t h i s  i n  an unexpurga ted  form he would be h a r d ly  l i k e l y  to  
g e t  f u l l  marks. The m as te r  would say t h a t  the boy was l a c k in g  
i n  common sense to  t a l k  about a "minus t im e" ,  even though
1. Compare M e r r i l l : -  "The ’ t ’ of P h y s ic s"  ( " J o u rn a l  of P h i lo ­
sophy" 1922 p . 240) -  " t ,  w hile  c r e a t e d  o r i g i n a l l y  from our 
d i r e c t  ex p e r ien ce  w i th  r e a l  t im e ,  i s  su b seq u en t ly  handled  
in  a way t h a t  has no r e l a t i o n  to  r e a l  time a t  a l l ,  s ince  
r e a l  time ca n ’ t  be i n c r e a s e d  or dec reased  by u s ,  nor can 
i t  equa l  z e ro . "
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such was a p o s s i b l e  s o l u t i o n  of the e q u a t io n .  From the p o in t  
of view of the  m a them at ic ian ,  i t  i s  q u i t e  i l l e g i t i m a t e  to  
a l low  only  one of the r o o t s  of a q u a d ra t ic  and to  d i s c a r d  the 
o t h e r :  from the p o i n t  of view of the p l a i n  man, i t  i s  obvious­
l y  s i l l y  to  t a l k  of a n e g a t iv e  number of seconds .  Both a r e ,  
from t h e i r  p o i n t  o f  view, r i g h t :  the d isp u te  i s  a  r e a l  one 
and cannot be evaded .  The q u e s t i o n  i s  no t  merely  one of the 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of r e s u l t s :  i t  goes deeper  than  t h a t .  Fundament­
a l l y ,  i t  i s  the q u e s t i o n  w hethe r ,  and how f a r ,  the  ’ t ’ of
p h y s ic s  a c c u r a t e l y  r e p r e s e n t s  ’ time* as i t  i s  g iven  in  ex- 
1
p e r i e n c e .  For p h y s i c s ,  ’ t ’ i s  l i t t l e ,  i f  a t  a l l ,  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  
from ’ s ’ : t h a t  does not  m a t t e r  as  long as they  remain t  and s ,  
bu t  does i t  when ’ t ’ i s  i n t e r p r e t e d  as  time and ’ s ’ as space?
These a re  m e tap h y s ica l  q u e s t i o n s ,  and w i th  them the 
p h y s i c i s t ,  and s t i l l  l e s s  the pure m athem atic ian ,  does no t  
concern  h im s e l f .  But they  a re  q u e s t io n s  which must be f a c e d .
P u t  s h o r t l y ,  the  crux  of the m a t t e r  i s  -  I s  the  ’ t ’ which 
p h y s ic s  g iv e s  u s ,  (a) a  com plete ,  (b) a l e g i t i m a t e , (c) a 
s u c c e s s f u l  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  of t ime?
1 .  S3 3  a l s o  Bridgman, "Logic of Modern P h y s ic s"  p . 63, comment­
ing  on the d i f f i c u l t y  of ap p ly in g  m athem atica l  r e s u l t s  to 
the  p h y s i c a l  w o r ld .
2 .  S im i l a r  q u e s t io n s  a r i s e  w i th  r e g a rd  to  sp ac e .  But th e re  i s  
no need to  go i n t o  them h e r e ,  as long as t t  i s  r e a l i s e d  
t h a t  the c o n f l i c t ,  though perhaps  most s e r i o u s  i n ,  i s
no t  co n f in ed  to  t i m e .
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The f i r s t  q u e s t io n  i s  q u ic k ly  answered. I t  i s  not  
com ple te ,  and i t  i s  the  p r id e  of the  p h y s i c i s t  t h a t  i t  i s  no t  - 
t h a t  he has m ere ly  tak en  one a s p e c t  in  which he i s  i n t e r e s t e d  
and developed i t ,  s t e r n l y  r u l i n g  out e v e ry th in g  e l s e  as  i r ­
r e l e v a n t  to  h i s  p u rp o s e s .  The t h i r d  q u e s t io n  a l s o  i s  s im p le .
The a s t o n i s h i n g  p ro g re s s  of the p h y s ic a l  s c ie n c e s  and t h e i r  
achievem ents  in  the  l a s t  th re e  hundred y e a r s  can leave  l i t t l e  
doubt as to  the success  of p h y s ic s  and to  the u t i l i t y  of t h i s ,
one of i t s  main c o n c e p t s .
But -  and here  comes in  the  d i f f i c u l t  second q u e s t io n  - 
i s  the p h y s i c a l  concept ’ t im e ’ a l e g i t i m a t e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of 
t h a t  time which i s  a s t a n d in g  m e taph ys ica l  problem? The hocus- 
pocus whereby the  m athem atica l  p a r t  of the p h y s i c i s t  conven­
i e n t l y  t u r n s  a  b l i n d  eye w hile  the common sense p a r t  h a s t i l y  
wipes out  h a l f  h i s  r e s u l t s  i s  very  s u s p i c i o u s .  We s a i d  above, 
c a r e f u l l y  s k a t i n g  over the t h i n  p l a c e s ,  t h a t  ’Maotween- the boy 
a n d -th e se-p tu agenar&an th e re - i s - a a - eBs e a t i a l - d i f f e^ n c e   ^ and 
t h i a  d i f f e r e n c e—can-nevef  be ado qua to ly  oxprfrsgg d by phys i c a l  
' t iaioM ; and "what i s  the w i l d e s t  a b s u r d i t y  of dreams i s  mere ly  
a l t e r i n g  the  s ig n  to  the p h y s i c i s t " .  A fundamenta l  f e a t u r e  of 
time as ex p e r ie n c e d  i s  i t s  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y :  i s  t h i s  r e a l l y  so, 
o r  i s  i t  m ere ly  an anthropomorphic p r e j u d i c e ,  and i s  p h y s ic s  
r i g h t  in  a b s t r a c t i n g  from t h i s ?
77
This q u e s t io n ,  of c o u rse ,  r a i s e s  a fundamental i s s u e  
t h a t  w i l l  need v e ry  much more c a r e f u l  h a n d l in g :  h e r e ,  where 
our main concern i s  the ’ t ’ of p h y s ic s ,  we cannot hope to  dea l  
w i th  i t  p r o p e r l y .
I t  must be r e i t e r a t e d  t h a t  p h y s ic s  has a p e r f e c t  
r i g h t  to  use what concep ts  i t  p l e a s e s :  and c r i t i c i s m  can only 
e n t e r  when one of  th ese  i s  l a b e l l e d  ’Time’ . Then i t  i s  f a i r  to  
ask  whether those  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of Time which are  n e g le c te d  
and even i m p l i c i t l y  n eg a ted  are  no t  im p o r ta n t .  I f  they  a r e ,  
i t  i s  re a so n a b le  to  h o ld  t h a t ,  however u s e f u l  ’ t ’ may be f o r  
p h y s i c s ,  i t s  complete i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i th  Time i s  f a l l a c i o u s .
I t  i s  n e c e s sa ry  -  and i t  i s  a p o s s ib l e  c r i t i c i s m  of Bergson 
t h a t  he never p r o p e r l y  r e a l i s e d  t h i s  -  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between 
l e g i t i m a t e  a b s t r a c t i o n  and f a l s i f y i n g  a b s t r a c t i o n .  The spatial45 
i s a t i o n  of t im e ,  a g a in s t  which Bergson p r o t e s t e d ,  i s  no t  nec­
e s s a r i l y  i l l e g i t i m a t e .  Where the i r r e v o c a b i l i t y  of time does 
not  e n t e r ,  we may p r o f i t a b l y  r e g a rd  time as an i n t e r v a l ,  ab­
s t r a c t e d  from i t s  c o n te n t ,  d i s t i n c t  from and y e t  comparable to 
space i n t e r v a l s ,  and capable  of m athem atica l  development. But 
i t  i s  when we f o r g e t  t h a t  our s p a t i a l i s e d  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  
on ly  an a b s t r a c t i o n  from tem poral  sequence, which i s  e s s e n t i a l ­
l y  a l o g i c a l  -  as we may say ,  c o n s id e r in g  i t  only  as "sequence" 
and f o r g e t t i n g  the s p e c i f i c a l l y  " tem pora l"  p a r t  -  t h a t  we are
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l i a b l e  to  become confused .  For i f  i t  i s  c la im ed, whether
openly  or by i m p l i c a t i o n ,  t h a t  the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  ’ t ’
g ive  a f i n a l l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  account  of t im e ,  t h a t  c la im  i s
unfounded. This i s  n o t ,  of co u rse ,  to  say t h a t  the p l i a b l e ,
r e v e r s i b l e  ’ t ’ may no t  be very  u s e f u l  and im p or tan t  i n  i t s
own sp h e re ,  but i t s  sphere i s  not t h a t  of m e tap h y s ic s .  The
e x c u rs io n s  i n t o  m e taph ys ica l  fancy  of a s c i e n t i s t  who has
w r i t t e n  a s t a n d a r d  book on s c i e n t i f i c  method may be quoted
here  as  an awful w arn ing .  "Space and time are  so s i m i l a r  in
c h a r a c t e r ,  t h a t  i f  space be termed the b re a d th ,  time may be
1
termed the l e n g th ,  of  the f i e l d  of p e r c e p t i o n . "  Worse s t i l l  - 
"The i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  of n a t u r a l  p ro c e s s e s  i s  a p u r e ly  r e l a t i v e  
co n c e p t io n .  H i s to ry  goes backward or fo rw ard  acco rd ing  to the 
r e l a t i v e  motion of e v e n ts  and t h e i r  o b s e rv e r .  Conceive a demon, 
g i f t e d  w i th  an immensely i n t e n s i f i e d  ac u te n e s s  of s i g h t ,  so 
t h a t  he could  watch from an immense d i s ta n c e  the movements o f  
the e a r t h .  How suppose him to  t r a v e l  away from the e a r t h  w i th  
a v e l o c i t y  g r e a t e r  than  the v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t .  A l l  n a t u r a l  
p ro c e s se s  and a l l  h i s t o r y  would be f o r  him r e v e r s e d .  Men would 
e n t e r  l i f e  by d e a th ,  grow young, and f i n a l l y  leave  i t  by b i r t h .  
Complex types  of l i f e  would grow s im p le r ,  e v o lu t io n  would be 
r e v e r s e d ,  and the  e a r t h ,  growing h o t t e r  and h o t t e r ,  would 
ag a in  become n eb u lo us .  S h o r t l y ,  by motion to  or from the e a r t h ,
1. K ar l  P ea r so n ,  "Grammar of Science"  p . 181.
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our demon cou ld  go backward or fo rw ard  in  h i s t o r y ,  or  w i th  
one speed - t h a t  of l i g h t  - l i v e  in  an e t e r n a l  n£w." One i s  
tempted to  remark t h a t  "Keep o f f  the g ra s s "  i s  as a p p l i c a b le  
to  s c i e n t i s t s  in  m ataphysics  as  the o th e r  way roundl
That ’ t ’ does not  g ive the whole of time i s  i m p l i c i t ­
l y  ad m it te d  by ev e ry  schoolboy who, secure  in  the knowledge 
t h a t  everyone w i l l  u n d e r s ta n d  why, "cooks" h i s  r e s u l t s  to the 
e x t e n t  of r e j e c t i n g  out of  hand one of h i s  answers - a sure 
i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  th e re  a re  two, q u i t e  s e p a r a t e ,  s t a n d a rd s  to 
which he conform s, the laws of  mathematics  and the f a c t s  about 
t im e .  ( I f  he f a i l s  in  one, i t  w i l l  a lm ost  c e r t a i n l y  be the 
fo rm er!)  That be ing  so ,  i t  i s  s t r a n g e  t h a t  w r i t e r s  on p h y s ic s  
shou ld  n o t ,  a p p a r e n t l y ,  p e rc e iv e  any d i f f e r e n c e .
To sum up, the a b s t r a c t i o n  which p h y s ic s  makes from 
the ev en ts  which make up the c o n ten t  of time i s  l e g i t im a te  and 
u s e f u l  f o r  the purposes  of  p h y s ic s ;  b u t ,  o v e r r id d e n ,  i t  may be 
f a l l a c i o u s .  Apart  from the ig n o r in g  of what i s ,  a t  f i r s t  s i g h t  
a t  l e a s t ,  the most s t r i k i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of time -  i t s  i r ­
r e v e r s i b i l i t y  - th e re  i s  a second danger i n  t h a t  h y p o s t a t i s a t i o n  
i s  on ly  too e a s y .  The s e p a r a t i o n  of time from ev en ts  i n t o  some­
th in g  a b s o l u t e ,  a bare continuum ( l i k e  Hewton’ s ,  " a b s o lu te ,  
t r u e ,  and m athem atica l  time" which "of i t s e l f ,  and from i t s  
own n a t u r e ,  f lows equab ly  w i th o u t  r e g a rd  to a n y th in g  e x t e r n a l " ,  _
1 . I b i d .  p . 394. For a s i m i l a r  i d e a ,  compare C.Flammarion’ s 
"Lumen."
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and which i s  c o n t r a s t e d  w i th  " r e l a t i v e ,  a p p a re n t ,  and common
1
t im e " ,  t h a t  m ere ly  measures d u ra t io n  by means of motion, ) i s  
a  p r o f i t a b l e  b reed ing -g ro un d  f o r  m e tap h y s ica l  f a l l a c i e s .
I t  cannot be too o f t e n  emphasized t h a t  p h y s ic s  i s  
concerned w ith  the measurement of t im e ,  r a t h e r  than  w ith  the 
e s s e n t i a l l y  m e tap h y s ica l  q u e s t io n  as to  i t s  n a t u r e .  Granted 
t h a t  no m e tap h y s ica l  th e o ry  can hope to  su rv iv e  which p u ts  
i t s e l f  i n  n e e d le s s  o p p o s i t io n  to  f a c t s  e s t a b l i s h e d  by p h y s ic s ,  
i t  y e t  remains t ru e  t h a t  i n  the l a s t  r e s o r t  a p u re ly  p h y s ic a l  
d e s c r i p t i o n  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t ,  and sometimes f a l l a c i o u s ,  from 
the p o in t  of view of m e ta p h y s ic s .  We must no t  b e l ie v e  t h a t  
p h y s i c a l  t h e o r i e s  can u l t i m a t e l y  so lve  the m e tap hy s ica l  p ro b ­
lems t h a t  time r a i s e s ,  or t h a t  they  have any s p e c i a l  re lev ance  
to  th ese  p rob lem s.
I I .
W ith in  the l a s t  f i f t y  y e a r s ,  the b a s ic  concepts  of 
p h ys ic s  - among them time - have undergone a r a d i c a l  a l t e r ­
a t i o n .  C e r t a in  fundamenta l  assum pt ion s ,  as we saw, a re  made in  
a l l  measurement, and th e se  assum ptions a re  common to  the 
s im p le s t  forms of measurement and to  t h e i r  development i n t o  
the h ig h ly  complex, ingen ious  and d e l i c a t e  measurements which 
the modern p h y s i c i s t  makes. Amid t h i s  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n ,  the 
u n d e r ly in g  assum ptions  were t h r u s t  out of s i g h t ,  and t h i s  d id
1. " P r i n c i p i a "  1 , 6 .
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not  g r e a t l y  m a t t e r  from the p h y s i c i s t ’ s p o i n t  of view - t h a t  
of g e t t i n g  v a l i d  r e s u l t s  -  as long as  the r e s u l t s  were f o r t h ­
coming. But a fundam enta l  check, i n  the unexpected  n ega t ive  
r e s u l t  of  the MicheIson-M orley  exper im en t ,  meant t h a t  the 
o p t i m i s t i c  " l a i s s e z - f a i r e "  p o l i c y  could  not  con t inue  i n d e f i n ­
i t e l y ,  and t h a t  a  r a d i c a l  o v e rh a u l in g  of these  im p or tan t  
assum pt ions ,  and of the  b a s i c  concep ts  of p h y s ic s  - t im e, space,  
energy  - would soon be n e c e s s a r y .  The work of L o ren tz ,  Min­
kowski, and above a l l ,  E i n s t e i n ,  was to  accom plish  t h i s .  Hence, 
in  s p i t e  of  the o r i g i n a l i t y  of  the  q u es t io n s  r a i s e d  and 
answered by E i n s t e i n ,  i t  would be a m istake to  suppose t h a t  
h i s  work can be t r e a t e d  i n  e n t i r e  i s o l a t i o n  from t h a t  of h i s  
p r e d e c e s s o r s :  on the c o n t r a r y ,  i t  was only  made p o s s ib le  by 
the p re v io u s  r e s e a r c h  of s p e c i a l i s t s .  R e l a t i v i t y ,  a t  l e a s t  as  
re g a rd s  space and time (perhaps  not  so much w ith  the b r i l l i a n t  
e l e c t r o - m a g n e t i c  s p e c u la t i o n s  of the G e n e ra l i s e d  T heory ) , i s  a 
s tag e  i n  the h i s t o r i c a l  development of these  concep ts  r a t h e r  
than  a d ram atic  s u r p r i s e  e n t i r e l y  unconnected  w i th  t h e i r
former h i s t o r y .
This p o i n t ,  r e g a rd in g  the need of c o n s id e r in g  the 
d o c t r i n e s  of R e l a t i v i t y  i n  t h e i r  h i s t o r i c a l  s e t t i n g ,  has been  ^
emphasized, p a r t l y  because i t  i s  ap t  to  be over looked ,  but  
c h i e f l y  because I  do not  propose to  s e t  out in  d e t a i l  the 
ev e n ts  which le d  up to  the S p e c ia l  Theory of R e l a t i v i t y ,
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s ince  th e y  have been many times r e c a p i tu l a t e d .^ T h e  b r i e f  
r e f e r e n c e  to  th e se  e v e n ts  must not be taken  to  mean t h a t  t h i s  
method of approach  i s  u n im p o r tan t .
The Michelson-Morley experiment (which Eddington 
c a l l s  the P r in c e  of Denmark in  the p h y s i c i s t s ’ performance of 
"Hamlet") was d es ig ned  to  measure a c c u r a t e l y  a c e r t a i n  t ime- 
i n t e r v a l .  This t i m e - i n t e r v a l ,  which was c o n f id e n t ly  e x p e c te d , 
was the d i f f e r e n c e  between the t imes taken  by two l i g h t - s i g n a l s  
to  r e t u r n  to  the p o in t  o f  o r i g i n .  From t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  i t  was
2
hoped to  c a l c u l a t e  v ,  the speed of the e a r t h  th rough  the e t h e r . 
But no d i f f e r e n c e  a t  a l l  was observed ,  though the experiment 
was c a r e f u l l y  r e p e a t e d  many t imes to  o b v ia te  p o s s ib l e  c o u n te r ­
a c t i n g  c o n d i t io n s  t h a t  might mask the expec ted  e f f e c t .  I t  
should  be n o t i c e d ,  to o ,  t h a t  while s l i g h t  i n e q u a l i t i e s ,  where 
e q u a l i t i e s  a re  e x p e c ted ,  may be pu t  down to  ex p e r im en ta l  e r r o r s ,  
t h i s  could  not  be done i n  the op po s i te  case which i s  now in  
q u e s t i o n ,  f o r  i t  would be s im ply  i n c r e d i b l e  t h a t  every  time 
th e re  shou ld  be e q u a l i t y  i n s t e a d  of a v a ry in g  degree of i n e q u a l ­
i t y .  Hence the  c o n t in u a l  n eg a t iv e  r e s u l t  of the  Michelson-Morley
1. An e s p e c i a l l y  good account  of the h i s t o r i c a l  development i s  
to  be found i n  S i l b e r s t e i n :  "Theory of R e l a t i v i t y " .  See a lso  
Cunningham, " P r i n c i p l e  of R e l a t i v i t y " ;  Benedicks,  "Space ahd 
Time"; C a s s i r e r ,  " E i n s t e i n ’ s Theory of R e l a t i v i t y " ,  and 
Langevin,  "La Physique depuis  v in g t  Ans."
2 .  I n  Marit a i n ’ s p l e a s a n t  p h ra se ,  "The e t h e r ,  where the  phys­
i c i s t s  used to  pu t  t h e i r  b l a c k e s t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  out to 
p a s t u r e . "  ("The Freedom of the I n t e l l e c t " ,  p . 63.)
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exper im ent  cou ld  not e a s i l y  be ex p la in ed  away.
A m ak esh i f t  was proposed  in  the c e l e b r a t e d
L o r e n t z - F i t z g e r a l d  c o n t r a c t i o n .  This s a i d ,  in  e f f e c t : -  We
have reached  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  between our r e s u l t s  and our
c a l c u l a t i o n s .  The two times should  be in  the r a t i o  to  each
_ % 1 1 
o th e r  of 1 : ( ^ but  they  a re  n o t ,  ( f o r  whatever  the
unknown v may be - u n le s s  i t  i s  z e ro ,  i n  which éase c a d i t  
q u a e s t io  - the r a t i o  can never work out a t  u n i ty )  . I f  we 
a c c e p t  the  r e s u l t  of the experim ent  as  being a c c u r a t e ,  th e re  
i s  on ly  one way o u t .  That i s  to  assume t h a t  the l i g h t  ra y s  
d id  n o t ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  t r a v e l  eq u a l  d i s t a n c e s .  They were 
measured as being  eq u a l?  N e v e r th e le s s ,  t h a t  p roves n o th ing :
I f  we assume t h a t  e v e ry  moving body c o n t r a c t s  i n  the d i r e c t i o n  
of i t s  motion in  the r a t i o  1 : ‘  ^ ~v , our in s t ru m en t  of 
measurement w i l l  i t s e l f  c o n t r a c t ,  and the sh r inkage  cannot 
be d e t e c t e d .  On the o th e r  hand, i f  we assume t h i s  c o n t r a c t i o n ,  
i t  w i l l  e x p la in  the c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
On the face  of i t ,  t h i s  i s  an a r b i t r a r y  and an un­
s a t i s f a c t o r y  e x p l a n a t i o n .  In  the f i r s t  p l a c e ,  th e re  i s  no 
obvious reaso n  why we should  assume t h a t  our measurements of 
time are a c c u r a t e ,  and t h a t  our measurements of space are  
a t  f a u l t ,  s in ce  the l a t t e r  i s  much e a s i e r  to  measure .  I t
1. This  r e s u l t  can e a s i l y  be worked out f o r  o n e s e l f ,  by
u s in g  the f a m i l i a r  ana logy  of the  swimmers a c ro s s  s tream  
and down s t rea m .  I f  the d i s t a n c e s  are  e q u a l ,  the  former 
swimmer must g e t  back f i r s t .
8 ^
seems p a ra d o x ic a l^ s o  r a d i c a l l y  to  d i s t r u s t  space-m easurem ent, 
and a t  the  same time to  i n s i s t  on our a c cu ra te  measurement 
of  t im e ,  which i s  u s u a l l y  measured by motion in  sp ace .  As 
Gunn e x p re ssed  i t : -  "The supposed c o n t r a c t i o n  to  which the 
L o r e n t z - F i t z g e r a l d  f i g u r e s  r e f e r  i s  a m a t te r  of p e r s p e c t i v e .  
The L o r e n t z - F i t z g e r a l d  e q u a t io n s  merely  i n t e r p r e t  the M ichel­
son-Morley exper im ent  i f  we d e f in e  d i s t a n c e s  by the time i t
1
tak es  l i g h t  to  t r a v e r s e  them." Secondly ,  t h i s  p o s t u l a t e d  
c o n t r a c t i o n  cannot be e m p i r i c a l l y  conf irm ed .  The v e l o c i t y  of 
l i g h t ,  c ,  i s  so enormous compared w i th  speeds of moving ob­
j e c t s  on the e a r t h ,  t h a t  w i th  normal speeds the c o n t r a c t io n  
i s  so sm all  t h a t  i t  i s  im poss ib le  to  d e t e c t .  Whereas when 
we are^ d e a l in g  w i th  supposed ly  h ig h  v e l o c i t i e s ,  such as the 
v e l o c i t y  of the  e a r t h  th rough  space ,  the  c o n t r a c t i o n  should  
in  th e o ry  be d e t e c t a b l e ,  but u n f o r t u n a t e ly  i t  cannot be 
d e t e c t e d ,  because we and e v e ry th in g  we might measure w i th  are 
moving w ith  the e a r t h ,  and th e r e f o r e  a re  presumably undergo­
ing  the  same c o n t r a c t i o n .  Hence the p o s t u l a t e d  shr inkage  can 
n e i t h e r  be proved nor d isp ro v ed ,  and fo r  t h i s  reason  i t  could  
not  be more th an  a temporary m a k e s h i f t .
T h i rd ly ,  the c o n t r a c t i o n ,  i f  th e re  be one, i s  of a 
d i f f e r e n t  k ind  from any known c o n t r a c t i o n ,  s ince  i t  s e t s  up 
no e f f e c t s ,  such as  s t r a i n s  and s t r e s s e s ,  which c o n t r a c t i o n
1 .  Op.c i t .  p . 205. On the o th e r  hand, see W hitehead’ s 
a r t i c l e , "Space, Time, and R e l a t i v i t y "  ( A r i s t .  Soc.
P ro c .  1915-16) •
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norm ally  does;  and, too ,  th e re  i s  no ap p a ren t  d i f f e r e n c e  
between d i f f e r e n t  m a t e r i a l s ,  f o r  example, wood and g l a s s ,  in  
t h e i r  r e s i s t a n c e  to  the c o n t r a c t i o n .  I t  would seem t h a t  the 
c o n t r a c t i o n  i s  no t  a p h y s i c a l  c o n t r a c t i o n ,  but a mebhodological  
’ dodge’ c o n t r iv e d  to  make the  m athem atica l  r e s u l t s  t a l l y .  I t  
i s  o b v io u s ly  on ly  a m a k e s h i f t .
But the importance of t h i s  su gg es ted  e x p la n a t io n  
was, t h a t  i t  went f u r t h e r  a f i e l d  than  o th e r  more obvious ex­
p l a n a t i o n s  (such  as t h a t  the e t h e r - d r i f t  always managed e x a c t ­
l y  to  n u l l i f y  the ex p ec ted  e f f e c t ) , and r a i s e d  a number of 
q u e s t io n s  which a re  of c a p i t a l  im portance-
The f i r s t  concerns  the n a tu re  of measurement. I f ,  
a s  we are  t o l d ,  o b j e c t s  " rea l j ry  a r e " a d i f f e r e n t  l e n g th  from 
what they  are  measured to  be, we g e t  what i s  a very  u n d e s i r ­
ab le  d i s t i n c t i o n  between the appearance and the unseeab le  
r e a l i t y ,  and one which i s  in  the end f a t a l  to  s c i e n c e .
On the o th e r  hand, i t  does r a i s e  the very  im por tan t  
q u e s t io n  how f a r  what i s  measured by p h y s ic s  co rresponds  to  
the concep ts  which p h y s ic s  has of the th in g s  which are  sup­
posed to  be m easured. In  o th e r  words, the concepts  ’ sp ac e ’ 
and ’ t im e ’ and so on, as  a t  p r e s e n t  used  in  p h y s ic s ,  a re  ^
a d m i t te d ly  d i f f e r e n t  from the p l a i n  man’ s concep t ion  of them: 
i s  i t  a l s o  the case t h a t  they  are  d i f f e r e n t  from the
1. Though Bddington s u r p r i s i n g l y  says ,  "P e rc e p tu a l  space and 
time i s  the same as th e  measured space and time which 
the s u b j e c t - m a t t e r  of n a t u r a l  geom etry ."  ("Space,  Time,
and R e l a t i v i t y " ,  p .  15.)
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m easurable  q u a n t i t i e s  w i th  which the p r a c t i s i n g  p h y s i c i s t  i s  
concerned? I t  would seem so .  Hence the  need f o r  a c l e a r e r  and 
s t r i c t e r  use of  th ese  c o n c e p ts .  Broad pu t  the p o in t  c o n c i s e ly  
when he s a i d ,  "The L o r e n tz - F i t z g e r a l d  c o n t r a c t i o n  ceases  to 
be a p h y s i c a l ^ s h o r t e n i n g , and becomes a q u e s t io n  of u n i t s  of 
measurement."
T h i rd ly ,  the o ld  c o n t ro v e r s y  between s u p p o r te r s  of 
r e l a t i v e  and a b s o lu te  motion i s  reopened ,  t h i s  time in  con­
n e c t io n  w i th  such q u e s t io n s  as "What do we mean bÿf t h e ’ 
v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t ? "  "What do we mean by the v e l o c i t y  of the 
e a r t h  th rough  space?"
F o u r th ly ,  the  o ld  p h y s ic s  took i t  f o r  g ra n te d  t h a t
we knew what we meant by say ing  t h a t  two l i g h t  ray s  l e f t  or
2
r e tu r n e d  to  a source 0 " a t  the  same t im e " .  I s  t h i s  the ca se ,  
o r  have we i n  p h y s ic s ,  w i th  an in c r e a s i n g  s o p h i s t i c a t i o n  i n  
the  concep ts  we u s e ,  to  d i s c a r d  our p r i m i t i v e  i n t u i t i v e  
awareness of " s im u l ta n e i ty "  and to  make t h a t  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  too?
The l a s t  two q u e s t io n s  are  the fundamental  ones: 
the o t h e r s ,  though s u f f i c i e n t l y  im p o r ta n t ,  a r i s e  i n c i d e n t a l l y .
1. "iSuclid, Newton, and T i n s t a i n . "  ( "H ih h e r t  Jou rn a l"  1919-20, 
p #439.
2 .  As Whitehead e x p re s s e s  i t : -  "The measurement of  t i m e - i n t e r -  
v a l s  i s  a d e t a i l  compared to  s i m u l t a n e i t y .  A may th in k  a 
sermon long ,  and B may th in k  i t  s h o r t ,  hut a t  l e a s t  they  
shou ld  bo th  agree  t h a t  i t  s topped  when the  c lo ck  hand 
p o in t e d  a t  the h o u r ."  ("Space,  Time, and R e l a t i v i t y  ,
P ro c .  A r i s t .  S o c . ,  1915-16, p . 118).
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I t  i s  i n  a sk ing  these  q u e s t i o n s ,  and in  the o r i g i n a l i t y  of 
h i s  answers to  them, t h a t  E i n s t e i n ’ s g r e a t  advance, as f a r  as 
p h y s i c a l  time i s  concerned ,  c o n s is ted *
The r e s t  of t h i s  s e c t i o n  w i l l  he taken  up w i th  d e a l ­
ing  w i th  these  two p rob lem s , of s i m i l t a n e i t y  (and hence tempor* 
a l  r e l a t i o n s  i n  g e n e r a l ) ,  and of the c r i t i c a l  v e l o c i t y  of 
l i g h t ,  and w i th  a t h i r d ,  more u s u a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  the 
name of Minkowski, but a l o g i c a l  development of the  th eo ry  of 
r e l a t i v i t y  -  the q u e s t io n  of  the hyphena ting  of space and 
t i m e . Such a p ro c e d u re ,  of co u rse ,  i s  not to  be taken  as 
im ply ing  t h a t  these  th re e  to p i c s  exhaus t  the b ea r in g  of the 
Theory of R e l a t i v i t y  on t im e ,  nor  t h a t  they  are  independent 
of each  o t h e r :  i t  i s  used  m erely  f o r  convenience of d i s c u s s ­
io n ,  and i t  must a t  the o u t s e t  be emphasized t h a t  ’ t im e ’ i s  
but one of the q u e s t io n s  w i th  which E i n s t e i n  d e a l t ,  and t h a t  
i t s  e x c lu s iv e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  can give us only a very  one­
s id ed  view of the importance of h i s  work. Bearing t h i s  in  
mind, the d i s c u s s io n  of p a r t i c u l a r  p o in t s  can b eg in .
The d e n ia l  of s i m u l t a n e i t y  i s  so g e n e r a l l y  re g a rd ed  
as  a consequence of  the  new d o c t r in e s  in  p hy s ics  t h a t  i t  i s  
o f t e n  over looked  t h a t  t h e " s i m u l t a n e i t y ” which E i n s t e i n  d en ies  
i s  on ly  one s p e c i a l i z e d  k ind  of  s i m u l t a n e i t y .  Granted the
88
1
assum ptions  which p h y s ic s  makes, i t  can be shown t h a t  
s i m u l t a n e i t y  i s  r e l a t i v e  sense t h a t  i t  i m p l i t l y  i n ­
vo lves  r e f e r e n c e  to  a system, and th a t  by changing from one 
a r b i t r a r i l y  chosen system to  a n o th e r ,  we can u p s e t  our former 
d e f i n i t i o n s  of s i m u l t a n e i t y . Hence the c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  "ab­
s o lu t e  s im u l t a n é i t y "  i s  as redundan t  and o t io s e  a concep t ion  
as " a b so lu te  t im e ."  But E i n s t e i n  does not  deny the p o s s i b i l ­
i t y  of an o b j e c t i v e  d e te r m in a t io n  of s i m u l t a n e i t y  w i th in  a 
s in g le  system, and s t i l l  l e s s  do h i s  d o c t r in e s  a f f e c t  our 
immediate judgments of s i m u l t a n e i t y .  (This  l a t t e r  p o in t  w i l l  
be r e tu r n e d  to  l a t e r . )  I t  should  be c l e a r l y  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  the 
d o c t r i n e s  of r e l a t i v e  s i m u l t a n e i t y  and of the c r i t i c a l  v e lo c ­
i t y  of l i g h t  a re  c l o s e l y  connec ted .  "S im u l ta n e i ty  i s  r e la . t iv e "  
méan^^linder c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s ,  my judgments of s im u l t a n e i ty  
a re  (and must be) d i f f e r e n t  from y o u rs ,  and th e re  i s  no way 
of showing t h a t  mine i s  p r e f e r a b l e ." What are  those  con­
d i t i o n s ?  Simply t h a t  the systems of  r e f e r e n c e  which you and I 
choose a re  i n  motion r e l a t i v e l y  to  each  o t h e r .  As E i n s t e i n  
saw, once we h o ld  the d o c t r in e  of r e l a t i v e  motion (so t h a t  
the t r a i n  no lo n g e r  "moves" while  the s t a t i o n  " s ta y s  s t i l l " )  
we have no lo n g e r  any grounds f o r  say ing  - a p a r t  from p r a c ­
t i c a l  convenience - t h a t - A ’ s judgments of s im u l t a n e i ty  are  
" b e t t e r "  than  B’ s (wheré A i s  on the p la t fo rm  and B i s  i n  the
1. Such a s ,  t h a t  time can, f o r  i t s  p u rp o se s ,  be regarded  
as a measurable  continuum, i n f i n i t e l y  d i v i s i b l e ,  r e v e r s ­
i b l e ,  e t c .
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t r a i n ) .  As S i n s t a i n  h im se l f  pu t  i t ,  "C e r ta in  sense p e r c e p t io n s  
oÿ d i f f e r e n t  i n d i v i d u a l s  co r respond  to  each  o th e r ,  while  fo r  
o th e r  sense  p e r c e p t i o n s  no such correspondence can be e s t a b -  
l i s h e d *  We are  accugtomed to  re g a rd  as r e a l  th ose  sense p e r ­
c e p t io n s  which a re  common to  d i f f e r e n t  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  and which 
t h e r e f o r e  are  i n  a measure im p e rso n a l .  . . .  The only  j u s t i f i c ­
a t i o n  f o r  our concep ts  and system of concepts  i s  t h a t  they
serve  to  r e p r e s e n t  the complex of our e x p e r ie n c e s :  beyond
1
t h i s  they  have no l e g i t im a c y . "  This may be g r a n te d .  But i t  
i s  a f u r t h e r  p o i n t ,  and one which does not  fo l lo w  l o g i c a l l y  
from i t ,  but i s  based on the  p r a c t i c e  of p h y s i c i s t s ,  t h a t  
the  p h y s i c i s t ’ s judgment of  s i m u l t a n e i t y  should  be determ ined  
by the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of l i g h t .  These two s e p a ra te  p o i n t s  
have been s e v e r a l l y  c r i t i c i s e d .
F i r s t l y ,  as r e g a rd s  th d  importance of l i g h t - s i g n a l s .  
I t  i s  one th in g  to  say t h a t  we cannot make judgments of 
s i m u l t a n e i t y  w i th  r e g a rd  to  ev en ts  a t  some d is ta n c e  from each 
o th e r  w i th o u t  the  he lp  of l i g h t - s i g n a l s :  i t  i s  q u i te  an o th e r  
to  de f ine  s i m u l t a n e i t y  as depending on l i g h t - s i g n a l s . Mr.
W.D. Ross,  i n  h i s  paper  in  a Symposium on "The P h i lo s o p h ic a l  
Aspect  of the Theory of R e l a t i v i t y " ,  a s s e r t e d  t h a t / S i n s t e i n  
had done the l a t t e r ,  h i s  p rocedure  would have been c i ^ u l a r ,
1. "The Meaning of R e l a t i v i t y " ,  p . 2.
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bu t  as i t  was, he was on ly  seek ing  a t e s t  o f  s i m u l t a n e i t y .
On the o th e r  hand, a c co rd in g  to  Whitehead, 3 i n s t a i n  wa^
a t t e m p t in g  to  d e f in e  s i m u l t a n e i t y  by means of l i g h t - s i g n a l s .  I f
t h a t  i s  so ,  t h e r e  i s  a s u s p ic io n  of c i r c u l a r i t y  about i t ,
s ince  the v e l o c i t y  of  l i g h t  i s  taken as f i n i t e  and to measure
judgments ol s i m u l t a n e i t y  a re  requ ired#  As Reichenbach
say s ,  "V e lo c i ty  can be measured only  when s im u l t a n e i ty  i s
a l r e a d y  d e f in e d :  hence s i m u l t a n e i t y  cannot be r e g u la t e d  by
2
measurements of  v e l o c i t y . "  But i t  could  ve ry  w e l l  be r e p l i e d  
t h a t  the p rocedure  i s  no t  r e a l l y  c i r c u l a r ,  the p r i m i t i v e  
judgment of s i m u l t a n e i t y  on which the measurement of the 
v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t  i s  based  i s  not  the  same as the s i m u l t a n e i t y  
which i n  the  f i n a l  r e s u l t  i s  c a l l e d  " r e l a t i v e . "  And I t h in k  
a very  good case could  be made out f o r  say ing  t h a t  these  are
not the same.
The second p o in t  has  been something of a "cause 
c é lè b re "  in  r é c e n t  y e a r s .  The p r o t a g o n i s t s  have been such 
c e l e b r a t e d  men as Bergson, M a r i t a in ,  and Nordmann. B r i e f l y , 
the  two former have c r i t i c i s e d  E i n s t e i n  on the  ground t h a t ,  
a f t e r  a l l ,  E i n s t e i n  has not succeeded in  h i s  a t tem pt to  do 
away w i th  a p r i v i l e g e d  sys tem . They base t h e i r  c r i t i c i s m  on 
the  c e l e b r a t e d  ana logy  about the judgments of s i m u l t a n e i t y
3 ' ' t h ï s ' ' b o % k ' ' L r ^ ^ ^ ^  ( H i b % r f  J o u r Z r
1919-20, p . 397) •
2 .  "Atom and Cosmos", (Eng. t r a n s . )  p . 58.
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madd by a man i n  a v e ry  f a s t  t r a i n ,  and a man s ta n d in g  by the 
r a i lw a y  l i n e .  According to  S i n s t e i n ,  these  d i f f e r .  According 
to  h i s  c r i t i c s ,  S i n s t a i n  has only shown t h a t  the man on the 
ground would judge t h a t  the man in  the t r a i n  saw the two 
e v e n ts  a t  d i f f e r e n t  t im es ,  no t  t h a t  the  man in  the t r a i n  
a c t u a l l y  d id  see them a t  d i f f e r e n t  t im e s ,  which i s  the r e a l  
p o in t  a t  i s s u e .  They c la im  t h a t  E i n s t e i n  has no r i g h t  to con­
s i d e r  t h a t  A’ s judgments about B’ s p e r c e p t io n s  agree  w ith  
what B a c t u a l l y  p e r c e i v e s ;  and t h a t  the m is taken  i d e n t i f i c ­
a t i o n  i s  due to the f a c t  t h a t  E i n s t e i n  i s  s t i l l  i m p l i c i t l y  
c o n s id e r in g  the judgment of the mam on the ground to  be the 
" c o r r e c t "  o n e . Nordma^nn, who a c te d  as judge in  the  c o n t ro v e r sy ,  
p o in te d  out t h a t  the c r i t i c i s m  of a p a r t i c u l a r  example d id  
not  demolish  E i n s t e i n ’ s main c o n te n t io n s  w i th  r e g a rd  to 
s i m u l t a n e i t y , s ince  these  depended on m athem atica l  p rem ises ,  
and not  on a sem i-popu la r  e x p o s i t i o n .  He a l s o  showed t h a t  i t  
was p o s s ib l e  to  r e s t a t e  even the example i n  q u e s t io n  so t h a t  
the c r i t i c i s m s  of Bergson and M a r i t a in  no lon g e r  a p p l i e d .  In  
a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  Nordmann’ s view i s  c o r r e c t ,  and th e re  i  
need to  e n t e r  i n t o  i t  more f u l l y  h e r e .
"Revue U n i v e r s e l l e " ,  1924 (no t  1923, as ITordmann, and
8 no
fo l lo w in g  him, Gunn, g ive)  . .
D e t a i l e d  acco un ts  o f  the c o n t ro v e rs y  a re  g iv en  by Nortoann, 
"The Tyranny of Time", p p . 157-204, and by Gunn, o p . c i t .  
p p . 192-8, who a g ree s  w i th  Nordmann’ s summing up .
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For p h y s i c s ,  th en ,  s i m u l t a n e i t y  i s  r e l a t i v e  -  i n  a 
sense t h a t  can be s t r i c t l y  d e f in e d ,  i f  n e c e s s a ry .  That t h i s  
i s  30 does not  mean any v e ry  g r e a t  m o d i f i c a t io n  in  p r a c t i c e ,  
f o r  i t  i s  on ly  where g r e a t  speeds and g r e a t  accuracy  are  con­
ce rned  t h a t  the  o ld  method does not g ive a s u f f i c i e n t l y  ex a c t  
a p p ro x im a t io n .  Addington’ s a v i a t o r  i s  n o t ,  as y e t ,  i n  s e r io u s  
danger of c o m p e t i t io n .
The nex t  q u e s t i o n ,  and a very  im po r tan t  one, i s  the 
e f f e c t  t h a t  the new d o c t r i n e s  r e g a rd in g  s i m u l t a n e i t y  have on 
the  p l a i n  man’ s u n h e s i t a t i n g  b e l i e f  t h a t  two ev e n ts  j u s t  are 
s im u l tan e o u s ,  and t h a t  th e re  i s  an end of i t .  But i f  he i s  
g iven  a c a r e f u l l y  g ra d u a te d  s e r i e s  of examples, beg inning  
w i th  the f a m i l i a r  " f l a s h  and bang" of  a d i s t a n t  gun, going on 
to  two guns between which he s t a n d s ,  and ending with  f u l l ­
blown E i n s t e i n  and t r a i n s  and l i g h t - s i g n a l s , he w i l l  admit 
t h a t  i t  fo l low s  from th ese  t h a t  s i m u l t a n e i t y  i s ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  
r e l a t i v e .  How i s  he to  r e c o n c i l e  the  two? The fundamental  
p o in t  i s ,  I  t h i n k ,  t h a t  the s i m u l t a n e i t y  w i th  which E i n s t e i n  
d e a ls  i s  only  a very  d i s t a n t  cous in  of the s i m u l t a n e i t y  w ith  
which the p l a i n  man and the m e tap h y s ic ian  are  concerned,  j u s t  
as the  p h y s ic a l  concept " t "  i s  a v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  th in g  from 
time as  e x p e r ien ced  and Time as the bane of the s y s te m -b u i ld e r  
E i n s t e i n ’ s a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  s i m u l t a n e i t y  i s  r e l a t i v e  has no 
d e ro g a to ry  e f f e c t  a t  a l l  - excep t  as the  r e s u l t  of con fus ion
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upon the c e r t a i n t y  of the p l a i n  man t h a t  h i s  judgments of 
s i m u l t a n e i t y  a re  t r u e .  I f  the  s c e p t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t  says t h a t  
t h i s  i s  "merely s u b j e c t i v e "  and tha t  c e r t a i n t y  i s  not know­
le d g e ,  we may g r a n t  i t ,  but a s s e r t  t h a t  i t  does not  m a t te r  - 
i f  i t  d id ,  th e re  cou ld  be no s c i e n c e .
" S im u l ta n e i ty "  i s  now a dangerous ly  ambiguous word,
2
s ta n d in g  f o r  a t  l e a s t  two q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  n o t i o n s .  That they  
a re  d i f f e r e n t  does no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  mean t h a t  one i s  a g r e a t  
improvement on the o t h e r .  "S im u l ta n e i ty "  as i t  i s  now used in  
p h y s ic s  i s  a l o g i c a l  development of t h a t  a s p e c t  of time in  
which alone p h y s ic s  i s  i n t e r e s t e d  - i t s  measurable a s p e c t .  
C onsequen tly ,  th e re  i s  both g a in  and lo s s  - g a in  in  t h a t  i t  
i s  s t r i c t l y  d e l im i t e d  and p la y s  i t s  p a r t  in  the p e r f e c t e d  
techn ique  of p h y s ic s  -  l o s s  i n  t h a t  c e r t a i n  a s p e c t s  a r e ,  
n e c e s s a r i l y ,  ig n o re d .
The p l a i n  man i s ,  j u s t i f i a b l y ,  r a t h e r  
pu zz led  when he i s  t o l d  t h a t  ey e n ts  are  not  " r e a l l y "  s im ul­
tan eo u s ,  however much the dem o n s t ra t io n  of the m athem atic ian
1. A llowing ,  of co u rse ,  f o r  e r r o r s  of o b s e rv a t io n  in  complic­
a t e d  c a s e s .  But I am r e f e r r i n g  once more to  the p r im i t iv e  
p e r c e p t io n  of two ev e n ts  as happening " a t  the  same t im e ."  
Compare Bergson, "Durée e t  S i m u l t a n é i t é " ,  p . 116-7.
2 .  Theré may be more. Gunn, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  fo u r  
sen ses  ( o p . c i t .  p . 424) .  But the fundamenta l  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  
between these  two. See a l s o  the c l e a r  and i n t e r e s t i n g  
remarks of M a r i t a in  in  h i s  e s sa y  on "The Mathematical  
A t t e n u a t io n  of Time" i n  the volume "The Freedom of the 
I n t e l l e c t "  ( e s p e c i a l l y  p p . 85, and $ 0 -9 6 ) .
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may have s i l e n c e d  him. He may wallow in  an i n f i n i t y  of "he re -  
nows" and " a b s o lu te  e lsew heres"  and he may acq u ie sce  in  t a l k ­
ing  of  ev e n ts  t h a t  a re  " n e i t h e r  before  nor a f t e r "  each o th e r :  
but when i t  comes to  the p o i n t ,  however much he may agree  in  
th e o ry ,  th e re  w i l l  be a m ental  r e s e r v a t i o n  somewhere t h a t  
" r e a l l y " ,  i t  must be e i t h e r  t ru e  o r  no t  t ru e  t h a t  two even ts  
"a re"  s im u l tan e o u s ,  and th a t  f a i l i n g  s i m u l t a n e i t y ,  th e re  must 
be some k ind  of  tem pora l  r e l a t i o n  (be fo re  or  a f t e r )  ho ld in g  
between them -  though to  him and everyone e l s e  they  seem to  be 
i n  d i f f e r e n t  c a u sa l  s e r i e s .  In  o th e r  words, the admission 
t h a t  two ev e n ts  a re  not c a u s a l ly  r e l a t e d  does not  seem to  him 
to  e n t a i l  t h a t  th e re  can be no tem poral  r e l a t i o n s  h o ld in g  
between them. He i s  j u s t i f i e d ,  i n  t h a t  the  sense in  which 
p h y s ic s  t a l k s  about even ts  t h a t  are  n e i t h e r  be fo re  nor a f t e r  
each o th e r  i s  a s p e c i a l i s e d  one - r i g h t l y  from i t s  p o in t  of 
view, but  l i a b l e  to  cause con fus ion  i f  too c a v a l i e r l y  
eq u a ted  w i th  what we o r d i n a r i l y  mean by before  and a f t e r .  For 
tem poral  r e l a t i o n s ,  as t r e a t e d  i n  modern p h y s ic s ,  a re  r e ­
l a t i o n a l  r i g h t  enough -  in  t h e i r  connec t ing  of ev en ts  l i e s  
t h e i r  u t i l i t y  and importance -  but they  are  s c a r c e ly  "tem­
p o r a l " ,  excep t  i n  the  s p e c i a l i s e d  sense in  which p hys ics
the word. We have seen  t h i s  in  the case of s i m u l t a n e i t y ,  
i t h  which E i n s t e i n  h im se l f  was s p e c i a l l y  concerned, but i t
u ses  
wi
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h o lds  good th ro u g h o u t .  P h y s ic s  never  t a l k s  about "p a s t"  and 
" f u t u r e " :  i t  i s  always " b e f o r e - a n d - a f t e r "  which i s  a l o g i c a l  
r e l a t i o n  used  to  connect  e v e n t s .  Expressed  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  p h y s ic s  
tak e s  ev e n ts  in  a b s t r a c t i o n  from t h e i r  happen ing , and c o n s id e r s  
on ly  the o rd e r  of  t h e i r  happening: hence before  and a f t e r  i s  
not s t r i c t l y  a tem poral  r e l a t i o n , though the e lem ents  which 
i t  r e l a t e s  a re  tem p o ra l .  Thus Robb, who has made an i n t e r ­
e s t i n g  and im p o r tan t  a t tem p t  to  c o n s t r u c t  a geometry based 
on the b e f o r e - a n d - a f t e r  r e l a t i o n  ( r a t h e r  than  on the  more 
u s u a l  s p a t i a l  r e l a t i o n s )  f i n d s  no d i f f i c u l t y  in  f i t t i n g  space 
in to  h i s  geom etry .  " S p a t i a l  r e l a t i o n s  are to  be reg a rd ed  as 
a m a n i f e s t a t i o n  of  the f a c t s  t h a t  the e lem ents  of time form
a system in  c o n ic a l  o rd e r  : a co ncep t ion  which may be an a ly se d
1
in  terms of the r e l a t i o n s  a f t e r  and b e f o r e . "  Again, " I f  we 
c a l l  any element of the  e n t i r e  s e t  an " i n s t a n t " ,  any i n e r t i a  
l i n e  of the s e l e c t e d  system a " p o in t " ,  any a c c e l e r a t i o n  p lane  
of the  s e l e c t e d  system a " s t r a i g h t  l i n e " ,  and any r o t a t i o n  
t h r e e f o l d  of the s e l e c t e d  system "a p l a n e " :  we can speak of 
succeed ing  i n s t a n t s  a t  any g iven  p o i n t ,  and have thus  ob­
t a i n e d  a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of the spac^and time of our exper ience  
i n  so f a r  as t h e i r  g e o m e t r ic a l  r e l a t i o n s  a re  concerned ."
Since Robb i s  no t  a s u p p o r t e r  of S i n s t a i n  and h a s ,  indeed ,
1 .  "A Theory of Time and Space" .  p .3 7 0 .
2 .  O p . c i t .  p . 367.
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c r i t i c i s e d  him ( f o r  ov e r look ing  the importance of the  befo re  
and a f t e r  s e r i e s  ) We may take  i t  t h a t  t h i s  tendency to  de- 
t e m p o ra l i s e  time and temporal r e l a t i o n s ,  i s  not con f ined  to 
the r e l a t i v i s t s ,  bu t  i s  common to  a l l  p h y s i c i s t s .  The d i f f e r ­
ence between the p l a i n  man and the p h y s i c i s t  i s  w e l l - e x p re s s e d  
by Addington; "Those who s u s p e c t  t h a t  A i n s t e i n ’ s th eo ry  i s
u n j u s t i f i a b l e  t r i c k s  w i th  time shou ld  r e a l i s e  t h a t  i t  
l e a v e s  e n t i r e l y  untouched t h a t  time su c c e s s io n  of  which we 
have i n t u i t i v e  knowledge, and co n f in e s  i t s e l f  to  o v e rhau l ing
the a r t i f i c i a l  scheme of time which Rttmer f i r s t  in t ro d u c e d
2
i n t o  p h y s i c s . "  R e l a t i v i t y  p h y s ic s ,  th en ,  in  r a i s i n g  the ques­
t i o n  as to  the p r e c i s e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  which temporal r e l a t i o n s  
such as  s i m u l t a n e i t y  have f o r  i t , i s  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  say ing  
an y th in g  which i s  r e l e v a n t  f o r  the m e tap h y s ic ian ,  s t i l l  l e s s  
i s  i t  l a y in g  down d i c t a  to  which m etaphysics  must conform.
This  i s  n o t ,  of co u rse ,  in te n d e d  as a c r i t i c i s m  of p h y s i c s .  
What can he c r i t i c i s e d  i s  the  i l l e g i t i m a t e  passage  from the 
r e s u l t s  of p h y s ic s  to  m e tap h y s ic s .  Bergson r i g h t l y  p o in t s  out 
t h a t  the ’ t ’ of p h y s ic s  i s  h a r d ly  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  from space,  
t h a t  the  concept o f " s im u l t a n e i ty "  i s  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  and a long 
way removed from the expe r ience  of the p l a i n  man, and t h a t  
p h y s ic s  confuses  time as p a s s in g  and time as p a s sed ,  w i th  
d i s a s t r o u s  r e s u l t s .  But th ese  are no t  v a l i d  c r i t i c i s m s  a g a in s t
1. See "Absolute R e la t i o n s  of Time and Space ."
2 .  "The Theory of R e l a t i v i t y  and i t s  In f lu e n c e  on S c i e n t i f i c  
Thought", p . 18.
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p h y s i c a l  t i m e ,  u n l e s s  p h y s i c a l  t i m e  i s  c l a i m e d  t o  he a  f a i r  
a n d  c o m p l e t e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  " T i m e " .  And t h i s  i s  v e r y  r a r e l y  
s e r i o u s l y  h e l d ,  e x c e p t  by  i m p l i c a t i o n ,  w hen  i t  i s  m o s t  d a n ­
g e r o u s  .
The second to p ic  to  be d i s c u s s e d  concerns the n o t io n  
of the v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t  as c r i t i c a l .  The R e s t r i c t e d  Theory 
of R e l a t i v i t y  depends in  g r e a t  p a r t  upon the assumption t h a t  
l i g h t ,  u n l ik e  an y th in g  e l s e ,  has a v e l o c i t y  which i s  independ­
en t  of the  motion of i t s  so u rce ,  so t h a t  the o rd in a ry  a d d i t i o n  
and s u b t r a c t i o n  of v e l o c i t i e s  no lo n g e r  ho lds  good. I t  has 
been made a s u b je c t  of c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  in  the G en e ra l i s ed  
Theory t h i s  assum ption  i s  cas6 a s i d e ,  and t h a t  the G e n e ra l i s e d  
Theory a p p a r e n t ly  r e s t s  on p o s t u l a t e s  c o n t r a ry  to  those of 
the R e s t r i c t e d  T heory . .B u t  i t  i s  not t h a t  they  are  i n  c o n t r a ­
d i c t i o n  so much as t h a t  the General Theory in c lu d e s  what was 
only  in co m p le te ly  s y n th e s i s e d  in  the S p e c ia l  Theory. The 
c r i t i c i s m  r e s t s  on a wrong co n cep t io n  of what "the c r i t i c a l  
v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t "  means.
I t  i s  u su a l  to  say t h a t  the  v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t  i s  
f i n i t e ,  and t h a t  i t  i s  186,000 m ile s  p e r  second. Such an 
enormous v e l o c i t y ,  e m p i r i c a l l y , d i f f e r s  from i n f i n i t y  not 
a t  a l l :  no one, i t  i s  sa fe  to  a f f i r m ,  has ever  d i r e c t l y  ob­
se rved  t h a t  l i g h t  " ta k e s  a f i n i t e  time" (however small)  to  
t r a v e l  a c e r t a i n  d i s t a n c e .  But very  minute and exac t
98
exper im ents  have e s t a b l i s h e d  i n d i r e c t l y  t h a t  l i g h t  tak es  a 
f i n i t e  time to t r a v e l .  (S e c o n d a r i ly ,  and more weakly, i t  may
be u rged  th a t  the time l a g  between " f l a s h "  and "bang" shows
t h a t  sound has a f i n i t e  v e l o c i t y ,  and from t h a t  an analogy 
may be made to  the case of l i g h t :  or a m e tap hy s ica l  view may 
be taken  t h a t  a l l  ev e n ts  - i n c lu d in g  the p ro p a g a t io n  of l i g h t  
- must " take  t im e ." )  E v i d e n t l y , only the  f i r s t  argument i s  of 
much value -  n e v e r t h e l e s s  I t h in k  t h a t  i t  i s  o f t e n  supplemented 
in  p r a c t i c e ,  by vaguely  fo rm u la ted  m e tap h y s ica l  assum ptions .
On the o th e r  hand, i s  the i n s i s t e n c e  of the R e s t r i c t ­
ed Theory t h a t  the v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t  has a p e c u l i a r i t y  t h a t ,  
o th e rw is e ,  c h a r a c t e r i s e s  only  i n f i n i t e  w holes .  This c h a r a c t e r -  
i d t i c  i s ,  t h a t  the o rd in a ry  r u l e s  of a r i t h m e t i c  do not apply  
to  i t .  This i s  tan tam ount to  say ing  t h a t ,  îm one s e n s e , we 
might as  w e l l  c a l l  the v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t  i n f i n i t e  and &ave
done w i th  i t .  ^
I f  we d e f in e  time - i n t e r v a l s , as îTordmann d id ,  in  
terms of the v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t  ( a d m i t te d ly  a h ig h ly  Pickwick­
i a n  d e f i n i t i o n ) , we cannot but admit in  the end t h a t  time i s  
m ere ly  a f u n c t i o n  of l i g h t .  In  o th e r  words, time measured 
e x c lu s i v e l y  by l i g h t - s i g n a l s  i s  bound to  l e a d  to  the n o t io n  
of the  v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t  as p e c u l i a r , and d i s t i n c t  from
f i e l d . "  ( " 3 i n s te  in  and the  U n ive rse" ,  p . 6 5 j .
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o th e r  v e l o c i t i e s ,  s im ply  because th e re  i s  no way of g iv in g  
meaning to  the  q u e s t io n  "How long does i t  take l i g h t  to 
t r a v e r s e  t h i s  g iven  f i n i t e  d i s t a n c e ? "  I t  i s  because we have 
a dua l  co n c ep t io n  of t im e ,  because we do not on ly  t h in k  of 
time in  terms of i t s  measurement by l i g h t - s i g n a l s ,  t h a t  we 
can a t t a c h  meaning to t h i s  q u e s t io n :  o therw ise  i t  would be 
s i l l y  to  say e i t h e r  t h a t  l i g h t  " took  time" or  t h a t  i t  d id  
not  ’ take t im e ’ , s ince  the  n o t io n  of time would have no 
a p p l i c a t i o n .  S i n s t a i n  saw t h a t  the l o g i c a l  r e s u l t
of  the  p h y s i c i s t ’ s co ncep t ion  of  time as an i n t e r v a l  measured 
by l i g h t - s i g n a l s  was t h a t  l i g h t  must be co n s id e re d  as exempt 
from o rd in a r y  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , such as the a d d i t i o n  and sub­
t r a c t i o n  of  r e l a t i v e  v e l o c i t i e s .  The p o in t  i s  l i a b l e  to  be
1
obscured  by the r e t e n t i o n  of the f i n i t e  f i g u r e  f o r  the 
v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t :  t h e re  seems no more magic in  the number 
186,000 ( e s p e c i a l l y  as i t  i s  n o t  a round numberl) than  i n  
any o t h e r .  And of course th e r e  i s n ’ t :  the magic l i e s  i n  the 
s imple f a c t  t h a t  we have s t a r t e d  by assuming i t s  constancy  
(a s  we must,  i f  i t  i s  to  be our s t a n d a r d ) .  P o in c a re ,  w r i t i n g  
before  j î i n s t e i n ’ s work was p u b l i s h e d ,  p u ts  the p o in t  c l e a r l y :  
" I I  a commence p a r  adm ettre  que l a  lumière  a une v i t e s s e  
c o n s t a n t e , e t  en p a r t i c u l i e r  que sa  v i t e s s e  e s t  l a  même dans 
t o u t e s  l e s  d i r e c t i o n s .  C’e s t  l à  un p o s t u l a t  sans l e q u e l
1. Which i s  j u s t i f i a b l e  on o th e r  g rounds .  See on.
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aucune mesure de c e t t e  v i t e s s e  ne p o u r r a i t  ê t r e  t e n t é e . "
I f  we once a l low ed  t h a t  A, who was i n  a v e ry  f a s t  a e ro p lan e ,  
found the v e l o c i t y  of  l i g h t  l e s s  than  i t  was f o r  B, s t a t i o n ­
a r y  on the e a r t h ,  we shou ld ,  a p p a r e n t ly ,  s im p l i fy  m a t t e r s .
But,  r e a l l y ,  we shou ld  be makdr% them more complex, because 
we would have u p s e t  the  accuracy  of our s ta n d a rd  to s im p l i fy  
a minor p o i n t ,  and when we came to d i s c u s s  what we meant by 
s ay in g  B was " a t  r e s t " ,  we shou ld  be l e f t  w ith  a whole h o s t  
of c o m p l ica t io n s  r e g a rd in g  the movement of  the e a r t h  r e l a t i v e ­
ly  to  o th e r  p l a n e t s ,  " th rough  sp ace" ,  and so on. To do t h a t
2
would be penny wise and pound f o o l i s h .  As P o in ca re  remarked,
"La s i m u l t a n é i t é  de deux événements, ou l ’ ordre  de l e u r  suc­
c e s s io n ,  1 ’ é g a l i t é  de deux d u ré e s ,  d o iv en t  ê t r e  d é f i n i e s  de 
t e l l e  s o r t e  que l ’ énoncé des l o i s  n a t u r e l l e s  s o i t  a u s s i  simple 
que p o s s i b l e j "  and t h i s  b r in g s  us to  the fundamental  p o in t  
t h a t ,  i f  we "choose the s i m p le s t " ,  we have some choice in  
the m a t t e r .  The measurement of t i m e - i n t e r v a l s , as has  a l r e a d y  
been i n s i s t e d ,  i s  in  some degree c o n v e n t io n a l .  The re le v an ce  
of t h i s  in  the p r e s e n t  connec t ion  i s  t h a t  we need not have 
chosen l i g h t  as our s t a n d a r d ,  but t h a t  the  choice was guided 
by p r a c t i c a l  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  (The very  experim ents  which 
a s s ig n e d  to  l i g h t  a f i n i t e  v e l o c i t y  g r e a t e r  than  a l l  o th e r  
known v e l o c i t i e s  l e d  to  i t s  choice as an " a b so lu te  s tand a rd"  
and hence to  i t s  a p p a re n t ly  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  p r o p e r t i e s . )  I f




t h i s  p o i n t  i s  f o r g o t t e n  i t  i s  a p t  to  seem as i f  E i n s t e i n
eq u a ted  time w ith  l i g h t - s i g n a l s  - an o bv iou s ly  q u e s t io n a b le
p ro c e d u re ,  which Benedicks,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  c r i t i c i s e d  - but
E i n s t e i n  c l e a r l y  r e a l i s e d  and p o in te d  out  in  h i s  e x p o s i t i o n
in  "The Meaning of R e l a t i v i t y "  t h a t  l i g h t  i s  only  chosen as
the b a s i s  of time-measurement because more i s  known about i t
than  about  an y th in g  e l s e .  Hence the r e t e n t i o n  of a f i n i t e
f i g u r e  f o r  the v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t  can be ex p la in ed  as le a v in g
open the p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  the n o t io n  of time i s  no t  wholly
to be a n a ly s e d  in  terms of l i g h t  s i g n a l s ,  and t h a t  t h e r e f o r e
1
i t  can be a p p l i e d  to  the p ro p a g a t io n  of l i g h t  i t s e l f .  On the 
o th e r  hand, the anomalies  which le a d  us to  c a l l  the v e l o c i t i ^  
of l i g h t  " c r i t i c a l "  a re  a d i r e c t  r e s u l t  of the second concep­
t i o n  of time as measured, and measurable  on ly ,  by l i g h t .
The G e n e ra l i s e d  Theory does n o t ,  as sometimes sug­
g e s t e d ,  deny the p o s t u l a t e s  on which the  R e s t r i c t e d  Theory 
r e s t s ,  but i t  i s  b roader  in  i t s  scope,  and so i t  i s  ab le  to 
in c lu de  the two a s p e c t s  of time which in  the R e s t r i c t e d  Theory 
a p p e a r ,  i f  not  i n  o p p o s i t io n ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  uneasy  p a r t n e r s h i p .  
Perhaps  t h a t  i s  why the th eo ry  of R e l a t i v i t y  should  appear  to
1. Compare Bridgman, "The Logic of Modern P h y s ic s"  p . 70: "In 
o r d e r  to a s c r ib e  any simple s i g n i f i c a n c e  to  p o s t u l a t e s  
about the  v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t ,  i t  would seem t h a t  we must 
have an in s t ru m e n t  f o r  measuring t h i s  v e l o c i t y , and t h e r e ­
fo re  f o r  measuring t im e ,  which does not i t s e l f  invo lve  t  e 
p r o p e r t i e s  of l i g h t . "
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have more re le v an ce  to  m etaphysics  than  do most p h y s ic a l  
t h e o r i e s :  though e s s e n t i a l l y  p h y s i c a l  (and to  deny t h i s  would 
he to  oouamit the k ind  of m istake which Bergson r e p e a te d ly  
c r i t i c i s e d ,  the i l l e g i t i m a t e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of p h y s ic s  and 
m etaphysics)  i t  y e t  em phasizes ,  i n  i t s  own way, the danger of  
co n fu s in g  the two concep t ions  of t im e .
The second p o in t  i n  connec t ion  with  the v e l o c i t y  
of l i g h t  i s  a c a u sa l  one. We are  accustomed by now to  p a r a ­
doxes of the t i m e - t r a v e l l e r , who, l i k e  Rip van Winkle, found 
two hundred y e a r s  had e l a p s e d  in  what he thought  was two days,
and of the Young Lady of B r ig h t  who - "e loped  one day
IÏL a  r e l a t i v e  way 
And r e tu r n e d  the p re v io u s  n i g h t . "
We a re  s t i l l  more t i r e d  of  m y th ica l  t r a v e l l e r s  who, whizzing
away from the e a r t h  i n to  space w i th  a v e l o c i t y  g r e a t e r  than
l i g h t ,  ’ see* the ev e n ts  of  t h e i r  l i v e s  happening * backwards’ ,
as  i n  Hordmann’ s example of the r e v e r s e d  b a t t l e  of the Marne,
o r  the ad ven tu res  of Flammarion’ s Lumen. At f i r s t  s i g h t  i t
would seem as i f  R e l a t i v i t y  i s  encourag ing  th e se  p la g u e s .  But
when T in s te  in  s ay s ,  " i f  I  t r a v e l  f a s t e r  than l i g h t ,  even ts
w i l l  happen in  r e v e r s e  o rd e r  f o r  me", he i s  not su g g es t in g
1. Compare a l s o  Fechner ,  "Vier  P a ra d o x a " , which l i k e  "Lumen", 
was w r i t t e n  before  the Theory of R e l a t i v i t y .  Meyerson, in  
h i s  " I d e n t i t y  and R e a l i ty "  p . 217; B re ton ,  in  "Les Mondes 
of 1875; and Hordmann h im s e l f ,  show a h e a l t h y  s c e p t i c i s m .  
But K. P ea rson  ought to  have known b e t t e r  than  to t a l k  
about r e v e r s i b i l i t y  as he d id  i n  the passages  quoted
e a r l i e r .
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t h a t  t h i s  i s  p o s s i b l e :  on the c o n t r a r y ,  the in fe r e n c e  goes 
the o th e r  way. I t  i s  because ev en ts  do not happen in  reveirse 
o r d e r ,  t h a t  the v e l o c i t y  of  l i g h t  cannot be exceeded .  I t  i s  
n o t ,  as i t  might seem a t  f i r s t  s i g h t ,  merely  a q u e s t io n  of 
f i n d i n g  a v e l o c i t y  s l i g h t l y  g r e a t e r  than  t h a t  of l i g h t ,  though 
the p e r s i s t e n c e  of our o ld  h a b i t  o f  th in k in g  of v e l o c i t i e s  
as a d d i t i v e  makes us th in k  so .  Tddington ex p re s se s  the p o in t  
ve ry  c l e a r l y : -  "The l i m i t  to the  v e l o c i t y  of s i g n a l s  i s  our 
bulwark a g a in s t  t h a t  topsy-turvydom  of p a s t  and f u t u r e ,  of 
which T i n s t e i n ’ s th e o ry  i s  sometimes w ro n g fu l ly  accu sed .  Ex­
p r e s s e d  i n  the co n v e n t io n a l  way t h i s  l i m i t a t i o n  of the speed 
of  s i g n a l l i n g  to 299,796 k i lo m e t r e s  a second seems a r a t h e r  
a r b i t r a r y  decree of n a t u r e .  We almost  f e e l  i t  a cha l leng e  to 
f i n d  something t h a t  goes f a s t e r . But i f  we s t a t e  i t  i n  the 
a b s o lu te  form t h a t  s i g n a l l i n g  i s  only  p o s s ib le  along a t r a c k  
of tem poral  r e l a t i o n  and not  a long  a t r a c k  of s p a t i a l  r e l a t i o n  
the  r e s t r i c t i o n  seems r a t i o n a l .  To v io -r la te  i t  we have not mere­
l y  to  f i n d  something which goes j u s t  one k i lo m e tre  p e r  second 
b e t t e r ,  but something which o v e r le ap s  t h a t  d i s t i n c t i o n  of time 
and space - w h ich , we are a l l  convinced,  ought to  be m a in ta in ed  
in  any s e n s ib l e  t h e o r y . "  E d d ing ton ’ s d i s c u s s io n  was i n  terms 
of  h i s  con cep t io n  of Space-Time as a double cone; and he
1. "Nature of the  P h y s ic a l  World", p . 57-8 .
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r i g h t l y  o b je c te d  t h a t  the  o v e r le a p in g  of the c r i t i c a l  v e l o c i t y  
would be to  confuse space and t im e .  A l t e r n a t i v e l y  i t  can be 
re g a rd e d  as a  c o n fu s io n ,  not of space and t im e,  but of cause 
and e f f e c t .  In  so f a r ,  of co u rse ,  as cause and e f f e c t  are  
r eg a rd ed  as  in te rc h a n g e a b le  (a s  they  would be, i d e a l l y ,  in  
t h 0  d.0 t e r m i n i s t i c  systems of l a s t  cen tury)  , t h i s  does not 
m a t te r  a g r e a t  d e a l . But we do norm ally  re g a rd  aause and e f f e c t  
as d i s t i n c t ,  and hence the w eird  e f f e c t  of the r e v e r s e d  b a t t l e  
o f  the Marne, and of B re to n ’ s and Flammarion’ s examples .  The 
w e ird n ess  i s  i n c r e a s e d  by the con fus ion  in to  which, f o r  i n ­
s t a n c e ,  Flammarion f a l l s .  He p e r s i s t s  in  ju dg ing  a sequence 
of  ev e n ts  which e s s e n t i a l l y  means t h a t  our everyday s ta n d a rd s  
of c a u s a l i t y  have l o s t  t h e i r  v a l i d i t y ,  by these  very  s t a n d a r d s .  
I n  o th e r  words, we may i f  we p le a s e  indu lge  in  u n v e r i f i a b l e  
and even n o n s e n s ic a l  s p e c u l a t i o n s ,  but  we have no r i g h t  to 
a t tem p t  to  r e l a t e  them to  the everyday concep t ions  on whose 
d e n ia l  they  are  based .  E i t h e r  cause and e f f e c t  a re  or  are not 
e q u iv a le n t»  i f  th ey  a r e ,  then  the paradoxes  d isap p ea r  i n  
any ca se ,  and th e re  i s  no need to  drag  i n  v e l o c i t i e s  g r e a t e r  
th an  t h a t  of l i g h t ;  i f  they  are  n o t ,  the  paradoxes remain 
p aradoxes  on ly  because we app ly  our p r e s e n t  s t a n d a rd s  to  them. 
This  p o i n t  w i l l  need to  be more f u l l y  d i s c u s s e d  i n  connec t ion  
w i th  what i s  o f t e n  c a l l e d  the  " I r r e v e r s i b i l i t y "  of t im e:  here
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i t  may be sim ply  s t a t e d  t h a t  the o b j e c t i o n  to  speeds g r e a t e r  
th an  l i g h t  i s  t h a t  i t  would b lu r  the d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
cause and e f f e c t ,  and (perhaps  the  same, perhaps  more fundament­
a l )  d i s t i n c t i o n  between space and t im e .
In  p l a c i n g  the v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t ,  which i s  n o t ,  ap­
p a r e n t l y  , as unimpeachable as  the  o th e r  two fundamental d i s ­
t i n c t i o n s ,  on a l e v e l  w i th  them, E i n s t e i n  i s  not  d e t r a c t i n g  
from t h e i r  i n t e g r i t y .  On the c o n t r a r y ,  he i s  p o in t in g  out t h a t  
the consequence of the  t r e n d  in  p h y s ic s  towards d e f in in g  t ime- 
i n t e r v a l s  (such  as s im u l t a n e i ty )  in  terms of l i g h t - s i g n a l s ,  
i s  to endue the v e l o c i t y  of l i g h t  w i th  t h e i r  im por tance .  Hence 
the  moral of the Young Lady of B r ig h t ,  whose f e a t  was an im­
p o s s i b i l i t y ,  i s  t h a t  so i s  such a speed,  i f  i t  l e a d s  to such 
im poss ib le  co nseq uences . The v e l o c i t y  o^ l i g h t  i s  no o rd in a ry  
v e l o c i t y :  i t  i s ,  ^  d e f i n i t i o n , the bar  between p a s t  and 
f u t u r e  ( o r ,  as  th e y  appear  i n  p h y s ic s ,  before  and a f t e r ) ,  and 
such a b a r  must not l i g h t l y  be d i s r e g a r d e d .
The l a s t  im p or tan t  d o c t r in e  to  be d i s c u s s e d  as i l ­
l u s t r a t i n g  the contemporary t r e n d  of though t  in  p h y s ic s  i s  
the d o c t r i n e ,  a r i s i n g  out of the  Theory of R e l a t i v i t y ,  but 
u s u a l l y  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  the work of Minkowski, of  the hyphen­
a t i n g  of space and t im e .  In  Minkowski’ s c e l e b r a t e d  words:
"Prom h e n c e f o r th  space by i t s e l f  and time by i t s e l f  a re  doomed 
to  fade away i n t o  mere shadows, and only  a k ind  of  un ion  of
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the two w i l l  p re se rv e  an independent  r e a l i t y . " ^
Now why should  t h i s  d i s c o v e ry ,  of the e s s e n t i a l  
connec tedness  of space and t im e ,  he h a i l e d  as  such an im p or t ­
a n t  d isco ve ry ^  and why i s  i t  t h a t  p h y s ic s  has a p p a r e n t ly  only 
j u s t  r e a l i s e d  what has been f o r  a c o n s id e ra b le  time s u f f i c ­
i e n t l y  obvious to  the p l a i n  man? The answer i s  not t h a t  the 
p h y s i c i s t  i s  more s t u p i d  than  the p l a i n  man: but t h a t  the  d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  which we have been concerned to  make i s  s t i l l  a p p l i c ­
a b l e .  The importance i s  no t  in  the con nec t ion  of "space" and 
" t im e" :  r a t h e r  i s  i t  in  the d isco v e ry  (which i s  a new one, 
and no t  by any means s e l f - e v i d e n t ,  as  what the p l a i n  man 
th in k s  he means i s ) , t h a t  no s a t i s f a c t o r y  d e s c r i p t i o n  of the 
w orld  in  p h y s i c a l  terms can be c o n s t r u c te d  which does not  
emphasize the need f o r  time c o o rd in a te s  as v/ell a s  space ones .  
The d is c o v e ry  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a m a th em at ica l ,  not  a metaphys­
i c a l  one : shorn  of t h e i r  m athem atica l  co v e r in g s ,  the i n t e r -  
p r e t a t i o n  of x ,  y ,  z ,  and t ,  as  "space" and " t im e" ,  and the 
a s s e r t i o n  of an e s s e n t i a l  co n n ec t io n  between them, i s  l i a b l e  
to  f a l l  f l a t ,  s in ce  even the  p l a i n e s t  of p l a i n  men has  always 
s u s p e c te d  t h a t  th ey  were connected ,  in  c e r t a i n  obvious ways. 
Minkowski’ s c e l e b r a t e d  t ru i sm ;  "Nobody has ave r  n o t i c e d  a
1. "The Theory of  R e l a t i v i t y "  (volume of c o l l e c t e d  monographs) 
"C re a t iv e  E v o lu t io n " ,  (Eng. t r a n s . p.355) .
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p la c e  ex cep t  a t  a t im e,  or  a  time ex cep t  a t  a p l a c e " , ^  i s  so 
obv ious ly  t r i t e ,  i f  i n t e r p r e t e d  l i t e r a l l y ,  t h a t  t h a t  a lone 
ought to l e a d  us to  s u sp ec t  t h a t  what Minkov/ski meant was 
something t h a t  can only  be m is le a d in g ly  t r a n s l a t e d  from i t s  
n a t iv e  m athem atica l  symbols, i n to  o rd in a ry  language .  I t  i s  
once a g a in  the  d i f f i c u l t y  which the p h y s i c i s t  f i n d s  in  i n t e r -  
pre t i n g  h i s  r e s u l t s .
Having s a i d  how m is lead in g  o rd in a r y  language may be, 
to  con t inue  i s  to  c o u r t  d i s a s t e r .  But i t  i s  n e c e s s a ry .
The word "d im ension",  as i t  i s  a t  p r e s e n t  u sed ,  has  
undergone an e x te n s io n  from i t s  o r i g i n a l  use ( to  denote the 
th re e  e m p i r i c a l  dimensions of space) while  u n f o r t u n a t e ly  r e ­
t a i n i n g ,  i n  o rd in a r y  u sag e ,  i t s  o r i g i n a l  meaning. Thus, f o r
2
i n s t a n c e ,  when Rice s ay s :  "Our arrangem ent of even ts  in  a 
t im e -o rd e r  i s  a th re e -d im e n s io n a l  being;’ 6 mode of d e a l in g  w i th  
a s t a t i c  arrangem ent in  a space of fo u r  d im ens ions" , he i s  not  
t a l k i n g  about  the f a m i l i a r  space of everyday e x p e r ie n c e ,  and 
the  second "dimensions" i s  used  in  a h ig h ly  t e c h n i c a l  sense ,  
which i s  p r o p e r ly  n o n - s p a t i a l  ( though the e a r l i e r  p h ra se ,  
"Three d im ens iona l  being" may make us over look  t h i s ) . Very 
rou g h ly  speak ing ,  "dimension" i s  now used  to i n d i c a t e  any way 
in  which an o b j e c t  can be measured.
1. Op.c i t .  p . 76.
2 .  " R e l a t i v i t y "  p . 108. The i t a l i c s  a re  mine.
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Suppose t h a t  I  am measurS}lng an oblong o b j e c t .
B es ides  AB and AD, I may, i f  I p l e a s e ,  take measurements a l s o
a lon g  AC and A3. I n  p r a c t i c e ,  I  do n o t ,  merely because I  f i n d
i t  g u f f i c i e n t  f o r  a graph  to  know AB and AD, and i t  i s  more
conven ien t  than  b o th e r in g  a l s o  w ith  AC* And th e re  i s  a u s e f u l
dodge by which AC can be reg a rd ed ,  f o r  many p u rp o ses ,  merely
by the l e n g th  of the shadow, or p r o j e c t i o n  (AB) i t  throws
upon AX. Supposing we begin  w i th  one dimension on ly ,  AX. Then
we can g e t  a long  very  n i c e l y  f o r  a time by c o n s id e r in g  A3 and
AC only  in  t h e i r  p r o j e c t i o n s  AF and AB along AX. But when we
come to  D, we are i n  a d i f f i c u l t y ,  because AD has no p r o j e c t i o n
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a lo ng  AX. So i f  wsVdecide to in t ro d u ce  a  second dimension,
we would choose AY as the a x i s  f o r  t h i s  second dimension
r a t h e r  th an  AC or A3. I f  we have a p a r a l l e lo g r a m  to d ea l  w i th
f t  s
we u s u a l l y  s t i l l ^ L d o p t  the  same p ro ced u re ,  and use dimensions 
a t  r i g h t  an g le s  to  each o t h e r ,  r e g a r d l e s s  of the f a c t  t h a t  
ad  and BC now have to  be c o n s t r u c t e d .  In  t h i s  we reg a rd  ourowr,
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convenience - i t  i s  im p o r tan t  to  n o t i c e  t h a t  the  dimensions 
we take are  l a r g e l y  co nv en t ion s ,  no t  c a s t - i r o n  s t r u c t u r e s ,  
l i k e  the d i v i s i o n s  of an egg-box, runn ing  in e x o ra b ly  through 
the  w o r ld .  I n  an i n t e r e s t i n g  pa ssag e ,  S i l b e r s t e i n  s ay s ;  "The 
number of  dimensions i s  no t  an in h e r e n t  p r o p e r ty  of  space or  
the  w orld  or  any m an ifo ld  w h a te v e r . To endow i t  w i th  dimension­
a l i t y  some o rd e r in g  p r i n c i p l e  must be im pressed  upon i t . "  Or, 
as a d d in g to n  ex p re s sed  i t ,  " I t  i s  the r e l a t i o n  of o rd e r  which 
i s  i n t r i n s i c  i n  n a t u r e ,  and i s  the same f o r  both squares  and
diamonds; shape i s  p u t  i n t o  n a tu re  by an o b se rv e r  when he has
2
chosen h i s  p a r t i t i o n s . "  We choose these  p a r t i t i o n s ,  our axes ,  
w i th  r e g a r d  to  our own conven ience .  I t  i s  l e s s  t r o u b le  to  take 
our measurements i n  c e r t a i n  ways, and so we use those  ways. I t  
i s  a l s o  l e s s  t r o u b le  to  make as few measurements as  p o s s i b l e ;  
i f  we know AB and AD we can f i n d  A3 w i th o u t  needing to  b o th e r  
w i th  AC as  w e l l .  Consequently  the dimensions we take a re  those  
a t  r i g h t  ang les  to each  o t h e r .  But the  importance i s  not in  
the  mere being a t  r i g h t  a n g le s :  i t  i s  t h a t  two l i n e s  a t  r i g h t  
an g le s  cannot be r e p r e s e n te d  a t  a l l  by each o t h e r ,  and so two 
dimensions a re  n e c e s s a ry  f o r  a  p ro p e r  d e s c r i p t i o n  of them b o th .  
So when we t a l k  about two dimensions a t  r i g h t  an g le s  to  each
o th e r  what we mean i s  no t  p r i m a r i l y  t h a t  i;^ we a c t u a l l y
1. "Theory of R e l a t i v i t y "  p . 316. .
2 .  "Space, Time, and R e l a t i v i t y "  p . 54. L a te r  in  the  s ^ e  book
Sddington remarked t h a t  i t  i s  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  p o s s ib le  to 
d e s c r ib e  phenomena w i th o u t  r e f e r e n c e  to  any mesh-system, 
by a ca ta lo gu e  of co in c id en c es  (b u t  too cumbersome in  
p r a c t i c e )  .
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measured the angle  between the two we should  f i n d  i t  to  be 
90"*, But t h a t  by u s in g  these  dimensions we g e t  two c o e f f i c i e n t s  
n e i t h e r  of which can be d isp en sed  w i th ,  and which a re  the 
s im p le s t  and most economical way in  which we can d e sc r ib e  ob­
j e c t s  w i th in  t h a t  tw o-d im ensional  m a n ifo ld .  This l a s t  c lause  
i s  n e c e s s a ry  as a s a fe g u a rd .  I t  i s  conce ivab le  t h a t  we m ight,  
f o r  convenience ,  make our measurements in  th re e  d i r e c t i o n s ,  
though, t h e o r e t i c a l l y ,  two would have s u f f i c e d .  In  such a case ,  
we shou ld  not  t a l k  of th re e  d im ens io ns , but of th re e  axes in  a 
tw o-d im ensional  sp ace .  S i m i l a r l y ,  we may use "ob lique  a x e s ", 
but i t  i s  s i l l y  to  t a l k  of ob lique  d im en s ion s , - j u s t  as s i l l y  
as i t  i s  to  i n t e r p r e t  "dimensions a t  r i g h t  an g les  to  each o th e r"  
s p a t i a l l y  and l i t e r a l l y .  I t  i s  only  too easy  to  confuse a x i s  
and d im en s ion .
The p l a i n  man, not u n n a t u r a l l y ,  has g r e a t  d i f f i c u l t y  
i n / s e e i n g  what can be meant by t a l k  about " te n  d im ensions,  a l l  
a t  r i g h t  an g le s  to each o t h e r . "  What i t  comes t o ,  i s  t h a t  "a t  
r i g h t  an g le s"  i s  a compendious way of say in g ,  "Ten dimensions 
a re  needed f o r  the complete d e s c r i p t i o n  of t h i s  o b j e c t .  I  have 
so chosen them t h a t ,  though I  might con ce ivab ly  have needed 
more than  te n  c o o r d in a te s ,  i f  I  had chosen d i f f e r e n t l y ,  I could  
not p o s s i b l y  have done w i th  l e s s .  Ten i s  the minimum. "
So, in  the new p h y s ic s ,  when i t  i s  s a i d  t h a t  the 
dimensions of  " s p a c e - t im e " a re  a t  r i g h t  an g le s  to  each o t h e r ,  
t h a t  does not  mean, as the  p l a i n  man might th in k  (and as too
I l l
many w r i t e r s  on p h y s ic s  seam to  t h i n k ) , t h a t  time i s  somehow 
reduced  to  a dimension of s p a c e . I t  means p r e c i s e l y  the con­
t r a r y .  When we want to graph a t i m e - i n t e r v a l ,  we must show 
t h a t  i t  i s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from space ,  and to  do t h i s  we pu t  
i t  a t  r i g h t  an g le s  to  space ,  o therw ise  we would be c o n s id e r in g  
i t  as r e s o lv a b le  i n  terms of s p a c e . I t  would be a d e lu s io n  to 
suppose t h a t  the " a t  r i g h t  ang le s"  i s  s p a t i a l :  i t s  meaning i s  
much wider th an  t h a t .  (Of co u rse ,  i n  the example j u s t  g iven ,  
by the ve ry  n a tu re  of g raph ing  we are g iv in g  a s p a t i a l  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n :  but we must not conclude t h a t  t h i s  i s  a l l  t h a t  i s  
m ean t .)
And here  we come to  the second e x te n s io n  of "dimens­
io n " ,  which r e a l l y  fo llov/s  on from the f i r s t .  "Dimension" 
lo s e s  a l l  s p e c i f i c a l l y  s p a t i a l  c o n n o ta t io n s  : and though "a t  
r i g h t  an g le s "  p e r s i s t s  to  delude u s ,  we have seen t h a t  t h i s  
i s  not n e c e s s a r i l y  s p a t i a l .  (Nor, f o r  t h a t  m a t t e r ,  i s  "space" ,  
which i s  sometimes used  i n  a g e n e ra l  and n o n - s p a t i a l  sense 
where "continuum" or "manifold" would have been b e t t e r . )  F i n a l ­
l y  «’.dimension" comes to  s t a n d  f o r  the number of c o e f f i c i e n t s  
n e c e s s a ry  f o r  a f u l l  d e s c r i p t i o n ,  whether they  are  s p a t i a l  or 
n o t .  Thus supposing  I wish t o  c o n s id e r  an o b je c t  w i th  r e s p e c t  
to  a c e r t a i n  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  x :  the r e s u l t  w i l l  be a c e r t a i n  
f u n c t i o n  of x .  L a te r  I may d is c o v e r  t h a t  t h i s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
depends on o t h e r s :  i n  p lace  of one v a r i a b l e  I have now s e v e r a l ,
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and the  co m p ara t iv e ly  simple f (x )  i s  r e p la c e d  by f ^ ( y ) ,
^ p ( z ) , and so on. I f  th ese  a l l  va ry  in d ep en d e n t ly  of each
le
o t h e r ,  they  c a n ^ e g i t i m a t e l y  regarded  as each a "dimension",  
i n  the ex tended  sense i n  which p h y s ic s  now uses  t h i s  word.
This long e x p o s i t i o n  has been d i r e c t e d  towards 
e s t a b l i s h i n g  th re e  p o i n t s .  The f i r s t  i s ,  t h a t  the n o t io n  of 
dimension i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  connected  w ith  t h a t  of measurement. 
Secondly ,  dimensions and axes must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  L a s t l y ,  
and most im p o r ta n t ,  n e i t h e r  "dimension" nor " a t  r i g h t  ang les"  
nor " sp a ce" ,  as th ey  are  a t  p r e s e n t  used in  p h y s ic s ,  must be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  s p a t i a l l y .
M a th e m a t i c a l ly ,of c o u r se ^ th e re  i s  no reason  why 
we shou ld  c o n te n t  o u r s e lv e s  w ith  th ree  dimensions - t h a t  i s  
a p u r e ly  s p a t i a l  l i m i t a t i o n .  That what ho ld s  good f o r  two or 
th re e  dimensions can be ex tended ,  as f a r  as mathematics i s  
concerned ,  to  n d im ensions ,  i s  p e r f e c t l y  p o s s i b l e .  But i t  i s  
when we come to  the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of these  dimensions t h a t  
we a!re p u z z le d .  We may ju g g le  w ith  our e q u a t io n s  in v o lv in g  
fo u r  d im ensions ,  but we f i n d  i t  as im poss ib le  to  p i c t u r e  
such a fo u r -d im e n s io n a l  world  as the i n h a b i t a n t s  of F l a t l a n d  
found i t  to  p i c t u r e  a s p h e re .  But t h a t  "dimension" had 
o r i g i n a l l y  s p a t i a l  c o n n o ta t io n s  does not j u s t i f y  us in  
assuming t h a t  Minkowski’ s fo u r -d im e n s io n a l  continuum i s  
" s p a t i a l "  (ex cep t  in  a h ig h ly  P ickw ick ian  s e n s e ) . I t  i s  not
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the case t h a t  the d i s t i n c t i o n  between space and time has bèen 
broken down: as C a s s i r e r  p u ts  i t ,  the hyphena t ion  of space and 
time does not invo lve  t h a t  th e re  i s  no d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e i r  
fundamenta l  c h a r a c t e r .  In  h i s  book, "The Meaning of R e l a t i v i t y " ^  
E i n s t e i n  h im s e l f  s a i d :  "The n o n - d i v i s i b i l i t y  of the f o u r ­
d im ensiona l  continuum of ev e n ts  does not a t  a l l ,  however, i n ­
volve th e  e q u iv a le n t*  of the space c o o rd in a te s  w i th  the time 
c o o r d i n a t e . On the c o n t r a r y ,  we must remember t h a t  the time 
c o o rd in a te  i s  d e f in e d  p h y s i c a l l y  wholly  d i f f e r e n t l y  from the 
space c o o r d i n a t e s . "  Consequently  the p l a i n  man w i l l  do w ell  
to  d i s t r u s t  any p i c t u r e s  he may see ,  even in  newspapers,  of
what " the  f o u r t h  dimension" " looks l i k e . "
When Minkowski gave h i s  c e l e b r a t e d  Cologne a d d re s s ,  
what was novel i n  i t  was not  t h a t  time and space are  r e l a t e d  
i n  e x p e r i e n c e , bu t  t h a t  to  g e t  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  d e f i n i t i o n  of 
the  u n iv e r se  in  p h y s i c a l  te rm s ,  we must abandon the  o ld ,  s t a t i c
w o r l d - a t - a n - i n s t a n t  co n cep t io n  in  favour  of a new one which
2
no lo n g e r  ig n o re s  the lap se  of t i m e . C onsequen t ly , the p h y s ic ­
i s t s  no lon g e r  say t h a t  the d i s t a n c e  between two p o in t s  i s
g iven  by the e q u a t io n  aJ (x -x ,  jz 4(y-y^ )^ , and then
1 ÿ Eng. t r a n s .  p . 34.
2 .  But though i t  in c lu d e s  the lapse  of t im e ,  i t  s t i l l  ign o res  
the pass in g  of t im e .  (Compare Bergson’ s remark ("Duree e t  
S im u l ta n é i té "  p . 8 5 ) : -  "You w i l l  never g e t  the  id e a  of 
tem poral  f l u x  from Minkowski’ s schema.")
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c a l c u l a t e  what has happened to  s du r in g  the t i m e - i n t e r v a l
t - t ^ :  i n s t e a d  the two p ro c e s se s  become welded in to  one. I t
need h a r d ly  be s a id  t h a t  s now i s  not a s p a c e - i n t e r v a l ,  but an
i n t e r v a l  in  s p a c e - t im e ,  and i t  i s  t h i s  i n t e r v a l  which i s  so
im p o r ta n t .  " I t  i s  n e i t h e r  the  p o in t  i n  space ,  nor the  i n s t a n t
i n t t i m e ,  a t  which something happens t h a t  has  p h y s i c a l  r e a l i t y ,
1
but only  the ev en t  i t s e l f . "
But the "sp ace - t im e"  of the p h y s i c i s t  i s  a compend­
iou s  way of say ing  t h a t ,  f o r  p h y s ic s ,  i t  i s  u s e f u l  to  fo rm ula te  
i t s  e q u a t io n s  in  terms of a c o o rd in a te  which s tan d s  f o r  time 
as w e l l  as  in  terms of the more u s u a l  space ones .  But the 
"space" i s  the x . y . z .  of p h y s ic s ,  and the "time" i s  the ’ t ’ of 
p h y s ic s :  how then  i t  can be supposed t h a t  the m ixture  of the
two shou ld  r e a d i l y  y i e l d  to  an e x t r a - p h y s i c a l  and p h i l o s o p h ic a l
2
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  i s  h a rd  to  u n d e r s ta n d .  The p o in t  has been w el l
pu t  by S c h l i c k  and W hitehead .  " I t  would be wrong to  a s s o c i a t e
any m e tap h y s ica l  s p e c u la t io n s  w i th  the i n t r o d u c t i o n  of the
3
fo u r -d im e n s io n a l  p o in t  of v iew ,"  and "Time and space are  among
1. "Meaning of R e l a t i v i t y "  p . 33. For a g e n e ra l  s ta tem en t  of 
what Minkowski has done, see E dd ing ton ,  "Space, Time and
R e l a t i v i t y " ,  p . 55 -6 .  ,
2# Thus A lex an d e r’ s " s p a c e - t im e " , f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i s  q u i te  
d i s t i n c t  from t h a t  of  p h y s i c s .
3 .  WSpace and Time in  Contemporary P h y s i c s " ,  p . 51.
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the fundamenta l  p h y s ic a l  f a c t s  y i e l d e d  by our knowledge of
the  e x t e r n a l  w or ld .  We cannot r e s t  co n te n t  w ith  any th eo ry  of
them which simply tak es  m athem atica l  e q u a t io n s  in v o lv in g
fo u r  v a r i a b l e s ,  which are  i n t e r p r e t e d  as space and time co- 
1
o r d in a t e s
In  the fo re g ô in g ,  I  have t r i e d  to  examine th re e  
of the major i s s u e s  concern ing  time r a i s e d  by the new con­
c e p t io n s  in  p h y s i c s .  That the f i n a l  co n c lu s io n  should  endorse 
the e a r l i e r  one, which was t h a t  i t  i s  a mistake to  suppose 
t h a t  p h y s i c a l  t h e o r i e s  can u l t i m a t e l y  so lve the m etaphys ica l  
problem of t im e ,  i s  no t  to  p r e te n d  to  p u t  ’p a i d ’ to the 
c la im s of  p h y s i c s .  To show t h a t  ’ t ’ i s  a s p e c i a l i s e d  a b s t r a c ­
t i o n  d i f f e r i n g  i n  im p o r tan t  ways from "time" i s  n o t ,  as 
Bergson sometimes seemed to  t h in k ,  a v a l i d  ground of c r i t ­
i c i sm  a g a in s t  p h y s i c a l  t h e o r i e s :  what i t  v a l i d  to  c r i t i c ­
i s e  a re  the  m e tap h y s ica l  conc lu s ion s  drawn from such t h e o r i e s
1. " P r i n c i p l e s  of N a tu ra l  Knowledge", p . 45. See a l s o
Bridgman, o p , cit. p.7 4 ,  and Cunningham, op.cit. p.21b
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CHAPTER I I I . LOGIC.
I t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  e v id e n t  from the fo re -g o in g  
t h a t  q u e s t io n s  in v o lv in g  the notion;/  of time may be d i sc u sse d  
from any one of s e v e r a l  d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t s .  Corresponding to 
these  d i l f e r e n t  a s p e c t s  th e re  i s  a l s o  a d i f f e r e n c e  in  the 
c o n n o ta t io n  oi the most im po r tan t  con cep ts ;  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a 
p s y c h o lo g i s t  would say  t h a t  two e v e n ts ,  such as a r e p o r t  from 
a gun M and a f l a s h  from an o th e r  N were s im ultaneous  i f  a 
s u b j e c t  S sensed  them to g e t h e r ,  while  a p h y s i c i s t  would d i s ­
a g r e e .  He would say t h a t  the two f i r i n g s  were no t  s im ultaneous  
i f  S was s ta n d in g  a t  equ a l  d i s t a n c e s  from both g u n s . L i g h t /  
t r a v e l s  q u ic k e r  than  sound, and from the r e p o r t  from M to  be 
sensed  a t  the same time as the f l a s h  from N, M must have been 
f i r e d  f i r s t .  Again, assuming t h a t  the l i g h t n i n g  f l a s h  and 
the th u n d e rc la p  come from the same so u rce ,  we c a l c u l a t e  how 
f a r  away the storm i s  by the t i m e - i n t e r v a l  between them.
In  h i s  own f i e l d ,  the p s y c h o lo g i s t  or the p h y s i c i s t  
i s  q u i t e  s a f e .  As long as h i s  use of a t e c h n i c a l  term remains 
c o n s t a n t /  and as  long as ( i f  d e p a r t in g  from g e n e ra l  usage) 
he makes p e r f e c t l y  c l e a r  the sense in  which he i s  u s in g  i t ,  
the s c i e n t i s t  i s  a t  p e r f e c t  l i b e r t y  to  use words in  whatever 
sense he l i k e s .  P e t e r  Pan may, i f  he chooses,  w r i t e  a novel 
i n  which ' k i s s ’ and ’ th im b le ’ exchange the meanings t h a t
1 .  Or, where t h i s  i s  no t  p o s s i b l e ,  v a r i e s  only  between 
w e l l - d e f i n e d  and e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d  l i m i t s .
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th ey  o r d i n a r i l y  have;  and h i s  r e a d e r s ,  once they  r e a l i s e  t h i s ,  
need not  com plain .  But such a procedure  i s  i n  the h ig h e s t  
degree i n c o n v e n ie n t : not to  me qua r e a d e r  of P e t e r ’ s novel ,  
hut  to me qua r e a d e r  a l s o  of "The M il l  on the F l o s s " ,  "Pride 
and P r e j u d i c e ",  and so on. Of co u rse ,  in  the h y p o t h e t i c a l  
case above , we a re  i n  no danger of perm anently  con fus ing  ’k i s s ’ 
w i th  ’ t h im b le ’ because they  s ta n d  f o r  two very  d i s t i n o t t t h i h g § s . 
But i f  I  so confused  two terms t h a t  are  o f te n  used  in  the 
same co n te x t  -  i f  f o r  in s ta n c e  I used  the word ’ d a c t y l ’ i n ­
d i f f e r e n t l y  f o r  a d a c ty l  and a t ro chee  - the d e n o ta t io n  of 
‘^’d a c t y l ’would be e n la rg e d ,  but w i th  the b l u r r i n g  of the former 
d i s t i n c t i o n ,  i t  would be co r re sp o n d in g ly  l e s s  p r e c i s e .
In  the same way, the use in  s i m i l a r ,  but d i s t i n c t ,  
c o n te x t s  of the  same word i s  bound to  le ad  to  co n fu s io n .  I t  
i s  because we do no t  keep our p h y s ic s  and our psychology and 
our m etaphysics  i n  s e p a ra te  compartments t h a t  i t  i s  d e s i r a b l e  
to  examine our te rm ino log y ,  and to  see what terms are  used  
to e x p re ss  more than  one n o t i o n .  S ys tem at ic  am biguity  may not 
be h a rm fu l ,  but i t  i s  l i a b l e  to  l e a d  to  r e a l  am bigu i ty :  and 
the use of ambiguous language i s  h a r d ly  l i k e l y  to  produce 
c l e a r  th o u g h t .  Hence the need f o r  a l o g i c a l  c l a r i f i c a t i o n  of 
the concep ts  we u s e .  This c h a p te r  may be d u l l :  i t  w i l l  n ev e r ­
t h e l e s s  be im p o r ta n t .
At the o u t s e t  a d i s t i n c t i o n  (which w i l l  r e ap p ea r
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i n  p a r t i c u l a r  form in  many of the l a t e r  d i s t i n c t i o n s  t h a t  are  
drawn) must be made between time as i t  i s  p e r c e iv e d ,  and the 
0^ Time. I do no t  wish to  give the  im press ion  here 
t h a t  th e re  i s  only  one concept of time • I f  th e re  were one con­
s i s t e n t  and adequate  concep"0^the t a s k  of the s y s te m -b u i ld e r  
would be much e a s i e r  I As i t  is^ the m e tap h ys ic ian  grumbles t h a t  
the p h y s i c i s t ’ s concept t a k e s  account of one a s p e c t  on ly ,  and 
the p h y s i c i s t  r e t o r t s  t h a t  the v a r io u s  m etaph y s ica l  concep ts  
a re  a l l  i n c o n s i s t e n t . But t h a t  does not p re v en t  th e re  being  a 
v e ry  im p o r tan t  sense in  which a l l  concep tua l  ’ t im e s ’ , d i f f e r ­
e n t  though they  may be, can be grouped t o g e t h e r ,  as a g a in s t  
time as i t  i s  pe rce ived*  To use a f a m i l i a r  ana logy ,  which 
must n o t ,  however, be p r e s s e d  too f a r ,  concept and p e rc e p t  
bear  to  each o th e r  something of the r e l a t i o n  between f i n i s h e d  
p rod u c t  and raw m a t e r i a l .  This  l e a d s  on to  an o th e r  p o in t  
t h a t  however v a l i d  and u s e f u l  the d i s t i n c t i o n  we make may be, 
and however h e l p f u l  i t  i s  i n  av o id in g  harmful am bigu i ty ,  we 
can never make i t  a b s o l u t e .  Paper  and wood-pulp d i f i e r  in  
many ways; but we would be s t u p i d  i f  we denied  t h a t ,  when a l l  
i s  s a i d  and done, pape r  i s  ’made o f ’ wood-pulp. As Kant ex 
p re s s e d  i t ,  i n  a s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  con nec t io n ,  "Thoughts
w i th o u t  co n te n t  are  empty, i n t u i t i o n s  w i th o u t  concepts  are  
1
b l i n d . "
1. " C r i t iq u e  of Pure Reaso ( t r a n s .  Kemp Smitji) , B.75.
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N e v e r th e le s s ,  as long as we remember these  r e s e r v ­
a t i o n s ,  the d i s t i n c t i o n  between concept and p e rc e p t  i s  an 
ex t rem e ly  u s e l u l  one , and Gunn was r i g h t  r e p e a t e d ly  to em­
p h as ize  i t .  As he p u ts  i t :  "We p e rc e iv e  time : we are aware 
of  c e r t a i n  amounts of d u ra t io n  and a l s o ,  u s u a l l y ,  of a suc­
c e s s io n  of e v e n t s .  This knowledge i s  a t  the p e r c e p tu a l  l e v e l  
of e x p e r i e n c e .  Time i s  a p e r c e p t .  But as we in c re a s e  and organ­
i s e  our knowledge, and b r in g  to bear  our powers of a n a l y s i s ,  
s y n t h e s i s ,  and a b s t r a c t i o n ,  we come to a concept of Time. 
P e r c e p tu a l  time and co ncep tua l  time are  not qu i te  a l i k e  in  
t h e i r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  or more s t r i c t l y  we may say t h a t  time 
as p e r c e iv e d  i s  not i d e n t i c a l  w ith  Time as conce ived .  I t  i s  
most im p or tan t  to reco g n ise  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  and to  bear i t  
i n  mind, f o r  some th in g s  which are  t ru e  of time as  conceived 
a re  not  t ru e  of i t  as  p e r c e i v e d . For i n s t a n c e ,  time as p e r ­
ce iv ed  i s  always l i m i t e d .  We never p e rc e iv e  the whole of t im e .  
I t  i s  a l s o  p e rc e iv e d  as s e n s i b l y  co n t in u o u s ,  as having  a 
c e r t a i n  d i r e c t i o n a l  q u a l i t y :  i t  i s  t r a n s i t i v e  and r e l a t e d  
in  i t s  co n te n t  to  the s u b je c t  a t  the moment of e x p e r i e n c e .
Only i f  the  wlder^ Irnnlied temporal p e r s p e c t iv e  and the time- 
8pan immediately  ex p e r ien ced  be apprehended as p a s s in g  i n to  
one a n o th e r  can Time be g ra sped ,  and in  t h i s  v;ay i t  i s  g ra sped  
as a continuum. Time as conceived  i s  u n l im i te d  in  c h a r a c t e r ,  
i s  re g a rd ed  as i n f i n i t e l y  d i v i s i b l e  and m a th em a t ica l ly  con­
t in u o u s  l i k e  an i n f i n i t e  s e r i e s .  F u r th e r ,  i t  i s  looked on as
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i n v o lv in g  an o b j e c t i v e  o rd e r  of b e f o r 9 - a n d - a f t e r , which i s  
n o t  to  be e q u a te d  w i th  the p a s t ,  p r e s e n t ,  and f u t u r e  of a 
s u b j e c t .  This has u n f o r t u n a t e l y  l e d  some i d e a l i s t  c r i t i c s  to  
c la im  t h a t  p a s t ,  p r e s e n t  and f u t u r e  a re  m ere ly  s u b j e c t i v e  and 
i l l u s o r y  d i s t i n c t i o n s  which show th e  i n h e r e n t  s e l f - c o n t r a d i c ­
t i o n  and u n r e a l i t y  ol Time. T h is ,  however, i s  due i n  p a r t  to 
c a r a l e s s n e s s  i n  the c o n s t r u c t i o n  of the concept  and to  a f a i l ­
ure to  r e f e r  to  our a c t u a l  tem pora l  ex p e r ien ce  in  p e r c e p t i o n .  
C onceptua l  time i s  a l s o  conceived  to  be a u n i t y  i n  s p i t e  of 
the d i f f i c u l t y  of a s c r i b i n g  to  i t  any p r i n c i p l e  of co h e ren ce .  
P e r c e p t u a l  t im e ,  however, i s  r o o te d  in  ex p e r ien ce  and p r o ­
f e s s i o n s  of u n i t y  a re  n o t  made i n  r e g a rd  to  i t .  There may on
1
t h i s  l e v e l  be many u n r e l a t e d  t im e s . "
To th e se  can be added a n o th e r  d i f f e r e n c e .  What we 
p e rc e iv e  i s  no t  so much ’ t im e ’ as  the  passage  of e v e n t s .  We 
never  p e r c e iv e  ’ t i m e ’ by i t s e l f  i n  a b s t r a c t i o n  from e v e n t s ;  
f o r  p e r c e p t i o n ,  the fundam enta l  t h in g  i s  the happening of 
e v e n t s .  B u t , we f i n d  i t  u s e f u l  f o r  some pu rposes  to  emphasize 
the  s u c c e s s iv e n e s s  of the happen ing  of e v e n t s :  hence we con­
ce ive  of e v e n ts  as happening  " in "  t im e ,  where time i s  r e g a r d ­
ed as a compendious way of d e a l in g  w i th  e v e n ts  i n  t h e i r
1. Gunn, "The Problem of Time" p . 373-4 .  See a l s o ,  T a y lo r ,  
"Elements of M etaphysics"  B k . I I I ,  Ch. IV.
2 .  I  would make the  rem inder  here  t h a t  we have d i r e c t  p e r ­
c e p t io n  in  the sp e c io u s  p r e s e n t  of bare s u c c e s s iv e n e s s ,  
hence i t  i s  no t  c i r c u l a r  to  t a l k  i n  t h i s  way about 
s u c c e s s i v e n e s s .
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a s p e c t  ol ’h a p p e n in g s . ’ C a r r ie d  to  an ex t rem e ,  t h i s  may r e s u l t  
i n  a c o n c e p t io n  of time . as f o r  i n s t a n c e  i n  Newton) as being  
in d ep en d e n t  of eveln ts .  On the  o th e r  hand, th e re  i s  Whitehead, 
who i n s i s t s  t h a t  a b s o lu t e  time i s  a mere h y p o s t a t i s e d  f i g m e n t , 
and t h a t  time i s ^ o n l y  the  passage  of Nature c o n s id e r e d  i n  i t s  
c r e a t i v e  a s p e c t -  The q u e s t i o n  of the  r e l a t i o n  between time 
and e v e n ts  i s  a d i f f i c u l t  one, no t  to  be gone i n t o  f u l l y  h e r e .  
We need on ly  invoke what was s a i d  above - t h a t  th rough  the  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between p e r c e p t  and concep t  has i t s  u s e s ,  we 
shou ld  beware of making an a b s o lu t e  s e p a r a t i o n  between them.
To av o id  co n fu s io n  between p e r c e p t u a l  and co n c e p tu a l  
t im e ,  u n l e s s  the  c o n te x t  makes i t  c l e a r  which i s  be ing  d i s ­
cu s sed ,  time as p e r c e i v e d  w i l l  be c a l l e d  ’ the sp ec io u s  p r e s e n t ’ 
and the  word ’ t im e ’ w i l l  be r e s e r v e d  f o r  c o n c ep tu a l  t i m e .
I t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  a d m i t te d  t h a t  the  n o t io n s  of time 
and change a re  c l o s e l y  co n nec ted :  we cannot w r i t e  about t ime 
w i th o u t  f i n d i n g  t h a t  ’ change’ crops  up r e p e a t e d l y .  As Broad 
showed i n  h i s  e x c e l l e n t  a n a l y s i s  in  the  second c h a p te r  of h i s  
" S c i e n t i f i c  Thought" ,  the word ’ change’ , as i t  i s  commonly 
u sed ,  covers  two fu n d a m e n ta l ly  d i s t i n c t  n o t i o n s .  The f i r s t  
i s  change i n  a th in g  w i th  r e s p e c t  to  i t s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  as 
when a s i g n a l  lamp changes from re d  to  g re en :  the second i s  
the  change of the  tem pora l  C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  th em se lv es ,  as
1. "Concept of Nature"  p . 73, and " P r i n c i p l e s  of N a tu ra l  
Knowledge" Chap. V.
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when a f u t u r e  e v e n t ,  a s  we say ,  'becomes p r e s e n t ' ,  and a
p r e s e n t  one r e c e d e s  i n t o  the  p a s t .  The f i r s t  I s  a q u a l i t a t i v e
change;  but ' p a s t '  and ' p r e s e n t '  and ' f u t u r e '  can i n  no v a l i d
sense  be c a l l e d  ' q u a l i t i e s '  of an o b j e c t .  An e v e n t  has not the
q u a l i t y  f i r s t  of ' p r e s e n t n e s s '  and then  of ' p a s t n e s s ' ,  as  a
s i g n a l  lamp has  f i r s t  the q u a l i t y  of  ’ r e d n e s s ’ and th e n  of
’g r e e n n e s s ’ • As Broad p u t  i t ,  "We cannot reduce changes of
Time to  changes i n  Time, s in c e  Time would th e n  need a n o th e r
1
Time to  change i n ,  and so on to  i n f i n i t y . "
I n  what f o l l o w s ,  q u a l i t a t i v e  change w i l l  always be 
r e f e r r e d  to  as  ’ a l t e r a t i o n ’ # A s p e c i a l ,  and v e ry  im p o r ta n t  
case of a l t e r a t i o n  i s  the  a l t e r a t i o n  of  p a r t i c l e s  w i th  r e ­
s p e c t  to  t h e i r  s p a t i a l  p o s i t i o n s .  This  i s  known as movement, 
and i t  i s  tem p t ing  to  suppose t h a t  a l l  a l t e r a t i o n s  can u l t i m ­
a t e l y  be r e s o l v e d  i n t o  movements. (The p re v a le n c e  of such
b e l i e f s ,  from Dem ocritus  to  modern atomic t h e o r i e s ,  shows
2
t h e i r  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  to  the  s c i e n t i s t .  )
I n  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n ,  i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  note t h a t  
A r i s t o t l e ,  who d e f in e d  time i n  terms of m otion ,  not  on ly  
c o n s id e r e d  t h a t  a l l  a l t e r a t i o n s  were movements, but a l s o  
i d e n t i f i e d  ’ changes of t i m e ’ w i th  ’ changes in  t im e ’ ( a l t e r ­
a t i o n s )  : hence we sh o u ld  e x p e c t  to  f i n d  t h a t  h i s  view of
1. Op.c i t .  p . 65. While a g r e e in g  w i th  the c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  
changes of  Time a re  i r r e d u c i b l e ,  I  am no t  su re  whether
h i s  r e a s o n  i s  v a l i d .  „ v, ^ vtt
2. Compare Meyerson, " I d e n t i t y  and R e a l i t y  , chap .  V I I .
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time i s  s t u n t e d ,  i n  t h a t  he c o n s id e re d  on ly  h a l f ,  and the 
l e s s  im p o r ta n t  h a l l  a t  t h a t ,  of the p rob lem .
With r e g a r d  to  changes £ f  t i m e , Broad makes a f u r t h e r  
d i s t i n c t i o n ,  i n  the  l i g h t  of h i s  t h e o r y  of the  n o n e n t i t y  of 
the f u t u r e ,  between the  change from p r e s e n t  to p a s t ,  and the 
change by which the  f u t u r e  becomes p r e s e n t .  I t  i s  the  l a t t e r  
which he c o n s id e r s  fu n d a m e n ta l ,  and to which the o th e r  ty p es  
of change a r e  u l t i m a t e l y  r e d u c i b l e • There are many who would 
r e j e c t  B road’ s view of th e  f u t u r e , and w i th  i t  t h i s  second 
d i s t i n c t i o n :  but u n t i l  we have d i s c u s s e d  the m a t t e r ,  we may 
a t  l e a s t  make a v e r b a l  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  f o r  even i f  i t  i s  f i n a l l y  
d e c id e d  t h a t  th e r e  i s  no r e a l  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  i t  can do no harm. 
The change from p r e s e n t  to p a s t  and th e n  to  the more remote 
p a s t  w i l l  be c a l l e d  r e c e s s i o n ; the  passage  of  th e  p r e s e n t  i n t o  
the  f u t u r e ,  f o l lo w in g  Broad, w i l l  be c a l l e d  becoming. Passage  
w i l l  be used  g e n e r a l l y  to  cover  bo th  r e c e s s i o n  and becoming; 
change w i l l  r e t a i n  the wide use t h a t  i t  o r d i n a r i l y  h a s ,  i n c l u d ­
ing  passage  and a l t e r a t i o n .
Next comes a group of d i s t i n c t i o n s  t h a t  a re  r e l a t e d
in  t h a t  the  same fundam enta l  d i s t i n c t i o n  ru ns  th ro u g h  them a l l .  
T h is  i s  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between time co nce iv ed ,  a s  m athem atics  
c o n c e iv e s  i t ,  as a  c o n t in u o u s  l i n e ,  i n f i n i t e  i n  l e n g th  and 
i n f i n i t e l y  d i v i s i b l e ,  and time as i t  i s  l i v e d ,  and as i t  
a p p e a rs  to  th e  s u b j e c t .  I n  th e s e  fo l lo w in g  d i s t i n c t i o n s ,  we
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h ave ,  of c o u r s e ,  the o ld  d i s t i n c t i o n  between p e r c e p t  and 
con cep t  r e a p p e a r in g ,  bu t  th ey  p r i m a r i l y  emphasize a d i s t i n c ­
t i o n  between p e r c e p t  and a p a r t i c u l a r  k in d  of  c o n c ep t ,  be­
tween ' p r i v a t e '  and ' p u b l i c '  t im e s .  F i r s t ,  we must d i s t i n g u i s h  
between the  v a r io u s  s e n se s  of  ' p r e s e n t ' . As has  a l r e a d y  been 
s a i d ,  the  sad d le  backed s p e c io u s  p r e s e n t  of  immediate e x p e r i ­
ence i s  v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  from the d u r a t i o n l e s s  m a them at ica l  
p o i n t  which r e p r e s e n t s  the p r e s e n t  ’ i n s t a n t ’ . J u s t  a s  a  l i n e  
i n  geom etry ,  though c o n t in u o u s ,  i s  conce ived  as  made up of 
s e p a r a t e  p o i n t s  a t  i n f i n i t e s i m a l  d i s t a n c e s  a p a r t ,  so a p o i n t  
of  time i s  conce ived  as composed of i n s t a n t s . The p re s e n t  
i n s t a n t , on the  one hand, i s  to  he d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from o th e r  
i n s t a n t s :  on the o t h e r  hand,  i t  i s  to  he d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from 
the now of which we a re  im m edia te ly  aware in  the  s p e c io u s  
p r e s e n t .  W ith in  the  s p e c io u s  p r e s e n t ,  a f u r t h e r  d i s t i n c t i o n  
must he made. U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  as  has  a l r e a d y  been s a i d ,  ’p r e ­
s e n t ’ i s  ambiguous: i t  may be used  to  denote  p r e s e n t n e s s  in  
the  tem pora l  sense  - the now, or  to  denote t h a t  which i s  
p r e s e n t e d  to us s p a t i a l l y  - the  g iv e n ,  the h e r e .  The l a t t e r
use w i l l  be av o id ed  as l a r  as  p o s s i b l e .
S econd ly ,  the  v a r io u s  u se s  of  ' p a s t '  need e l u c i d a t -
' ( H i S f ’  (C " o ' t  I .
i n g .  I t  sh o u ld  be r e a l i s e d  t h a t s y n o n y m o u s  w i th  'my p a s t ' :
hence the  c o n c e p t io n  of ' t h e  p a s t '  as  the s u m - to t a l  o f  a l l
e v e n t s  t h a t  have e v e r  happened i s  no t  to  be i d e n t i f i e d  w i th
1 .  See Gunn, o p . c i t .  p . 377, and f o o t n o t e .
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memory, n e i t h e r  my own memory, nor ev e ry b o d y ’ s memories pu t  
t o g e t h e r .  As James p o i n t s  o u t ,  "13van though we were to  con­
ce iv e  the  o u t e r  s u c c e s s io n s  as  fiorces s tam ping  t h e i r  images 
on the  b r a i n ,  and the b r a i n ’ s s u c c e s s io n s  as  fo rm ing  t h e i r  
image on the mind, s t i l l ,  between the  mind’ s own changes being  
s u c c e s s i v e ,  and Icnowing t h e i r  own s u c c e s s i o n , l i e s  as b road  a 
chasm as between the  o b j e c t  and s u b j e c t  of any case of c o g n i t ­
io n  in  the  w o r ld .  A s u c c e s s io n  of f e e l i n g s ,  i n  and of i t s e l f ,  
i s  no t  a f e e l i n g  of s u c c e s s i o n .  And s i n c e ,  to  our s u c c e s s iv e  
f e e l i n g s ,  a  f e e l i n g  of t h e i r  own s u c c e s s io n  i s  added, t h a t  
must be t r e a t e d  as an a d d i t i o n a l  f a c t  r e q u i r i n g  i t s  own s p e c i a l
e l u c i d a t i o n ,  which t h i s  t a l k  about  o u t e r  r e l a t i o n s  s tam ping
1
c o p ie s  o f  th em se lv es  w i t h i n ,  l e a v e s  a l l  u n to u ch ed ."
A lso ,  memory of an ev e n t  i s  to  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
from memory of r e c e i v i n g  in fo rm a t io n  about  t h a t  e v e n t .  S t r i c t ­
l y ,  the c h i l d  who i s  g iv en  a h i s t o r y  t e s t  does no t  ’ remember’ 
when the  S pan ish  Armada was: what he remembers i s  t h a t  ^  
has r e a d  i n  h i s  h i s t o r y - b o o k ,  or has  been t o l d ,  t h a t  i t  took 
p la c e  i n  1588. I n  o t h e r  words,  th e  p a s t  ev en t  to which the  
memory r e f e r s  d id  not  occur  i n  1588, but a  few days p r e v io u s
1 .  Op.c i t .  p . 628. Compare a l s o  Collingwood ( "P ro ceed in g s  of
the  A r i s t o t e l i a n  S o c ie ty "  1925-6) who d i s t i n g u i s h e s  between 
"my p r e s e n t  memory of a p a s t  e v e n t " ,  and " the  p r e s e n t  
e f f e c t  of t h a t  p a s t  ev e n t  on my o rgan ism ."  S im i l a r  remarks 
a re  made i n  "]3ssays i n  C r i t i c a l  R ea l i sm ."
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1
to  the  t e s t .
Whether a d i s t i n c t i o n  between ' t h e  f u t u r e '  and 'my 
f u t u r e ' ,  s i m i l a r  to the  one between ' t h e  pas t»  and 'memory',  
can be made, I  do no t  know, (Gunn would seem to  imply t h a t  i t  
can, i n  h i s  c r i t i c i s m s  of  th e  work of  Dunne and Ostify^)
That t ime has  a c e r t a i n  e x t e n s i o n  i s  no t  a mere ex­
t r a p o l a t i o n  of  the  s c i e n t i s t :  we a re  im m edia te ly  co nsc io us  of 
time as 'g o in g  on», and we can remember e v e n ts  which happened 
" q u i t e  a long time a g o " .  But the  ex ten d e d n ess  of  time as  i t  i s  
im m ed ia te ly  e x p e r i e n c e d  by the co n sc io u s  s u b j e c t ,  as Bergson 
was n ev e r  t i r e d  of p o i n t i n g  o u t ,  i s  a  v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  m a t t e r  
from the  p o i n t e r - r e a d i n g s  and o b j e c t i v e  measurements of  the  
s c i e n t i s t .  I t  i s  u n d e s i r a b l e  t h a t  bo th  sh o u ld  be c a l l e d  
d u r a t i o n :  f o l l o w in g  Bergson, l e t  us keep ’ durée» f o r  l i v e d  
t im e ,  and e x p re s s  o b j e c t i v e l y  measured d u r a t i o n  ( the  ’ t ’ of  
p h y s ib s )  by ’ t i m e - i n t e r y a l ’ .
D i f f e r e n t  meanings o f ’ s im u l t a n e i ty »  have r e c e i v e d  a 
good a i r i n g  i n  the  l a s t  few y e a r s .  F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  the  fu n ­
dam ental  d i s t i n c t i o n  between our judgments  of s i m u l t a n e i t y ,  
and o b j e c t i v e  (as  we may f o r  the  p r e s e n t  c o n v e n ie n t ly  and 
v ag u e ly  c a l l  i t ) , s i m u l t a n e i t y . Nobody doubts  t h a t  such a 
d i s t i n c t i o n  can be drawn: the s c i e n t i s t  p o i n t s  out w ith  
u n c t i o n  t h a t  i f  two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  s t i m u l i  a re
1 .  Compare James, o p . c i t .  p . 689, " I  have shown t h a t  what i s  
p a s t ,  to  be known as p a s t ,  must be known w i to  what i s  
p r e s e n t ,  and d u r in g  the ’p r e s e n t ’ sp o t  ot t im e .
2 .  Gunn, op. c i t .  p p . 404-8 .
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p resen ted ,  i n  v e ry  r a p i d  s u c c e s s io n ,  th ey  a re  apprehended as 
s im u l t a n e o u s .  But when i t  comes to  d e f i n i n g  ’ o b j e c t i v e  s im u l­
t a n e i t y '  , i t  i s  l e s s  e a s y ,  and in d e e d ,  t h i s  i s  a f a v o u r i t e  
b a t t l e g r o u n d  a t  p r e s e n t ,  s in c e  the  advent of R e l a t i v i t y .
B r i e f l y ,  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  r e s u l t  from the c o n c ep t io n  of s im u l-  
t a n e i t y  as r e l a t i v e  to  the frame of r e f e r e n c e :  i f  two such 
fram es are  i n  m otion  r e l a t i v e l y  to  each  o t h e r ,  how are  we to  
dec ide  between them? On the o t h e r  hand, how are  we to  measure 
v e l o c i t i e s ,  u n l e s s  we are a l r e a d y  i n  p o s s e s s i o n  of some n o t io n
of  s i m u l t a n e i t y ?  Gunn, i n  a note  a t  the  end of h i s  "Problem 
1
of Time", d i s t i n g u i s h e s  f o u r  sen se s  of  s i m u l t a n e i t y • Beside 
the  fundam en ta l  d i s t i n c t i o n  between s u b j e c t i v e  and o b j e c t i v e  
s i m u l t a n e i t y ,  he d i s t i n g u i s h e s  th r e e  k in d s  of the l a t t e r .
" (a )  S y n t o p i c " ( r e c o rd e d  by camera w i th  r e v o lv in g  f i l m ,  (b) 
spaced  s i m u l t a n e i t y  of  two k in ds  -  ( i )  where only  o b s e rv e r s  
no t  i n  r e l a t i v e  m otion would ag ree  as  to  the s i m u l t a n e i t y  of 
two g iv en  e v e n t s ,  ( i i )  where no t  on ly  t h e s e ,  but a l s o  o b s e rv e r s  
i n  r e l a t i v e  un ifo rm  m otion  would a g r e e ,  (some c a l l  t h i s  p u b l i c  
s i m u l t a n e i t y )  and t h i s  i s  the  s i m u l t a n e i t y  which T i n s t a i n  den ies
d e n i e s •"
The th e o ry  of R e l a t i v i t y ,  and the d o c t r i n e  t h a t
s i m u l t a n e i t y  i s  on ly  r e l a t i v e ,  does no t  a , f f a c t , of c o u r s e , the
c e r t a i n t y  of the o b s e rv e r  t h a t  two e v e n t s ,  to  him, took  p la c e
2
a t  th e  same t im e :  hence the  g r e a t  Importance of drawing a
1. p . 424. 2 .  And the  a b s o l u t e n e s s  of s im u l­
t a n e i t y ,  i n  t h a t  s e n s e .
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p a r t i c u l a r  d i s t i n c t i o n  between e x p e r ie n c e d  s i m u l t a n e i t y , 
and s i m u l t a n e i t y  i n  the  sense  or sen se s  i n  which i t  i s  used  
in  p h y s i c s .
L a s t l y ,  i n  o r d i n a r y  language ’E t e r n i t y ’ has  been
used  to  s i g n i f y  unending t im e ,  and t i m e l e s s n e s s , and the
t r a n s c e n d in g  of time i n  i n f i n i t y .  I t  w i l l  be b e t t e r  i f  the
word i s  k ep t  on ly  f o r  the l a s t  of  th e s e  s e n s e s :  as i t  u sed ,
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  by Me i s t e r  3 c k h a r t  i n  the  Middle Ages and by
Baron von Htigel i n  r e c e n t  t im e s ;  " In  e t e r n i t y  i s  no b e fo re
and a f t e r :  the  happen ings  of the p a s t  millennium, and the
f u t u r e  one, and now, i n  e t e r n i t y  a re  a l l  the same. God’ s do ings
of  a thousand  y e a r s  ago and now and a thousand  y e a r s  to  come
1 2 
are  b u t  one s i n g l e  a c t . "  Or, as  Von Httgel p u t s  i t ,  S t e r n a l
l i f e  p r e c l u d e s  no t  on ly  s p a t i a l i s e d  c lo c k  t i m e , but even
d u r a t i o n .  Time i s  no t  a b a r r i e r  a g a i n s t  S t e r n a l  L i f e ,  but  the
means by which we apprehend  l i f e .
As r e g a rd s  the  f i r s t  u sa g e ,  as e q u i v a l e n t  to  'u n e n d ­
in g  t i m e ’ , i t  i s  b e t t e r  av o id ed ,  f o r  time conce ived  as  somehow
going  on and on w i th o u t  end i s  s t i l l  t ime ( t h a t  i s ,  i l  i t  i s
an y th in g  a t  a l l  bu t  a  f i g m e n t ) . As Aquinas p o in t e d  out i n  h i s
1 .  H c k h a r t ' s  "Works", t r a n s .  Bvans ( V o l . I .  p . 15 0 ) .
2 .  " jS ta rna l  L i f e " ,  p . 383.
3 .  A qu inas ,  Works ( V o l . I .  p . 9 7 - ? Ç r B u t  B oe th ius  h im se l l  d i s -  
t i n g u i s h e s  v e ry  c l e a r l y  between b e ing  conducted th ro u g h  a 
l i f e  of an i n f i n i t e  d u r a t i o n ,  and comprehending the whole 
of  t h i s  d u r a t i o n  as p r e s e n t .  D u ra t io n ,  even i f  i n f i n i t e ,  
i s  no t  e t e r n a l .
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Q r i t i c i s m  of B o e th iu s ’ d e f i n i t i o n  o f  e t e r n i t y  as the  " s im u l­
t a n e o u s ly  whole and p e r f e c t  p o s s e s s io n  of  i n t e rm in a b le  l i f e " ,  
’ i n t e r m i n a b l e ’ i s  a weak, i m p e r f e c t ,  n e g a t iv e  term by v/hich 
to  d e s c r ib e  the  f u l l n e s s  and the com ple teness  t h a t  i s  e t e r n i t y .
On the  o t h e r  hand,  i t  i s  e q u a l l y  u n d e s i r a b l e  to  use 
’ e t e r n a l ’ as  a k in d  of reach-me-down o p p o s i te  o f ’ t e m p o r a l ? , to  
be u sed  whenever ’ t e m p o r a l ’ does no t  a p p ly .  I f  we mean t h a t  
tem pora l  n o t io n s  do no t  a p p ly ,  l e t  us use t i m e l e s s , or  ( t e t t e r )  
n o n - tem p o ra l  r a t h e r  th an  ’ e t e r n a l . ’ Thus m a them at ica l  t r u t h s ,  
such as 2 + 2 = 4 ,  a re  no t  e t e r n a l , a l th o u g h  th ey  a re  no t  tem per-  .
a l :  r a t h e r  i s  i t  b e t t e r  to c a l l  them n o n - te m p o ra l , meaning
by t h a t  t h a t  th ey  a re  out  of time a l t o g e t h e r ,  and th a t  tempor­
a l  n o t io n s  have no r e le v a n c e  a t  a l l  to  them.
F o l lo w in g  on from t h i s ,  we have to  note  the ambigu­
ous use of words l i k e  ’ a lw a y s ’ and ’ som etim es’ ; and must be 
c a r e f u l  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between e x p r e s s io n s  which appear  to 
h av e ,  bu t  do no t  r e a l l y  h ave ,  a tem pora l  e lem en t ;  and e x p r e s s ­
io n s  which g e n u in e ly  c o n ta in  tem pora l  e l e m e n t s .
We say  of a p r e p o s i t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n ,  such as -d ,
t h a t  i t  i s  a lw ays ,  sometimes, or n eve r  t r u e .  I t  i s  e a sy  to
see t h a t  i n  such  e x p r e s s i o n s  the  words ' a l w a y s ' ,  ' s o m e t im e s ' ,  
and ' n e v e r '  have no t  th e  same meaning as  th ey  have ,  f o r  i n ­
s t a n c e ,  i n  " I  have n e v e r  t o l d  a  l i e ;  bu t  sometimes I  have 
knowingly  m is le d  peo p le  by my s i l e n c e . "  There i s  a  d i f i e r e
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a a y in e ,  -H, aom eti» ,=  a a t ,  f l , h  on Priclayo" and s a y ln e  
"At 1 p .m . on P r l d a y ,  23rd  llovombor, 1934 - t h a t  I s ,  a t  some 
( p a r t i c u l a r )  t ime - he a t e  f i s h . "
When we say ,  " B  cy z> Ç . - t ^  A "o &  i s  .
,a lwaj_3 t r u e " ,  we do ^  p r i m a r i l y  mean to  a s s e r t  t h a t  a t  any 
p a r t i c u l a r  t ime the  . im p l ic a t io n  h o l d s ,  though i n  f a c t  i t  does ;  
what we a r e  ch i  e l l y  concerned  w i th  i s  the  imp11 c a t i  o n , which 
i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  n o n - t e m p o ra l , i n  the  sense t h a t  i t  has no 
s p e c i a l  c o n n e c t io n  w i th  t im e .  I t  i s  t r u e ,  bu t  i r r e l e v a n t ,  t h a t  
the  i m p l i c a t i o n  cannot  be found to  h o ld  good on p a r t i c u l a r  
o c c a s io n s  e x c e p t  a t  a  t im e :  but i f  i t  comes to  t h a t ,  on ev e ry  
such o c c a s io n ,  some p la c e  i s  co n ce rn ed .  We might j u s t  as  w e l l  
say ,  " 5^  ^ S>, 4 & ^C j  A 3  Ç i s  everywhere t r u e " ,  e x c e p t ,
of c o u r s e ,  t h a t  i t  i s  e a s i e r  to  imagine our m enta l  o p e r a t io n s  
(and our  p e r c e p t i o n  of i m p l i c a t i o n s )  as hav ing  p o s i t i o n  in  
time r a t h e r  th a n  p o s i t i o n  i n  s p a c e . But the  p o in t  i s  t h a t  i f  
we s a i d  " i s  evelywhere t r u e " ,  we
sh o u ld  r e a l l y  be a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  to  change p o s i t i o n  i n  space 
makes no d i f f e r e n c e  a t  a l l  to  the  i m p l i c a t i o n ;  t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  
s p a t i a l  p o s i t i o n  i s  i r r e l e v a n t .  S i m i l a r l y  when we say "
R:>C IS. ihjvoL " ,  what we mean i s  t h a t  mere
d i f f e r e n c e  i n  da te  does no t  a f f e c t  the  i m p l i c a t i o n :  hence the  
e x p r e s s i o n  i s  i n  a fundam enta l  sense  n o n - te m p o ra l , and the
1. This  i s  the minimum p o s i t i o n :  many people  would go 
f u r t h e r  th a n  t h i s ,  and say  t h a t  the  whole n o t io n  i s
a b s u r d .
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use of tem pora l  lan g u ag e ,  i f  p r e s s e d  too  f a r ,  i s  bound to  be 
m i s l e a d i n g .  The p o i n t  can be pu t  i n  a n o th e r  way. The p re p o s ­
i t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n  ç /3 a  i s  e x e m p l i f i e d
on th e  sad  o c c a s io n  when I  d i s c o v e r  t h a t  my l e n g t h  i s  g r e a t e r  
th an  th e  l e n g t h  of the t a p e -m e asu re ,  and t h a t  g r e a t e r  than  
the  l e n g t h  o f  the  new m ac in to sh  I have bought ,  and hence con­
c lude t h a t  I  s h a l l  be c o n s id e r a b ly  lo n g e r  than  the  m a c in to s h .  
Wow t h i s  i s  o b v io u s ly  an even t  i n  time -  I m igh t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
r e c o r d  i t  i n  rny d i a r y  as happening  on a c e r t a i n  day - and 
e q u a l l y  o b v io u s ly  the  g e n e r a l  f u n c t i o n  i s  no t  an ev e n t  i n  
t im e .  H ard ly  anyone would make the g ro s s  m is take  of  supposing  
i t  to  be ajo e v e n t ,  but I t h i n k  t h a t  many people  te n d  to  look  
upon a p r e p o s i t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n  as  a k in d  of  c l a s s  of e v e n t s ,  
formed by the  summation of p a r t i c u l a r  e v e n t s  which a re  i n ­
s t a n c e s  of the f u n c t i o n ,  and t h i s  seems to  me q u i t e  wrong.
The t r o u b l e  i s ,  t h a t  they  would u s u a l l y  no t  h o ld  t h i s  view 
e x p l i c i t l y ,  bu t  by o v e r -u se  of tem pora l  e x p r e s s io n s  i n  p r e p o s ­
i t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n s  th ey  i m p l i c i t l y  s l u r  over the  d i s t i n c t i o n ,  
between t h e i r  use in  such f u n c t i o n s  and in  o rd in a r y  tem pora l  
e x p r e s s i o n s .  Suppose I say ,  "When I  am in  London, I  always 
s t a y  w i th  X." T h is  e v i d e n t l y  means t h a t  on eve ry  a c t u a l  oc­
c a s io n  t h a t  I  am i n  London, I s t a y  w i th  X. The r e f e r e n c e  to  
time he re  i s  e s s e n t i a l .  On the  o t h e r  hand, i f  I  a t t e m p te d  to  
make a s i m i l a r  a n a l y s i s  of  " ^
always t r u e " , and to say  t h a t  i t  meant t h a t  on ev e ry  o ccas io n
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on which t r i a l  has been made of i t ,  Pi z? d  was found to 
h o ld  good, my a n a l y s i s  would be i n s u f f i c i e n t . For we do not  
m ere ly  mean by t h i s  g e n e r a l  i m p l i c a t i o n  t h a t  i t  does a 
— ® ££ l^old good in  w hatever  p a r t i c u l a r  in s t a n c e  we
l i k e  to  t a k e ,  bu t  t h a t  i t  h o ld s  of n e c e s s i ty *  Now time and 
tem pora l  e v e n ts  cannot  y i e l d  n e c e s s i t y ,  bu t  on ly  m a t t e r s  of  
f a c t ,  so t h a t  i f  we are concerned  w i th  f u n c t i o n s  t h a t  c la im  
n e c e s s i t y  f o r  t h e i r  i m p l i c a t i o n s ,  a tem pora l  a n a l y s i s  i s  i n ­
s u f f i c i e n t .  I t  i s ,  of c o u r s e ,  t r u e  t h a t  i t  does h o ld  ’ a lw a y s ’ , 
i n  th e  sense t h a t  we cannot f i n d  any p a r t i c u l a r  o c c a s io n  on 
which i t  does no t  h o ld :  but we mean more than  t h a t  by our 
a s s e r t i o n .  But t h e  b e s t  way of showing t h a t  the  use of ’ a lw a y s ’ 
i n  p r o p o s i t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n s  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  n o n - tem p o ra l ,  i s  t o  
f i n d  an example where we sh ou ld  no t  use the  word ’ a lw a y s ’ 
t w i c e . L e t  us g r a n t ,  f o r  the sake of the  i l l u s t r a t i o n ,  t h a t  
whenever a man ta k e s  a c e r t a i n  q u a n t i t y  of a r s e n i c  under  c e r ­
t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s ,  h i s  d e a th  n e c e s s a r i l y  f o l l o w s .  Then i t  would
2 «£ U
be p e r m i s s i b l e  to  say(?^X<^x o  x  , o r ,  "The f u n c t i o n
  ^  oc LË. always t r u e  ." But i n  the  o r d i n a r y , tem pora l
sense  o f ’ a lw a y s ’ , we sh o u ld  n o t  say t h a t  peop le  a re  ’ always 
swallowing a r s e n i c ’ , t h a t  i s ,  i t  i s , n o t  always t r u e  t h a t  
a . - b . c .d .  . . .  a re  h ap p e n in g .  The d i f f e r e n c e  i s  b e t ^ e n  a s s e r t ­
in g  the  i m p l i c a t i o n ,  " I f  A th en  (a lways) B" and between
1 .  T h is  i s  an a s s e r t i o n  which w i l l  need d i s c u s s i o n  l a t e r  on.
2 .  Though n o t ,  a s  r e g a r d s  the second a l t e r n a t i v e ,  d e s i r a b l e
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a s s e r t i n g  "A and B" (always) • Hence i n  a tem poral  sense  i t
i s  o n ly  some time s t r u e  t h a t  a , h , c  .# # x o cc u r :  whereas i t
i s  u n i v e r s a l l y  the  case  t h a t  g iven  a , h , c , • • •  , x  r e s u l t s .
In  o t h e r  words,  sometimes w e ^ . h . c #  : ^  we have a , b , c ,  then
we always have x .  But t h i s ' a lw a y s ’ i s  not  a t e m p o r a l , bu t  a
u n i v e r s a l  ' a l w a y s ' . To imagine t h a t  i t  was a tem poral  ' a lw a y s '
would l e a d  us i n t o  the  a b s u r d i t y  of suppos ing  t h a t  somebody
was, a t  e v e ry  i n s t a n t ,  i n  p ro c e s s  of  swallowing a r s e n i c :
a c t u a l l y  of c o u r s e ,  w he the r  the n o n- tem pora l  ' a lw a y s ' h o ld s
good a l s o  t e m p o r a l ly ,  depends upon the  a n te c e d e n t  f a c t s ,  to
which i t  i s  s u b o r d i n a t e , and th e s e  may o n ly  be a ' s o m e t im e s ' .
There seem to  be f o u r  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  g iven  t h a t  A has the
1
r e l a t i o n  r  to  C.
(1) A always happens ( t e m p o ra l ly )  and r  i s  a u n i ­
v e r s a l  r e l a t i o n  ( n on - tem p ora l  ' a l w a y s ' ) .  Then we have 'a lw ay s  
C  i n  a tem pora l  sense  as  w e l l*  I  doubt i f  any example of
t h i s  cou ld  be g iv e n .
(2) A sometimes happens ,  and r  i s  a u n i v e r s a l  r e -  
l a t i o n .  Then we have 'a lw ay s  C  on ly  in  a  non- tem pora l  s e n s e .
An example i s  "A l o g i c a l l y  e n t a i l s  C".
(3) A always happens ,  and r  i s  a p a r t i c u l a r  r e l a t i o n .
' Always C  i n  n e i t h e r  s e n s e .
(4) A sometimes happens ,  and r  i s  a p a r t i c u l a r  r e ­
l a t i o n  -  ' Always C  i n  n e i t h e r  s e n s e .  An example of  t h i s
1. ' r '  need no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  he a r e l a t i o n  of i m p l i c a t i o n
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would be, "A i s  o f t e n  followed, by C".
Now, oi c o u r s e ,  nobody does b e l i e v e  t h a t  somebody 
i s ,  a t  e v e ry  i n s t a n t , swallowing a r s e n i c ,  so we do i n t e r p r e t  
the 'a lw ay s  C  i n  a non- tem pora l  s e n s e :  but i n  o t h e r  examples, 
where th e  r e s u l t s  a re  no t  so o b v io u s ly  a b s u rd ,  i t  i s  ea sy  to
i n t e r p r e t  the  'a lw ay s  Gï in  a tem pora l  s e n s e ,  and to  base
im p o r ta n t  m e ta p h y s ic a l  arguments on m is ta k e s  i n  l o g i c a l  ana­
l y s i s .  I t  i s  d e s i r a b l e  to  in t ro d u c e  s e p a r a t e  te rm in o lo g y :  
so i n  what f o l l o w s ,  the  no n- tem pora l  "always" w i l l  be r e ­
p l a c e d  by "h o ld s  good in  a l l  c a s e s " , or  "u n i v e r s a l l y " ; the  
n on - tem p o ra l  "sometimes" by "ho lds  good i n  some c a s e s " , or  
" the r e l a t i o n  between A and G i ^  a p a r t i c u l a r  one": the  non­
tem pora l  "never"  by "h o ld s  good i n  no c a s e s " : and the non­
tem pora l  "whenever" by " i f , . . . V  t h e n . "
A r e l a t e d  cause of s tum b lin g  i s  to  be found i n  the 
v e r b a l  a m b ig u i ty  t h a t  a r i s e s  i n  languages  t h a t  do no t  p o s s e s s  
a t e n s e l e s s  mood, such as  E n g l i s h .  O n to lo g ic a l  arguments a re  
a  permanent w arn ing  of  the  ease  w i th  which we can s l i d e  from 
t e n s e l e s s  s t a t e m e n t s  to  a f f i r m a t i o n s  ab ou t  p r e s e n t  e x i s t e n c e .  
As L a i r d  p u t  i t : -  " I t  i s  s im ply  f a l s e  to m a in ta in  t h a t  any 
a s s e r t i o n  of e x i s t e n c e  i s  c o n f in e d  to  the  p r e s e n t  t e n s e .  One 
might w ish  t h a t  European l a n g u a g e s ,  l i k e  some O r i e n t a l  ones ,  
had a t e n s e l e s s  mood, but even a European can see the  p o i n t .
1. Th is  i s  a p o s s i b l e  c r i t i c i s m  of McTaggart .  See Ghap. V I I .
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I t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  the  p a s t  does n o t  e x i s t  now, j u s t  as i t  i s  
t r u e  t h a t  the  p r e s e n t  d id  n o t  e x i s t  f o rm e r ly ,  but e x i s t e n c e  
i t s e l l  means the  whole of  e x i s t e n c e ,  no t  m ere ly  p r e s e n t  ex­
i s t e n c e ,  and p a s t  e v e n t s ,  l i k e  p r e s e n t  ones,  have t h e i r  determ-
1
i n a t e  p l a c e  i n  the  d e te rm in a te  s e r i e s  of e x i s t e n c e . "
A f a v o u r i t e  m e ta p h y s ic a l  magic c a r p e t  i s  the  m i r a c u l ­
o u s ly  e a sy  t r a n s i t i o n  from "The p a s t  does n o t  e x i s t "  (npw) 
th ro u g h  "The p a s t  no t"  to  "The p a s t  i s  no t  r e a l " .  ( I  shou ld  
l i k e  to  see an a n a l y s i s  on s i m i l a r  l i n e s  of  "The p a s t  i s  p a s t " ;  
I  f a n c y  t h a t  t h i s  o b v io u s ly  t r u e ,  even i f  t a u t o l o g i c a l  s t a t e ­
ment,  might p r e s e n t  i n s u p e r a b le  d i f f i c u l t i e s . )  The l a c k  of a 
t e n s e l e s s  mood means t h a t  the  p r e s e n t  t e n s e  ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  
th e  v e rb  ' t o  b e ’ ) has  to  do du ty  f o r  two q u i t e  d i s t i n c t  p u r ­
p o s e s ,  o n ly  one of  which i s  t em p o ra l .  I f  I  say ,  "X i s  a u n i ­
v e r s a l  t r u t h " ,  I  do no t  mean m ere ly ,  "X i s  now t r u e " ;  I  mean 
p r e c i s e l y  the  o p p o s i t e ,  s in c e  my emphasis i s  on the  t r u t h  and 
no t  on the  p a r t i c u l a r  t i m e . Of course  i f  X r e a l l y  i s  u n i v e r s ­
a l l y  t r u e  ( i f  any meaning can be a t t a c h e d  to  t h i s ) ,  i t  does ,  
i n  f a c t ,  h o ld  good now, but  t h i s  immedia te ,  p a r t i c u l a r  a p p l i c ­
a t i o n  i s  the l a s t  t h in g  I  w ish  to  em phas ize .  (And he re  i t  
sh o u ld  be p o in t e d  out  t h a t  i n  th e  above s o - c a l l e d  ' e l u c i d a t i o n '  
of  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t e n s e d  and t e n s e l e s s  s t a t e m e n t s ,  
t h e r e  occur examples of e a c h . )  S h o r t  of in v e n t in g  a new mood
1. "A S tudy  i n  R e a l i sm " ,  p . 50.
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f o r  e v e ry  v e rb  In  the  language - a  t a s k  which c e r t a i n l y  cannot 
he a t t e m p te d  here  -  th e s e  a m b ig u i t i e s  a re  u n a v o id a b le ,  and un­
f o r t u n a t e l y  t h e i r  f r e q u e n c y  i n c r e a s e s  ( a l s o  unavo idab ly )  as  we 
p a s s  from o r d i n a r y  c o n v e r s a t io n  to  any k in d  of a n a l y t i c a l  
s t a t e m e n t .  As an example of  the d i f f i c u l t y  of  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  
between tem p o ra l  and no n - tem p ora l  lan gu age ,  t h e r e  i s  an a r ­
gument of B ro a d 's  which i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  a n a l y s e .  This i s  
the  im p o r ta n t  argument i n  " S c i e n t i f i c  Thought" where Broad, i n  
a n a ly s i n g  th e  t h r e e  s t a t e m e n t s  " I t  has  r a i n e d " ,  " I t  i s  r a i n i n g " ,  
and " I t  w i l l  r a i n " ,  seeks  to  show t h a t  though the  f i r s t  two 
can be t r a n s l a t e d  by e x p r e s s io n s  which do no t  c o n ta in  a r e f e r ­
ence to  t e n s e ,  the  l a s t  cannot  be so t r a n s l a t e d ,  and the  r e f e r ­
ence to  the f u t u r e  rem ains  o u t s t a n d i n g .  His f o r m u la t i o n  of 
" I t  has r a in e d "  i s  "There i s  an e v e n t  which i s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  
by r a i n i n e s s ,  and the sum t o t a l  of e x i s t e n c e  when the  judgment 
i s  made in c l u d e s  a l l  and more th a n  a l l  which i t  i n c lu d e s  when 
t h i s  even t  becomes." This  i s  e a s i l y  open to  the o b j e c t i o n  
t h a t  i t  sh o u ld  be ' i n c lu d e d '  i n s t e a d  of ' i n c l u d e s . '  Let  us 
t r y  to  g e t  r i d  of the  d e b a ta b le  ph ra se  " in c lu d e s  a l l  and more 
th an  a l l  which i t  i n c lu d e s  when t h i s  e v e n t  b e c o m e s T r a n s ­
l a t e d ,  the p r o p o s i t i o n  now becomes "There ( i s )  an even t  
w h i c h ( i s ) c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by r a i n i n e s s ,  and the sum t o t a l  of 
e x i s t e n c e  when the  judgment ( i s )  made ( i s )  g r e a t e r  th an  tha 
s u m - to t a l  of e x i s t e n c e  when t h i s  e v e n t (b e c o m e s ) ." S i m i l a r l y ,
1 .  O p . c i t .  p . 76 .  _
2 .  A l l  the  v e rb s  e n c lo s e d  i n  b r a c k e t s  a re  t i m e l e s s .
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" I t  i s  r a i n i n g " ,  can be t r a n s l a t e d  "There ( i s )  an even t  
which ( i s )  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by r a i n i n e s s ,  and the  sum t o t a l  of 
e x i s t e n c e  when the judgment i s  made ( i^ )  eq u a l  ^  the sum t o t a l  
of  e x i s t e n c e  when t h i s  e v e n t  (becomes) ." A l l  the  v e rbs^n  th ese  
t r a n s l a t i o n s  a re  t e n s e l e s s ;  though, a p p a r e n t l y ,  th e y  a re  i n  
the p r e s e n t  t e n s e ,  a c t u a l l y  th ey  a re  t i m e l e s s .
Gan the  judgment " I t  w i l l  r a i n "  be s i m i l a r l y  t r a n s ­
l a t e d ?  Yes. I t  becomes, "There ( i s )  an e v e n t  which ( i s )  c h a r ­
a c t e r i s e d  by r a i n i n e s s ,  and the sum t o t a l  of e x i s t e n c e  when 
the  judgment i s  made ( i ^ )  l e s s  th an  the sum t o t a l  of e x i s t e n c e  
when t h i s  ev en t  (becom es) ."  The v e rb s  here  too are  t i m e l e s s .
Now t h i s  Broad d e n i e s .  I t  seems t h a t  h i s  argument i s  based on 
a c o n fu s io n ,  due to  h i s  t r a n s l a t i o n  of " I t  has r a in e d "  a s  
" . . .  i n c l u d e s  a l l  and more than  a l l  which i t  in c lu d e s  when 
t h i s  e v e n t  becomes."  I s  the  second " in c lu d e s "  in te n d e d  to  be 
i n  the  p r e s e n t  t e n s e ,  or t i m e le s s ?  I f  the  fo rm er ,  then  he i s  
wrong, and i t  ought to  be " i n c l u d e d " ; i f  the  l a t t e r ,  then  by 
p a r i t y  of r e a s o n in g ,  h i s  t r a n s l a t i o n  of " I t  w i l l  r a i n "  shou ld  
be e q u a l l y  t e n s e l e s s .  B road’ s whole p o i n t  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  imposs­
i b l e  to  g e t  r i d  of t h e  f u t u r e  t e n s e ;  but I  t h i n k  the t r a n s ­
l a t i o n  su g g e s te d  might do i t .  Again , when Broad b eg in s  h i s  
t r a n s l a t i o n s  by "There i s  an e v e n t . . . "  and goes on to  h o ld  t h a t  
t h i s  cannot  be so in  the case of e v e n ts  t h a t  have not  y e t  
happened, " f o r  the on ly  e v e n ts  t h a t  th e r e  a re  a re  the  ev e n ts  
t h a t  have become up to  the  time when the a s s e r t i o n  was made:
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the  sum t o t a l  of e x i s t e n c e  does n o t  c o n ta in  f u t u r e  e v e n t s " ,
he i s  doing  one of  two t h i n g s .  S i t h e r  the  " i s " i n  "There i s  an
e v e n t"  i s  t i m e l e s s ,  i n  which case he i s  g iv in g  a wrong re a so n
f o r  h i s  r e j e c t i o n  of  the  f u t u r e ,  o r ,  i f  i t  i s  n o t ,  t h e r e  i s
e q u a l l y  no way of  a n a ly s i n g  away ' has  been '  and ' i s  now' t h a t
does n o t  l e a d  to  an i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s .  I  cannot  t h i n k  t h a t
1
Broad has proved  h i s  c a s e ,  bu t  i f  such an e x a c t  t h i n k e r  can be 
m is le d  by v e r b a l  s i m i l a r i t y ,  t h a t  shows the  i n s i d i o u s n e s s  of 
the c o n f u s io n .
Wherever p o s s i b l e ,  when t e n s e l e s s  language i s  used  
a f t e r  t h i s  i n  an argum ent,  the  ambiguous word i n  q u e s t i o n ,  
g e n e r a l l y  the  v e rb ,  w i l l  be e n c lo s e d  i n  b r a c k e t s .  (But i n  a l l  
p r o b a b i l i t y  the  g r e a t e r  number w i l l  c reep  p a s t  u n o bse rved .)
From what has been s a i d  above, the  im portance of  a 
f i r m  l o g i c a l  b a s i s  to  any s e l f - r e s p e c t i n g  m etaphysic  can h a rd ­
ly  be o v e r e s t im a t e d .  I  would su g g es t  t h a t  we cannot hope to  
so lv e  the m e ta p h y s ic a l  problems connec ted  w i th  time u n l e s s  we 
have f i r s t  no t  o n ly  made an a n a l y s i s  of the  concep ts  which we 
propose  to  employ, but a l s o ,  and no l e s s  im p o r ta n t ,  brought 
ou t  e x p l i c i t l y  the ease  w i th  which we can s l i d e  i n t o  c o n tu s io n ,  
i f  we f a i l  to  r e a l i s e  the p r e s s i n g  n e c e s s i t y  of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  
between language which i s  g e n u in e ly  tem pora l  and t h a t  which i s ,  
i n  a fundam enta l  s e n s e ,  n o n - t e m p o ra l .
1 .  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  s p e c u la t e  whether  i t  i s  ev e r  p o s s i b l e ,  
by s t r i c t  l o g i c a l  t e n s e l e s s  lan gu ag e ,  to  prove a metaphys- 
i c a l  t h e o ry  r e g a r d in g  tem pora l  c o n c e p t s .
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CHAPTER IV. KANT.
The f i r s t  s e c t i o n  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  w i l l  be t a k e n  #p 
w i t h  showing th e  g r a d u a l  development o f  Kants v iews on time 
w i t h i n  th e  C r i t i q u e ,  and th e  c o n f l i c t i n g  t e n d e n c i e s  which 
th e y  r e v e a l . F o r  no o t h e r  p h i lo s o p h e r  i s  i t  n e c e s s a ry  as  i t  i s  
w i t h  Kant t o  t r a c e  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  v iews which he h o ld s  a t  d i f ­
f e r e n t  t i m e s ,  and t o  w r i t e  s e c t i o n s  on **The A e s t h e t i c ” , "The 
A n a l y t i c ” , and so on. Only a f t e r  t h i s  h as  been done can we go 
on to  d i s c u s s  i n  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  th e  more i n t e r e s t i n g  o f  th e  
problem s which he r a i s e s .
I n  th e  A e s t h e t i c ,  Kant s a i d  t h a t  space and t ime 
were e m p i r i c a l l y  r e a l ,  bu t  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y  i d e a l :  by t h i s  
he a t t e m p te d  t o  r e c o n c i l e  two a p p a r e n t ly  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  f i n d ­
in g s  o f  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e .  On th e  one hand,  no one would say 
t h a t  space and t ime a r e  r e a l ,  i f  a t  a l l ,  i n  th e  same way 
t h a t  m a t e r i a l  o b j e c t s  a r e  r e a l .  On th e  o t h e r  hand, our  ex­
p e r i e n c e s  do seem t o  be a r r a n g e d  in  s p a t i a l  o r d e r ,  and t o  be 
s e r i a l  i n  t im e ,  so t h a t  we sh o u ld  be l o t h  t o  b e l i e v e  in  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  e x p ^ r i e h c e l t h ^ t  i s  n o t  i n  t ime o r  sp ace .  Ad­
m i t t e d l y ,  t h e s e  a r e  two im p o r ta n t  p o i n t s ,  and t h e i r  a t t e m p t ­
ed r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  cann o t  bu t  be i n t e r e s t i n g .  But what i s  
meant by ” t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " ?  Does i t  j u s t  mean t h a t  t h e  c r i t e r i a  
which a r e  emphasized a re  th o s e  o f  m a t e r i a l  o b j e c t s ?  -  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  w h i le  t im e i s  " r e a l "  i n  so f a r  as  i t  i s  ex­
p e r i e n c e d ,  i t  i s  " i d e a l "  i n  t h a t  i t  i s  o b v io u s ly  d i f f e r e n t
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from m a t e r i a l  o b j e c t s ,  which a r e  th u s  h e l d  t o  be th e  only 
t h i n g s  t h a t  a r e  " r e a l "  i n  t h e  s t r i c t e s t  sen se .  Such m a t e r i a l ­
ism would be a p o s s i b l e  p o s i t i o n :  bu t  i t  i s  no t  K a n t ' s .  I t  i s  
above a l l  im p o r ta n t  t o  see t h a t  he goes f u r t h e r  t h a n  t h i s  ( i t  
may be s a i d ,  f u r t h e r  th a n  he l o g i c a l l y  need have done;- on th e  
ev idence  o f  th e  A e s t h e t i c ) .  F o r  no t  only  d id  he h o ld  t h a t  
space and t ime were t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y  i d e a l ,  bu t  he a l s o  h e ld  
t h a t  m a t e r i a l  o b j e c t s ,  a s  th e y  a re  apprehended  by u s ,  a r e  
i d e a l ,  and d i s t i n c t  from th e  t h i n g s  as th ey  a re  in  th em se lv es .  
We a re  n o t ,  t h e n ,  asked  to  c o n t r a s t  th e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y  i d e a l  
space  and t im e w i th  " r e a l "  m a t e r i a l  o b j e c t s :  on th e  c o n t r a r y ,  
t h e  i n t u i t i o n s  o f  ou9T s e n s e s ,  a lo n g  w i t h  th e  "forms" t h a t  
c o n d i t i o n  t h e s e  i n t u i t i o n s ,  a r e  c o n t r a s t e d  w i th  a " r e a l "  w orld
t h a t  i s  co m p le te ly  n o n -se n su o u s .  I f  a n y th in g , s p a c e  and time
1
a s  th e  c o n d i t i o n i n g  forms o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  sh o u ld  be t r e a t e d  
w i th  g r e a t e r  r e s p e c t  by t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  th a n  th e  
mere c o n d i t i o n e d  i n t u i t i o n s .  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e  su p p o r t  which 
common sen se  would a t  f i r s t  g iv e  t o  t h e  d o c t r i n e  ( s in c e  th e  
p l a i n  man would p ro b a b ly  a l low  a vague " r e a l i t y "  t o  space and 
t im e )  can  no lo n g e r  be g iv e n .
Secondly ,  Kant em phas izes  th e  a p r i o r i  c h a r a c t e r  o f  
space add t ime -  i n d e e d ,  th e y  a r e  what make a p r i o r i  s y n t h e t i c  
judgments p o s s i b l e .  Though th e y  a re  an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  a l l
1. Accord ing  to  F o u i l l e 'e ,  however, t ime i s  a form o f  a p p e t i t i o n  
and n o t  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n .  ( " P sy c h o lo g ie  des  Idées  F o rces"  
I I ,  p . 104 .)
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e x p e r i e n c e ,  th ey  a r e  n o t  g iv e n  to  us  th ro u g h  e x p e r i e n c e ,  bu t  
a p r i o r i ^  He b a se s  h i s  b e l i e f  i n  t h e i r  a - p r i o r i t y  on t h r e e  
g rounds :  f i r s t l y  t h a t  " n e i t h e r  c o e x i s t e n c e  no r  s u c c e s s io n  
would e v e r  come w i t h i n  our  p e r c e p t i o n ,  i f  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
2
o f  t ime were n o t  p re sup po sed  as  u n d e r ly in g  them a l l  a p r i o r i ."  
That  i s .  Time i s  l o g i c a l l y  p r i o r  t o  t i m e s .  T h is ,  however, i s  
l a t e r  c o n t r a d i c t e d  when Kant says  t h a t  "only  th ro u g h  s u c c e s s iv e  
s y n t h e s i s  o f  p a r t  t o  p a r t  in  i t s  a p p re h e n s io n  can  the  whole be 
known." Which o f  t h e  two r e p r e s e n t s  h i s  r e a l  p o s i t i o n  i s  d i f ­
f i c u l t  to  d e c id e .  Secondly ,  "we cannot . . .  remove t ime i t s e l f ,
M
though we can w e l l  t h i n k  t ime a s  vo id  o f  a p p e a ra n c e s . "  B ut ,  
a s  Kemp Smith p o i n t e d  o u t ,  even i f  t im e i s  n e c e s s a ry  to  our 
a p p r e h e n s io n s ,  t h a t  does n o t  a lone  prove i t  t o  be a p r i o r i .  
L a s t l y ,  Kant c o n t r a s t s  c o n c e p t s ,  which " c o n ta in  on ly  p a r t i a l  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  w i th  i n t u i t i o n s ,  and say s  t h a t  t h e  i n f i n i t y  6 f  
t im e ,  and th e  f a c t  t h a t  th e  whole o f  Time p re c e d e s  i t s  p a r t s ,  
shows t h a t  i t  i s  an i n t u i t i o n .  But l a t e r  he changes  h i s  mind 
and t r e a t s  Time as  a c o n c e p t .
Thus, i n  th e  A e s t h e t i c ,  Kant makes a d i s t i n c t i o n  
between e m p i r i c a l  and t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  r e a l i t y  which he c o n s i d e r s  
fu n d a m e n ta l :  he em phas izes  t h e  v ie w  of space and Lime as
1. The ov er -em p h as ized  p a r a l l e l i s m ,  in  i i i s  lan gu age ,  oetween 
space and time i s  h e re  a d e f e c t ,  and shou ld  be d i s c o u n te d ,  
i n  so f a r  as  th e  c o n f u s io n s  and un fo rL un a te  language a re  no t  
an e s s e n t i a l  r e s u l t  o f  Kant * s p o s lL io n .
2 .  B 46 (Kemp S m i th ' s  t r a n s l a t i o n ) .  3 .  B 204.
4 .  B 46. 5 .  B48.
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" f o r m s "  w h i c h  c o n d i t i o n  o u r  s e n s i b l e  a p p r e h e n s i o n s ;  a n d  on  
t h e  w h o l e ,  h e  t r e a t s  s p a c e  a n d  Lime a s  o i  e q u a l  i m p o r t a n c e ,  
t h o u g h  s o m e t i m e s  h e  i s  i n c l i n e d  t o  ho ld ,  t h a t  t i m e ,  n o t  o n l y  
m ay ,  b u t  m u s t ,  b e  r e p r e s e n t e d  by s p a c e .  B u t  t i m e ,  i n  K a n t ' s  
p h i l o s o p h y ,  d o e s  n o t  o c c u p y  t h e  v e r y  m i n o r  p o s l L i o n  i n  t h e  
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  s c h e m e  as 1l would seem  r r o m  t n e  A e s t h e t i c ,  t h e  
p l a c e  w h e r e  h e  i s  a v o w e a l y  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t i m e .  As t h e  C r i t i q u e  
p r o g r e s s e s ,  L ime o c c u p i e s  a m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  p l a c e ,  u n t i l  i t  i s  
f u n d a m e n t a l ,  w h i l e  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  a t t a c h e d  t o  s p a c e  p r o p o r t i o n ­
a t e l y  d e c l i n e s .  T h u s  t h e  " S c h e m a t i s m  o f  t h e  p u r e  c o n c e p t s  o f  
t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ” i n  t h e  C a t e g o r i e s  p r o c e e d s  o n l y  t h r o u g h  t h e  
p o s t u l a t i o n  o f  m o d e s  o f  t i m e , -  t h o u g h  i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  how f a r  
" m o d e s ” a r e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  t i m e  a s  a  p u r e  i n t u i t ­
i o n ,  o n e  a n d  i n d i v i s i b l e ,  w h i c h  h e  e m p h a s i z e d  i n  t h e  A e s t h e t i c .  . 
A n d ,  by t h e  t i m e  t h a t  t h e  A n t i n o m i e s  a r e  r e a c h e d ,  n o t h i n g  l e s s  
t h a n  a n  I d e a  ox f i e a s o n  i s  n e e d e d  t o  d i s e n t a n g l e  t n e  F i r s t  
A n t i n o m y !
Y e t  i t  S h o u l d  n o t  b e  t h o u g h t  t h a t  t h i s  i s  t n e  o n l y  
t r e n d  i n  t h e  m i d d l e  o f  t h e  C r i t i q u e .  S i d e  b y  S i d e  w i t h  t h e s e ,  
a n d  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e m ,  a r e  p a s s a g e s  w h e r e  K a n t  s e em s  t o  
h a v e  a p u r e l y  s p a t i a l  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t i m e ,  a n d  t o  e a r n  B e r g s o n ’ s 
c r l L i c i s m  L h a t  h e  c o n c e i v e d  o f  T im e a s  a  h o m o g e n e o u s  m edium  -  
t h o u g h  h e  c o u l d  n e v e r  make u p  m s  m in d  w h e t h e r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
i n  s p a c e  i s  m e r e l y  c o n v e n i e n t ,  o r  n e c e s s a r y .  "We a r e  u n a b l e  t o  
p e r c e i v e  a n y  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i n  t i m e  s a v e  t h r o u g h  c h a n g e  i n
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1 may
o u t e r  r e l a t i o n s " ;  " I n  o r d e r  t h a t  we/^make i n n e r  a l t e r ­
a t i o n s  t h i n k a b l e ,  we m u s t  r e p r e s e n t  t i m e  f i g u r a t i v e l y  a s  a  
2
l i n e , "  "We c a n n o t  o b t a i n  f o r  o u r s e l v e s  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f
t i m e ,  w h i c h  i s  n o t  a n  o b j e c t  o f  o u t e r  i n t u i t i o n ,  e x c e p t  u n d e r
3
t h e  i m a g e  o f  a  l i n e . * On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d  : -  " T h e  s y n t h e s i s  o f  
t h e  m a n i f o l d  p a r t s  o f  s p a c e  i s  s u c c e s s i v e ,  t a k i n g  p l a c e  i n
a
t i m e  a n d  c o n t a i n i n g  a  s e r i e s . "  I t  w o u l d  a p p e a r  t h a t  K a n t  
n e v e r  c o m p l e t e l y  m ade  u p  h i s  m i n d  o n  t h i s  p o i n t ,  y e ^ t  w o u l d  
s u r e l y  b e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  h i s  m a i n  p o s i t i o n  t o  h o l d  t h a t  
s p a t i a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  n e c e s s a r y ,  w h e r e a s  i t  i s  a  t e n a b l e  
p o s i t i o n  w h i c h  n o b o d y  i s  l i k e l y  t o  d i s p u t e ,  t o  s a y  t h a t  s u c h  
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  o f t e n  c o n v e n i e n t .  On t h e  w h o l e ,  K a n t ' s  m a i n  
t r e n d  i s  d e f i n i t e l y  t o w a r d s  e m p h a s i z i n g  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  
t i m e  a n d  r e l e g a t i n g  s p a c e  t o  t h e  b a c k g r o u n d ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  t o  
t h e  r a t h e r  f o r c e d  p a r a l l e l i s m ; ^  o f  t h e  A e s t h e t i c .  T he  a b a n d o n ­
m e n t  o f  s u c h  p a r a l l e l i s m  i s  a l l  t o  t h e  g o o d ,  a s  f a r  a s  t i m e  
i s  c o n c e r n e d ,  s i n c e  w h en  t h e r e  i s  d i s t o r t i o n  t o  f i t  a n  a r c h i ­
t e c t o n i c  s c h e m e ,  i t  i s  i n v a r i a b l y  t i m e  t h a t  s u f f e r s ,  r a t h e r  
t h a n  s p a c e ,  j u s t  b e c a u s e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  w h i c h  a r e  n o t  
common t o  b o t h  a r e  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t e m p o r a l  r a t h e r  t h a n  s p e c i f i c ­
a l l y  s p a t i a l .  So t h e  v e r y  p r e - e m i n e n c e  o f  t i m e  i s  l i k e l y  t o  
p u t  i t  a t  a  d i s a d v a n t a g e .
As s o o n  a s  K a n t  p r o c e e d s  t o  f o r m u l a t e  a n d  d e d u c e  
t h e  c a t e g o r i e s ,  h e  d i s c o v e r s  t h a t  t h e  p o s i t i o n  h e  t o o k  up  i n
1 .  B 2 7 7 .  2 .  B . 2 9 2
3 .  B . 1 5 6 .  4 .  5 . 4 3 9
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t h e  " A e s t h e t i c "  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e  w a s  i n s u f f i c ­
i e n t .  Now h e  s a y s ,  " S p a c e  a n d  t i m e  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  a  p r i o r i
n o t  m e r e l y  a s  f o r m s  o f  s e n s i b l e  i n t u i t i o n ,  b u t  a s  t h e m s e l v e s
1
i n t u i t i o n s  w h i c h  c o n t a i n  a  m a n i f o l d . "  A n d ,  " S p a c e  a n d  t i m e  
c o n t a i n  a  m a n i f o l d  o f  p u r e  a  p r i o r i  i n t u i t i o n ,  b u t  a t  t h e  
sam e  t i m e  a r e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  r e c e p t i v i t y  o f  o u r  m in d  -  
c o n d i t i o n s  u n d e r  w h i c h  a l o n e  i t  c a n  r e c e i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s
o f  o b j e c t s , a n d  w h i c h  t h e r e f o r e  m u s t  a l s o  a l w a y s  a f f e c t  t h e
2
c o n c e p t  o f  t h e s e  o b j e c t s . "  I n  a  f o o t n o t e ,  p e r h a p s  a w a r e  o f  
t h e  f l a t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  a s  i t  s t a n d s  w i t h  t h e  A e s t h e t i c ,  h e  
s a y s ,  " i n  t h e  A e s t h e t i c ,  I  h a v e  t r e a t e d  t h i s  u n i t y  ( o f  s p a c e )  
a s  b e l o n g i n g  m e r e l y  t o  s e n s i b i l i t y ,  s i m p l y  i n  o r d e r  t o  em­
p h a s i z e  t h a t  i t  p r e c e d e s  a n y  c o n c e p t ,  t h o u g h  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  
f a c t ,  i t  p r e s u p p o s e s  a  s y n t h e s i s  w h i c h  d o e s  n o t  b e l o n g  t o  t h e
s e n s e s  b u t  t h r o u g h  w h i c h  a l l  c o n c e p t s  o f  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e  f i r s t%
b e c o m e  p o s s i b l e . "  K a n t ' s  p o s i t i o n  i n  t h e  T r a n s c e n d e n t a l
D e d u c t i o n  w o u l d  s e e m  t o  b e  t h a t  t i m e  i s  n o t  p u r e l y  a  m a t t e r
o f  s e n s i b i l i t y ,  b u t  d e p e n d s  a l s o  u p o n  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  a n d
i t s  " o r i g i n a l  p o w e r  o f  c o m b i n i n g  t h e  m a n i f o l d  o f  i n t u i t i o n . "
I n n e r  s e n s e ,  a l o n e ,  c o n t a i n s  o n l y  t h e  m e r e  f o r m  o f  i n t u i t i o n ,
b u t  no  d e t e r m i n a t e  i n t u i t i o n ,  w h i c h  i s  p o s s i b l e  o n l y " t h r o u g h
t h e  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  o f  t h e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  m a n i f o l d  by  t h e
3
t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  a c t  o f  i m a g i n a t i o n . "  When I  am g i v e n  a n
1 .  B 1 6 0 .  2 .  B 1 0 2 .  3* B 1 6 0 - 1 .  I t a l i c s  m in e
4 .  B 1 5 3 .  5 .  B 1 5 4 .
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a p p e a r a n c e  I n  t i m e ,  I  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e p r e s e n t  t o  m y s e l f  s y n ­
t h e t i c  u n i t y  o f  t h e  m a n i f o l d ,  b e c a u s e  o t h e r w i s e  I  c o u l d  n o t  
i n t u i t  t h a t  t i m e - r e l a t i o n  a s  b e i n g  d e t e r m i n e d  i n  t i m e -  
s e q u e n c e .  T h i s  s y n t h e t i c  u n i t y ,  i f  I  a b s t r a c t  f r o m  t h e  f o r m  
o f  i n n e r  d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  g i v e s  t h e  c a t e g o r y  o f  c a u s e .  ( I t  
s h o u l d  b e  n o t i c e d  t h a t  K a n t ' s  m a i n  c o n c e r n  h e r e  i s  n o t  w i t h  
t i m e  a s  s u c h ,  b u t  w i t h  c a u s a t i o n  a s  n e c e s s a r y  i n  o r d e r  t o  
r e f u t e  Hume -  h e n c e  p o s s i b l y  some o f  h i s  i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s . )  By 
a  s i m i l a r  a b s t r a c t i o n  f r o m  s p a c e  we g e t  t h e  c a t e g o r y  o f  q u a n ­
t i t y .
Y e t  i n  t h e  S c h e m a t i s m  h e  h a s  g o n e  c o n s i d e r a b l y  f u r ­
t h e r  t h a n  t h i s  p o s i t i o n .  I t  i s  n o  l o n g e r  m e r e l y ,  t h a t  t i m e ,  
l i k e  s p a c e ,  i s  d e p e n d e n t  u p o n  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  On t h e  c o n ­
t r a r y ,  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  a r e  v a l u e l e s s  u n l e s s  t i m e  i s  t h e r e  t o  
m e d i a t e  t h e  s u b s u m p t i o n  o f  a p p e a r a n c e s  u n d e r  t h e m .  S e c o n d l y ,  
w h e r e a s  b e f o r e  s p a c e ,  e q u a l l y  w i t h  t i m e ^ w a s  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  a  
s p e c i a l  c a t e g o r y ,  now t i m e  i s  e m p h a s i z e d  a n d  s p a c e  i g n o r e d .
T im e  i s  t h e  " f o r m a l  c o n d i t i o n  o f  t h e  m a n i f o l d  o f  i n n e r  s e n s e ,
1
a n d  t h e r e f o r e  o f  t h e  c o n n e c t i o n  o f  a l l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s " ,  a n d ,
" t i m e  i s  c o n t a i n e d  i n  e v e r y  e m p i r i c a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e  
2
m a n i f o l d . ” More  t h a n  t h a t ,  " t h e  s c h e m a  o f  e a c h  c a t e g o r y  c o n ­
t a i n s  a n a  m a k e s  c a p a b l e  o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o n l y  a  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
3
o f  t i m e . "  T h u s  t h e  s c h e m a  o f  m a g n i t u d e ,  n o t  now s p a t i a l ,  i s  
1 .  B .  1 7 7 .  2 . B  1 7 8 .  3 .  B 1 8 4 .
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t h e  " g e n e r a t i o n  o f  t i m e  i n  t n e  s u c c e s s i v e  a p p r e h e n s i o n  o f  a n  
4
o b j e c t " ,  a n d  s i m i l a r l y  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  s c h e m a t a  w h i c h  " a r e
n o t h i n g  b u t  a  p r i o r i  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  o f  t i m e  i n  a c c o r a a n c e  
2
w i t n  r u l e s . "  T he  c a t e g o r i e s  c a n  o n l y  be  a p p l i e d  t o  a p p e a r ­
a n c e s  t h r o u g h  t h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  t i m e .  Y e t  
t i m e  i s  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y  i d e a l ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  A e s t h e t i Ô Î  
B u t  K a n t  s e e s  t h a t ,  i n  r e a l i s i n g  t h e  c a t e g o r i e s ,  t h e  s c h e m a t a  
i n e v i t a b l y  r e s t r i c t  t h e m  t o  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s e n s i b i l i t y .  Ob­
v i o u s l y ,  i f  s c h e m a t i s m  e s s e n t i a l l y  i n v o l v e s  t i m e ,  a n d  t e m p o r a l  
p r e d i c a t e s  a r e  i n a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h i n g s  i n  t h e m s e l v e s ,  h e  m u s t  
h o l d  t h a t  " t h e  c a t e g o r i e s  i n  t h e i r  p u r e  s i g n i f i c a n c e ,  a p a r t
f r o m  a l l  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  s e n s i b i l i t y ,  o u g h t  t o  a p p l y  t o  t h i n g s
3
a s  t h e y  a r e ,  a n d  n o t  r e p r e s e n t  t h e m  o n l y  a s  t h e y  a p p e a r . "
N e v e r t h e l e s s  h e  a d m i t s  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  t h e r e  i s  a  m e a n i n g  i n  t h e
p u r e  c o n c e p t s  o f  u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,  i t  i s  a  p u r e l y  l o g i c a l  o n e ,
a n d  " s u c h  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  I  c a n  p u t  t o  n o  u s e ,  f o r  i t  t e l l s
me n o t h i n g  a s  t o  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  t h a t  w h i c h  i s  t h u s  t o  b e  v i e w e d
4
a s  a  p r i m a r y  s u b j e c t .  I  w o u l d  s u g g e s t  t h a t  i f  t h i s  i s  so  h e  
h a s  h a r d l y  a n  a d e q u a t e  g r d u n d  f o r  h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  
p h e n o m e n a  a n d  n o u m e n a ,  a n d  t h a t  t o  s a y  t h a t  t i m e  i s  t r a n s c e n d ­
e n t a l l y  i d e a l  i s  t o  s a y  v e r y  l i t t l e .
T he  n e w e r  v i e w - p o i n t  i s  d e v e l o p e d  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  
A n a l y t i c  o f  P r i n c i p l e s ,  a n d  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  t h e  A n a l o g i e s .  T he
1 .  B 1 8 4 -  2 .  B 1 8 4 .  I t a l i c s  m i n e .  3 .  B 1 8 6 .
4 .  B 1 8 6 - 7 .
147
K a n t  o f  t h e  A e s t h e t i c  c o u l d  n o t  h a v e  s a i d ,  " E v e n  s p a c e  a n d  
t i m e ,  h o w e v e r  f r e e  t h e i r  c o n c e p t s  a r e  f r o m  a n y t h i n g  e m p i r i c a l ,  
a n d  h o w e v e r  c e r t a i n  i t  i s  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  r e p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  
m i n d  c o m p l e t e l y  a  p r i o r i ,  w o u l d  y e t  b e  w i t h o u t  o b j e c t i v e  v a l i d ­
i t y ,  s e n s e l e s s  a n d  m e a n i n g l e s s ,  i f  t h e i r  n e c e s s a r y  a p p l i c a t i o n
1
t o  t h e  o b j e c t s  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  w e r e  n o t  e s t a b l i s h e d . "  H e r e  s p a c e  
a n d  t i m e  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  c o n c e p t s ,  a n d  t o  a l l o w  t h i s  a  d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  p u r e  a n d  e m p i r i c a l  c o n c e p t s  i s  n e c e s s a r y .
W hat  K a n t  c a n  m ean  b y  ’ o b j e c t i v e  v a l i d i t y ’ i s  d u b i o u s ;  c e r t a i n ­
l y  i t  c a n n o t  m ea n  ’ t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  r e a l i t y * ,  s i n c e  a t  t h e  same 
t i m e  h e  a s s e r t s  t h e i r  n e c e s s a r y  a p p l i c a t i o n  t o  o b j e c t s  o f  e tx-  
p e r i e n c e .  I t  w o u l d  s e e m  t h a t  o f  t h e  t w o  e x p r e s s i o n s ,  t h e  f o r m e r  
i s  t h e  i m p o r t a n t  o n e .  We s a w ,  i n  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t h e  A e s t h e t i c »  
t h a t  t i m e  i s  i n d u b i t a b l y  ’ r e a l ’ f o r  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e :  i f  i t  i s  
a l s o  a l l o w e d  t o  h a v e  o b j e c t i v e  v ^ f e l i d i t y ,  i t  w o u l d  a p p e a r  t o  
m a t t e r  v e r y  l i t t l e  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  i t  h a s  ' t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ’ r e a l ­
i t y .  I  w o u l d  s u g g e s t  t h a t  m o s t  o f  w h a t  i s  v a l u a b l e  i n  K a n t ’ s 
t r e a t m e n t  o f  t i m e  i s  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  t h i s  q u e s t i o n .
I n  t h e  A n a l o g i e s ,  t h e  t n r e e  r u l e s  o f  a l l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  
a p p e a r a n c e s  i n  t i m e  a r e  c o n c e i v e d  a s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  w i t h  t h e  
t h r e e  m o d e s  o f  t i m e  -  d u r a t i o n ,  s u c c e s s i o n ,  a n d  c o e x i s t e n c e .
B u t  t h o u g h  i t  i s  u n f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  K a n t  i m p l i e d  t h a t  t h e s e  t h r e e
2
’ m o d e s ’ c a n  b e  s e p a r a t e l y  a p p r e h e n d e d  ( a n d ,  i n d e e d ,  w a s  n e v e r  
c l e a r  w h e t h e r  t h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  s u c h  m o d e s  o r  o n l y  t w o ) ,  t h e
1 '  B 1 9 5 .  2 .  C o m p are  Kemp S m i t h ,  " C o m m e n t a r y "  p . 3 5 6 .
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i m p o r t a n t  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  h e  saw t h e  e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  p l a y e d  b y  
t i m e  i n  o u r  a p p r e h e n s i o n s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  
c a u s a l i t y .  I t  i s  o f t e n  s a i d  t h a t  t h e  A n a l o g i e s  a r e  t h e  m o s t  
i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  o f  t h e  C r i t i q u e ,  a s  s h o w i n g  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  c o n ­
n e c t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  i n v o l v e d  i n  p e r c e p t i o n :  a n d  t h e  p r i m e  p l a c e  
g i v e n  t o  t i m e  i n  t h e s e  A n a l o g i e s  ( r u l e s  w h i c h  a r e  " p r i o r  t o  
a l l  e x p e r i e n c e  a n d  i n d e e d  make i t  p o s s i b l e " ,  a n d  w h i c h  d k B m ia*  
d e t e r m i n e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  e v e r y  a p p e a r a n c e  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  b h e  
u n i t y  o f  a l l  t i m e )  s h o u l d  show t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  t i m e  i n  
K a n t ’ s  p h i l o s o p h y ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  h i s  o c c a s i o n a l  s p a t i a l  l a n ­
g u a g e .  I n  t h e  f i r s t  A n a l o g y ,  i f  a n y t h i n g ,  h e  o v e r d o e s  t h e  
e m p h a s i s  o n  t i m e  : s i n c e  t h e  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  a  p e r m a n e n t  e n d u r ­
i n g  t h r o u g h  c h a n g e  i s  n o t  i t s e l f  t e m p o r a l .  A s i m p l e r  a l t e r n a  
a t i v e  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  t o  c o n n e c t  t h i s  e n d u r i n g  p e r m a n e n c e  
w i t h  s p a c e ,  a s  a  b a c k g r o u n d  b e f o r e  w h i c h  c h a n g e s  ( s u c h  a s  
t h o s e  w i t h  w h i c h  t h e  S e c o n d  A n a l o g y  d e a l s )  t a k e  p l a c e .  E n ­
d u r a n c e  a n d  d u r a t i o n  a r e  n o t  i d e n t i c a l :  g r a n t e d  t h a t  a n  o b ­
j e c t  w h i c h  e n d u r e s  * i n  t i m e *  h a s  d u r a t i o n ,  y e t  w h a t  we p r i m a r i ­
l y  m ean  w h e n  we s a y  t h a t  a n  o b j e c t  e n d u r e s  i s  t h a t  t h e  l a p s e  
o f  t i m e ,  w h i c h  d u r a t i o n  m e a s u r e s ,  h a s  n o t  a f f e c t e d  i t ,  a n d  i s  
t h e r e f o r e  l a r g e l y  i r r e l e v a n t .  As Kemp S m i t h  e x p r e s s e d  i t ,
" K a n t  h e r e  . . .  u n d u l y  i g n o r e s  s p a c e ,  l i m i t i n g  h i s  a n a l y s i s  t o  
i n n e r  s e n s e .  He d e f i n e s  t h e  s c h e m a  o f  s u b s t a n c e  a s  t h e  p e r ­
m a n e n c e  o f  t h e  r e a l  i n  t i m e ,  i . e .  a s  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  
t h e  r e a l  w h i c h  p e r s i s t s  w h i l e  a l l  e l s e  c h a n g e s . . .  C o n s c i o u s n e s s
1 .  B 2 1 9 .  ^ —" G o m m e p . 3 o G-.
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l a  o n l y  p o s s i b l e  t h r o u g h  t h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  o b j e c t s  i n  
s p a c e . O n l y  i n  o u t e r  s e n s e  i s  a  p e r m a n e n t  g i v e n  i n  c o n t r a s t  
t o  w h i c h  c h a n g e  may b e  p e r c e i v e d .  The p r o o f  o u g h t  t h e r e f o r e  
t o  h a v e  p r o c e e d e d  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  m a n n e r .  T ime c a n  b e  c o n ­
c e i v e d  o n l y  a s  m o t i o n ,  a n d  m o t i o n  i s  p e r c e i v a b l e  o n l y  a g a i n s t
a  p e r m a n e n t  b a c k g r o u n d  i n  s p a c e .  C o n s c i o u s n e s s  o f  t i m e  t h e r e -
1
f o r e  i n v o l v e s  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  o f  a  p e r m a n e n t  i n  s p a c e . “
B u t  K a n t ' s  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  a b o u t  t i m e ,  
a n d  h i s  r e a l  o r i g i n a l i t y ,  a r e  t o  b e  f o u n d  i n  t h e  S e c o n d  A n a ­
l o g y .  H i s  o r i g i n a l i t y  l i e s  i n  h i s  h a v i n g  g r a s p e d  a n d  f o r m u l ­
a t e d ,  e v e n  i f  he  a i d  n o t  s u c c e e d  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  s a t i s f a c t o r i l y ,  
q u e s t i o n s  w n l c n  a r e  f u n d a m e n t a l  n o t  o n l y  on  h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
m e t a p h y s i c ,  o u t  on  a n y  a t t e m p t  s e r i o u s l y  t o  g r a p p l e  w i t h  t i m e .  
T h e s e  q u e s t i o n s ,  w h i c h  w i l l  b e  m ore  f u l l y  d i s c u s s e d  i n  t h e  
n e x t  s e c t i o n ,  a r e : -  W hat  i s  t h e  r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  s i m u l t a n e i t y  
a n d  s u c c e s s i o n ?  How i s  i t  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  o u r  s e n s a t i o n s  a r e  
d i s c r e t e  a n d  s u c c e s s i v e ,  we a t t r i b u t e  c o n t i n u i t , y  t n r o u g h  
t i m e  t o  t h e  o b j e c t  w h i c h  o c c a s i o n s  tnemV D o es  t n a t  i n v o l v e  a  
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  s u b j e c t i v e  a n d  o b j e c t i v e  s u c c e s s i o n ?  I f  
s o ,  w h a t  i s  fche c r i t e r i o n  b y  w h i c h  we d i s t i n g u i s h  t h e m ?  I s  
t h a t  c r i t e r i o n  i n f a l l i b l e ,  o r  o n l y  r e a s o n a b l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  -  
d o e s  i t  r e s t  o n  l o g i c a l  g r o u n d s ,  o r  o n l y  o n  m a t t e r s  o f  f a c t ?  
( I f  t h e  l a t t e r ,  h a s  h e  s u c c e e d e d  i n  a n s w e r i n g  Hum e?)
We a r e  n o t  c o n c e r n e d  a t  p r e s e n t  w i t h  t h e s e  q u e s t i o n s  
-  some o f  w h i c h  K a n t  r a i s e d  e x p l i c i t l y ,  a n d  some o f  w h i c h
1 .  " C o m m e n t a r y "  p . 3 6 0 .
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w e r e  o n l y  i m p l i c i t ,  t o  b e  r a i s e d  by  l a t e r  c o m m e n t a t o r s  -  
h e r e  we h a v e  o n l y  t o  c o n s i d e r  t h e  r e l a t i o n  o f  t h e  A n a l o g y  t o  
t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  C r i t i q u e .
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s e e  how K a n t ,  i f  t i m e ,  a s  h e  g #  
s a y s  o v e r  a n d  o v e r  a g a i n ,  i s  e n t i r e l y  s u b j e c t i v e  a n d  a  f o r m  o f  
o u r  a p p r e h e n s i o n ,  c a n  c o n s i s t e n t l y  d i s t i n g u i s h  b e t w e e n  s u b j e c t ­
i v e  a n d  o b j e c t i v e  s u c c e s s i o n .  On h i s  p r e m i s e s ,  w h a t  c a n * o b j e c t ­
i v e  s u c c e s s i o n *  b e ?  Y e t  h e  h o l d s  t h a t  t h e r e  c a n  o n l y  b e  c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s  o f  t i m e s  c o n d i t i o n i n g  o n e  a n o t h e r  i n  a  s i n g l e  o b j e c t ­
i v e  t i m e .  ( T h a t  h e  d o e s  t h i s  i s  c e r t a i n ,  f o r  w i t h o u t  i t  h e  
w o u l d  h a v e  l e f t  a  v e r y  o b v i o u s  l o o p h o l e  o p e n  t o  H u m e . )  " A b ­
s o l u t e  t i m e  i s  n o t  a n  o b j e c t  o f  p e r c e p t i o n  . . .  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,
t h e  a p p e a r a n c e s  m u s t  d e t e r m i n e  f o r  o n e  a n o t h e r  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n
1
i n  t i m e ,  a n d  make t h e i r  t i m e - o r d e r  a  n e c e s s a r y  o r d e r . "  T h o u g h  
t i m e  c a n n o t  i t s e l f  b e  e x p e r i e n c e d ,  i t s  e s s e n t i a l  c h a r a c t e r s  
m u s t  b e  r e p r e s e n t e d  t h r o u g h  a p p e a r a n c e s  -  w h i c h  s o u n d s  l i k e  a n  
i m p l i c i t  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  R e a l i t y  a n d  A p p e a r a n c e .  I f  s o ,  
why s h o u l d  t i m e  i t s e l f  b e  r e l e g a t e d  t o  t h e  w o r l d  o f  A p p e a r a n c e ?
W i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  h i s  f r e q u e n t  u s e  o f  s p a t i a l  l a n g u a g e  
i n  t h e  C r i t i q u e ,  i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o t e  t h a t  i n  t h e  A n a l o g i e s  
h e  f u l l y  r e c o g n i s e s  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  o f  t i m e ,  
u s i n g  i t  a s  a  p r e m i s t  i n  h i s  a r g u m e n t  f o r  c a u s a l i t y .  T h i s  s h o u l d  
g o  f a r  t o  c l e a r  h i m  o f  t h e  c h a r g e  o f  h o l d i n g ,  a t  b o t t o m ,  a n
1 .  B 2 4 5 .
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u n d u l y  s p a t i a l  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t i m e ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  many p a s s a g e s
i n  w h i c h  h i s  l a n g u a g e  i s  s p a t i a l ,  some o f  t h e m  e v e n  i n  t h e
A n a l o g i e s  t h e m s e l v e s .
M o r e o v e r ,  i n  t h e  A n a l o g i e s  K a n t  r a i s e s  t h e  i m p o r t a n t
p r o b l e m  -  v e r y  f o r e i g n  t o  t h e  d o c t r i n e s  o f  t h e  A e s t h e t i c l  -  o f
m o t i o n  a n d  c h a n g e ,  a n d  t h e  r e l a t i o n  o f  t  hem  t o  t h e  p e r m a n e n t .
He e m p h a s i z e s  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  t h a t  o u r  e x p e r i e n c e s  s h o u l d  b e
c o n n e c t e d ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  c h a n g e s  s h o u l d  b e  d e t e r m i n e d  by  a
n e c e s s a r y  l a w .  The  A n a l o g i e s  a r e  ’‘‘r u l e s  w h i c h  a r e  ^ p r i o r  t o  a l l
1
e x p e r i e n c e ^  a n d  e v e n  make i t  p o s s i b l e " ,  a n d  t i m e  p l a y s  a  v e r y  
i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  i n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h i s  e s s e n t i a l  d o c t r i n e  
i n  K a n t ’ s r e p l y  t o  Hume.
I n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h i s ,  i f  t i m e  i s  g i v e n  a  p r i o r i ,  
a n d  p r i o r  t o  a l l  e x p e r i e n c e  -  m ore  t h a n  t h a t ,  m a k i n g  e x p e r i ­
e n c e  p o s s i b l e  -  i t  i s  c u r i o u s  why t i m e  s h o u l d  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  
h a v i n g  n o  v a l i d i t y  a p a r t  f r o m  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  p o s s i b l e  e x ­
p e r i e n c e :  a n d  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  F i r s t  A n t i n o m y ,  w h i c h  m i g h t
h a v e  p a s s e d  m u s t e r  i n  t h e  A e s t h e t i c ,  i s  q u e e r  a f t e r  t h e  d o c -
2
t r i n e s  o f  t h e  A n a l y t i c .  T he  A n t i n o m y  i s  c o n c e r n e d  t o  p o i n t  out 
t h e  u n t h i n k a b l e n e s s  o f  b o t h  t h e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  t h a t  t h e  w o r l d  
h a d  o r  h a d  n o t  a  b e g i n n i n g  i n  t i m e .  C o m m e n t a t o r s  h a v e  s u f f i c ­
i e n t l y  e x e r c i s e d  t h e m s e l v e s  i n  c r i t i c i s m  a n d  e m e n d a t i o n :  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e y  h a v e  o b j e c t e d  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g  u s e  o f  
*v e r f l i e s s e n * , t o  K a n t  * s  w r o n g  c o n c e p t i o n s  o f  t h e  i n f i n i t e ,
1 .  B 2 1 9 .
2 .  S e e  t h e  s h o r t ,  b u t  c l e a r  a r t i c l e  by  V a n  B ie m a  i n  " R e v u e  d e  
M e t a p h y s i q u e  e t  d e  M o r a l e " , 1 9 0 8 .
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a n d  t o  t h e  u n d e s i r a b l e  d i c h o t o m y  o f  ’ t h e  w o r l d *  a n d  ’ t i m e . *
T h i s  l a s t  p o i n t  l i n k s  on  t o  o t h e r  p l a c e s  w h e r e  K a n t  s p e a k s  a s  
i f  t i m e  i s  s o m e t h i n g  a p a r t  f r o m  e v e n t s ,  a n d  so  i t  c a n  be  c o n ­
s i d e r e d  h e r e . B e r g s o n  o b j e c t e d  t h a t  K a n t  c o n c e i v e d  t i m e  a s  a  
h o m o g e n e o u s  m ed iu m .  W h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h a t  i s  e n t i r e l y  t r u e ,  i t  i s  
c e r t a i n l y  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  K a n t ’ s  l a n g u a g e  i n  some p l a c e s  s u g g e s t s
t h i s .  We s h o u l d  e x p e c t  t o  f i n d  i t  i n  t h e  A e s t h e t i c ,  w h e r e  t h e
1
w h o l e  t r e a t m e n t  o f  t i m e  i s  d e f e c t i v e  t h r o u g h  f o r m a l i t y  : b u t
w h e n  h e  s a y s  i n  t h e  F i r s t  A n a l o g y ,  " C h a n g e  d o e s  n o t  a f f e c t
2
t i m e  i t s e l f ,  b u t  o n l y  a p p e a r a n c e s  i n  t i m e "  t h a t  i s  more  s e r i o u s
N e v e r t h e l e s s  i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  w h e t h e r  h e  d i d  r e a l l y  i n t e n d  t o
h y p o s t a t i s e  t i m e  i n  t h i s  m a n n e r s  i n  t h e  P o s t u l a t e s  o f  E m p i r i c a l
T h o u g h t  h e  c o n t r a d i c t s  w h a t  h e  h a d  s a i d  i n  t h e  F i r s t  A n a l o g y  :
’* S p a c e  a l o n e  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  a s  p e r m a n e n t ,  w h i l e  t i m e  a n d  t h e  r e -
3
f o r e  e v e r y t h i n g  t h a t  i s  i n  i n n e r  s e n s e  i s  i n  c o n s t a n t  f l u x .  "
B u t  t h o u g h  K a n t  c a n  b e  c r i t i c i s e d  f o r  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  a n d  u n ­
s a t i s f a c t o r i n e s s  o n  p a r t i c u l a r  p o i n t s  -  h i s  s p a t i a l i s a t i o n ,  
h i s  s u b j e c t i v i t y ,  h i s  i l l e g i t i m a t e  t r a n s i t i o n  t o  p h y s i c s  i n  
t h e  F i r s t  A n a l o g y ,  h i s  d u b i o u s  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  t i m e  i s  o n l y  
g i v e n  t o  u s  t h r o u g h  s u c c e s s i v e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s  -  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  
o f  h i s  t r e a t m e n t  o f  t i m e  r e m a i n s .  I t  i s  u n f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  h i s  
m o s t  v a l u a b l e  r e m a r k s  on  t i m e  s h o u l d  come a s  i t  w e r e  i n c i d ­
e n t a l l y  a n d  i m p l i c i t l y  ( f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i n  t h e  A n a l o g i e s ,  w h e r e
1 .  A s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i n  B 5 8 ,  " T i m e k t s e l f  d o e s  n o t  c h a n g e ,  b u t  
o n l y  s o m e t h i n g  w h i c h  i s  i n  t i m e . '
2 .  B 2 2 6 .  3 .  B 2 9 1 .
155
h e  i s  p r i m a r i l y  d e a l i n g  w i t h  c a u s a l i t y )  r a t h e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  
p l a c e s  w h e r e  h e  i s  s p e c i f i c a l l y  d e a l i n g  w i t h  t i m e  ( t h e  
A e s t h e t i c  a n d  t h e  F i r s t  A n t i n o m y ) ,  m ore  e s p e c i a l l y  a s  t h e  
f o r m e r  d e v e l o p  i n t o  s o m e t h i n g  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  f r o m ,  a n d  i n  
many w a y s  c o n f l i c t i n g  w i t h ,  t h e  l a t t e r .
I I .
A f t e r  t h i s  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  i t  i s  now 
p o s s i b l e  t o  a t t e m p t  t o  d i s c u s s  i n  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  t h e  m ore  
i n t e r e s t i n g  q u e s t i o n s  w h i c h  K a n t  r a i s e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  t h o s e  
i n  t h e  S e c o n d  A n a l o g y .
L o o k i n g  i n  a  c e r t a i n  d i r e c t i o n ,  I  o b s e r v e  a  b r o w n ­
i s h  o b j e c t ,  r o u g h l y  e l l i p t i c a l  i n  s h a p e ,  s u r r o u n d e d  by  w a t e r .
I  move my h e a d  s l i g h t l y  a n d  s t i l l  s e e  s u c h  a n  o b j e c t ,  s t i l l
s u r r o u n d e d  by  w a t e r .  B u t  t h e r e  i s  a  s l i g h t  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h a t
1
my f i e l d  o f  v i s i o n  f o r m e r l y  i n c l u d e d  some t r e e s  d i r e c t l y  
b e h i n d  t h e  o b j e c t ,  a n d  now i t  d o e s  n o t .
On a n o t h e r  o c c a s i o n  I  am l o o k i n g  a t  a  b r i c k  e r e c t i o n ,  
i n  w h i c h  a r e  g a p s  a t  r e g u l a r l y  s p a c e d  i n t e r v a l s .  I  move my 
h e a d  s l i g h t l y ,  a n d  s t i l l  s e e  s u c h  a n  o b j e c t ,  i n  w h i c h  t h e r e  
a r e ^ t i l l  g a p s .  B u t  I  s e e  s l i g h t  c h a n g e s  i n  d e t a i l  -  t h e  
g a p s  a r e  s m a l l e r ,  o r  d i f f e r e n t l y  c o l o u r e d .
On b o t h  o c c a s i o n s  my p e r c e p t i o n s  a r e  s u c c e s s i v e .
T h e r e  s e e m s  t o  b e  l i t t l e  t o  c h o o s e  b e t w e e n  t h e m ;  y e t  Î ,  
w i t h  my a d m i r a b l e  c a p a c i t y  f o r  i n f e r e n c e ,  s a y  t h a t  i n  t h e
1 .  How s o o n  t h e  a t t e m p t  t o  d e s c r i b e  s e n s a  o n l y  a n d  t o  e x c l u d e  
* i n t e r p r e t a t i o n *  f a i l s !
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f i r s t  c a s e  I  h a v e  ’ s e e n *  a  b o a t  m o v in g  down s t r e a m ,  i n  t h e  
s e c o n d  I  h a v e  ' s e e n ’ f i r s t  t h e  l o w e r  s t o r e y s  o f  a  h o u s e  a n d  
t h e n  t h e  u p p e r .  A c h i l d  w o u l d  p e r f o r m  t h e  same c o m p l i c a t e d  
i n f e r e n c e  a l s o .  O r i ^ h a t  g r o u n d s  d o  we d i s t i n g u i s h  b e t w e e n  t h e  
tw o  a n d  s a y  ( i n  K a n t i a n  l a n g u a g e )  t h a t  t h o u g h  o u r  p e r c e p t i o n s  
w e r e  i n  e a c h  c a s e  s u c c e s s i v e ,  t h e  f i r s t  g e n u i n e l y  i s  a n  e x ­
a m p le  o f  s u c c e s s i v e  a p p e a r a n c e s  o f  t h e  o b j e c t  i n  d i f f e r e n t  
p l a c e s ,  w h i l e  t h e  s e c o n d  i s  n o t ?  T h i s  w a s  K a n t ’ s  p r o b l e m  -  
f a m i l i a r  e n o u g h  t o  s e e m  a b s u r d  t o  u s ,  who make s u c h  d i s c r i m ­
i n a t i o n s  e v e r y  d a y  w i t h o u t  t h i n k i n g :  a n d  y e t  f o r  a l l  t h a t  e x -
1
t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t  i f  n o t  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  e x p l a i n  l o g i c a l l y .
On t h e  t w o  o c c a s i o n s ,  my p e r c e p t i o n s  b e f o r e  a n d  
a f t e r  I  t u r n  my h e a d  r e s e m b l e  e a c h  o t h e r  i n  a  n u m b e r  o f  w a y s :  
b u t  i n  o t h e r  r e s p e c t s  t h e y  a r e  u n l i k e .  Why s h o u l d  my tw o  
j u d g m e n t s  r e g a r d i n g  w h a t  h a s  * r e a l l y ’ h a p p e n e d  d i f f e r  so  
m a r k e d l y ?
I t  may b e  s a i d ,  t h a t  my j u d g m e n t  i s  b a s e d  o n  some 
p a t t e r n  o f  s i m i l a r i t y  a n d  d i s s i m i l a r i t y  : i n  o n e  c a s e ,  t h e  
l i k e n e s s e s  a r e  g r o u p e d  i n  a  c e r t a i n  w a y , i n  t h e  o t h e r ,  i n  a n ­
o t h e r .  T h u s  i n  t h e  e x a m p l e  o f  t h e  b o a t  t h e  s i m i l a r i t i e s  c o n ­
c e r n  t h e  m a i n  f e a t u r e  -  t h e  b r o w n i s h  o b j e c t  -  a n d  t h e  d i s ­
s i m i l a r i t i e s ,  c o m p a r a t i v e l y  u n i m p o r t a n t ,  a r e  i n  t h e  b a c k g r o u n d ^
1 .  And K a n t  h a d  t o  e x p l a i n  i t  l o g i c a l l y  i f  h e  w a s  t o  a n s w e r  
Hume -  i t  w o u l d  h a v e  b e e n  u s e l e s s  t o  i n s i s t  t h a t  we d o  i n  
f a c t  make  s u c h  d i s t i n c t i o n s ,  s i n c e  Hume w o u l d  n e v e r  h a v e  
d e n i e d  t h i s .
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So I  s a y  t h a t  w h a t  I  h a v e  s e e n  i s  t h e  sam e o b j e c t  i n  d i f f e r ­
e n t  p o s i t i o n s .  I n  t h e  s e c o n d  c a s e ,  t h e r e  i s  no  o n e  ' o b j e c t *  
t o  w h i c h  I c a n  a t t r i b u t e  s e l f - i d e n t i t y :  o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e  
d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s  a r e  n o t  l o c a l i s e d  a s  t h e y  w e r e  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
e x a m p l e ,  b u t  s c a t t e r e d  a n d  b l a t a n t l y  o b v i o u s .  (No d o o r  i n  
t h e  f i r s t  f l o o c ;  w i n d o w - b o x e s  o n  t h e  s e c o n d  f l o o r ;  d o r m e r  
w i n d o w s  i n  t h e  a t t i c s ,  a n d  s o  o n . )  I f a i l  i n  my s e a r c h  f o r  a  
u n i t y  : c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  I g r o u p  t h e  w h o l e  l o t  t o g e t h e r  a n d  c a l l  
i t  a  ’ t h i n g * , o f  w h i c h  I  h a v e  s u c c e s s i v e l y  o b s e r v e d  t h e  p a r t s .
W i t h  r e g a r d  t o  t h i s ,  t h r e e  r e m a r k s  may b e  made : -  
( 1 )  We d o  n o t ,  i n  a t t r i b u t i n g  ’ t h i n g h o o d ’ , f o l l o w  t h e  p r o ­
c e d u r e  i n d i c a t e d  i n  t h e  l a s t  s e n t e n c e .  K a n t ’ s  e x a m p l e  m i g h t  
h a v e  b e e n  o n  l o o k i n g  a l o n g  a  row  o f  b u n g a l o w s  i n  a  s u b u r b .  
U n i t y  i s  m a r k e d l y  a b s e n t :  y e t  we d o  n o t  s a y  t h a t  we h a v e  b e e n  
l o o k i n g  a t  t h e  p a r t s  o f  o n e  ’ t h i n g . ’ I n  a t t r i b u t i n g  t h i n g h o o d ,  
we f o l l o w  o u r  own c o n v e n i e n c e  m ore  t h a n  t h i s  a l l o w s .  ( 2 )  I t
w o u l d  f o l l o w ,  t h a t  t h e r e  may b e  d e g r e e s  i n  t h e  c e r t a i n t y  o f
1
o u r  j u d g m e n t .  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  s u p p o s e  t h a t  a  m o v in g  o b j e c t  
p r e s e n t s  a  ’ p a t t e r n ’ o f  l i k e n e s s e s  a n d  u n l i k e n e s s e s  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c  o f  o u r  s e c o n d  c a s e ,  s h o u l d  we n o t  h e s i t a t e  i n  o u r  
j u d g m e n t ,  o r  e v e n  m ake  a  m i s t a k e ?  T h i s  w h o l e  s u g g e s t i o n  
r e s t s  u p o n  a  d o u b l e  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  w h a t  i s  ’ r i g h t ’ a n d  w h a t  i s  
’ m i s t a k e n .  ’ A m o t o r - c y c l e ,  w i t h  a  b a d l y  s m o k i n g  e x h a u s t ,  
m o v e s  s l o w l y  a l o n g :  I s e e  f i r s t  ’ f r o n t  o f  m o t o r - c y c l e ’ , t h e n  
' b a c k  o f  m o t o r - c y c l e ’ , t h e n  ’ d e n s e  b l u e  s m o k e ’ , t h e n  ’ r a r e r
1 .  B e g g i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n  f o r  a  m i n u t e  a n d  a s s u m i n g  t h a t  we 
know w h a t  ’ o b j e c t *  m e a n s .
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w h i t e  s m o k e .*  Ah! I  s a y :  a l l  t h e s e  p e r c e p t i o n s  e x h i b i t  c h a r ­
a c t e r i s t i c  d i f f e r e n c e s  -  t h e y  t h e n  b e l o n g  t o  o n e  c o e x i s t e n t  
o b j e c t .  S h o u l d  I  n o t  b e  w r o n g  i n  t h i s ?  O f  c o u r s e  y o u  w o u l d ,  
s a y s  c o m m o n s e n s e .  B u t , i f  o u r  c r i t e r i o n  i s ,  a s  i t  i s  e x  h y p o -  
t h e s i ,  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  p a t t e r n s ,  why a r e  we d r a g g i n g  i n  com­
mon s e n s e ?  T he  a r g u m e n t ,  w h i c h  w a s  m e a n t  t o  b e  a  r e d u c t i o  a d  
a b s u r d u m ,  f a i l s  b e c a u s e  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  c o m m o n s e n s e  i s  
i l l e g i t i m a t e .  I f  o u r  c r i t e r i o n  r e a l l y  w e r e  t h e  o n e  s u g g e s t e d ,  
i t  w o u l d  b e  i m p o s s i b l e  t o  s a y  t h a t  i n  a  c a s e  l i k e  t h a t  o f  
t h e  m o t o r - c y c l e  we h a d  ’ made a  m i s t a k e * .  I  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h o u g h  
s u c h  a  c r i t e r i o n  may be  p o s s i b l e  i t  i s  n o t  t h e  o n e  w h i c h  we 
d o  i n  f a c t  u s e .  ( 3 )  E v e n  i f  i t  w e r e ,  i t  w o u l d  n o t  s o l v e  K a n t ’ s 
p r o b l e m .  I t  s a y s ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  t h a t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  t h e  
t w o  c a s e s  i s  o n e  o f  d e g r e e  o n l y ,  a n d  i s  p u r e l y  r e l a t i v e .
A s e c o n d  a t t e m p t  a t  s o l u t i o n  m i g h t  be  b a s e d  on  t h e  
m o d e r n  d o c t r i n e  o f  t h e  s p e c i o u s  p r e s e n t .  My g l a n c e s  a t  t h e  
h o u s e  a n d  a t  t h e  b o a t  a r e  n o t  i n s t a n t a n e o u s ,  b u t  o c c u p y  a  
f i n i t e ,  t h o u g h  s m a l l ,  t i m e - i n t e r v a l .  May t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  n o t  
b e ,  e s s e n t i a l l y ,  t h a t  i n  t h e  s e c o n d  c a s e  t h e  t i m e  w h i c h  
e l a p s e s  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  me d i r e c t l y  t o  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e  
p a t t e r n  s e t  o u t  b e f o r e  me i n  s p a c e  c h a n g e s  v e r y  s l i g h t l y  -  
c o m p a r a b l e  t o  t h e  b l u r r i n g  o f  a  p h o t o g r a p h  by s l i g h t  m o v em en t  • 
w h i l e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  c a s e  t h e r e  i s  no  s u c h  b l u r r i n g ?  P s y c h o ­
l o g i s t s  r e p e a t e d l y  i n s i s t  t h a t  we m u s t  d i s t i n g u i s h  b e t w e e n
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’ s e e in g  t h a t  a change has  o c c u r re d * ,  and * see in g  a change’ , 
and d e c l a r e  t h a t  t h e  l a t t e r  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  former can be 
p e r c e iv e d  - r i g h t l y ,  a s  each  o f  us can t e s t  f o r  h im s e l f .
T h is  s o l u t i o n  would p robab ly  n o t  be a c c e p ta b l e  t o  Kant: bu t  
t h a t  might e a s i l y  be o v e r lo o k e d .  U n fo r tu n a te ly ,  however, I 
doubt w he the r  i t  s u i t s  th e  q u e s t i o n  which Kant r a i s e d  any 
b e t t e r .  I t  would, i f  a i lo w ea  a s  v a l i d ,  so lv e  the  p a r t i c u l a r  
example which Kant g iv e s  w i th o u t  any d i f f i c u l t y ,  b u t  Kant 
c o u ld ,  w i th  no more d i f f i c u l t y ,  frame a n o t h e r  which th e  ex­
p l a n a t i o n  co u ld  n o t  meet.
A s n a i l  moves a lon g  th e  ground. He i s  a l e i s u r e l y  
specim ent  even of  h i s  k in d ,  and my s p e c io u s  p r e s e n t ,  which 
may comprehend th e  movements o f  b o a t s ,  i s  f a r  to o  clumsy an 
i n s t ru m e n t  f o r  th e  p r e s e n t  t a s k .  Of c o u r s e ,  I c o u ld  keep my 
eye on him, and o bse rve  t h a t ,  a f t e r  a c e r t a i n  t i m e - i n t e r v a l ,  
he has  moved. But t h a t  i s  an e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  m a t t e r ,  as  
th e  p s y c h o l o g i s t s  a s s e r t ,  and i n  th e  p r e s e n t  case  i t  i s  
begg ing  th e  «gdÊhtiât i s s u e ,  which i s  how we Ere go ing  t o  
g ive  l o g i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  what we do in  p r a c t i c e  w i th o u t  
a t h o u g h t .  I t  must a g a in  be i n s i s t e d  t h a t  i t  i s  u s e l e s s  t o  
a p p e a l  t o  o u r  c o n c e p t io n ,  c o n v e n ie n t ly  vague, o f  what con­
s t i t u t e s  th in g h o o d ,  and t o  a r g u e , "The s n a i l  i s  a t h i n g .
T h is  t h i n g  i s  i n  a d i f f e r e n t  s p a t i a l  c o n f i g u r a t i o n  from t h a t  
which i t  was i n  a moment b e f o r e .  T h e r e f o r e , t h i s  t h i n g  has
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moved"; b ec au se ,  i n  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  a t  most we can only 
a s s e r t  r e l a t i v e  movement, and ,  i n  th e  s e c o n d  p l a c e ,  our 
c r i t e r i o n  o f  th in g h o o d  i s  i t s e l f  in  q u e s t i o n ,  and must i t s e l f  
be j u s t i f i e d  b e f o re  i t  can p ro v id e  m e ta p h y s ic a l  a l i b i s  f o r  
i t s  d e p e n d e n ts .  Second ly ,  i t  must be r e a l i s e d  t h a t  i t  i s  no t  
v a l i d  t o  condemn Kant f o r  r e s o r t i n g  t o  a h ig h ly  a b s t r u s e  a r ­
gument t o  do what any c h i l d  can do w i th o u t  any f u s s .  For h i s  
o b j e c t  i s  n o t  th e  d i s t i n ^ u i s h i n g  between th e  two c a s e s :  i t  i s  
th e  l o g i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  our  b e h a v io u r  when we make t h a t  
d i s t i n c t i o n .
K an t’ s problem s t i l l  rem ains ,  t h e n : -  What c r i t e r i o n  
have we by which we a re  l o g i c a l l y  j u s t i f i e d  i n  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g ,  
a s  we do u n t h i n k i n g l y , between s u b j e c t i v e  and o b j e c t i v e  su c ­
c e s s io n ?  S h o r t  c u t s  h av in g  f a i l e d ,  what does Kant h im s e l f  say ,  
and how does  he a t t e m p t  t o  so lv e  h i s  problem?
In  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  he s t a r t s  from th e  b e l i e f  t h a t  
a l l  s e n s a t i o n s  a re  s u c c e s s i v e .  This  i n  i t s e l f  i s  very  dub ious :  
and i t  makes h i s  t a s k  n e e d l e s s l y  d i f f i c u l t ,  s in c e  i t  i s  h a rd  
t o  see how, g iv en  on ly  s u c c e s s iv e n e s s ,  we e v e r  managed t o  g e t  
h o ld  of  th e  concep t  o f  s i m u l t a n e i t y ,  ex cep t  by a very  invo lved  
p r o c e s s .  Yet he i s  f a r  from denying  t h a t  we have such a con­
c e p t ,  thou gh  h i s  t r e a tm e n t  o f  s i m u l t a n e i t y , as  w i l l  l a t e r  
ap p e a r ,  i s  no t  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  G ran ted ,  t h e n ,  h i s  p re m ise s ,  i n  
each  case  we have s u c c e s s iv e  and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  
s e n s a t i o n s ,  and we a l s o  have c e r t a i n  k i n a e s t h e t i c  s e n s a t i o n s ,  
consequen t  on th e  movement o f  our head .  Yet i n  t h e  one case
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we a t t r i b u t e  the  d i f f e r e n c e s  s o l e l y  t o  our movement, while  
i n  th e  o t h e r  we say t h a t  th e  o b j e c t  i t s e l f  has  moved. But bo 
s t a t e  i t  t h u s ,  i n  a form which makes i t  a mere c o r o l l a r y  o f  
r e l a t i v e  m otion ,  i s  t o  m iss  th e  main p a r t  o f  K an t ’ s problem*
Hé l é  n o t  concerned  so much w i t h  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  d i s t i n g u i s h ­
in g  motion and r e s t ,  a s  w i th  th e  d i f f i c u l t y  of  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g ,  
when our s e n s a t i o n s  a r e  in  eve ry  case  s u c c e s s iv e ,  o b j e c t i v e  
s u c c e s s io n  from s u c c e s s io n  t h a t  i s  merely  s u b j e c t i v e .  The 
l a t t e r  d i s t i n c t i o n  c o n d i t i o n s  th e  fo rm er .
I n  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  what,  to  Kant, can ’o b je c t iv e *  
s u c c e s s io n  be h e ld  t o  wean ? ( i n c i d e n t a l l y ,  t h a t  he a d m i t te d  
t h a t  he a d m i t te d  t h a t  t h e r e  can be * o b j e c t i v e  coex is ten ce*  
makes i t  h a r d e r  t h a n  e v e r  t o  see why, i n  d e f ia n c e  o f  common 
s e n s e ,  he th o u g h t  f i t  to  deny t h a t  our  s e n s a t i o n s  may c o e x i s t . )  
We c e r t a i n l y  do, i n  p r a c t i c e ,  d i s t i n g u i s h  between s u b je c t iv e  
and o b j e c t i v e  s u c c e s s io n :  b u t  i f  Kant was doing more th an  
pay ing  l i p - s e r v i c e  t o  common language ,  i f  he r e a l l y  meant to  
i n s i s t  t h a t  t h e r e  ^  a genuine  d i s t i n c t i o n  -  and p robab ly  he 
d id  -  t h e n  th e  q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s  how f a r  t h a t  s q u a re s  w i th  h i s  
fo rm er  i n s i s t e n c e  t h a t  time i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  a way in  which men 
r e g a r d  t h i n g s ,  and o f  no acco u n t  o u t s id e  th e  rea lm s of p o s s ­
i b l e  e x p e r i e n c e .  Time i s  h e re  t r e a t e d  a s  be ing  v e ry  much more 
t h a n  a mere form of  i n t u i t i o n .  F u r t h e r ,  h i s  s o l u t i o n  depends 
upon th e  d i s t i n c t i o n .  The only  r e l e v a n t  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
t h e  two c a s e s ,  says  Kant, i s  t h a t  when I am lo o k in g  a t  a 
house I can  r e v e r s e  t h e  o r d e r  o f  my p e r c e p t i o n s  a t  w i l l :  bu t
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I  c a n n o t  do  t h i s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  b o a t .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  s i n c e  
i n  t h e  s e c o n d  c a s e  w h a t e v e r  I  d o  I  c a n n o t  g e t  my o r i g i n a l  
s e n s a t i o n  b a c k ,  I  c o n c l u d e  t h a t  t h i s  i s  a n  e x a m p l e  o f  o b j e c t ­
i v e  s u c c e s s i o n .  I  c o n s i d e r  my v a r i o u s  s e n s a t i o n s  a s  s h o w in g  
d i f f e r e n t  p o s i t i o n s  o f  t h e  sam e o b j e c t  a t  d i f f e r e n t  t i m e s :
a n d  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  t h e  h o u s e ,  a s  b e i n g  s u c c e s s i v e  g l i m p s e s
1
o f  p a r t s  o f  a  s i n g l e  w h o l e  p e r s i s t i n g  i n  t i m e .  B u t  w h a t  i s  
t h i s  ’ t i m e *  i n  w h i c h  s u c h  a n  o b j e c t  i s  c o n c e i v e d  t o  p e r s i s t ?  
E v i d e n t l y  n o t  t i m e  a s  i m m e d i a t e l y  p e r c e i v e d .  On t h e  o t h e r  
h a n d ,  a l t h o u g h  a n  i n f e r e n c e  i s  n e c e s s a r y  w hen  we s a y  t h a t  t h e  
s u c c e s s i v e  a p p e a r a n c e s  o f  t h e  b o a t  a r e  o b j e c t i v e l y  s u c c e s s i v e ,  
w h i l e  t h o s e  o f  t h e  h o u s e  * r e a l l y *  c o e x i s t  t h o u g h  we s e e  t h e m  
( s u b j e c t i v e l y )  i n  s u c c e s s i o n ,  i t  i s  a n  i n f e r e n c e  w h i c h  we 
make  i m m e d i a t e l y  a n d  v / i t h o u t  d e m u r .  K a n t ’ s  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  
t h i s  i n f e r e n c e  i s  n o t  made a s  a  m ere  m a t t e r  o f  f a c t  ( t h o u g h  
c o n d i t i o n e d  by  a  f a c t u a l  c r i t e r i o n ,  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  w h a t  we do  
m a k e s  a n y  d i f f e r e n c e )  b u t  t h a t  i t  i s  a  n e c e s s a r y  o n e .  We
1 .  As w a s  s a i d  a b o v e ,  i t  i s  m i s s i n g  t h e  p o i n t  t o  o b j e c t  t h a t  
o u r  s u c c e s s i v e  g l i m p s e s  may n o t  b e  * p a r t s ’ o f  o n e  ’w h o l e  *, 
b u t  o f  d i f f e r e n t  * o b j e c t s . ’ K a n t  * s a r g u m e n t  d o e s  n o t  d e p e n d  
o n ,  t h o u g h  o f  c o u r s e  i t  i s  m o re  e a s i l y  e x e m p l i f i e d  b y ,  t h e  
d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  o b j e c t  m o v in g  ori^the o n e  h a n d ,  a n d  
a n  o b j e c t  p e r s i s t i n g  u n c h a n g e d  o n  t h e  o t h e r .  I t  i s  a l s o  a  
m i s a p p r e h e n s i o n  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  h i s  p r o b l e m  i s  o f  d i s t i n ­
g u i s h i n g  b e t w e e n  m o t i o n  a n d  r e s t  -  i t  i s  m ore  g e n e r a l  t h a n  
t h a t ,  b e i n g  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  a n  o b j e c t  w h i c h  i s  
c h a n g i n g  i n  t i m e , a n d  one  w h i c h  p e r s i s t s  u n c h a n g e d  t h r o u g h  
t i m e .
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n e c e s s a r i l y  make t h e  i n f e r e n c e  t o  th e  t i m e - o r d e r  i n  v/hich, 
o b j e c t i v e l y ,  e v e n t s  a r e  a r r a n g e d ,  because  t h e r e  can only be 
c o n s c io u s n e s s  o f  t im e s  as  c o n d i t i o n i n g  one a n o th e r  in  a 
s i n g l e  o b j e c t i v e  t im e .  In  o t h e r  words, though  to  c o n s c io u s ­
n e s s  our s u b j e c t i v e  t i m e - s e r i e s  (B erg so n ’ s dur^e)  i s  p r i o r ,  
l o g i c a l l y  i t  i s  dependen t  upon th e  e x i s t e n c e  of an o b j e c t i v e  
s e r i e s ,  s in c e  v / i th o u t  th e  l a t t e r  t h e r e  would be no c o n s c io u s ­
n e s s  o f  th e  fo rm er .  Hence, t i m e - o r d e r  i s  d e te rm in e d ,  not  
merely  c a s u a l ,  and from t h i s  fo l lo w s  K a n t ’ s a t t e m p t  to  r e ­
h a b i l i t a t e  c a u s a l i t y .
F i r s t ,  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  which Kant o f f e r s  needs exam­
i n a t i o n .  I t  i s  t h a t ,  when v /hatever we do o r  do n o t  do makes
no d i f f e r e n c e ,  we a t t r i b u t e  o b j e c t i v i t y .
Gase I .  I  do no t  l i k e  a g l a r i n g  a d v e r t i s e m e n t  on 
th e  w a l l  o f  a tu be  s t a t i o n .  I  t u r n  my h ead ,  and my former 
s e n s a t i o n  i s  r e p la c e d  by a n o th e r .  I t  would be g r a t u i t o u s  t o  
assume t h a t ,  a s  I t u r n e d  my head  (and t h a t  I  d id  t u r n  my 
head ,  k i n a e s t h e t i c  s e n s a t i o n s  a s su re  me), one o b j e c t  v an ish ed  
and a n o th e r  ap p e a red ,  though t h a t  i s  t h e  im p re s s io n  I g e t .
I  a t t r i b u t e  th e  change e n t i r e l y  to  th e  movement o f  my head;
and t h i s  o p in io n  i s  conf irm ed  i f ,  t u r n i n g  my head back a g a in ,  
t h e  o r i g i n a l  s e n s a t i o n  r e a p p e a r s .  C onsequen t ly ,  on p u re ly  
e m p i r i c a l  grounds ( s i n c e  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  my he a d - tu r n in g  s 
c o in c id e d  w i th  th e  o b j e c t i v e  v a n i s h in g  o f  one a d v e r t i s e m e n t )
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I  s a y  t h a t  t h o u g h ,  i n  my p r i v a t e  t i m e - o r d e r ,  t h e  tw o  s e n s a ­
t i o n s  w e r e  s u c c e s s i v e ,  t h e  o b j e c t s  w h i c h  o c c a s i o n e d  t h e s e  
s e n s a t i o n s  d i d  n o t  come i n t o  a n d  go  o u t  o f  e x i s t e n c e  i n  a  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  m a n n e r  : o n  t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e y  e n d u r e d  f o r  a  
f i n i t e  l e n g t h  o f  t i m e .
C a s e  I I .  I  am s t a n d i n g  i n  a  r a i l w a y  s t a t i o n .  N e a r  
me i s  a  t a l l  t h i n  m an .  My a t t e n t i o n  w a n d e r s  a n d  I  g l a n c e  a w a y .  
I n  a  s e c o n d  p o s i t i o n  I  s e e  t h e  t a l l  t h i n  m an .  I  l o o k  b a c k  
a g a i n  a n d  s e e  a  s h o r t  f a t  man w i t h  a  s u i t c a s e .  I  l o o k  a t  t h e  
s e d o n d  p l a c e  a n d  s e e  n o b o d y .  I  l o o k  o n c e  m ore  a t  t h e  f i r s t  
p l a c e  a n d  s e e  t h e  tw o  men t a l k i n g  t o  t h e  g u a r d  o f  t h e  t r a i n .
I n  t h i s  e x p e r i e n c e ,  t h e r e  i s  a  c o m p l e x i t y  n o t  t o  b e  e x p l a i n e d  
b y  t h e  s i m p l i c i t y  o f  my a c t i o n  -  t h e  m e r e  t u r n i n g  o f  my h e a d  
b e t w e e n  t w o  p o i n t s .  The  v a n i s h i n g  a n d  r e a p p e a r a n c e  a t  a n o t h e r  
p l a c e  o f  t h e  t a l l  m an :  t h e  m i r a c u l o u s  c o n j u r i n g  u p  o f  t h e  
g u a r d :  t h r e e  men w h e r e  o n l y  o n e  man w a s  b e f o r e  -  a l l  t h e s e  
a r e  i n e x p l i c a b l e  a s  l o n g  a s  w e  c o n f i n e  o u r s e l v e s  t o  my a c t i o n s  
We h a v e  t o  i n t r o d u c e  o t h e r  s o u r c e s  o f  c h a n g e :  we s a y  t h a t  t h e  
men m o v e d ,  a n d  t h a t  my s u c c e s s i v e  s e n s a t i o n s  w e r e  o c c a s i o n e d
b y  o b j e c t i v e l y  s u c c e s s i v e  e v e n t s .
1
C a s e  I I I .  I  k e e p  my h e a d  s t i l l  a n d  s t a r e  a t  t h e  
a d v e r t i s e m e n t .  N o t h i n g  h a p p e n s .
1 .  T he  l a s t  tw o  c a s e s  w e r e  n o t  c o n s i d e r e d  by  K a n t ,  b u t  t h e y  
a r e  a d d e d  h e r e  f o r  t h e  s a k e  o f  c o m p l e t e n e s s .  T h e y  p r e s e n t  
l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y ,  f o r  i f  no  c h a n g e  t a k e s  p l a c e  i n  me, i t  
m u s t  b e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  o u t s i d e  e v e n t s .
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G a s e  I V .  I  k e e p  my h e a d  s t i l l  a n d  o b s e r v e  c o m i n g s  
a n d  g o i n g s  o n  t h e  p l a t f o r m .  I  a t t r i b u t e  t h e s e  t o  t h e  m o v e m e n t s  
o f  o t h e r s .
So f a r ,  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  w o u l d  s e e m  t o  J u s t i f y  i t s  u s e .  
B u t ,  i t  may b e  s a i d ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  w i t h  r o l l e d  a d v e r t i s e ­
m e n t s ,  t h a t  i n  t h e  f i r s t  c a s e  my t u r n i n g  o f  t h e  h e a d  j u s t  
h a p p e n e d  t o  c o i n c i d e  e v e r y  t i m e  w i t h  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  " Y a r d -  
l e y * s  S o a p . "  I  m i g h t  h a v e  l o o k e d  b a c k  i n  t i m e  t o  s e e  " O v a l -  
t i n e "  o r  " D u b a r r y ’ s  P o w d e r " ,  o r  a  f o r m l e s s  b l u r  a s  t h e y  c o ­
a l e s c e d .  O f  c o u r s e ,  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  b u t  i t  i s  v e r y  u n l i k e l y ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  i f  I  l o o k e d  b a c k  a t  i r r e g u l a r  i n t e r v a l s .  N e v e r t h e ­
l e s s ,  t h e  a t t e m p t  t o  a v o i d  t h i s  o b j e c t i o n  p l a i n l y  a f f i r m s  
t h a t  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  i s  p u r e l y  e m p i r i c a l ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no  
l o g i c a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  o u r  e x t r a p o l a t i o n ,  f o r  h o v f e v e r  u n ­
l i k e l y ,  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  m i s t a k e  s t i l l  r e m a i n s .  T he  q u e s ­
t i o n  i s  w h e t h e r  t h i s  e m p i r i c i s m  t e l l s  a g a i n s t  K a n t ’ s  a t t e m p t  
t o  show t h e  ’ n e c e s s i t y ’ o f  t h e  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n .  B u t ,  i m p o r t ­
a n t  a s  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s ,  i t  i s  b e t t e r  p o s t p o n e d .
A s e c o n d  o b j e c t i o n  i s  o n e  f o r m u l a t e d  a t  l e n g t h  by
G u nn .  " K a n t ’ s  c r i t e r i o n  o f  o b j e c t i v e  s e q u e n c e  i s  i n a d e q u a t e .
I t  n e e d s  t o  be  c h e c k e d  by  o t h e r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  f o r ,  i f  a n
1
o b s e r v e r  s t o o d  n e a r  a  g u n ,  t h e n  w h a t e v e r  h e  d i d  t h e  f l a s h  
w o u l d  i n v a r i a b l y  p r e c e d e  t h e  r o a r ,  b u t  i f  h e  a c t e d  on  K a n t ’ s 
c r i t e r i o n  h e  w o u l d  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  f l a s h  o b j e c t i v e l y  p r e ­
c e d e d  t h e  r o a r ,  a n d  t h i s  w o u l d  b e  i n c o r r e c t .  A g a i n ,  i f  a n
1 .  S u r e l y ,  " a t  some d i s t a n c e  f r o m "  ?
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o b s e r v e r  w e r e  b e t w e e n  tw o  g u n s  f i r i n g  s u c c e s s i v e  r o u n d s  t o ­
g e t h e r ,  a n d  h e  s t o o d  i n  s u c h  a  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  t h e  s o u n d s  weie 
s i m u l t a n e o u s ,  t h e n  i f  h e  m oved  i n  one  d i r e c t i o n  -  s a y  n o r t h -  
h e  w o u l d  g e t  a  d i f f e r e n t  s e q u e n c e  f r o m  t h a t  w h i c h  h e  w o u l d  g e t  
i f  h e  m oved  s o u t h .  S u c h  a n  o b s e r v e r ,  on  K a n t ’ s  c r i t e r i o n ,
w o u l d  a r r i v e  a t  a  j u d g m e n t  a b o u t  s i m u l t a n e i t i e s  o r  c o e x i s t -
1
e n c e s  w h i c h  w o u l d  b e  e r r o n e o u s . "  T h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  t h i s  i s  
e a s i l y  a n s w e r e d .  A man a t  a  d i s t a n c e  f r o m  a  g u n  may s e e  t h e  
f l a s h  b e f o r e  h e  h e a r s  t h e  r e p o r t ,  b u t  h e  h a s  o n l y  t o  v»alk 
n e a r e r  a n d  n e a r e r  t h e  g u n  f o r  t h e  s o u n d  a n d  t h e  f l a s h  e v e n t ­
u a l l y  t o  c o i n c i d e .  T he  s e c o n d  h a l f ,  t o o ,  p r o s r e s  n o  m ore  t h a n
t h e
t h e  r e l e v a n c e  o f  p o s i t i o n  i n / _ d e t e r m i n i n g  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e
s e q u e n c e  o f  s o u n d s .  G r a n t e d  t h a t  a  man s o u t h  o f  t h e  p o i n t
2
midway b e t w e e n  t h e  tw o  g u n s  w o u l d  make a  d i f f e r e n t  j u d g m e n t  
f r o m  a  man n o r t h ,  i f  e a c h  made o n l y  o n e  e s t i m a t e ,  t h e i r  
j u d g m e n t s  h a v e  no  m o re  g r o u n d s  t h a n  m in e  w o u l d  h a v e  i f ,  b e ­
c a u s e  I  saw  a  t a l l  man a t  a  c e r t a i n  p o i n t ,  I  j u d g e d  t h a t  h e  
r e m a i n e d  t h e r e  f o r  some t i m e .  B u t  i f  t h e  man s o u t h  m oves  
n o r t h ,  a s  G unn  s a y s ,  " h e  w o u l d  g e t  a  d i f f e r e n t  s e q u e n c e  f r o m  
t h a t  w h i c h  h e  w o u l d  g e t  i f  h e  m oved  s o u t h . " S u r e l y  t h a t  v e r y  
f a c t ,  o n  K a n t ’ s c r i t e r i o n ,  w o u l d  s e r v e  t o  make h i m  s u s p i c i o u s  
a b o u t  t h e  o b j e c t i v i t y  o f  h i s  j u d g m e n t s  o f  s u c c e s s i o n  a n d  
s i m u l t a n e i t y .
1 .  " P r o b l e m  o f  T im e "  p . 1 0 8 .  O f .  a l s o  a r t i c l e  by B r o a d  ( f r o m  
whom t h e  c r i t i c i s m  i s  t a k e n )  i n  A r i s .  S o c .  P r o c .  1 9 2 5 - 6 , p .
2 0 0 .
2 .  A l l o w  t o  e a c h  o f  t h e m  a  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  s o u n d ,  t o  a s s i s t  
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .
165
The second p a r t  o f  K an t’ s argument which needs exam­
i n a t i o n ,  i s  h i s  use o f  a co n cep t  o f  ’ o b j e c t i v e  t i m e . ’ I t  has  
a l r e a d y  been  I n d i c a t e d  t h a t  t h i s  i s  h a rd  t o  square  w i th  some 
o f  h i s  own p r i n c i p l e s  : a more im p o r tan t  t o p i c ,  i s ,  however, 
how f a r  i t  i s  on any p r i n c i p l e s  d e f e n s i b l e .  I f  i t  can be d e ­
fended  a s  l e a d in g  t o  f r u i t f u l  r e s u l t s ,  t h e r e  a r e  few who 
would c r i t i c i s e  Kant h a r s h l y  f o r  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  w i th  th e  r a t h e r  
b a r r e n  of  th e  A e s t h e t i c .
B efore  he t r e a t s  th e  s e p a r a t e  a n a lo g ie s  i n  d e t a i l ,  
he g iv e s  a p ro o f  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e  o f  th e  a n a lo g i e s ,  
which i s  t h a t  e x p e r ie n c e  i s  p o s s i b l e  on ly  th ro u g h  th e  r e ­
p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  a n e c e s s a ry  c o n n e c t io n  o f  p e r c e p t i o n s .  In  
t h i s  p ro o f  he s a y s :  "S ince  t im e ,  however, cannot i t s e l f  be 
p e r c e iv e d ,  th e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  o f  th e  e x i s t e n c e  of  o b j e c t s  i n  
t im e can t a k e  p la c e  only  th ro u g h  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  i n  t ime in  
g e n e r a l ,  and t h e r e f o r e  only th ro u g h  c o n c e p ts  t h a t  connect  
them a p r i o r i .  S ince t h e s e  a lways c a r r y  n e c e s s i t y  w i th  them, 
i t  f o l lo w s  t h a t  expe r i e n c e  i s  only p o s s i b l e  th ro u g h  a r e ­
p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  n e c e s s a ry  c o n n e c t io n  of  p e r c e p t i o n s . . .  The 
g e n e r a l  p r i n c i p l e  o f  th e  t h r e e  a n a lo g i e s  r e s t s  on th e  n e c e s s ­
ary  u n i t y  of  a p p e r c e p t io n ,  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  em­
p i r i c a l  c o n s c io u s n e s s ,  t h a t  i s ,  o f  a l l  p e r c e p t i o n ,  a t  every  
i n s t a n t  o f  t i m e . . .  T h is  s y n t h e t i c  u n i ty  i n  th e  t i m e - r e l a t i o n s  
o f  a l l  p e r c e p t i o n s ,  a s  th u s  d e te rm in ed  a p r i o r i ,  i s  th e  
law, t h a t  a l l  e m p i r i c a l  t im e - d é t e r m i n â t io n s  must s ta n d  under
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1
r u l e s  o f  u n i v e r s a l  t i m e - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . "
I n  t h e  d e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  C a t e g o r i e s ,  K a n t  l a i d  g r e a t  
s t r e s s  o n  t h e  T r a n s c e n d e n t a l  U n i t y  o f  A p p e r c e p t i o n .  S y n t h e s i s ,  
h e  s a i d ,  i s  p r i o r  t o  a n a l y s i s ,  a n d  i s  l o g i c a l l y  p r e s u p p o s e d  
b y  i t .  H e r e  h e  i s  a p p l y i n g  t h e s e  f i n d i n g s  t o  t h e  p r o b l e m  how 
we f r o m  o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  p a r t i c u l a r s ,  a s  Hume w o u l d  h a v e  p u t  i t ,  
a r r i v e  a t  t h e  b e l i e f  t h a t  some o f  o u r  p e r c e p t i o n s  a r e  d e t e r m ­
i n e d  b y  o t h e r s :  a n d  h e  a g a i n  s t r e s s e s  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  u n i t y .  
J u s t  a s  p r e v i o u s l y  h e  h a d  s a i d ,  " A l l  t h e  m a n i f o l d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
s o  f a r  a s  i t  i s  g i v e n  i n  o n e  e m p i r i c a l  i n t u i t i o n ,  i s  d e t e r m ­
i n e d  i n  r e s p e c t  o f  o n e  o f  t h e  l o g i c a l  f u n c t i o n s  o f  j u d g m e n t ,
a n d  i s  t h e r e b y  b r o u g h t  i n t o  o n e  c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  N m  t h e  c a t e -
2
g o r i e s a r e  j u s t  t h e s e  f u n c t i o n s  o f  j u d g m e n t  . . . " ,  so  now h e  
i n s i s t s  t h a t  we c o u l d  n o t  h a v e  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  o f  t i m e s  u n l e s s  
t h e r e  w e r e  f i r s t  a  s i n g l e  o b j e c t i v e  t i m e  i n  w h i c h  e v e n t s  a r e  
d e t e r m i n e d  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  c a u s a t i o n .  B u t , 
w h a t  i s  t h i s  o b j e c t i v e  t i m e ?  I t  i s  o p e n  t o  t h e  o b v i o u s  o b ­
j e c t i o n  t h a t  i t  i s  a  r e t u r n  t o  t h e  N e w t o n i a n  a b s o l u t e  t i m e ,
a n d  i s  a  m e r e  h y p o s t a t i s e d  f i g m e n t .  C e r t a i n  p a s s a g e s  l e n d
3
s u p p o r t  t o  t h i s : -  "T im e  c a n n o t  i t s e l f  b e  p e r c e i v e d , "  a n d
" C h a n g e  d o e s  n o t  a f f e c t  t i m e  i t s e l f  b u t  o n l y  a p p e a r a n c e s  i n  
4
t i m e . "  S e c o n d l y ,  i t  i s  s p e c i a l l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e c o n c i l e  w i t h  
K a n t ’ s  own s t a t e m e n t s  t o  t h e  e f f e c t  t h a t  t i m e  i s  n o t  a n  
u l t i m a t e  c o n s t i t u e n t  o f  r e a l i t y .  L a s t l y ,  how i s  t h i s  ’ t i m e ’
1 .  B 2 1 9 - 2 2 0 .  2 .  B 1 4 3 .  3 .  B 2 1 9 .
4 .  B 2 2 6 .
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supposed t o  be r e l a t e d  t o  space?
I t  i s  n o t  to  be supposed t h a t  th e s e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
a r e  s l i g h t  ones : on t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  w hether  
even h i s  s t a u n c h e s t  adm ire r  co u ld  defend  Kant co m p le te ly  on 
a l l  t h e s e  c h a rg e s .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  I am i n c l i n e d  t o  t h i n k  t h a t  
t h e  very  o b v io u sn ess  of  some o f  th e s e  o b j e c t i o n s  i s  l i k e l y  to  
b l i n d  c r i t i c s  t o  t h e  im portance  and t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  o f  what 
Kant Was t r y i n g  to  fo rm u la te .
L e t  us g r a n t  h i s  p o s t u l a t i o n  o f  an o b j e c t i v e  time 
a s  a  n e c e s s a ry  u n i t y ,  comparable i n  f u n c t i o n  to  th e  T ra n s ­
c e n d e n t a l  Unity of  A p p e rc e p t io n ,  an d  l e t  us see what use he 
makes o f  i t ^  G ran ted  t h a t  we n e c e s s a r i l y  a r ran g e  e v e n ts  in  a 
t im e  o r d e r ,  how can t h a t  j u s t i f y  us i n  say ing  that"M  causes  B" 
i s  a r e l a t i o n  such t h a t  i f  A o c c u r s ,  B mu s t  (no t  merely ’does* 
a s  Hume s a id )  fo l low ?  As Kant r i g h t l y  i n s i s t e d ,  i t  c anno t :
b u t  what i t  can do> i s  t o  p ro v id e  "a r u l e  a c c o r d in g  to  which
1
a u n i ty  o f  e x p e r ie n c e  may a r i s e  from p e r c e p t i o n . "  The whole 
p a ra g ra p h  i s  o f  g r e a t  im portance  as  showing K an t’ s c o n c ep t io n  
o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  o f  th e  t h r e e  A n a lo g ie s .  "Since e x i s t e n c e  
canno t  be c o n s t r u c t e d ,  th e  p r i n c i p l e s  can  apply  only  to  th e  
r e l a t i o n s  o f  e x i s t e n c e ,  and can y i e l d  only  r e g u l a t i v e
1. See on t h i s  p o i n t  Ewing, "K an t’ s Treatm ent  o f  C a u s a l i t y " ,  
p . 7 2 n . ,  where he t a k e s  e x c e p t io n  to  K a n t ’ s use of  th e  
te rm  ’ana logy* .  H is  remarks on t h a t  argument o f  K an t’ s in  
th e  Second Analogy which d i f f e r s  from a l l  th e  r e s t  a re
very  sound ( p p .7 3 - 6 ) .
2 .  B 222.
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p r i n c i p l e s .  We c a n n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  ex p e c t  e i t h e r  axioms or  
a n t i c i p a t i o n s .  I f ,  however, a p e r c e p t i o n  i s  g iv en  in  a t im e ­
r s  l a t  ion  t o  some o t h e r  p e r c e p t i o n ,  th e n  even a l th o u g h  t h i s  
l a t t e r  i s  i n d e t e r m i n a t e ,  and w e c o n se q u en t ly  canno t  d ec ide  
wh a t  i t  i s ,  o r  what i t s  magni t ude may be ,  we may none th e  l e s s  
a s s e r t  t h a n  i n  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  connec ted  w i th  
t h e  fo rm er  in  t h i s  mode of  t im e .  In  p h i lo so ph y  a n a lo g i e s  
s i g n i f y  something v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  from what they  r e p r e s e n t  i n  
m athem atics  . . .  i n  p h i lo so p hy  th e  ana logy  i s  no t  the  e q u a l i t y  
o f  two q u a n t i t a t i v e  bu t  o f  two q u a l i t a t i v e  r e l a t i o n s :  and 
from t h r e e  g iv en  members we can  o b ta in  a p r i o r i  knowledge 
only  of  t h e  r e l a t i o n  to  a f o u r t h ,  no t  o f  th e  f o u r t h  member 
i t s e l f . "  The e s s e n t i a l  p u rp o r t  of  t n i s  passage  i s  th e  a n t i ­
t h e s i s  between c o n s t i t u t i v e  and r e g u l a t i v e :  we canno t  dec ide  
what th e  i n d e t e r m i n a t e  second p e r c e p t i o n  i s ,  bu t  we do know 
t h a t  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r i l y  c o n n e c ted  w i th  th e  former " i n  t h i s  
mode of  t im e"  ( i n  t h e  case  o f  c a u s a l i t y ,  s u c c e s s i o n ) .  We know 
th e  r u l e ,  bu t  v/e do no t  know th e  p a r t i c u l a r s  to  which i t  ap ­
p l i e s .  We have no c o n s t i t u t i v e  p r i n c i p l e  t h a t  would enab le  us 
t o  say "M cau ses  N" where M and N s ta n d  f o r  p a r t i c u l a r s ,  bu t  
we can say t h a t  e v e n t s  a re  so r e l a t e d  t h a t  th e  bond between 
them i s  a n e c e s s a ry  one.
Expressed  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  i t  may be s a i d  -  Kant looks  
upon th e  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n  as  a p r i n c i p l e  of  th e  c o n n e c t i v i t y
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o f  e v e n t s .  I t  i s  concerned  witl:^he s y n t h e t i c  u n i t y  which 
a l l  a p p re h e n s io n  of  a m an ifo ld ,  and a s  such ,  i t  i s  
n e c e s s a r y .  He does n o t  b o th e r  w i th  p a r t i c u l a r  e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n s  
o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  c a u s a l  p r i n c i p l e ,  such as  th o se  which (as  
Hume p o i n t e d  ou t)  a r e  d i s c o v e r e d  by e m p i r i c a l  and in d u c t iv e  
methods.  On th e  c o n t r a r y ,  he says  t h a t  t h e  g e n e r a l  c a u s a l  
p r i n c i p l e  does no t  depend f o r  i t s  v a l i d i t y  on p a r t i c u l a r  
c a u s a l " l a w s " : r a t h e r  do they  d e r iv e  from th e  u n i ty  of a p p e r ­
c e p t i o n  w i th o u t  which e x p e r ie n c e  i t s e l f  would be im p o s s ib le .  
C a u s a t io n ,  t h e n ,  i s  n e c e s s a ry  as  be ing  a p r i n c i p l e  or th e  
c o n n e c t i v i t y  of  e v e n t s  : a n d t  he e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  p lay ed  by t im e 
i s ,  t h a t  i t  i s  i n  t im e t h a t  e v e n ts  a r e ,  and must be, re g a rd e d  
a s  b e in g  co n nec ted .
I I I .
There a re  now two q u e s t i o n s  which must be answered;
th ey  a r e , I s  t n i s  view of  t ime a s a t i s f a c t o r y  one? and. Has
Kant succeeded  in  p ro v in g  th e  n e c e s s i t y  o f  c a u s a t io n ?  These
two q u e s t i o n s  a r e  d i s t i n c t  : i t  i s  u s e l e s s  to  c r i t i c i s e  Kant
1
( a s  Gunn i s  i n c l i n e d  to  do ) on th e  f i r s t  head because  h i s  
p ro o f  o f  c a u s a t i o n  i s  no t  w a t e r t i g h t .  There a re  two s ta g e s  
i n  h i s  p ro o f  o f  c a u s a t i o n  - f i r s t ,  t h a t  we are  i n  p o s s e s s io n  
o f  a c r i t e r i o n  t o  en a b le  us t o  a r ran g e  e v e n ts  a s  o c c u r r in g  
i n  o rd e r  o f  t ime : seco n d ly ,  t r i a t  g iven  t n i s  t ime o r d e r ,  we 
n e c e s s a r i l y  b e l i e v e  t h a t  e v e n t s  a r e  c a u s a l l y  con n ec ted ,
1. As, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  o p . c i t .  p . 109.
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though t h e  p ro c e s s  by which we d i s c o v e r  p a r t i c u l a r  c a u s a l  
c o n n e c t io n s  i s  n o t  i t s e l f  a n e c e s s a ry  o n e . F a i l u r e  i n  the  
p ro o f  o# c a u s a t i o n  i s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t o  be l a i d  to  th e  a c ­
count  o f  th e  second s t a g e ,  and my o p in io n  i s  t h a t  th e  second 
s t a g e ,  and th e  acco un t  o f  t im e w h ic h i t  c o n t a i n s ,  i s  bo th  
v a l i d  and v a l u a b l e .
R e tu rn in g  t o  th e  e a r l i e r  o b j e c t i o n s ,  i n  so f a r  as  
Kant keeps  t o  h i s  main c o n t e n t i o n s  (which i s  no t  a lways ,  and 
so he ca n n o t  be c l e a r e d  e n t i r e l y ) ,  i t  canno t  be s a i d  t h a t  he 
u s e s  h i s ’o b j e c t i v e  t i m e ’ as  a mere hypoé t a t i s a t i o n  l i k e  New­
t o n ’ s a b s o l u t e  t im e .  On th e  c o n t r a r y ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  fundam enta l  
d o c t r i n e  o f  time c o n s id e r e d  a s  a p r i n c i p l e  of  th e  c o n n e c t i v i t y  
o f  e v e n ts  -  i t  i s  o b j e c t i v e  i n  t h a t  i t  i s  a way in  which we 
n e c e s s a r i l y  r e g a rd  e v e n ts  as  co n nec ted .  (Space i s  a n o th e r ,  
and t h a t  answers t h e  t h i r d  o b j e c t i o n . )  But t h a t  i s  a s  f a r  r e ­
moved a s  p o s s i b l e  from th e  u n d e s i r a b l e  assum ption  o f  time as  
b e in g  something a p a r t  from e v e n t s ,  and in deed ,  t h e r e  i s  much 
i n  common between Kant and W hitehead. L a s t l y ,  t h e  second and 
l e a s t  im p o r ta n t  o b j e c t i o n  -  o f  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  - co u ld  to  a 
c e r t a i n  d eg ree  be met, s in c e  t o  say t h a t  we must r e g a rd  e v e n t s  
a s  b e in g  o b j e c t i v e l y  d e te rm in ed  in  t im e ,  i s  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  t o  
say t h a t  a p a r t  from th e  c o n d i t i o n s  of  o u r  s e n s i b i l i t y ,  t ime 
and c a u s a l i t y  a re  something i n  th e m se lv e s .
But w i th  t h e  f i r s t  s t a g e  of t h e  p ro o f  o f  c a u s a t io n ,  
and w i th  i t s  more p a r t i c u l a r  t r e a tm e n t  o f  t im e ,  a l e s s  s a t i s ­
f a c t o r y  c o n c lu s io n  i s  re a c h e d .  The q u e s t i o n  was r a i s e d  in  th e
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p r e v io u s  s e c t i o n ,  and t h e r e  l e f t  unanswered, how f a r  th e  
e m p i r i c a l  c r i t e r i o n  ac c o rd in g  t o  which we a r r a n g e i e v e n t s  in  a 
t i m e - o r d e r  i s  a b le m ish  tha]^ a f f e c t s  th e  whole argumebt.  I f  
(however u n l i k e l y  i t  be) i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  I shou ld  make a 
m is tak e  i n  my a r rang em en t ,  does  t h a t  v i t i a t e  th e  whole o f  th e  
su bseq u en t  p ro c eed in g s?  I t  d o e s ,  i f  my aim i s  t o  prove t h a t  
Y n e c e s s a r i l y  fo l lo w s  on X, s in c e  my e a r l i e r  m is tak e  may have 
been  t o  r e v e r s e  th e  o rd e r  o f  M and N, a n t e c e d e n t s  o f  X and Y. 
But i t  does  no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a f f e c t  th e  g e n e r a l  c o n c lu s io n  
t h a t  e v e n t s  i n  t ime e x h i b i t  n e c e s s a ry  c o n n e c t io n s .  For Kant 
might r e p ly  t h a t  when we t a l k  about "a  m is take  i n  my a r r a n g e ­
m ent" ,  t h a t  i s  i t s e l f  p o s t u l a t i n g  an o r d e r  i r i^h ich  e v e n ts  a r e  
o b j e c t i v e l y  a r r a n g e d ,  and t h a t  t h a t  i s  a l l  h i s  argument 
r e q u i r e s .
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  w h e the r  o r  no we dec ide  t h a t  t h i s  
c r i t e r i o n ,  and w i th  i t ,  K a n t ’ s p roo f  o f  th e  n e c e s s i t y  of  r e ­
g a rd in g  e v e n t s  as  e x h i b i t i n g  c a u s a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ,  i s  v a l i d ,  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  rem ains  o f  K a n t ’ s t r e a tm e n t  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  a s p e c t s  
o f  t ime ( s i m u l t a n e i t y ,  s u c c e s s io n  e t c . )  i n  th e  f i r s t  s t a g e .
I t  cannot  be d e n ie d  t h a t  t h i s  i s  no t  wholly  s u c c e s s f u l .  As
1
Kemp Smith  em phasized ,  K an t’ s t r e a tm e n t  o f  s i m u l t a n e i t y  as  
e lsew here  i n  th e  C r i t i q u e ,  i s  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y .  S t a r t i n g  from 
t h e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  a l l  our s e n s a t i o n s  a r e  s u c c e s s iv e ,  th e  
passage  t o  o b j e c t i v e  s i m u l t a n e i t y  would be a d i f f i c u l t  one -
1 .  " C o m m e n t a r y " ,  p p . 1 3 5 - 8 ,  & 3 5 6 - 9 .
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i f  i t  were f u l l y  e x p la in e d :  b u t  i t  i s  g lo s s e d  over  w i th  an 
ease  t h a t  i s  a lm ost  m ira c u lo u s ,  no t  t o  say s u s p i c i o u s .  Then, 
t o o ,  Kant i s  neve r  c e r t a i n  w he th e r  s i m u l t a n e i t y  i s  o r  i s  n o t  
a mode o f  t ime : and t h e  argument of th e  Second Analogy, a s  o f  
t h e  o t h e r  two a n a l o g i e s ,  i s  n o t  h e lp ed ,  but  r a t h e r  h in d e re d ,  
by h i s  tendency  t o  a s s i g n  t o  each ,  a s  a g u a rd ia n  a n g e l ,  one of 
t h e  s o - c a l l e d  "modes of  t im e " .  I t  i s  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  to  t r e a t  
a s  he d o es ,  where he remembers th e  r e q u i r e m e n ts  o f  h i s  a r c h i ­
t e c t o n i c  scheme, ’ d u ra t io n *  and * success ion*  and * s i m u l t a n e i t y  * 
a s  i f  t h e y  cou ld  be c o n s id e r e d  a p a r t  from each o t h e r .
A l a s t  im p o r ta n t  p o i n t  a r i s e s  which must be fa c e d .
In  h i s  t r e a tm e n t  o f  s u c c e s s io n  in  what we have c a l l e d  th e  
* f i r s t  s tage*  -  long  b e fo re  c a u s a t io n  can  r i g h t l y  be invoked - 
i s  h i s  p ro ced u re  c i r c u l a r ,  due to  the  s u r r e p t i t i o u s  i n t r o d u c ­
t i o n  o f  c a u s a l  n o t io n s ?  As Gunn p u ts  i t : -  **He i s  h e re  on ve ry  
dangerous  ground, f o r  i t  r e q u i r e s  only a l i t t l e  r e f l e c t i o n  t o  
see  t h a t ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  we form our  c o n c e p t io n  of  c a u s a l  con­
n e c t i o n  because  o f  th e  s u c c e s s io n  o f  e v e n t s .  How th e n  . . .  can 
we invoke th e  p r i n c i p l e  of c a u s a l i t y  i n  o r d e r  t o  determ ine
t i m e - o r d e r  when we r e a l l y  base  our p r i n c i p l e  o f  c a u s a l i t y  on
1
t h e  sequence of e v e n ts ? "  Of c o u r s e ,  i t  must be remembered 
t h a t  t h e  c o n n e c t io n  between t im e and c a u s a l i t y  i s  a d m i t te d ly  
a very  c l o s e  one, and t h a t  something a k in  to  v e r b a l  t i g h t - r o p e  
w a lk ing  i s  needed t o  p re s e rv e  a d i s t i n c t i o n .  Kant d id  no t  sh in e
1. Op. c i t .  p=106.
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a t  t h i s  - he cou ld  be condemned out o f  n i s  ovm mouth f o r  
a lm ost  a n y th in g  -  and i t  i s  no wonder i f  he t r a n s g r e s s e s  
v e r b a l l y .  The q u e s t i o n  i s  w he the r  t h e r e  i s  more to  i t  than  
t h a t  - w h e the r  h i s  whole t r e a tm e n t  i s  i n  e ssence  a c i r c u l a r  
one, p re su p p o s in g  c a u s a l i t y  to  prove o b j e c t i v e  t im e ,  and th e n  
u s in g  t h a t  t o  prove th e  n e c e s s i t y  of  c a u s a t io n .  S igw art  s a i d  : -  
"The use  o f  th e s e  s t a n d a r d s  of  t ime f o r  th e  tem p o ra l  d e te r m in ­
a t i o n  of  s u b j e c t i v e  e v e n t s ,  and s t i l l  more f o r  th e  d e te rm in ­
a t i o n  o f  th e  o b j e c t i v e  e v e n ts  of  which th e y  a re  p e r c e p t i o n s ,  
n e c e s s i t a t e s  th e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  of th e  r e l a t i o n  between the  
t ime of  t h e  event and the  t ime of th e  p e r c e p t i o n ,  and th e  r e ­
d u c t i o n  o f  the  s u b j e c t i v e  s e r i e s  of  p e r c e p t i o n s  t o  th e  o b j e c t ­
iv e  s e r i e s  of changes i n  t h i n g s .  T h is  r e d u c t io n  can only be 
c a r r i e d  ou t  by assuming c a u s a l  law s , i n  which th e  s e n s a t io n  i s  
r e g a rd e d  as  a t e m p o ra l ly  de te rm in ed  e f f e c t  o f  o b j e c t i v e  change : 
b u t  e s t a b l i s h  such  laws i s  p o s s i b l e  only a g a in  by assuming
t h a t  in  t h e  case  o f  co n t in u o u s  e v e n ts  tn e  s u c c e s s io n  of s e n s -
1
a t i o n s  c o r re s p o n d s  t o  th e  s u c c e s s io n  o f  th e  e v e n t s " . And - 
"Before  we can e s t a b l i s h  a c a u s a l  c o n n e c t io n ,  a r u l e  ac c o rd in g  
t o  which B folloY/s A, we must be ab le  t o  a f f i r m  w i th  o b j e c t i v e  
v a l i d i t y  t h a t  B has  fo l low ed  A : b u t  b e f o re  we can a f f i r m  t h i s
w i t h  o b j e c t i v e  v a l i d i t y  we must have re c o g n is e d  a c a u s a l  con-
2
n e c t i o n  between A and B". S ig w ar t* s  argument,  e s s e n t i a l l y ,
1. S ig w a r t ,  " L o g ic " , p . 2 j 7 .  I t a l i c s  mine.
2 .  i b i d . ,  p . 246. The whole o f  the  s e c t i o n  ( p p . 236-252) i s  
im p o r ta n t  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n .
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i s  t h a t  i n  h i s  a t t e m p t  to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between s u b j e c t i v e  
and o b j e c t i v e  s u c c e s s io n ,  Kant makes i l l e g i t i m a t e  use of th e  
i d e a  o f  c a u s a t i o n .  In  th e  examples g iv en  e a r l i e r ,  my giere 
t u r n i n g  o f  my head i s  no t  th o u g h t  t o  be s u f f i c i e n t  to  account  
f o r  th e  complex d i f f e r e n c e s  which my s u c c e s s iv e  p e r c e p t io n s  
on th e  r a i lw a y  s t a t i o n  e x h i b i t .  I  am f o r c e d  to  p o s t u l a t e  o t h e r  
c a u s e s  f o r  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s .  But g r a n te d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some 
c i r c u l a r i t y ,  i t  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  a v i c i o u s  c i r c u l a r i t y .  I t  
must be remembered t h a t  Kant i s  d e a l i n g  w i th  n o t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  
ex t re m e ly  a b s t r a c t  and g e n e r a l  and fundam en ta l :  we have th e  
g r e a t e s t  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  fo r m u la t i n g  a sen ten c e  w i th o u t  p r e ­
suppos ing  them, and so com m itt ing  v e r b a l  f a l l a c i e s  -  b u t ,  Kant 
might r e p l y ,  t h a t  i s  the  very  t h i n g  he i s  t r y i n g  t o  u rg e ,  t h a t  
we must r e g a r d  e v e n t s  as  c a u s a l l y  co nn ec ted .  Let  anyone t r y  
th e  exper im en t  o f  f o rm u la t in g  a s  p r e c i s e l y  a s  he can, the  
e x a c t  d i f f e r e n c e  between a house p e r s i s t i n g  in  t im e ,  the  p a r t s  
o f  which a r e  s u c c e s s i v e l y  apprehended ,  and the  s e r i e s  of  
e v e n t s  which a re  t h e  s u c c e s s iv e  app ea rances  a t  d i f f e r e n t  
p l a c e s  o f  a moving o b j e c t ,  such  as  a b o a t ,  and i t  w i l l  be seen  
how d i f f i c u l t  i t  i s  n o t  t o  make use o f  th e  n o t io n  o f  cau se .
And th e n  he may s e t t l e  f o r  h im s e l f  w h e the r  the  i n t r o d u c t i o n  
o f  cause h e re  i s  v i c i o u s l y  c i r c u l a r ,  i n v a l i d a t i n g  K an t’ s 
whole a rgu m en t , o r  w he the r  i t  does no t  i t s e l f  show th e  n e c ­
e s s i t y  we a r e  un d er  o f  r e g a r d i n g  e v e n ts  as  s u b j e c t  t o  de te rm ­
i n a t i o n s  o f  c a u s a l i t y .
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à somewhat d i f f e r e n t  c r i t i c i s m ,  and one which can
be summarily t r e a t e d ,  i s  t h a t  which says  t h a t  th e  use Kant
makes o f  th e  n o t i o n  o f  cause i s  r i d i c u l o u s .  The p o s i t i o n  o f
th e  b oa t  e a r l i e r  i s  n o t  th e  cause  of  th e  l a t e r  p o s i t i o n  of  th e
b o a t .  But Kant n e v e r  s a id  i t  was : a l l  he s a i d  was t h a t  we a re
bound t o  p o s t u l a t e  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a c a u s a l  c h a in  l i n k in g
1
t o g e t h e r  t h e  two e v e n t s .  Schopenhauer’ s c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  on 
K a n t ’ s view th e  f i r s t  ev en t  i s  re g a rd e d  as  th e  cause  of th e  
second (so  t h a t  day would cause  n i g h t , a man’ s w alk ing  under 
a ro o f  cau se  a t i l e  to  drop  on him, and th e  f i r s t  n o te s  o f  a 
melody cause  th e  l a s t  n o t e s ) ,  r e s t s  on a m isu n d e rs tan d in g  of  
K an t’ s p o s i t i o n ,  f o r  he was n o t  concerned  w i th  p a r t i c u l a r  ap ­
p l i c a t i o n s ,  bu t  w i t h  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  c a u s a l i t y  i n  g e n e r a l .
K an t’ s view of  t ime i s  open t o ,  and has  r e c e iv e d ,  
many c r i t i c i s m s  from very  d i f f e r e n t  q u a r t e r s .  I t  i s  l o o s e ly  
p h ra se d ,  i n c o n s i s t e n t ,  and o b s c u re .  As Kemp Smithy Kant s
view of  t im e  " i s  t h e  most v u l n e r a b le  t e n e t  in  h i s  whole s y s -  
2
tern."  On th e  one haad ,  Gunn grumbles a t  h i s  s u b je c t i v i s m :  on 
t h e  o t h e r  hand, t h e r e  a re  p a s s a g e s  where Kant i s  so ’o b j e c t i v e ’ 
t h a t  he e a r n s  B e rg so n ’ s c r i t i c i s m  of  c o n c e iv in g  an a b s o lu te  
time which ,  l i k e  Newton’ s ,  i s  a homogeneous and s p a t i a l i s e d
1. "F o u r fo ld  Root o f  th e  P r i n c i p l e  of  S u f f i c i e n t  Reason",
sec .  23* For good d i s c u s s i o n s  of  the  v a lu e  of  S chopenhauer’ s 
c r i t i c i s m s ,  see Gunn, o p . c i t .  p p .124-6 ;  g f ï n g ,  o p . c i t .  
p p . 86-90; Kemp Smith ,  o p . c i t .  p p .36 5 -6 ,  377-9 (w i th  r e f e r ­
ences  t o  o th e r  d i s c u s s i o n s , )  and 387-9 .
2 .  "Commentary", p . 137.
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medium. R u s s e l l  r i d i c u l e s  t h e  view of t h e  i n f i n i t e  on which 
th e  F i r s t  Antinomy r e s t s :  on humbler ground,  th e  p s y c h o lo g i s t  
c a v i l s  a t  t h e  view t h a t  a l l  s e n s a t i o n s  a r e  s u b j e c t i v e .  The 
p h y s i c i s t  f i n d s  K a n t ’ s c r i t e r i o n  of  o b j e c t i v i t y  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  
and h i s  t r e a tm e n t  o f  s i m u l t a n e i t y  i m p r a c t i c a b l e :  and the  
commentator murmurs a t  h i s  f r e q u e n t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s .  The l o g i c ­
i a n  s c o f f s  a t  th e  a r c h i t e c t o n i c  fo r m a l i t y  of  the  A e s th e t i c  : 
and the  h i s t o r i a n  o f  p h i lo so p h y  d e c id e s  t h a t  he has  no t  
succeeded i n  ansv/ering Hume.
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  d i s c o u n t i n g  a l l  t h e s e ,  however j u s t ­
i f i e d ,  t h e  v a lu e  of  K an t ’ s t r e a tm e n t  of  t ime remains  : in  
h i s  f o r m u la t i o n  o f ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  h i s  answer t o ,  th e  d i f f i c u l t  
p roblems which he f i r s t  opened up: i n  h i s  i n s i s t e n c e  upon 
th e  im portance  of  t im e in  m e ta p h y s ic a l  s p e c u l a t i o n :  and more 
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  in  h i s  t r e a tm e n t  of  t ime as  a p r i n c i p l e  by 
which e v e n t s  a re  g iv e n  as  connec ted  in  e x p e r i e n c e .
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CHAPTER V. BERGSON.
I t  would be r a s h  to  a s s e r t  t h a t  to  any one man i s
c h i e f l y  due th e  im p o r ta n t  p la c e  which t ime and tem po ra l
n o t i o n s  occupy in  p r e s e n t - d a y  th o u g h t .  Yet i f  t h a t  a s s e r t i o n
were to  be made, I t h i n k  t h a t  i t  would be g e n e r a l l y  agreed
t h a t  Mo Bergson was t h a t  man. Nobody has  done as  much as  he
t o  i n s i s t  on th e  im portance  o f  t im e ,  "La c l e f  des  p lu s  g ros  
^  1 
problèm es p h i lo s o p h iq u e s  e s t  l à , "  -  and t o  en su re  t h a t  we
2
sh ou ld ,  i n  A le x a n d e r ’ s p h ra s e ,  " ta k e  Time s e r i o u s l y . "  He 
h im s e l f  was th e  f i r s t ,  w i th  t h e  s in g le  e x c e p t io n  o f  Kant, 
whose view of  time he c r i t i c i s e d ,  t o  do t h i s .
And th e  im portance  o f  t ime and change i n  h i s  m eta­
p h y s ic  canno t  be d e n ie d .  One o f  h i s  most p rom inent E n g l i s h  
a d h e r e n t s ,  Wildon C a r r ,  e n t i t l e d  a book t h a t  he w rote  on 
B ergson ,  "The P h i lo sop h y  of  Change. " Time i s  co nce iv ed  by 
Bergson a s  ’d u r ^ e ’ , and t h i s  dur^e i s  n o t  mere b la n k  l a s t i n g ­
n e s s ,  e n d u r in g  th ro u g h  a h y p o s t a t i s e d ,  s p a t i a l i s e d  Time -  i t  
i s  a c e a s e l e s s ,  c o n t in u o u s  f low ,  i n  which, a s  i n  A r i s t o t l e ’ s 
God, a l l  t h i n g s  l i v e  and move and have t h e i r  b e in g .  Dur^e i s  
n o t  only  r e a l  ( a s  a g a i n s t  t h o s e  who would deny t h a t  t ime i s  
r e a l ) :  i t  i s  i t s e l f  R e a l i t y .  L ike H e r a c l i t u s ,  Bergson i n s i s t s
1 ."Duree e t  S i m u l t a n é i t é " , P r e f a c e ,  v i i i .
2. "Sp inoza  and Time" p . 15- See a l s o  P.W. Lewis, "Time and 
.W este rn  Man", who t h i n k s  t h a t  t ime i s  be ing  t a k e n  too
s e r i o u s l y ,  and who in v e ig h s  a g a in s t  t ime as  much as  
Bergson  a g a i n s t  space .
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t h a t  th e  n o t i o n  o f  p r o c e s s ,  o f  c e a s e l e s s  change, i s  fundam enta l:  . 
u n l ik e  him, he does n o t  p roceed  to  s t u l t i f y  th e  n o t io n  by 
a l lo w in g  c y c l i c  r e p e t i t i o n ,  b u t  c o n s i d e r s  t h a t  d u rée  ev o lv es  
e v e r  new and newer forms - t h a t  i t  i s  r e a l l y ,  and no t  only 
f i g u r a t i v e l y ,  c r e a t i v e •
The i n f l u e n c e  o f  B e rg so n ’ s n o t i o n s  has  been w id esp read .  
Perhaps  f o r  t h a t  v e ry  re a so n  th e  v a lu e  o f  h i s  work i s  l i a b l e  
t o  be wrongly  e s t i m a t e d ,  in  some ways, a t  th e  p r e s e n t  day. Id e as  
which we tak e  very  much f o r  g r a n te d  a re  d i f f i c u l t  t o  c o n s i d e r  
c r i t i c a l l y .  That may mean, on th e  one hand, an u n c r i t i c a l  
a c c e p ta n c e  o f  B ergson .  On th e  o t h e r  hand ,  i t  makes i t  d i f f i c u l t  
f o r  us t o  r e a l i s e  t h a t  such i d e a s  -  a s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  the  need 
o f  t a k i n g  Time s e r i o u s l y  - have not  a lways been a s  g e n e r a l l y  
a c c e p te d  a s  they  a r e  now. Hence we f â 4 l  t o  a p p r e c i a t e  the  r e a l  
o r i g i n a l i t y  of  B ergson ,  and t h e  im portance  o f  h i s  p r o t e s t  
a g a i n s t  t h e  s p a t i a l i s a t i o n  of  t im e ,  a t  t h e  d a te  a t  which he 
w ro te .  In  what f o l l o w s ,  we s h a l l  be concerned  v /i th  th e  expos­
i t i o n  and c r i t i c i s m  in  d e t a i l  of  B erg so n ’ s v iew s ,  bu t  i t  shou ld  
be c l e a r l y  r e a l i s e d  a t  t h e  o u t s e t  t h a t  such d e t a i l e d  t r e a tm e n t  
i s  i n  a sense  a lm os t  i r r e l e v a n t  to  th e  main i s s u e ,  s ince  w hat­
e v e r  th e  r e s u l t  r e a c h e d  by f u r t h e r  i n q u i r y ,  i t  w i l l  s tan d  un- 
a f f a c t e d .  The im portance  of  Bergson can  be summed up i n  a few 
words.  I t  i s ,  t h a t  i t  was he who f i r s t  saw and i n s i s t e d  on th e  
im portance  of  t im e ,  and t h a t  he was r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  the  awaken­
ing  of  modern p h i lo so ph y  from i t s  dogmatic s lum bers  i n  t h i s
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r e s p e c t .  H is  ( i f  t h e  com parison may be pardoned) i s  th e  
f u n c t i o n  o f  M odestineSs goad. C r i t i c i s m ,  t h e n ,  though by no 
means o t i o s e  on p a r t i c u & a r  p o i n t s ,  i s  unab le  t o  d e t r a c t  from 
h i s  r e a l  g r e a t n e s s ,  which rem a in s ,  w ha teve r  th e  c o n c lu s io n  
re ach ed .  I t  i s  w e l l  t h a t  t h i s  should  be emphasized to  s t a r t  
w i th .
F i r s t  o f  a l l ,  a n o te  on t e rm in o lo g y .  Bergson some­
t im e s  u s e s  ’t im e '  in  a narrow s e n s e ,  a s  meaning s p a t i a l i s e d  
o r  c lo c k  t im e ,  as opposed to  r e a l  t im e ,  o r  du r^e .  Granted  
t h a t  he had some excuse  f o r  t h e  narrow usage ,  in  t h a t w  r i t e r s  
o n ’t i m e ’ i n v a r i a b l y  s p a t i a l i s e d  i t ,  y e t  i t  w i l l  p robab ly  be 
found more co n v e n ie n t  n o t  to  use th e  word ’t i m e ’ u n q u a l i f i e d ,  
f o r  s p a t i a l i s e d  t im e ,  a s  i t  i s  l i k e l y  t o  le ad  t o  c o n fu s io n s  -  
-  and B ergson  h i m s e l f  was n o t  always s t r i c t  i n  h i s  u sage .  
’Time*, t h e n ,  ( e x c e p t  o f  cou rse  in  q u o t a t i o n s )  w i l l  co n t in u e  
t o  be u se d  g e n e r a l l y ,  to  co v e r  b o th  s p a t i a l i s e d  t im e and d u r é e . 
O th e rw ise ,  t h e r e  i s  no means o f  e sc a p in g  v e r b a l  c o n fu s io n s  
i f  ’ t i m e ’ i s  f i n a l l y  r e j e c t e d  a s  no t  b e in g  ’ r e a l l y  t e m p o r a l . ’ 
T h i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i s  no t  a s e r i o u s  c r i t i c i s m ,  i n  so f a r  as  
Bergson,  by v e r b a l  r e s t a t e m e n t s ,  cou ld  avo id  i t .  And s in ce  he 
d o es ,  on o c c a s io n ,  p o in t  out  t h a t  s p a t i a l i s e d  time i s  no t  t im e
1. "When we make t im e a homogeneous medium in  which co n sc io u s  
s t a t e s  u n fo ld  th e m s e lv e s ,  v/e t a k e  i t  t o  be g iv e n  a l l  a t  
once, which amounts to  s a y in g  t h a t  we a b s t r a c t  i t  from 
d u r a t i o n .  T h is  s imple c o n s i d e r a t i o n  ought t o  warn us t h a t  
we a r e  th u s  u n w i t t i n g l y  f a l l i n g  back upon space and r e a l l y  
g iv in g  up t i m e . "  ("Time and Free w i l l "  p . 98. See a l s o ,  
i b i d .  p . 91 . )
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a t  a l l ,  ana t n a t  t h e  only r e a l  t ime i s  d u ré e ,  I t h i n k  t h a t  we
may ta k e  i t  t h a t  t h i s  usage i s  c o r r e c t ,  and throw over t  he un-
pror«i)table d i s t i n c t i o n  between ’time* and ' d u r é e . '
The f i r s t  p o i n t ,  t h e n ,  on which Bergson i n s i s t s  i s
t h a t  we must make a fundam en ta l  d i s t i n c t i o n  between what ne
c a l l s  ' s p a t i a l i s e d *  t im e ,  and r e a l  t im e ,  which he i d e n t i f i e s  
. 1
w i th  d u ree^  B ut ,  s ec o n d ly ,  d u r / e ,  even as  i t  a p p e a r s  i n  n i s  
e a r l i e r  books b e f o re  he had e r e c t e d  i t  i n t o  a m y s t i c a l  a b s o l u t e  
a lm os t  a s  h y p o s t a t i s e d  as th e  ' t i m e ’ t h a t  he so o f t e n  c r i t i c i s e d ,  
i s  n o t  to  be e q u a te d  w ith  mere d u r a t i o n ,  as  we i n  England u n d e r ­
s ta n d  th e  word. Though, l i k e  i t ,  i t  i s  s u b j e c t i v e  i n  th e  sense  
t h a t  i t  i s  c l o s e l y  bound up w i t h  th e  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  th e  i n d i v i d ­
u a l ,  i n  some r e s p e c t s  i t  goes  f u r t h e r  t h a n  does ’d u r a t i o n .  ’ We 
have immediate a p p re h e n s io n  o f  duree  i n  a way in  which we do 
n o t  have immediate a p p re h e n s io n  of  d u r a t i o n .  I t  would no t  
no rm ally  be h e ld ,  a s  was p o i n t e d  out i n  th e  c h a p t e r  on Psycho­
lo gy ,  t h a t  we d i r e c t l y  apprehend  i n t e r v a l s , o t h e r  th a n  very  
s h o r t  ones .  Bergson ,  on th e  o t h e r  hand, i n s i s t s  t h a t  durée i s  
d i r e c t l y  and i n t i m a t e l y  e x p e r ie n c e d  as  a c e a s e l e s s  f lo w . The 
two words u n d e r l i n e d  i n  th e  l a s t  two s e n te n c e s  g iv e  th e  key to  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  -  more o f t e n  f e l t ,  th a n  e x p re s s e d  - between 
Î d u r é e ’ a s  Bergson u s e s  i t  and ’d u ra t io n *  as  i t  i s  commonly 
u n d e r s to o d  in  E n g l i s h .  The d i f f e r e n c e  i s  one o f  em phasis .  When 
we t a l k  o f  d u r a t i o n ,  we t h i n k  o f  something e n d u r in g  th ro u g h  a
1. Compare a l s o  Oakeley ,  ’’H i s to r y  and th e  S e l f ’’ pass im . On
th e  u n s o u n d n e s s ,o f  drawing an ana logy  between space and  
t im e ,  see B road ’ s a r t i c l e  on Time i n  th e  "Enc^opedia  of 
R e l i g io n  and E t h i c s . ’’
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p e r io d  o f  t im e ,  o f  l a s t i n g n e s s . Th is  l a s t i n g n e s s  i$' th e  very  
a n t i t h e s i s  o f  what Bergson w ish es  t o  e x p r e s s :  h i s  durée i s  no t  
en d u ran ce ,  b u t  f l o w .
Secondly ,  we o f t e n  use  th e  word ’d u ra t io n *  to  s t a n d  
a l s o  f o r  ’ o b j e c t i v e ’ measurements ,  a b s t r a c t e d  from th e  d i r e c t  
judgments  o f  i n d i v i d u a l s .  T h is ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  i s  th e  very  concep­
t i o n  o f  t im e a g a i n s t  which Bergson i s  t i l t i n g ,  and i t  p ro v id e s  
a f u r t h e r  r e a so n  why we whould be c a r e f u l  to  a v o id  co n fu s in g  
du rée  w i t h  d u r a t i o n .  Even th e  f i r s t  sense  of  d u r a t i o n  as sub ­
j e c t i v e ,  though ,  i s  n o t  what Bergson means, and he cou ld  e a s i l y
E n g l i s h
c r i t i c i s e  th e  ’ l a s t i n g n e s s ’ which i s  i n  m os t /^ readers ’ minds 
when th ey  re a d  th e  word ’d u r a t i o n ’ , a s  b e in g  th e  overflow  from 
t h e  second,  s o - c a l l e d  ’o b j e c t i v e ’ c o n c e p t io n ,  and hence a s  b e in g  
i t s e l f  open to  c r i t i c i s m .
I t  i s ,  t h e n ,  very  im p o r ta n t  t h a t  we shou ld  no t  d i s ­
t i n g u i s h  between d u r a t i o n  ( w i th  a l l  i t s ,  from B erg so n ’ s p o in t  
o f  view, ’ s p a t i a l ’ c o n n e c t io n s ) ,  and s p a t i a l i s e d  t im e ,  s in c e  in  
t h a t  case  h a l f  th e  p o i n t  o f  B e rg so n ’ s d i s t i n c t i o n  w i l l  have 
v a n i s h e d ;  b u t  between durée  and s p a t i a l i s e d  t im e .
What, t h e n ,  i s  t h i s  s p a t i a l i s e d  time about  which so
much h as  a l r e a d y  been  s a id ?  Bergson h i m s e l f ,  very  l u c i d l y ,
1
s u p p l i e s  th e  answer.  "When we speak o f  t im e ,  we g e n e r a l l y  
t h i n k  o f  a homogeneous medium i n  which our  co n sc io u s  s t a t e s
1. "Time and Free  w i l l "  p . 91- For  re a s o n s  a l r e a d y  s t a t e d ,  I 
have r e p l a c e d ,  f o r  th e  ’d u r a t i o n ’ of  th e  t r a n s l a t i o n ,  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  word ’d u r é e . ’
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a re  ran ged  a lo n g s id e  one a n o th e r  as  i n  space ,  so a s  t o  form a 
d i s c r e t e  m u l t i p l i c i t y .  Would n o t  t i # e ,  t h u s  u n d e r s to o d ,  be t o  
t h e  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  our  p sy ch ic  s t a t e s  what i n t e n s i t y  i s  t o  
c e r t a i n  o f  them -  a s ig n ,  a symbol, a b s o l u t e l y  d i s t i n c t  from 
t r u e  durée  ? . . .  Does the  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  our c o n s c io u s  s t a t e s  
b e a r  t h e  s l i g h t e s t  resem blance  to  th e  m u l t i p l i c i t y  o f  the  
u n i t s  o f  a number? Has t r u e  durée  a n y th in g  to  do w i th  space?
For i f  t im e ,  as  th e  r e f l e c t i v e  c o n s c io u s n e s s  r e p r e s e n t s  i t ,  i s  
a medium i n  which our  c o n sc io u s  s t a t e s  form a d i s c r e t e  s e r i e s  
so as  t o  admit of b e in g  co u n ted ,  and i f  on th e  o t h e r  ÿand 
our c o n c e p t io n  o f  number ends i n  s p re a d in g  out i n  space e v e r y ­
t h i n g  which can be d i r e c t l y  cou n ted ,  i t  i s  t o  be presumed t h a t  
t im e ,  u n d e rs to o d  in  th e  sense  o f  a medium in  which we make 
d i s t i n c t i o n s  and c o u n t ,  i s  n o th in g  bu t  sp ace .  . . .  i t  fo l lo w s  
t h a t  pure  durée  must be something d i f f e r e n t . "
So f a r ,  t h e r e  can be l i t t l e  doubt t h a t  th e  d i s t i n c -
1
t i o n  i s  n o t  only  j u s t i f i e d ,  b u t  v a l u a b l e .  But Bergson goes on 
to  push th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  i n t o  r e g io n s  where i t  would no t  be 
g e n e r a l l y  a d m i t te d  t h a t  i t  a p p l i e d ,  and t h i s  i s  a source of 
p o s s i b l e  c r i t i c i s m .  T r a n s i t i o n a l  between th e s e  i s  h i s  d o c t r i n e  
o f  i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n .  Durée i s  no t  merely a continuum ( i n  
m a th e m a t ic a l  language which Bergson would never  have used) -  
i t  i s  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by the  com plete  i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n  of i t s
1. See a l s o  "Durée e t  S i m u l t a n é i t é " . "The analogy between t im e 
and space i s  m ere ly  e x t e r i o r  and s u p e r f i c i a l . "  (P re face  v i i ) ,
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p a r t s .  Nay more ; " p a r t s "  i s  a misnomer: i t  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  durée  
f i r s t  h as  p a r t s  which a re  t h e n  mixed up and s h u f f l e d  t o g e t h e r ,  
l i k e  th e  i n g r e d i e n t s  of  a C h r is tm as  pudding ,  whereas  on th e  
c o n t r a r y  i t  i s  only s e c o n d a r i l y  t h a t  we even t r y  t o  d i s t i n g u i s h  
p a r t s  i n  what i s ,  e s s e n t i a l l y ,  c w  i n t e g r a l  u n i t y .  And j u s t  as  
i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n  c h a r a c t e r i s e s  r e a l  t im e ,  so does d i s c r e t e n e s s  
c h a r a c t e r i s e  space .  I f  we go on, th e n ,  w i th  o a f  a t te m p t  to  p a r t ­
i t i o n  t im e ,  we s h a l l  f i n d  t h a t  t h e  r e a l i t y ,  trie d u ré e ,  has 
e lu d ed  u s ,  and t h a t  what we a re  p a r t^ i t io n in g  i s  r e a l l y  sp ace .  
Bergson t a k e s  some t r o u b l e  to  show t h a t  " i f  space i s  to  be d e ­
f i n e d  as  t h e  homogeneous, i t  seems t h a t  i n v e r s e l y  every  homo­
geneous and unbounded medium w i l l  be s p a c e , "  and t h e r e a f t e r  he 
assumes t h a t  a l l  homogeneity i s  s p a t i a l .  ( I n  p a s s i n g ,  i t  may be 
remarked t h a t  i t  i s  very  d o u b t f u l  w h e the r  he h a s  proved t h i s  
p o i n t .  H is  view o f  space i s  e x c e e d in g ly  a r b i t r a r y ,  and he u se s  
i t ,  none to o  c i r c u m s p e c t ly ,  a s  a k ind  o f  reach-me-down c o n t r a ­
d i c t o r y  o f  pure d u ré e ,  and t h e  consequen t  r e c i p i e n t  of  many un­
com plimentary  a d j e c t i v e s .  His l a t e r  e x c e s s e s  a re  i n  pat?t t o  be
2
a t t r i b u t e d  to  h i s  s t u n t e d  view of  sp ace .  I t  must a lways be r e ­
membered t n a t  ‘ space* and * s p a t i a l *  in  h i s  usage have not t n e
1. "Time and Free w i l l "  p . 98.
2 .  But Wildon C a r r ,  i n  a sy m p a th e t ic  c r i t i c i s m ,  s a y s | t  h a t  t h i s  
i s  n o t  so ,  and b h a t  Bergson only p r o t e s t s  a g a i n s t  e x c e s s iv e  
s p a t i a l i s a t i o n  i B r i t i s h  Academy 1918: "Time and H is to ry  in  
Contemporary P h i lo s o p h y " ) .
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meaning th e y  have i n  o rd in a ry  l i f e ,  and f i n a l l y  become l i t t l e  
more t h a n  co n v e n ie n t  Aunt S a l l i e s . )
The second s t e p  i s  t o  p o in t  ou t  two d i f f e r e n t  ways 
0 1  r e g a r d i n g  th e  s e l f ,  and t h e i r  analogy w i th  space ana t i m e .
In  th e  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  I may t h i n k  of  my memories, my p e r c e p t i o n s ,  
my t e n d e n c i e s  -  a motley crowd. A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  I may r e a l i s e  
t h e i r  e s s e n t i a l  i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n  ana u n i t y  in  T h is  l a t t e r  
i s  th e  fundam en ta l  view.
"A ll  t n e se c l e a r l y  d e f in e d  e lem en ts  a p p e a r  more d i s ­
t i n c t  from me, the  more d i s t i n c t  they  a r e  from eacn  o t h e r .
But i f  I  draw m y se lf  i n  from th e  p e r ip h e r y  tow ards  th e  c e n t r e ,  
i f  I  s e a r c h  in  tn e  d e p tn  of my be in g  t h a t  which i s  most u n i fo rm ­
l y ,  most c o n s t a n t l y  and most e n d u r in g ly  m yse lf ,  I f i n d  a n  a l ­
t o g e t h e r  d i f f e r e n t  t h i n g .  There i s ,  b e n e a th  t h e s e  s h a r p l y - c u t  
c r y s t a l s  and t h i s  f r o z e n  s u r f a c e , a  c o n t in u o u s  f l u x  which i s  no t  
comparable  t o  any f l u x  I have e v e r  s e e n .  There i s  a s u c c e s s io n  
o f  s t a t e s ,  each  o f  which announces t h a t  which fo l lo w s  and con­
t a i n s  t h a t  which p re c e d e s  i t .  They can,  p ro p e r ly  speak ing ,  only  
be s a id  t o  form m u l t i p l e  s t a t e s  when I have a l r e a d y  passed  them 
and t u r n  back  to  o bse rve  t h e i r  t r a c k .  W h i l s t  I  was e x p e r i e n c in g  
them th e y  were so s o l i d l y  o r g a n i s e d ,  so p ro found ly  animated  
w i th  a common l i f e ,  t h a t  I  co u ld  no t  have s a i d  where any one
o f  them f i n i s h e d  o r  where a n o t h e r  commenced. In  r e a l i t y  no one
1
o f  them b e g in s  o r  en d s ,  bu t  a l l  ex tend  i n t o  each  o t h e r . "
1. " i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  M e ta p h y s ic s ,"  p . 9 -1 0 .  See a l s o  "Time and 
F ree  w i l l "  p . 98 -99 ,  and " C re a t iv e  E v o lu t io n "  p . 6.
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T h is  p assag e  has  been  quo ted  i n  f u l l ,  a s  i t  i s  im p o r t -
1
a n t  in  b r i n g i n g  t o g e t h e r  s e v e r a l  s t r a n d s  o f  B e rg so n ’ s t h o u g h t . 
B es id es  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  between time and space ,  between c o n t i n ­
uous f l u x  and f r o z e n  s u r f a c e ,  t h r e e  o t h e r  im p o r ta n t  p o i n t s  a r e  
made in  t h i s  and th e  succeed in g  p a ra g ra p h .  The f i r s t  i s ,  t h a t  
t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  i s  co nce iv ed  a n a lo g o u s ly  t o  th e  o p p o s i t i o n  b e ­
tween two ways of  r e g a r d in g  th e  s e l f ,  o f  which one i s  much more 
fu n dam en ta l  th a n  th e  o t h e r .  T h is  i s  th e  germ of th e  c o n c e p t io n  
o f  t ime a s  ana logous  t o  mind, i n  c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n  to  th e  dead 
m a t t e r  o f  space .  ( I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  compare and c o n t r a s t  
w i th  t h i s  A le x a n d e r ’ s view, t h a t  t ime i s  th e  mind of  s p a c e . )  
Second ly ,  t h e r e  i s  t h e  im p o r ta n t  n o t i o n  o f  t ime a s  c r e a t i v e ,  
which was f u l l y  d eve lo ped  i n  "C re a t iv e  E v o l u t io n . "  T h i r d ly ,  th e  
n o t i o n  o f  " t u r n i n g  back" t o  observe  " m u l t ip l e  s t a t e s "  forms th e  
b a s i s  o f  th e  c e l e b r a t e d  d i s t i n c t i o n  between t ime a s  p a s s in g  a n d " 
t im e as  p a s s e d .
1. T h is  p h ra se  would be e x c e e d in g ly  u n a c c e p ta b le  t o  Bergson, and 
w i th  r e a s o n .  For  he r e p e a t e d l y  i n s i s t s  t h a t  such, p a r t i a l ^  
f ra g m en ta ry  v iews a re  u s e l e s s ,  and h i s  whole p o in t  i s  t h a t  
’ s t r a n d s ’ cannot  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d .  The d i s a d v a n ta g e  of  such 
a method, to o ,  must be obvious  when compared w i t h  h i s  
b r i l l i a n t  and g lowing  p a s s a g e s .  Yet I use the  p le a s e  d e l i b ­
e r a t e l y .  He may be r i g h t  i n  h o ld in g  t h a t  th e  met^d o f  a n a ­
l y s i s ,  which i s  i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  m isses  t h e  h e a r t  o f  R e a l i t y ,  
which i s  only a c c e s s i b l e  t o  i n t u i t i o n :  n e v e r t h e l e s s  th e  aim 
he re  i s  much more humble. Whatever t h e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  a n a ­
l y s i s ,  i t  shou ld  a t  l e a s t  be p o s s i b l e  to  hope t h a t  th e
r e s u l t s  o f  i n t u i t i o n . sho u ld  n o t  prove to  be i n  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  w i th  th o s e  o f  a n a l y s i s ;  ----------------------
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I t  shou ld  go w i th o u t  say ing  t h a t  Bergson does no t
r e g a rd  t h e s e  as  s e p a r a b l e  and d i s t i n c t  n o t i o n s .  The most he
cou ld  a l lo w  would be t h a t  we may sometimes f i n d  i t  conven ien t
t o  r e g a r d  t h i n g s  from one a s p e c t ,  and sometimes from a n o th e r .
But always i t  i s  t h e  same R e a l i t y ,  which i s  c e a s e l e s s  f l u x .  The
c r i t i c  may however argue;"You t e l l  me t h a t  th e  motley crowd o f
s e n s a t i o n s ,  memories, e t c . ,  a r e  s p a t i a l  and u n e s s e n t i a l ,  and
t h a t  only th e  p e r c e p t i o n  of t h e  s e l f  as  a u n i ty  i s  fundam enta l .
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  when you t a l k  of  h e t e r o g e n e i t y  and homogeneity ,
you make th e  l a t t e r  co r re sp o n d  w i th  space and th e  form er w i th
t im e .  I  r e a l l y  do n o t  see how you know which co r re sp o n d s  t o
which i n  a l l  t h e s e  d i s t i n c t i o n s . "  Bergson would p robab ly  r e g a r d
t h i s  l a s t  a s  a s i l l y  q u e s t i o n :  bu t  w hethe r  i t  i s  o r  i s  n o t ,  th e
a p p a re n t  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  w i th  r e g a r d  to  homogeneity s t i l l  rem a ins .
Most p ro b a b ly ,  however, i t  i s  no t  an im p o r tan t  c r i t i c i s m ,  and
co u ld  e a s i l y  be av o id ed  by a f u r t h e r  d i s t i n c t i o n  between r e a l
hom ogeneity ,  which i s  s p a t i a l ,  and th e  homogeneity which i s  no t
mere l i k e n e s s ,  bu t  u n i t y  and i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n :  and between th e
fundam en ta l  h e t e r o g e n e i t y  of  t im e ,  and th e  b la n k ,  i r r e d u c i b l e
1
d i v e r s e n e s s  which i s  s p a t i a l .  Whether such d i s t i n c t i o n s  a re  
d e s i r a b l e  i s  a n o t h e r  m a t t e r .
J u s t i f i a b l y  o r  n o t ,  th e n ,  Bergson ex ten ded  th e  o r i g i n a l  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between s p a t i a l i s e d  time and durée t o  in c lu d e  
(what common sense  would c a l l )  o t h e r  d i s t i n c t i o n s ,  though he
1. Compare h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  between th e  two k in ds  o f  m u l t i p l i c i t y  
(*^Time and Free w i l l "  p . 85 ) ;  but  see a l s o  i b i d .  p . 98.
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would n e v e r  have a d m i t te d ,  i n  consequence of h i s  d o c t r i n e  of  
i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n ,  t h a t  t h e r e  was any o t h e r n e s s  about  them.
I t  seems a t  f i r s t  s i g h t  t h a t  h i s  c o n c lu s io n  does n o t  fo l low  
from h i s  p rem ises  : what h i s  argument comes t o ,  i s  t h a t  because 
t ime i s  a u n i t y  o f  i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n ,  and t h e  s e l f  i s  a l s o  such 
a u n i t y ,  t h e r e f o r e  t h e r e  i s  an in t im a te  c o n n e c t io n  between th e  
two u n i t i e s ,  so t h a t  i t  i s  i l l e g i t i m a t e  to  t a l k  o f  "tv/o u n i t i e s "  
o r  "two s t r a n d s  o f  B e rg so n ’ s th o u g h t ’’ , s in c e  they  them se lves  
i n t e r p e n e t r a t e ,  and can only be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  by a c o n v e n ie n t ,  
b u t  u l t i m a t e l y  unsound, i n t e l l e c t u a l  p r o c e s s .  Now a l l  t h i s  i s  
n o t  to  say t h a t  Bergson i s  wrong: he may q u i t e  w e l l  be r i g h t  
when he in v e ig h s  a g a i n s t  a r t i f i c i a l  i n t e l l e c t u a l  p a r t i t i o n s ,  
and i n s i s t s  t h a t  th e  p e r f e c t  w a ^  of  r e g a r d in g  th e  u n iv e r s e  
would be s y n t h e t i c ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  a n a l y t i c .  But i t  must be 
c l e a r l y  seen ,  t h a t  i f  we s t a r t  from d u ré e ,  from pure  memory, 
from mind, from l i f e ,  however much we ag ree  t h a t  each  i s  a 
u n i t y  and cannot be d iv id e d  i n t o  p a r t s ,  i t  i s  a f u r t h e r  s t e p  
t o  say t h a t  a l l  t h e s e  t o g e t h e r  form a u n i t y  and t h a t  the  
d i v i s i o n  i n t o  a s p e c t s  i s  seco nd a ry .  A m e ta p h y s ic a l  i n t u i t i o n  
o f  i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n  i s  im p l ie d  from th e  s t a r t :  i t  i s  im p o ss ib le  
to  d iv id e  h i s  argument i n t o  s t a g e s ,  as  h as  been a t tem p ted  h e r e .  
And t h i s ,  of c o u r s e ,  i s  what Bergson has  i n s i s t e d  a l l  a long :  
c o n s e q u e n t ly  f o r  him th e  method o f  m e taphys ics  i s  i n t u i t i o n a l  
r a t h e r  th a n  i n t e l l e c t u a l .  "A t r u e  em p ir ic ism  i s  t h a t  which
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p ro po ses  t o  g e t  as n e a r  to  t h e  o r i g i n a l  i t s e l f  as  p o s s i b l e ,  
t o  s e a r c h  deeply  i n t o  i t s  l i f e ,  and so ,  by a k in d  of  i n t e l l e c t ­
u a l  a u s c u l t a t i o n , t o  f e e l  t h e  th ro b b in g s  of  i t s  s o u l :  and t h i s  
t r u e  em p ir ic i sm  i s  t h e  t r u e  m e tap h y s ic s ,  i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  th e  
t a s k  i s  an  ex trem ely  d i f f i c u l t  one, f o r  none of t h e  ready-made 
c o n c e p t io n s  which th o u g h t  employs i n  i t s  d a i l y  o p e r a t i o n s  can 
be of  any u s e .  . . .  P h i lo so ph y  th u s  d e f in e d  does n o t  c o n s i s t  in  
th e  c h o ice  of  c e r t a i n  c o n c e p t s ,  and i n  t a k i n g  s l i d e s  w i th  a 
sch o o l ,  b u t  in  tn e  s e a r c h  f o r  a uhique i n t u i t i o n  from which we
can descend  w i th  e q u a l  ease  t o  d i f f e r e n t  c o n c e p ts ,  because we
1
a re  p la c e d  aoove th e  d i v i s i o n s  of  th e  s c h o o l s . "  In  c o n t r a s t  
t o  t h i s ,  i s  The b a r r e n n e s s  and a r t i f i c i a l i t y  of i n t e l l e c t u a l  
a b s t r a c t i o n : - " I n s t e a d  of a t t a c h i n g  o u r s e lv e s  t o  th e  in n e r  
becoming o f  t h i n g s ,  we p lace  o u r s e lv e s  o u t s id e  them in  o rd e r  
t o  recompose t h e i r  becoming a r t i f i c i a l l y .  We ta k e  s n a p s h o ts ,  
a s  i t  w ere ,  o f  th e  p a s s in g  r e a l i t y . * ’ i t  i s  no t  n e c e s s a ry  h e re  
t o  go f u r t h e r  i n t o  h i s  championing of i n t u i t i o n ,  a s  long as  i t  
i s  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between i n t e l l e c t  and i n t u i t i o n  
l i k e  a l l  t h e  o t h e r  d i s t i n c t i o n s ,  i s  i n  a l ignm ent  w i th  th e  
i i r s t  d i s t i n c t i o n  betv/een d u rée  ana s p a t i a l i s e d  t im e .
So f a r ,  i t  may be s a i d ,  B e rg so n ’ s view o f  t ime i s  
n o t  very  s t a r t l i n g .  He began byvdrawing a  d i s t i n c t i o n  between 
r e a l  t im e ,  and space m asquerading as  t im e ,  bu t  p roceeded  t o
1. " i n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  M etaphys ics"  p p . 31 & 32.
2. " C r e a t iv e  E v o l u t io n , "  p . 322# See a l s o  p#362.
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c a r r y  i t  t o  such ex trem es  i n  ’ other* d i r e c t i o n s ,  t h a t  i t s  e f f e c t  
was t o  b l u r  i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  t i m e , and by i t s  very  w ideness  
t o  become r a t h e r  vague .  But th e  im portance  o f  h i s  view o f  t ime 
l i e s  i n  h i s  c o n s t a n t  o r i e n t a t i o n  towards  th o se  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
o f  t ime which a re  fun d am en ta l ly  tem p o ra l ,  and h i s  r e j e c t i o n  of 
th o se  t h a t  a re  u n e s s e n t i a l .  To t h i s  e x t e n t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  the  
d i s t i n c t i o n s  h e lp  him, b u t  i n  h i s  a p p l i c a t i o n s ,  he a g a in  t a k e s  
them to o  f a r ,  and may be c r i t i c i s e d .  There a re  t h r e e  a p p l i c ­
a t i o n s  which w i l l  be c o n s id e r e d :  h i s  view of t h e  p a s t ,  and 
memory : h i s  i n s i s t e n c e  on c r e a t i v e n e s s :  and l a s t l y ,  h i s  remarks 
on r e v e r s i b i l i t y  and c a u s a l i t y .
Bergson d i s t i n g u i s h e s  very  c l e a r l y  between time in  
i t s  p a s s a g e ,  and t im e as  p a s s e d .  The l a t t e r  may be t r e a t e d  l i k e
space ,  and d iv id e d :  th e  form er i s  a u n i t y  -  "Nous d iv i s o n s  le
/  1
d é r o u lé ,  mais non pas  le  d é ro u le m e n t ."  "Time i s  n o t  a l i n e
on which we can p a s s  a g a in .  C e r t a i n l y ,  once i t  h as  e la p s e d ,  we
a re  j u s t i f i e d  i n  p i c t u r i n g  t h e  su c c e s s iv e  moments as  acêerna l  to
one a n o t h e r  and i n  th u s  t h i n k i n g  of a l i n e  t r a v e r s i n g  space:
b u t  i t  must th e n  be un d e rs to o d  t h a t  t h i s  l i n e  does no t  symbolise
2
t h e  time which i s  p a s s in g  b u t  th e  time which has  p a s s e d ."  I t
i s  a f a m i l i a r  f a c t ,  w i th  which everyone would a g r e e ,  t h a t  we
can look back on e v e n t s  which have happened as  i f  they  were
3
sp read  ou t  i n  f r o n t  o f  us a l l  a t  once. We may, and very o f t e n
1  o
1. "Dur4e e t  S im u l t a n é i t é "  p . 63. 2. "Time and Free * l l l " p . 181
- p . 182.
3 .  The s p a t i a l  language o f  " i n  f r o n t  of  us" I s  n o tew or thy :  so a l so  
i s  th e  e l i m i n a t i o n  of  t ime I m p l i c i t  In  th e  p h ra se  " a l l  a t  
once .
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dû, adopt th e  metaphor of lo o k in g  back a long  a road  t h a t  has  
been t r a v e r s e d :  we r e g a rd  th e  v a r io u s  happenings as  p o in t s  on 
t h e  ro a d :  we t a l k  o f  l i f e  as  a " jou rney"  from th e  c r a d l e  t o  th e  
g rav e ,  and of  c e r t a i n  e v e n ts ,  such as  l e a v in g  s c h o o l ,  o b t a i n ­
in g  a p o s t ,  and g e t t i n g  m a r r ie d ,  as " m i le s to n e s "  on t h a t  
Journey .  From the  n o t i o n  of look ing  back on our p a s t  l i f e  as  
sp read  o u t ,  i t  i s  an easy t r a n s i t i o n  to  th e  n o t io n  of time as  
a " sp r e a d in g  o u t" .  But Bergson i n s i s t s  t h a t  t h i s  t r a n s i t i o n  i s  
f a l l a c i o u s ,  t h a t  t ime as passed  i s  no t  t ime a t  a l l ,  bu t  space ,  
and t h a t  i t  i s  i l l e g i t i m a t e  t o  ex tend  a m e ta p h o r ic a l  co n c ep t io n  
o f  e v e n ts  t h a t  have happened to  t h e i r  h app en in g . And he r e ­
i t e r a t e s  t h a t  i t  i s  the  l a s t  a lone  which i s  t em p o ra l .
An i l l u s t r a t i o n  may make th e  p o in t  c l e a r e r .  Looking 
back ,  I see o r  seem t o  see ,  a co n n e c t io n  between two e v e n ts ,
M and N. There i s  a c e r t a i n  c u r io u s  i n e v i t a b i l i t y  about them, 
j u s t  a 8 i f  I looked back a lon g  a s t r a i g h t  road  and saw, f i r s t ,  
t h e  m i le s to n e ,  th e n  Halfway House, and th e n  World’ s End. But,
1
when I was a t  World’ s End t h i s  morning, I  knew t h a t  I would |
i
come to  th e  Halfway House b e f o re  th e  m i le s to n e  -  was a l l  
mapped ou t  a l r e a d y , waiting; f o r  me to  come and walk along i t .
Now though ,  e m p i r i c a l l y ,  we have no such an a lo g \o u s  knowledge 
a t  M of N and 0, i n  our humbleness of  h e a r t  we a r e  ready to  
a t t r i b u t e  i t  to  our  ig n o ra n c e ,  and to  h o ld  t h a t ,  o b j e c t i v e l y ,  i
1. "Can t ime be a d e q u a te ly  r e p r e s e n t e d  by space? . . .  Yes, i f
you a r e  d e a l in g  w i th  time flown. No, i f  you speak of t ime i
f lo w in g ."  (Time and Free w i l l "  p . 221 .)
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i t  i s  a l l  l a i d  out* I t  i s  to  t h i s  t h a t  Bergson o b j e c t s .  To 
say t h a t  i t  i s  a l l  l a i d  o u t ,  t h a t  " t o u t  e s t  donné" i s  an un­
w a r r a n ta b le  i n t r u s i o n  of  s p a t i a l  c o n c e p t io n s .  Though we f in d  
i t  u s e f u l  to  schem atise  i n  space ev e n ts  a f t e r  th ey  have happen­
ed,  we must no t  ex ten d  t h i s  schematism to  ev e n ts  in  t h e i r  
happen ing .  "The d u r a t i o n  where i n  we see o u r s e lv e s  a c t i n g , and 
in  which i t  i s  u s e f u l  t h a t  we should see o u r s e lv e s ,  i s  a 
d u r a t i o n  whose e lem ents  a re  d i s s o c i a t e d  and ju x ta p o s e d .  The
d u r a t i o n  wherein  we a c t  i s  a d u r a t i o n  w herein  our s t a t e s  m elt
1
i n t o  each o t h e r . "  Bergson r e j e c t s  w h o le -h e a r te d ly  the  concep­
t i o n s  of t ime as  a l i n e ,  and of  o u r s e lv e s  walking  to  meet 
f u t u r e  e v e n ts  t h a t  have "been th e r e "  a l l  th e  t im e .
This  d i s t i n c t i o n  seems to  me no t  only v a l i d ,  but 
th e  h i g h e s t  im por tance .
Secondly, the  condemnation of  the  s p a t i a l i s e d  schema 
i s  fundam enta l  f o r  th e  view o f  freedom adopted  in  h i s  f i r s t  
im p or tan t  book, "Time and F ree  w i l l . "  We a re  not  here  concerned 
w i th  t h i s  view in  d e t a i l ,  and i t  v / i l l  be s u f f i c i e n t  to  note  
t h a t  Bergson r e g a rd s  the  u s u a l  a l t e r n a t i v e s  - "I d id  X, bu t  I 
cou ld  have done Y" and " l  d id  X, and I c o u ld n ’t  have done Y" -
1. "M atte r  and Memory" p . 243* See a l s o  th e  d i s c u s s i o n  in  "Time 
and F ree  w i l l " ,  chap. I I .  He i n s i s t e d  t h a t  i t  i s  wrong t o  
suppose " t h a t  th e  sy m b o l ica l  diagram which we draw in  our own 
way f o r  r e p r e s e n t i n g  th e  a c t i o n  when completed has been 
drawn by the  a c t i o n  i t s e l f  w h i l s t  p r o g r e s s i n g , and drawn by 
i t  in  an au tom at ic  m anner ." ( ^Time and Free w i l l " p . l 9 0 . )
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as  bo th  open to  th e  same c r i t i c i s m .  T h is  i s  t h a t  they  r e s t  on 
a wrong co n c ep t io n  o f  X and Y as  mapped out  in  space ,  w i th  a
0
Y
J u n c t io n  o f  roads a t  0, and i t  does not  m a t te r  whether  we ho ld  
t h a t  road  Y was o r  was not  open, f o r  th e  c r i t i c i s m  ho lds  in  
e i t h e r  c a s e .  Bergson condemns th e  view of  d u r a t i o n  on which 
the  co n c e p t io n  i s  b ased ,  and u rg e s  t h a t  th e  problem i s  a pseudo 
one. I t  i s  because we look back and seem to  see t h a t  i f  we had 
done something o th e r  th an  we d id  in  f a c t  do a t  0 ,  we might by 
nov; be e x p e r ie n c in g  Y i n s t e a d  of  X. " i f  only" i s  a f a m i l i a r  
theme, from th e  c h i l d  d e t e c t e d  i n  m is c h ie f  and pun ished ,  to  
"O th e l lo "  and "Bar from the  Madding Crowd", and i n  r e t r o s p e c t  
i t  i s  v a l i d .  But,  Bergson i n s i s t s ,  ab 0 we cannot t a l k  about 
th e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  X ana i  in  t h i s  g l i b  way : what i s  v a l i d  enough 
f o r  p a s t  t ime i s  no t  v a l l a  f o r  time in  i t s  p a s s in g .  And Bergson 
does no t  merely mean tha% a t  0 we ard  ig n o ra n t  o f  X and Y -  which 
would in v o lv e  t h a t  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  between p a s t  and f u t u r e  i s  
an e p iS te m o lo g ic a l  one only -  he means t  h a t  we co u la  not  know 
X and Y, f o r  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  an o n t o l o g i c a l  o n e . Any o t h e r  
v iew, he h o ld s ,  depends on a f a l l a c i o u s  and s p a t i a l i s e d  con­
c e p t i o n  o f  d u r a t io n .
1. " R e a l i ty  has appeared  t o  us as a p e r p e t u a l  becoming. I t  
makes i t s e l f  o r  i t  unmakes i t s e l f ,  b u t  i t  i s  neve r  
something made.** I "C re a t iv e  E v o lu t io n " ,  p . 287. )
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T h i r d ly ,  he evo lves  a new -cheory of memory to  f i t  
i n  w i th  h i s  view o f  th e  p a s t ,  and w i th  h i s  runoamental d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  between r e a l  and s p a t i a l i s e d  t im e .  Corresponding t o  
t h i s  i s  a d i s t i n c t i o n  between hablt-memory and t r u e  memory^ 
habit-memory i s  m ere ly  a c r y s t a l l i s a t i o n  of o f t - r e p e a t e d  
a c t i o n s  and movements, and i s  p u re ly  m echanical  - i t  i s  only 
c a l l e d  "memory" by c o u r t e s y .  On th e  o t h e r  hand, t r u e  memory 
i s  unique and in c a p a b le  or r e p e t i t i o n ,  because i t  i s  i n t i m a t e ­
ly  connec ted  w i th  d u rée .  "The c a p i t a l  e r r o r  o f  a s s o c i a t i o n i s m  
i s  t h a t  i t  s u b s t i t u t e s  f o r  t h i s  c o n t i n u i t y  of becoming, which
i s  th e  l i v i n g  r e a l i t y ,  a d i s c o n t in u o u s  m u l t i p l i c i t y  of  e lem en ts ,
1
i n e r t  and j u x t a p o s e d . " In t h i s  co n n e c t io n  h i s  view of the
r e l a t i o n  between p a s t  and p r e s e n t  i s  very  i n t e r e s t i n g :  th e
p a s t  i s  n o t  a ’dead* p a s t ,  b u t  l i v e s  on i n t o  th e  p r e s e n t .  As
Bergson say s ,  "The pure p r e s e n t  i s  only th e  i n v i s i b l e  p ro g re s s
2
o f  th e  p r e s e n t  gnawing i n to  th e  f u t u r e . "  I t  i s  d o u o t fu l  here  
vmat i s  meant by " p u r e " ,  and i t  i s  a l s o  d o u b t fu l  how f a r  th e
im media te ly  p re c e d in g  s ta te m e n t  t h a t  we p e rc e iv e  only the
p a s t  Should be t a k e n .  As r e g a rd s  h i s  g e n e r a l  th e o ry  of memory, 
though i t  can be ag reed  t h a t  ’memory * and ' r e p e t i t i o n '  a re  
no t  i d e n t i c a l ,  y e t  when Bergson comes t o  a d e t a i l e d  working- 
ou t  in  te rm s of  n eu ro nes ,  he i s  l e s s  con v in c in g ,  and i t  may 
be th e  case  t h a t  h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  not s u f f i c i e n t  to  bear 
the w e i g h t  of the  ' a b s o lu te  ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t  he i s  t r y i n g
1. "M atte r  and Memory", p . 171. 2. I b i d . ,  p . 194*
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t o  put  upon i t ,  I t  i s ,  indeed ,  throughoutu,a d i f f i c u l t y  i n  
d e a l in g  w i th  Bergson to  know j u s t  how f a r  h i s  m e tap h o r ica l  
language i s  to  be i n t e r p r e t e d  l i t e r a l l y ,  and t h i s  i s  e s p e c i a l l y  
th e  case  i n  c o n n e c t io n  w i th  some of  h i s  remarks about the  
r e l a t i o n  between th e  p a s t  and th e  p r e s e n t .
The second t o p i c  to  be d i s c u s s e d  i s  B e rg s o n 's  con­
c e p t io n  o f  t ime a s  c r e a t i v e .  The o ld  i d e a ,  ex p re ssed  in  E c c le ­
s i a s t e s ,  t h a t  " t h e r e  i s  n o th in g  new under  th e  s u n , " i s  
vehemently  opposed by Bergson. On th e  c o n t r a r y ,  he u rg e s ,  i f  
we hold  a r i g h t  co n c ep t io n  o f  durée  as  a c e a s e l e s s  f low, we 
a r e  bound t o  ho ld  some kind o f  e v o lu t io n a r y  view in  c o n ju n c t io n  
w i th  i t .  Time i s  n o t  a s t a b l e  measure: i t  i s  a p r o c e s s ,  and a 
p ro c e s s  which i s  c o n t i n u a l l y  working tow ards  ev e r  new forms, 
which i t  i s  im poss ib le  to  p r e d i c t .  This  p o in t  o f  view i s  d e v e l ­
oped a t  l e n g th ,  and w i th  s p le n d id  imagery, i n  B e rg s o n 's  most 
c e l e b r a t e d  book, " C re a t iv e  E v o lu t io n . "  -  "The p a i n t e r  i s  b e fo re  
h i s  canvas ,  th e  c o lo u r s  a r e  on th e  p a l e t t e :  t h e  model i s  s i t ­
t i n g  -  a l l  t h i s  we see ,  and a l s o  we know the  p a i n t e r ' s  s t y l e  : 
do we f o r e s e e  what w i l l  ap p e a r  on th e  canvas? We p o sse ss  th e  
e lem ents  o f  the  problem: we know, in  an a b s t r a c t  way, how i t  
w i l l  be so lv ed ,  f o r  the  p o r t r a i t  w i l l  s u r e ly  resemble the  
model and w i l l  s u r e l y  resemble a l s o  th e  a r t i s t :  bu t  the  co n c re te  
s o l u t i o n  b r in g s  w i th  i t  t h a t  u n fo re s e e a b le  n o th in g  which i s  
e v e ry th in g  in  a work of a r t .  And i t  i s  t h i s  n o th in g  t h a t  t a k e s  
t im e .  Nought a s  m a t t e r ,  i t  c r e a t e s  i t s e l f  as  f o r m . . .  S u cce ss io n ,  
o r  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n  i n  t ime ( i s )  i r r e d u c i b l e
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t o  a mere i n s t a n t a n e o u s  j u x t a p o s i t i o n  i n  space .  Th is  i s  why 
th e  id e a  o f  re a d in g  in^  p r e s e n t  s t a t e  o f  th e  m a t e r i a l  u n iv e r s e  
th e  f u t u r e  of l i v i n g  forms, and of u n fo ld in g  now t h e i r  h i s t o r y  
y e t  t o  come, in v o lv e s  a v e r i t a b l e  a b s u r d i t y .  But t h i s  a b su rd ­
i t y  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  b r in g  o u t ,  because our memory i s  accustomed 
t o  p lace  a lo n g s id e  o f  each o t h e r ,  i n  an i d e a l  sp ace ,  the  te rm s 
i s  p e r c e i v e s  in  t u r n ,  because i t  always r e p r e s e n t s  p a s t  suc ­
c e s s i o n  i n  th e  form of  j u x t a p o s i t i o n .  I t  i s  ab le  t o  do so, i n ­
deed ,  j u s t  because th e  p a s t  be lo n gs  to  t h a t  which i s  a l r e a d y
1
i n v e n te d ,  t o  the  dead, and no lo n g e r  t o  c r e a t i o n  and l i f e . "
F o r  the  fundam enta l  r e a l i t y ,  acco rd in g  t o  Bergson, i s  not a 
s t a t i c  c h a n g e le s s  Being, bu t  a l i v i n g  and changing Becoming; 
and i t  i s  th e  g r e a t  d e f e c t  o f  Greek ph i losophy  t h a t  i t  does 
no t  admit such a fundam enta l  Becoming. "He who i n s t a l l s  h im s e l f  
i n  becoming sees  i n  d u r a t i o n  th e  very  l i f e  of  t h i n g s ,  the 
fundam enta l  r e a l i t y .  The Forms, which th e  mind i s o l a t e s  and 
s t o r e s  up in  c o n c e p ts ,  a re  t h e n  only sh ap sh o ts  of  th e  changing 
r e a l i t y .  They a re  moments g a th e r e d  a long  th e  co u rse  of  t im e ,  
and j u s t  because we have cu t  t h e  t h r e a d  t h a t  b in d s  them to  
t im e ,  th e y  no lo n g e r  e n d u r e . . .  They e n t e r  i n t o  e t e r n i t y ,  i f
2
you w i l l :  bu t  what i s  e t e r n a l  i n  them i s  j u s t  what i s  u n r e a l . "
I t  should  be c l e a r l y  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  Bergson i s  not  
t a k i n g  th e  a b s t r a c t  view (which i s  o f t e n  taken )  o f  e v o lu t io n
1. " C re a t iv e  E v o lu t io n " ,  p . 360.
2. "C re a t iv e  E v o lu t io n " ,  p p .334-5 .
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as  development ^ th ro u g h  th e  ages"  -  " th rough"  time in  t h a t  
vague sense  only - he i s  i n s i s t i n g  th ro u g h o u t  t h a t  time i t s e l f  
p la y s  an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  i n  e v o lu t io n a ry  p ro c e s s ,  and i s  i t s e l f  
c r e a t i v e . S l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t l y  e x p re s sed ,  time i s  no t  only the  
medium o f  e v o l u t i o n ,  but  i t  i s  a l s o  i t s  f o rc e .
I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  c r i t i c i s e  t h i s  view - the  sp lendour
o f  which cannot be den ied  - as  be ing  based  on a h y p o s t a t i s a t i o n
of  d u rée .  Bergson had j u s t i f i a b l y  c r i t i c i s e d ,  i n  h i s  e a r l i e r  
books, t h e  ' r e c e p ta c l e *  view of  time as  an i l l e g i t i m a t e  hypo­
s t a t i s a t i o n ,  bu t  he l a i d  h im s e l f  open to  a S im i l a r  c r i t i c i s m  
of  d u rée .  The p r e c i s e  c o n n e c t io n  between durée and th e  é la n  
v i t a l  i s  (pe rhaps  w i s e l y ) ,  n ev e r  made q u i t e  c l e a r ,  but t h e r e  
a re  p a s sa g e s  which re a d  a lm ost  a s  i f  he was co n ce iv in g  O fr the  
é l a n  v i t a l  as  a d e f i n i t e  f o r c e ,  and o t h e r s  which read  a s  i f  
he was concav ing  du rée  as  th e  é l a n  v i t a l .  But he re  aga in  i t  
i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  be sure how f a r  t o  take  what he says metaphor­
i c a l l y .
I f  h i s  remarks r e g a rd in g  the  v a r io u s  co u r se s  open to
th e  é l a n  v i t a l  -  th e  way of  i n t e l l e c t ,  th e  way of  i n t u i t i o n ,
and ( i n  some books) th e  way o f  i n s t i n c t  - a r e  ta k e n  l i t e r a l l y ,
1. But see Macmurray, who says  t h a t  n e i t h e r  p h y s i c a l  de te rm ­
in ism  n o r  e v o l u t i o n  can g ive  r e a l  change (Symposium on 
"Time and Change", A r i s t o t e l i a n  Supplement V I I I ,  p . 149). 
Broad, however, l a t e r  in  th e  Symposium, c r i t i c i s e s  Mac­
murray ' s view of  change.
2. See e s p e c i a l l y  "Time and Free w i l l "  Chap. I I .  and Con­
c l u s i o n .  But he was p robab ly  wrong-in  d i s m is s in g  Kant 
as he d id .
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i t  would seem t h a t  he has  l a i d  h im s e l f  open to  th e  c r i t i c i s m s
which he h im s e l f  made in  “Tim© and Free w i l l "  a g a in s t  a wrong
c o n c e p t io n  of  th e  p ro c e s s  of  c h o ice .  He d iagnosed  t h i s  view
o f  cho ice  as  be ing  th e  r e s u l t  of h o ld in g  a s p a t i a l i s e d  and
h y p o s t a t i s e d  view o f  t im e ,  and t h i s  i s  r a t h e r  s i g n i f i c a n t  i f  .
compared w i th  h i s  l a t e r  remarks in  “C re a t iv e  E v o lu t io n ."
Unless  he i s  t o  be i n t e r p r e t e d  e n t i r e l y  m e tap h o r ica l ly  on
th e s e  l a s t  two p o i n t s ,  i t  c e r t a i n l y  seems t h a t  he d id  p re ss
h i s  c o n c ep t io n  of dur^e too  f a r ,  and endued i t  w i th  an almost
m y s t i c a l  c r e a t i v e  power.
Secondly, i t  may be o b je c te d  t h a t  h i s  whole view i s
incom prenens ib le  and i r r a t i o n a l .  O b je c to r s  on t h i s j s  core p o in t
out  the  i n c r e a s i n g  v ig o u r  w i th  which he d i s t i n g u i s h e s  between
i n t e l l e c t  and i n t u i t i o n .  The e u lo g i e s  o f  i n t u i t i o n  in  the
1
“I n t r o d u c t i o n  t o  M etaphysics"  seem q u i t e  mild  b e s id e  what he 
has  t o  say in  “C re a t iv e  E v o l u t io n . "  F i n a l l y ,  i n t e l l e c t  i s  
d ism is se d  from ph i lo sophy  w i th  the  a s su ra n c e  t h a t  i t s  p roper  
home i s  i n  the  s c i e n c e s .  "S c ience  can work o n ly ,o n  what i s  
supposed t o  r e p e a t  i t s e l f  -  t h a t  i s  t o  say ,  on what i s  w i th ­
drawn, by h y p o th e s i s ,  from t h e  a c t i o n  o f  r e a l  t im e .  Anything 
t h a t  i s  i r r e d u c i o l e  and i r r e v e r s i b l e  i n  th e  su cc es s iv e  move­
ments of a h i s t o r y  e lu d e s  s c i e n c e .  To g e t  a n o t io n  of t h i s  
i r r e d u c i b i l i t y  and i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y ,  we must b reak  w i th  s c i e n t ­
i f i c  h a b i t s  which a re  adap ted  t o  th e  fundam enta l  req u irem en ts
1. Op.c i t .  passim, b u t  e s p e c i a l l y  p p .22-25.
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o f  th o u g h t ,  we must do v io l e n c e  t o  th e  mind, go co u n te r  t  o the
n a t u r a l  b e n t  of th e  i n t e l l e c t .  But t h a t  i s  J u s t  th e  fu n c t io n  of 
1
p h i lo s o p h y ."  And, a few^pages f u r t h e r  on, ne adds : "Time i s  
he re  d e p r iv e d  o f  e f f i c a c y ,  and i f  i t  does  n o th in g ,  i t  i s  no th ing ,  
R a d ic a l  mechanism im p l ie s  a m etaphysics  i n  which th e  t o t a l i t y  
o f  th e  r e a l  i s  p o s t u l a t e d  complete  in  e t e r n i t y ,  and in  which the  
ap p a ren t  d u r a t i o n  o f  t h i n g s  e x p re s s e s  merely th e  i n f i r m i t y  of a 
mind t h a t  cannot know e v e ry th in g  a t  once. But d u r a t i o n  i s  some­
t h i n g  very  d i f f e r e n t  from t h i s  f o r  our c o n s c io u s n e s s ,  t h a t  i s
t o  say, f o r  t h a t  which i s  most i n d i s p u t a b l e  i n  our e x p e r ie n c e .
2
We p e r c e iv e  d u r a t i o n  as  a s t ream  a g a in s t  which we cannot g o ."  
Again, Bergson r e p e a te d ly  i n s i s t s  t h a t  t h e  c r e a t i v e  ’becoming* 
o r  p ro c e s s  o f  Nature  i s  o f  n e c e s s i t y  i r r e d u c i b l e  t o  m athem atica l  
te rm s ,  and t h a t  i t  can never  be e x p la in e d  by lo g i c  a lone."Tim e 
i s  i n v e n t io n  o r  i t  i s  no th in g  a l l .  But of t i m e - in v e n t io n  
p h y s ic s  can  t a k e  no accoun t ,  r e s t r i c t e d  a s  i t  i s  t o  th e  c i n e -  
m a to g ra p h ic a l  method. I t  i s  l i m i t e d  t o  co u n t in g  s i m u l t a n e i t i e s  
between t h e  ev e n ts  t h a t  make up t h i s  t ime and t h e  p o s i t i o n s  of 
t h e  mobile time on i t s  t r a j e c t o r y .  I t  d e ta c h e s  th e s e  ev en ts  
from th e  whole, which a t  eve ry  moment p u t s  on a new form and 
which communicates to  them something of  i t s  n o v e l ty .  I t  con­
s i d e r s  them in  th e  a b s t r a c t ,  such as  th e y  would be o u ts id e  of  
th e  l i v i n g  whole, t h a t  i s  t o  say ,  i n  a time u n r o l l e d  in  space .
I t  r e t a i n s  only th e  e v e n ts  o r  systems of  e v e n t s  t h a t  can be th u s
1. " C re a t iv e  E v o lu t io n " ,  p . 31.
2. I b i d . ,  p . 41.
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i s o l a t e d  w i th ou t  be ing  made t o  undergo too  profound a deform­
a t i o n ,  because only th e s e  len d  them selves  to  the  a p p l i c a t i o n  
of  i t s  method. Our p h y s ic s  d a t e s  from th e  day when i t  was 
known how to  i s o l a t e  such systems. To sum up - while  modern 
p h y s ic s  i s  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from an c ie n t  p h y s ic s  by the  f a c t  t h a t
i t  c o n s id e r s  any moment of t ime whatever ,  i t  r e s t s  a l t o g e t h e r
1
on a s u b s t i t u t i o n  of  t im e - l e n g th  fo r  t i m e - i n v e n t i o n . " In  a l l  
p r o b a b i l i t y ,  Bergson was r i g h t  about the  i r r e d u c i b i l i t y  of 
t im e ,  bu t  t h a t  i s  h a rd ly  l i k e l y  to  be a recommendation of h i s  
views in  some q u a r t e r s .  I t  was, pe rhaps ,  u n fo r tu n a te  t h a t  
Bergson should  have ta k e n  such a very d e f i n i t e  a n t i - i n t e l l e c t -  
u a l i s t  p o s i t i o n ,  s in c e  i t  l e a v e s  him open to  very obvious 
c r i t i c i s m s .  And though, on h i s  p r i n c i p l e s ,  he cou ld  not have 
been an extreme r a t i o n a l i s t ,  he could y e t ,  I t h in k ,  c o n s i s t ­
e n t l y  w i th  them, have c o n s id e ra b ly  m odif ied  the  b l a s t  of h i s  
in v e c t iv e  a g a in s t  i n t e l l i g e n c e .  There must be many who would 
agree  t h a t  s y n th e s i s  i s  as  im portan t  as a n a ly s i s  ( f o r  t h i s  i s
one way of ex p re ss in g  h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n )  and t h a t  on some 
2
occas ions  we can g e t  n e a re r  to  what i s  e s s e n t i a l  by i n t u i t i o n
1. “C re a t iv e  E vo lu t ion "  p . 361. Compare a l s o  p. 48: “Concentra ted
on t h a t  which r e p e a t s ,  s o l e l y  p reoccupied  in  welding the  
same to  th e  same, i n t e l l e c t  t u rn s  away from the  v i s i o n  
o f  t im e ."
2. Bergson u s u a l ly  t a k e s  th e  example of a work of a r t .  See 
a l s o  h i s  book on "Laughte r" ,  e s p e c i a l l y  the  l a s t  c h a p te r .
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and sympathy ( in  th e  Bergsonian  sense) than  by a b s t r a c t  
r e a so n in g .  And o f t e n  we a re  c e r t a i n  of  something without  be ing  
ab le  a t  a l l  to  g ive reason s  f o r  our c e r t a i n t y .  But i t  i s  a 
d i f f e r e n t  p o s i t i o n ,  and one which does not  fo l low l o g i c a l l y  
from i t ,  t h a t  always i n t u i t i o n  can ge t  n e a r e r  to  what i s  
fundam enta l ,  to  the  t ru e  R e a l i t y ,  than  i n t e l l e c t ,  and t h a t  
i n t e l l e c t  i s  merely an i n t r u d e r ,  seeking to  d iv id e  what in  
t r u t h  i s  i n t e r c o n n e c te d .  In t a k in g  t h i s  second p o s i t i o n ,  Berg­
son went too  f a r .  The l o g i c a l  co nc lu s io n  of such a view, as 
h i s  c r i t i c s  have no t  been slow to  p o in t  ou t ,  would be chaos. 
I n t u i t i o n s  might no t  be s u c c e s s f u l ly  communicated, l o g i c a l  
f a l l a c i e s  would be condoned as  a mere b reak in g  of the  l e t t e r  
o f  the  law, and th e r e  could be no ph i losophy .  I t  has been 
p a r t l y  my i n t e n t i o n  i n  t r e a t i n g  of Bergson in  an a n a l y t i c a l  
way w i th  " secondlys"  and " t h i r d l y s "  and " f o u r t h l y s “ (which 
c e r t a i n l y  i s  t o  e x h i b i t  him i n  the  worst p o s s ib le  l i g h t ) ,  to  
show t h a t  he has no t  taken  advantage of len iency  in  the  
demands o f  l o g ic .  On the  c o n t r a r y ,  even from the  l o g i c a l  p o in t  
o f  view, t h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  to  c a v i l  a t  -  indeed th e  e x t r a o rd in a ry  
coherence and c o n s is te n c y  of h i s  id eas  one w i th  ano the r  
(which he c a l l s  i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n )  make i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  know 
in  what o rd e r  to  d e a l  w i th  them. Consequently ,  M. Bergson* s 
view of t ime i s  " i r r a t i o n a l "  only in  th e  sense t h a t  i t  i s  
i r r e d u c i b l e  to  p u re ly  l o g i c a l  te rm s,  not in  th e  sense  t h a t  i t  
abounds in  l o g i c a l  f a l l a c i e s ,  and th e  extreme a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l -
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1
1 s t  p o s i t i o n ,  t o  which e x c e p t io n  has been taken ,  could be 
modified c o n s i s t e n t l y  w ith  B ergson’s main c o n te n t io n s .
I have gone in  some d e t a i l  i n t o  th e  "a n t i - i n t e l l e c t - 
ualism" c r i t i c i s m  of  Bergson because I b e l i e v e  h i s  view of 
time as a c r e a t i v e  becoming, in  s p i t e  of  t h i s  and the  hypo- 
s t a t i s a t i o n  . c r i t i c i s m ,  to  be a v a l i d  and a fundamental one.
I t  i s  n ec essa ry  to  ge t  c l e a r  how f a r  such a view of  time as 
a l o g i c a l  and as c r e a t i v e  in v o lv es  a n t i - i n t e l l e c t u a l i s m ,  and 
how f a r  t h a t  was a n o n - e s s e n t i a l  a d d i t i o n .
The t h i r d  to p ic  to  be d is c u s s e d  i s  the  ’ i r r e v e r s ­
i b i l i t y *  of  t ime,  which fo l lo w s  from h i s  o th e r  p o s i t i o n s .  I f  
you hold  t h a t  t ime passed  and time p a s s in g  are  d i s t i n c t ,  and 
t h a t  i t  i s  the  l a t t e r  which i s  fundamental ,  and a l s o  hold  
t h a t  time i s ,  i n  some sense (however vaguely  t h a t  * is* may be 
i n t e r p r e t e d )  c r e a t i v e ,  you a re  fo rced  t o  ho ld  the  ’ i r r e v e r s ­
i b i l i t y  ’ o f  t im e .  On h i s  own p r i n c i p l e s ,  then ,  Bergson waa 
q u i t e  r i g h t  to  r e j e c t  the  ’ t ’ of p hys ics  as having noth ing  to  
do w i th  t im e .  I do not  propose to  d i s c u s s  "Dur^e e t  S im u l tan é i té "  
i n  d e t a i l  he re :  and s t i l l  l e s s  the  whole q u e s t io n  of " p h y s ic a l
t i m e " : i t  w i l l  be s u f f i c i e n t  to  say t h a t  Bergson i s  u n q u es t io n -
2
ab ly  r i g h t  in  h i s  main t h e s i s ,  and probably  r i g h t  in  i n s i s t i n g  
t h a t  i t  depends on durée which i s  p r i o r  t o  i t .
1. "The p roo f  of th e  e s s e n t i a l  u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y  o f  a theo ry  
seems to  me to  e s t a b l i s h  a very s t ro n g  presumption a g a in s t  
i t s  o n t o l o g ic a l  v a lu e . "  Cunningham, "Bergson’ s Conception 
o f  D ura t ion"  ( P h i lo s o p h ic a l  Review, 1914, p . 530) .
2 . I  say "p rob ab ly " ,  no t  because I doubt i t ,  but because i t  
has been doubted.
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Except f o r  extreme p h y s ic a l  f a n a t i c s ,  however, 
t h e r e  a re  few who would deny, a t  f i r s t  s i g h t ,  th e  s o - c a l l e d  
" i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y "  of  t i # e .  Bergson i s  on sa fe  ground here .
But i t  i s  p o s s ib le  t o  ho ld  t h a t  time i s  " i r r e v e r s i b l e "  in  the  
vague sense  t h a t ,  e m p i r i c a l l y ,  i t  i s  "going one way," and a l s o  
t o  hold  some d o c t r i n e  of r e c u r re n c e  in  c y c le s .  To a c e r t a i n  
e x t e n t ,  we a l l  ho ld  t h a t  view, s ince  we t a l k  of " th in g s  happen­
ing  s e v e r a l  t im e s , "  and even of  "even ts  r e c u r r i n g . "  But c a r r i e d  
to  an extreme, i t  i s  one which robs"change" and " i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  
o f  a l l  r e a l  meaning, even though we con t inue  to  t a l k  of i r ­
r e v e r s i b i l i t y  in  th e  s ^ n s e  mentioned above. Bergson has a
dec ided  advantage over H e r a c l i t e a n  d o c t r in e s  of  u n i v e r s a l  f l u x
1
i n  t h a t  he r e j e c t s  th e  n o t io n  of r e c u r re n c e .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  
which has  here been made between " i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y "  ( a t  l e a s t ,  
a s  i t  i a  commonly unders tood)  and " n o n - re c u r re n t"  i s  one- which 
Bergson does n o t ,  t o  my knowledge, make e x p l i c i t l y : but i t  
needs to  be made s in ce  i t  marks the p o in t  a t  which he d iv e rg es  
from th e s e  o th e r  v iew s.  This p o in t  w i l l  be r e tu r n e d  to  in  a 
l a t e r  c h a p te r .
The s e p a ra te  t r e a tm e n t  of a s p e c t s  which Bei^gson r e ­
gards  as i n t e r c o n n e c te d  may have i t s  advan tages ,  bu t  i t  c e r t a i n ­
ly  has a l s o  co r respond ing  d e f e c t s ,  the  c h i e f  of which i s  i t s
1. "Real d u ra t io n  i s  t h a t  d u r a t io n  which gnaws on th in g s ,  and 
le a v e s  on them th e  mark of i t s  t o o th .  I f  e v e ry th in g  i s  in  
t im e ,  ev e ry th in g  changes inw ardly ,  and the  same concre te  
r e a l i t y  never r e c u r s .  R e p e t i t i o n  i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  p o s s ib le  
only in  the  a b s t r a c t . "  ( "C rea t iv e  E v o lu t io n ,"  p . 4 8 . )
203
piecem eal  and fragm entary  c h a r a c t e r .  Unity i s  s t r e n g th :  and 
Bergson might very w e l l  complain t h a t  s in g l e  ’ s t r a n d s ’ , when 
s e p a ra te d  a r t i f i c i a l l y  from t h e i r  ne ighbours  and regarded from 
an)| a l i e n  ang le ,  may appear  more v u ln e ra b le  tn an  they  in  f a c t  
a r e .  I t  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  be a d v is a b le  to  i n s i s t  t h a t  s in g le  
c r i t i c i s m s  of i s o l a t e d  p o in t s  have l i t t l e  weight a g a in s t  such 
a co h e ren t  system as  Bergson’ s ,  and to  make some g e n e ra l  
c r i t i a i s m s  on the  whole.
The f i r s t  i s  d i r e c t e d  a g a in s t  Bergson’ s a n t i - i n t e l ­
l e c t u a l i s m .  This p o in t  has a l re a d y  been d isc u sse d  in  d e t a i l ,  
as  a r i s i n g  from one p a r t i c u l a r  a spec t  of  h i s  th o u g h t ,  but what 
was s a id  t h e r e  does,  I t h in k ,  hold  good g e n e r a l l y .
Secondly, a common c r i t i c i s m  a g a in s t  durée i s  t h a t  
i t  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  s u b j e c t i v e :  t h a t  the  only c r i t e r i o n  which 
Bergson admits  i s  t h a t  of immediate apprehens ion .  And t h i s ,  
o f  co u rse ,  i s  t r u e .  Whether i t  i s  an im portan t  c r i t i c i s m  i s  
a n o th e r  m a t t e r .  I t  seems to  me t h a t  t h e r e  a re  two ways in  
which th e  c r i t i c i s m  of s u b je c t iv i s m  can be l e v e l l e d  a g a in s t  
Bergson: one i s  s u p e r f i c i a l ,  th e  o th e r  n o t .  The s u p e r f i c i a l  
c r i t i c i s m  i s  t h a t  which condemns as  ’ s u b j e c t i v e ’ Bergson’ s 
r e l i a n c e  on immediate apprehens ion ,  w i th ou t  pausing to  con­
s i d e r  v/hether t h e r e  i s ,  in  f a c t ,  any o th e r  c r i t e r i o n  by which 
we c o r r e c t  our judgments of t im e .  "O bjec t ive"  methods (so-  
c a l l e d )  may, as has been s a id  e a r l i e r ,  e s s e n t i a l l y  depend on
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immediate app rehens ion .  I t  i s  a mere begging of the  q u es t io n
i
t o  c a l l  something " s u b j e c t i v e "  and t h e n  to  condemn i t  out of 
hand: we must a l s o  know why we c o n s id e r  such s u b j e c t i v i t y  i n ­
adequa te .  The second c r i t i c i s m  i s  much more im p o r tan t ,  i f  sub­
s t a n t i a t e d :  i t  i s  a l s o  co r respo nd ing ly  more d i f f i c u l t  to  f i x  
upon Bergson. I t  i s  t h i s  : Time, i t  may be a s s e r t e d ,  i s  not 
merely my p s y c h o lo g ic a l  apprehens ion  of t im e ,  and yours ,  and 
h i s  and h e r s ,  and . . . ,  and s t i l l  l e s s  i s  i t  any one of t h e s e .
On the  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  i s  the  e s s e n t i a l  go in g -o n -n ess  of t h i n g s ,
th e  happening of e v e n ts ,  the  growth of  acorn  i n t o  oak. E v id e n t ly ,
a l l
t h i s  i s  ve ry  much what Bergson was/_along emphasizing! But, i t  
may be s a i d ,  B ergson’ s r e a l  p o s i t i o n  was an i n s i s t e n c e  upon 
our  awareness of  p ro c e s s .  In  so f a r  a s t h i s  i s  so, then  perhaps 
t h e r e  i s  v i c io u s  s u b j e c t i v i t y  in  Bergson’ s view. I t  i s ,  however, 
e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  d i f f i c u l t  t o  decide how f a r  i t  i s  reasonab le  
to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between "knower" and "known." Would th e re  be 
time in  a m indless  u n iv e rse ?  We s h a l l  never  answer t h i s  
q u e s t io n ,  and i t  may even, as  framed by us ,  be n o n s e n s ic a l .
Kant p o in te d  out t h a t  apprehens ion  invo lved  a c o - l rn p l ic a t io n  
o f  o b je c t  and s u b je c t  : i f  we take  t h i s  s e r i o u s l y ,  we cannot 
c r i t i c i s e  Bergson f o r  i n s i s t i n g  on one a sp e c t  the  e x c lu s io n  
o f  the  o t h e r  s ince  t h a t  would be im p oss ib le .  Can we c r i t i c i s e  
nim f o r  in c o n s i s t e n c y  in  h i s  unhera lded  t r a n s i t i o n  from "my 
apprehens ion  of durée" to  "a world of becoming"? To a c e r t a i n
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e x t e n t ,  y e s ;  beyond t h a t ,  no. In  so f a r  a s  t a n t  i s  r i g h t ,  and 
they  are  u l t im a t e ly  c o im p l ic a n t ,  i t  would be s tu p id  to  t a l k  of 
i n c o n s i s t e n c y .  N e v e r th e le s s ,  Bergson does leave us r a t h e r  in  
t h e  dark  as  to  how e x a c t ly  t h e  t r a n s i t i o n  (which, even i f  i t  
be no t  u l t i m a t e ,  i s  c e r t a i n l y  regarded as a t r a n s i t i o n  in  o r ­
d in a ry  language) i s  mediated, and I t h i n k  t h a t  probably  he 
was i n c o n s i s t e n t  on t h i s  p o i n t ,  a n d t  ha t  ne would be hard put
i f
to  i t  to  e x p la in  th e  change of  emphasis in  "Time and i r e e  w i l l"  
and in  "C re a t iv e  E v o lu t io n ."  But the  in c o n s i s te n c y  was one 
which d id  not m a t te r  very much, and Bergson was w is e r  t h a n  he 
knew. Such i s  the  power oi i n t u i t i o n :
T h ird ly ,  can be grouped to g e th e r  a i l  th ose  c r i t i c i s m s  
r e g a rd in g  i l l e g i t i m a t e  e x te n s io n s  oi  du rée .  Bergson conceived 
o f  durée so widely  t h a t  i t  i s  o f t e n  vague : he hy^postatised i t  
i n to  R e a l i t y  and C r e a t i v i t y  and s e v e ra l  o th e r  t h i n g s  bes ide  : 
a t  th e  same time he l e f t  conv en ien t ly  m isty  what he meant by 
"R ea l" .  I t  would, of course ,  be s tu p id  to  expect  an a n a ly t i c  
d e f i n i t i o n  of  " R e a l i t y " :  bu t  i t  3^ i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  t e l l  us 
t h a t  i t  i s  tem pora l ,  o r  worse s t i l l ,  t h a t  i t  i s  Time, and to  
l e t  i t  go a t  t h a t .  And t h i s  Bergson was in c l i n e d  t o  do, a s  f o r  
example when he says  of Time -  " i t  i s  th e  fo un da t io n  of our
b e in g ,  and, as we f e e l ,  th e  very  subs tance  of the  world in
1
which we l i v e . "  "C re a t iv e  E v o lu t io n " ,  though l e s s  operkhan 
"Time and Free w i l l "  to  c r i t i c i s m  oi^he score  of s u b j e c t i v i t y ,
1. "C rea t iv e  E v o lu t io n " ,  p . 41.
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i s  more open to  th e  o b je c t io n  t h a t  in  i t  t ime becomes almost a ' 
m y s t ic a l  e n t i t y .  T h is  o b j e c t i o n ,  of co u rse ,  i s  only fundamental 
i f  th e  d i s a d v a n ta g e s  of  m ystic ism  outweigh a l l  o th e r  advantages  
o f  B ergson’ s co n c ep t io n  of t im e .  But t h a t  i s  no t  to  say t h a t  
h i s  system would n o t  have been b e t t e r  w ithou t  i t ,  i r ^ o  f a r  as 
i t  i s  s e p a ra b le  from th e  main ten o u r  of  h i s  work.
On the  o th e r  hand, Bergson’ s g r e a t  m er i t  was t o  emphas­
i z e  t h r e e  p o in t s  which a re  fundamental f o r  a p rope r  view of t im e .  
F i r s t ,  he sav/ t h a t  th e  analogy w ith  space ,  though ap p a ren t ly  
p l a u s i b l e ,  was f a l l a c i o u s  in  t h a t  i t  overlooked c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
which a re  fundamental  to  t im e .  These c h a r a c t e r s  a re  the  i r r e ­
v e r s i b i l i t y  and th e  "becoming" of t im e ,  and h i s  emphasis on 
th e s e  makes th e  second  and t h i r d  p o i n t s .  In  consequence, he i n ­
s i s t e d  on time as c r e a t i v e ,  a s  analogous to  l i f e ,  and as fu n ­
dam enta l ly  i r r e d u c i b l e  to  m athem atica l  terms ; and made a v a l u ­
ab le  d i s t i n c t i o n  between time in  i t s  passage and time as passed .
A l l  th e se  a r e  of g r e a t  im portance.  I t  i s  Bergson’ s 
d i s t i n c t i o n  not  only to  have shown t h a t  "no q u e s t io n  has been 
more n e g le c te d  by p h i lo s o p h e rs  than  t h a t  of t im e ,  a l though  a l l  
agree  in  d e c la r in g  i t  t o  be v i t a l " ,  and to  have made us t r y  to  
tak e  Time more s e r i o u s l y :  bu t  a l s o  to  have shown th e  e s ^ n t i a l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  which a t r u l y  temporal  theo ry  of time must not  
f a i l  to  t ak e  i n to  accoun t .
1. "Duree e t  S imultane^ité" , (P re fa c e ,  v i i .  )>-
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CHAPTER VI. ALEXANDER.
I t  would be im poss ib le  to  omit from a d i s c u s s io n  of 
modern t h e o r i e s  of t ime the  view of A lexander.  And t h i s  not 
only because he i n s i s t e d  on th e  need to  take  Time s e r io u s ly ,  
and showed in  an i n t e r e s t i n g  ex eg es is  how S p inoza’ s philosophy 
would have been improved had he pa id  more a t t e n t i o n  to  t im e ,  
bu t  because th e  t i t l e  of h i s  g r e a t  work "Space, Time and D eity"  
does no t  b e l i e  i t s  c o n te n t s ,  o r  a s c r ib e  t o  time an importance 
i n  h i s  system which i t  does no t  r e a l l y  possi^ss. There can be 
no two op in ion s  about the  s u b s t a n t i a l  c o r r e c t n e s s  o f  A lexander’ s 
c r i t i c i s m s  o f  Spinoza as put forward in  h i s  l e c t u r e  "Spinoza 
and Time": t h i s  c h a p te r  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  be concerned w i th  th e  
more d eb a ta b le  though b r i l l i a n t  s p e c u la t io n s  of "Space, Time 
and D e i ty . "
The c lo s e  c o n ju n c t io n  in  one sen tence  of "space" and 
" t im e" ,  and more p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e i r  hyphena t ion ,  a re  f a r  from 
u n f a m i l i a r  to  us i n  t h i s  t w e n t i e t h  c e n tu ry .  The work of E i n s t e in  
and Minkowski has made "space- t im e"  a t  l e a s t  v e r b a l ly  f a m i l i a r  
to  us a l l .  Consequently ,  when Alexander, beg inn ing  with  ’ s p a c e ’ 
and ’ t i m e ’ , shows t h a t  each in v o lv es  th e  o th e r ,  and t h e r e a f t e r  
speaks of ’ s p a c e - t im e ’ as formed from t h e i r  un ion ,  y e t  d i f f e r ­
ing  from b o th ,  we a re  ap t  t o  assume t h a t  we know a t  once what 
he means. But i t  cannot be too  s t ro n g ly  emphasized t h a t  the  
’ s p a c e - t im e ’ of A lexander’ s concep t ion  i s  d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  of
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Minkowski’ s ,  as A lexander h im s e l f  p o in t s  out : - t h i s  in q u i ry
which, be i t  observed ,  i s  e n t i r e l y  n o n -m a th e m a t ic a l . . . "  , and
’’We have th u s  ^  p u re ly  a n a l y t i c a l  or m e tap h y s ica l  and non-
ma th e m a t i c a l  methods a p p l ie d  to  a s u b j e c t - m a t t e r  p re se n ted  in
e x p e r ie n c e ,  a r r i v e d  a t  a n o t io n  of Space-Time which a t  l e a s t  in
s p i r i t  i s  no t  d i f f e r e n t  from the  n o t io n  of a world in  Space and
Time which was fo rm ula ted  by m athem atica l  methods by the  l a t e
2
H* Minkowski in  1908. ’’ For th e  m athem atic ian  i s  concerned w ith  
space-t im e as measurable  : A lexander’ s p o s i t i o n  i s  the  d i f f e r e n t  
one t h a t  no t  only p s y c h o lo g ic a l ly  and p h y s i c a l l y ,  but a l so  
on t o l o g i c a l l y , space and time a re  i n t im a te ly  connected .  I t  would 
be a m is take  to  imagine t h a t  t h e r e  i s  any s p e c i a l  connec t ion ,  
o th e r  th a n  t h a t  of v e r b a l  s i m i l a r i t y ,  between A lexander’ s meta­
physic  and c u r r e n t  p h y s ic a l  t h e o r i e s .  On th e  c o n t r a r y ,  i f  one 
sc ience  more than  a n o th e r  s u p p l i e s  the  dominant id e a s  of "Space, 
Time, and D e i ty" ,  t h a t  sc ien ce  i s  b io lo g y ,  w ith  i t s  d o c t r in e  of 
’ emergence’ , r a t h e r  th an  p h y s ic s .  I t  would, t h e r e f o r e ,  be su p e r ­
f i c i a l  to  c r i t i c i s e  Alexander on the  ground t h a t  he imported in to  
m etaphysics  n o t io n s  whose p ro p e r  home i s  p h y s ic s .  I t  should be 
c l e a r l y  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  Alexander was concerned th roughout  w i th  
m etaphysics  and not  w ith  p h y s ic s .
A second p re l im in a ry  remark can u s e f u l l y  be made befo re  
we go on to  c o n s id e r  A lexander’ s views in  d e t a i l .  That i s  th e
1. "Space, Time, and Deity" ( i )  57* Unless o therw ise  s t a t e d ,  a l l  
r e f e r e n c e s  in  t h i s  c h a p te r  a re  to  t h i s  work.
2. ( i ) ,  58. I t a l i c s  mine. For a very c l e a r  s ta tem en t  of th e  
r e l a t i o n  of the  Theory of R e l a t i v i t y  to  m etaphysics ,  see 
a l s o  i ,  87-92.
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th e  obvious ,  i f  not always s u f f i c i e n t l y  heeded, one th a t  i t  i s  
a m is take  to  come t o  m etaphysics  w i th  to o  r i g i d  p recon cep t io ns  
of  what th e  terms used should mean. I t  was wrong t o  equate 
Space-Time w i th  the  space- t im e  of p h y s ic s :  i t  would be equa l ly  
wrong to  equate i t  w i th  motion. That does not  mean, of co u rse ,  
t h a t  the  m etaphys ic ian  i s  f r e e d  from th e  need of making c l e a r  
how he i s  u s ing  h i s  terms - i f  he d e p a r t s  from common usage the  
need i s  a l l  the  g r e a t e r  t h a t  he should make h i s  ovm usage 
c l e a r ,  and i f  t h i s  i s  not  done, the  o b s c u r i ty  of h i s  concep t ions  
i s  a major  c r i t i c i s m  a g a in s t  him. But c r i t i c i s m s  based on m is­
u n d e rs ta n d in g  are  only too common, e s p e c i a l l y  in  the  case of 
such a w r i t e r  as Alexander.
I t  i s  a lmost an im per t inence  to  a t tem pt  t o  expound 
what i s  a l re ad y  so l u c id ly  expressed .  A lexander’ s own i n t r o ­
d u c t io n  i s  the  b e s t .  "Space and Time as p re se n ted  in  o rd ina ry  
expe r ience  a re  what a re  commonly known as  e x te n s io n  and 
d u r a t io n ,  e n t i t i e s  ( l e t  us say p r o v i s i o n a l l y )  or forms of ex ­
i s t e n c e ,  i n  which bod ies  occupy p la c e s ,  and events  occur a t  
t im es  or moments, th e s e  ev e n ts  being e i t h e r  e x t e r n a l o r  m en ta l .  
We s h a l l  d e a l  f i r s t  w ith  p h y s ic a l  Space and Time, leav in g  
m ental  occu rrences  to  a l a t e r  s ta g e .  Now in  o rde r  t o  examine 
e m p i r i c a l l y  what Space and Time a re ,  i t  i s  n ecessa ry  to  con­
s i d e r  them by them se lves ,  i n  a b s t r a c t i o n  from th e  bod ies  and 
ev e n ts  t h a t  occupy them, and t h i s  may seem to  some i l l e g i t i m a t e .  
The d i f f i c u l t y  i s  p a r t l y  d e r iv e d  from our p r a c t i c a l  h a b i t s ,  f o r
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we are  no t  accustomed to  t h i n k  about Space and Time them selves ,
bu t  about the  t h in g s  co n ta in ed  in  them. But i t  a l s o  has a
t h e o r e t i c a l  b a s i s .  For we have not any sense -o rgan  f o r  Space 
o r
axd Time : we only apprehend them in  and th rough  our  s e n s ib le  
app reh en s io n  of t h e i r  f i l l i n g :  by what mode of our apprehension  
we s h a l l  in q u i r e  l a t e r .  I s h a l l  c a l l  i t  i n t u i t i o n .  I t  i s  only
1
by a n a l y t i c  a t t e n t i o n  t h a t  we can th in k  of  them f o r  th em se lv es ."  
I t  w i l l  be seen t h a t  A lexander’ s s t a r t i n g  p o in t  i s  the  space 
and the  time of o rd in a ry  ex p e r ien ce :  he does not deny t h e i r  
r e a l i t y .  On the  o th e r  hand, he does not  ru sh  to  th e  o th e r  
extreme which c o n s i s t s  in  f o r g e t t i n g  t h a t  space and time are  
only a b s t r a c t i o n s  from e v e n ts ,  and in  h y p o s t a t i s i n g  them. I t  
may be ,  t h a t  in  the  end we must d e c i d e t  h a t  Alexander d id  hypo- 
s t a t i s e  them, but i t  should not  be overlooked t h a t  he showed 
h im s e l f  aware of t h i s  danger,  and r i g h t l y  s a id  t h a t  i t  must be 
r i s k e d .  For ,  from an extreme p o in t  of view, even to  t a l k  of 
’ sp ac e ’ and ’t i m e ’ i s  a h y p o s t a t i s a t i o n .  Such a c r i t i c i s m  we 
must a l l  r i s k ;  and i t  i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  p o in t  out t h a t  Alex­
ander always used c a p i t a l  l e t t e r s  f o r  ’ s p a c e ’ and ’t im e ’ , and 
a f o r t i o r i ,  f o r  ’ s p a c e - t im e ’ . The a t t i t u d e  t h a t  he here t a k e s  
up in  r e g a rd  to  th e  r e l a t i o n  between time and ev en ts  seems to  
me e n t i r e l y  j u s t i f i e d .
Secondly, as  he p o i n t s  ou t ,  we can re g a rd  tem poral  
phenomena as e i t h e r  e x t e r n a l  o r  mental  -  g iv ing  r i s e  to  the  
f a m i l i a r  dichotomy of ’p h y s i c a l ’ and ’p s y c h o l o g i c a l ’ t im e.  In
1. i ,  37.
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e i t h s r  case he i s  concerned t o  show t h a t  the  same conc lus ions  
fo l low .  His s t a r t i n g  p o in t ,  th e n ,  i s  beyond rep roach .
The whole of h i s  subsequent p rocedure  w i th  regard  to  
time can be summed up very s h o r t l y  as fo l lo w s .  Time and space 
cannot e x i s t  a p a r t :  they invo lve  and are  in te rd ep e n d en t  upon each 
o th e r .  T h e i r  in te rd e p e n d e n c e , which may be c a l l e d  f o r  convenience 
sp ac e - t im e ,  i s ,  however, not  the  mere sum of space and t im e ,  but  
i s  more th a n  t h a t :  from t h e i r  union something new has emerged.
Now e v id e n t ly  th e se  two s ta g e s  might no t  be he ld  to g e th e r  -  a t  
l e a s t ,  th e  f i r s t  might be g ra n te d  w i thou t  the second, though 
th e  second could not  be he ld  w ithou t  the  f i r s t .  I t  w i l l  t h e r e f o r e  
be more convenien t  to  d i s c u s s  them s e p a r a t e ly .
Space and t im e ,  says Alexander,  "are  o f t e n  thought to
2
be independent and s e p a ra te  (whether t r e a t e d  as e n t i t i e s  as here  
o r  as  systems of  r e l a t i o n s ) .  But a l i t t l e  r e f l e c t i v e  c o n s id e r ­
a t i o n  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  show t h a t  they are  in te rd e p e n d e n t ,  so t h a t  
t h e re  n e i t h e r  i s  Space w ithou t  Time nor  Time w i thou t  Space: any
1. That i s  r a t h e r  a sweeping s ta tem en t .  I t  would be p o s s ib le  
f o r  a man to  ho ld  t h a t  space and time were not  n e c e s s a r i l y  
in te rd e p e n d e n t ,  and y e t  to  hold  a d o c t r i n e  of emergence in
sp ac e - t im e .  But i t s  u n l ik e l ih o o d  may allow the  s ta tem ent  in  
the  t e x t  to  s ta n d .
2. The r e fe re n c e  here  i s  to  h i s  d i s c u s s io n ,  mentioned e a r l i e r ,  
of th e  a l t e r n a t i v e  con cep t ion s  of t ime a s  being a p a r t  from 
e v e n ts ,  or of be ing  only r e l a t i o n s  between e v e n ts .  See th e  
c r i t i c i s m  of what he b e l i e v e s  to  be a r a d i c a l  in c o n s is te n c y  
in  Alexander by Murphy ("M onist" ,  1927 & 1928).
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more th a n  l i f e  e x i s t s  w ithou t  a body o r  a body which can
fu n c t io n  as a l i v i n g  body e x i s t s  w ithou t  l i f e  : t h a t  Soace i s
1
in  i t s  ve ry  n a tu re  tem pora l  and Time s p a t i a l . "
A p o s s ib le  c r i t i c i s m  ( t h a t  though to  neve r  pe rce iv e
one w i th o u t  the  o t h e r ,  as in  Minkowski’ s c e l e b r a t e d  t ru ism ,
t h a t  does not  prove t h a t  o n t o l o g i c a l l y , they are  connected)
i s  qu ick ly  f o r e s t a l l e d .  Alexander i s  n o t  concerned to  e l a b o r a t e
the  obvious : he i s  no t  merely t a l k i n g  about what we expe r ience :
he goes f u r t h e r ,  and t r i e s  t o  show t h a t  space and time a r e
n e c e s s a r i l y ,  and no t  merely f a c t u a l l y  connected ,  s ince  one
w ithou t  th e  o th e r  would f a l l  i n t o  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s .  "The mere
te m p o ra l i ty  of Time, i t s  s u c c e s s iv e n e s s ,  leav es  no p lace  f o r
i t s  c o n t i n u i ty  or to g e th e r n e s s  and seems to  be c o n t r a d ic to r y
to  i t s  c o n t i n u i t y ,  Yet^the two are  found to g e th e r  i n  Time as
we ex pe r ien ce  i t .  I f ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  the  p a s t  i n s t a n t  i s  not  to  be
l o s t  as i t  o therw ise  would be ,  or r a t h e r  s ince  t h i s  i s  not  th e
case  in  f a c t ,  t h e r e  must needs be some continuum o th e r  than
Time which can secure  and s u s t a i n  the  t o g e th e rn e s s  of p as t  and
f u t u r e . . .  This  o th e r  form of being i s  Space: t h a t  i s ,  Space
s u p p l i e s  us w i th  th e  second continuum needed in  -order to  save
2
Time from being a mere ’now’ ."  The r e a l i s m  of Alexander ( i n  
c o n t r a s t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  to  Bradley or McTaggart) i s  w e l l  
brought out by h i s  sea rch  f o r  a "second continuum" to  save 
Time from c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  Whereas they a re  con ten t  to  conclude
1. i , 4 4 .  2. 1 ,46.
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t h a t  Time i s  u n r e a l ,  he s t a r t s  from th e  p o s i t i o n  t h a t  i t  i s
1
r e a l  as "an o b je c t  g iven  to  us  e m p i r i c a l l y " ,  and hence has t o  
f i n d  some means by which the  apparen t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  can be 
d i s s o lv e d .
S im i l a r ly ,  space i s  only saved from b lan k  n ega t io n
by time -  "Time i s  d isco v e red  to  supply the  element in  Space
2
w ithou t  which Space would be a b l a n k . " For  d i f f e r e n t  re a so n s ,
bu t  fundam enta lly  in  each case f o r  c o n t i n u i ty ,  space and time
involve  each  o th e r .  "Without Space t h e r e  would be no connec t ion
3
i n  Time. Without Time th e re  would be no p o in t s  t o  co nn ec t ."
Then comes the  g r e a t  jump, from Space and Time in v o lv in g  each
o t h e r ,  to  Space-Time. "There s re  nc^uch th in g s  as p o in t s  or
i n s t a n t s  by th em se lves .  There are only p o i n t - i n s t a n t s  or pure
e v e n t s . In  l ik e  manner t h e r e  i s  no mere Space o r  mere Time but
only Space-Time o r  Time-Space. Space and Time by themselves are
a b s t r a c t i o n s  from Space-Time, and i f  th e y  are  tak en  to  e x i s t
i n  t h e i r  own r i g h t  w ithou t  th e  t a c i t  assumption of the  o th e r
they  are  i l l e g i t i m a t e  a b s t r a c t i o n s  of the  s o r t  t h a t  Berkeley 
4
censu red .  How they come to  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  a p a r t  from each 
o th e r ,  and on what terms t h i s  i s  l e g i t im a te  and u s e f u l  w i l l  
appear in  due co u rse .  But a t  l e a s t  they a re  not  merely two
1. i ,  46. In  co nn ec t ion  w ith  th e  charge of hypoé t a t i s a t i o n ,  i t  
i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  note h i s  language h e re .  Time su re ly  i s  
not  g iven  to  us e m p i r i c a l ly  as an "o b je c t" ?
2. 1 ,47 .  3. i ,  48.
4. The former t e n t a t i v e  c r i t i c i s m  of h y p o s t a t i s a t i o n  i s  tn us  
ing en io u s ly  made to  serve as an argument f o r  A lexander’ s 
own Y leg'll
. 214
c o n c u r r e n t  t h o u g h  c o r r e l a t e d  c o n t i n u a .  The r e a l  e x i s t e n c e  i s
1
S p a c e - T i m e ,  t h e  c o n t i n u u m  o f  p o i n t  i n s t a n t s  o r  p u r e  e v e n t s . "  
T h i s  p a s s a g e  i s  o f  t h e  l a s t  i m p o r t a n c e .  Y e t  A l e x a n d e r  d o e s  n o t  
s e e k  t o  c o n s o l i d a t e  h i s  new p o s i t i o n ,  a s  y e t ,  b u t  t u r n s  b a c k  
a n d  show s i n  more  d e t a i l  some o f  t h e  w ay s  i n  w h i c h  s p a c e  a n d  
t i m e  i n v o l v e  e a c h  o t h e r .  F i r s t ,  h e  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  
r e p e t i t i o n  i n  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e ,  a n d  show s  t h a t  a  o n e - o n e  c o r ­
r e s p o n d e n c e  o f  p o i n t s  a n d  i n s t a n t s  w o u l d  b e  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o
s a v e  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e  f r o m  t h e  m i s f o r t u n e s  t h r e a t e n e d  e a r l i e r ,
2
b lankness  and p e r i s h i n g n e s s . But he adds t h a t  he conceives  of
" t h i s  a b s t r a c t  o r  e l e m e n t a r y  r e l a t i o n "  o f  S p a c e  a n d  Time a n a -
ime
l o g o u s l y  t o  t h e  f a m i l i a r ^ o f  i d e n t i t y - i n - d i f f e r e n c e , o f  a  t h i n g  
C h a n g i n g  a n d  y e t  r e m a i n i n g  " t h e  same" t h i n g .  Nay m o re ,  he 
h o l d s  t h a t  i t  i s  t h i s  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  o f  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e  w h i c h  
i s  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  how we c a n  s a y  t h a t  a  t h i n g  c h a n g e s  a n d  
y e t  i s  t h e  sam e .  T h i s  p a s s a g e  i s  d i f f i c u l t  a n d  n o t  t o  be t a k e n  
i n  i s o l a t i o n :  e v i d e n t l y  i t  i s  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  
c o n n e c t i o n  w i t h  t h e  t o p i c ,  w h i c h  i s  l a t e r  r a i s e d ,  o f  e m e r g e n c e .  
F o r  t h e  l o g i c a l  q u e s t i o n  r a i s e d  oy a l l  e m e r g e n c e  t h e o r i e s  i s  
a t  r o o t  t h e  f a m i l i a r  one  o f  i d e n t i t y - i n - d i f f e r a n c e . H e re  we 
c a n  o n l y  n o t e  t h e  r a t h e r  a b r u p t  t r a n s i t i o n  f r o m  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e  
t o  " o u r  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  e m p i r i c a l  s u b s t a n c e s . "  He g i v e s  no 
g r o u n d s  f o r  h i s  a  s s e r t i o n  o f  t h e  f u n d a m e n t a l  r e l e v a n c e  o f  s p a c e  
a n d  t i m e  t o  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  i d e n t i t y  i n  s u b s t a n c e s ,  b u t  w h e t h e r
1. i ,  48. 2. i ,  50.
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t h i s  i s  a  c o g e n t  c r i t i c i s m  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  s a y :  on t h e  w h o le
I  t h i n k  i t  i s  n o t ,  f o r  s u c h  a  f u n d a m e n t a l  p o s i t i o n  i s  more l i k e l y
t o  b e  t h e  b a s i s  o f  r e a s o n s  t h a n  i t s e l f  b a s e d  u p o n  r e a s o n s .  T h a t ,
o f  c o u r s e ,  l e a v e s  i t  q u i t e  o p e n  f o r  a n y b o d y  t o  d i s a g r e e  w i t h
A l e x a n d e r ,  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  i s ,  a t  l e a s t  a t  f i r s t  s i g h t  -  i t s
d e t a i l e d  i m p l i c a t i o n s  m us t  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  l a t e r ,  w h en  t h e r e  i s
m ore  d a t a  a t  o u r  d i s p o s a l  -  a n  a t t r a c t i v e  i d e a  t h a t  t h e  " d i f f e r -
1
e n c e s "  w h i c h  we a l l o w  i n  " a "  t h i n g  s h o u l d  be  u l t i m a t e l y  r e s o l v ­
a b l e  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n ^ o f  t i m e  a n d  s p a c e .  B u t  t h e  f u l l  
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  b e l o n g s  p r o p e r l y  t o  t h e j s  e c o n d  h a l f  o f  
A l e x a n d e r ’ s p o s i t i o n .
I n  a  v e r y  i n t e r e s t i n g  p a s s a g e ,  A l e x a n d e r  s e e k s  t o  
show i n  d e t a i l  how t h e  v a r i o u s  c h a r a c t e r s  o f  t i m e  -  i t s  s u c c e s s ­
i v e n e s s ,  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y ,  a n d  t r a n s i t i v i t y  -  a r e  c o n n e c t e d  w i t h  
t h o s e  o f  s p a c e .  He i n s i s t s  t h a t  a n  e x t r a  d i m e n s i o n  o f  s p a c e  i s  
n e e d e d  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  -  m o r e ,  t o  a d m i t  o f  t h e r e  b e i n g  -  e a c h  o f  
t h e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  B u t ,  a s  he  ' p o i n t s  o u t ,  " T h i s  i n q u i r y  
c o n t a i n s  n o  a t t e m p t  a t  a  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  S p a c e  a n d  T im e ,  a s  i f  
we w e r e  g i v i n g  r e a s o n s  f o r  t h e m  a n d  f o r  t h e i r  e x p e r i e n c e d  
f e a t u r e s ,  a n d  i n  a  m a n n e r  a f f e c t i n g  t o  p r e s i d e  o v e r  t h e i r  c r e ­
a t i o n .  S u c h  a n  a t t e m p t  w o u l d  be  a s  f o o l i s h  a s  i t  i s  u n s c i e n t i f i c .  
I  h a v e  m e r e l y  a t t e m p t e d  t o  show how t h e  v a r i o u s  f e a t u r e s  o f  t h e  
one  d e p e n d  f o r  t h e i r  c h a r a c t e r  on  t h o s e  o f  t h e  o t h e r .  The r e a s o n  
why S p a c e  h a s  t h r e e  d i m e n s i o n s  i s  t h a t  Time i s  s u c c e s s i v e ,
1 .  I  do  n o t  h e r e  i n q u i r e  w h a t  we mean by " a "  t h i n g ,  b u t  t a k e  
t h e  common u s a g e  f o r  g r a n t e d .
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i r r e v e r s i b l e ,  a n d  u n i f o r m  i n  d i r e c t i o n .  . . .  The w o r d  " m u s t "  
o r  " n e e d s "  w h i c h  I  h a v e  o c c a s i o n a l l y  u s e d  m eans  no  more t h a n  
t h a t  we a r e  f o r c e d  t o  l o o k  f o r  s o m e t h i n g ,  w h i c h  we may o r  may 
n o t  f i n d . "  S u c h  a  w a r n i n g  i s  v e r y  n e c e s s a r y :  a n d  i t  c l e a r s  
A l e x a n d e r  e n t i r e l y  f r o m  s u s p i c i o n  t h a t  s u c h  a  l a y i n g  down o f  
l a w s  was w h a t  he  w as  t r y i n g  t o  d o .  B u t ,  s e c o n d l y ,  i t  may be  
o b j e c t e d  t h a t  A l e x a n d e r ’ s c o n c e p t i o n  o f  t i m e  h e r e  i s  t o o  s p a t ­
i a l .  I n  s o  f a r  a s  i t  i s  h i s  av o w ed  i n t e n t i o n  t o  c o r r e l a t e  t e m ­
p o r a l  a n d  s p a t i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  i t  i s  s p a t i a l :  b u t  t h i s  
c a n  h a r d l y  be  made a  g r o u n d  o f  c r i t i c i s m ,  u n l e s s  h e  c a r r i e d  i t  
t o o  f a r .  A more  i m p o r t a n t  c r i t i c i s m ,  i f  s u b s t a n t i a t e d ,  i s  
t h a t  t h e  w h o l e  a t t e m p t  a t  c o r r e l a t i o n  i s  b a s e d  on a  f u n d a m e n t a l  
f a l l a c y .  A l e x a n d e r  w a n t s  t o  show t h a t  s p a c e  and  t i m e  a r e  n e c ­
e s s a r i l y  c o n n e c t e d :  w h a t  he  a c t u a l l y  sh o w s  i s  t h a t  t h e y  a r e ,  i n  
f a c t ,  so  c o n n e c t e d  Sn o u r  e x p e r i e n c e  t h a t  we c a n n o t  t h i n k  o f  
t h e  one  w i t h o u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h e  o t h e r .  He i s  n o t  p r o v i n g  t h a t  
i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i n v o l v e s  a  t w o - d i m e n s i o n a l  s p a c e ,  
b u t  o n l y  t h a t  we c a n n o t  s c h e m a t i s e  i t  w i t h o u t  a  t w o - d i m e n s i o n a l  
s p a c e .  I t  i s  d o u b t f u l  w h e t h e r  e v e n  t h i s  much o f  t h e  c r i t i c i s m  
c a n  be g r a n t e d :  A l e x a n d e r  c o u l d  make o u t  a  v e r y  g o o d  c a s e  f o r  
h i m s e l f  t h a t  h i s  p r o o f  h o l d s  g o o d  o n t o l o g i c a l l y  a s  w e l l  a s  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y .  B u t  e v e n  i f  t r i e  c r i t i c i s m  w e r e  g r a n t e d  so f a r ,  
t h e  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  t h i n g s  a s  t h e y  a r e  a n d  a s  t h e y  seem t o  
u s  t o  be  i s  one  w h i c h  t a k e s  u s  i n t o  v e r y  d e e p  w a t e r s .  G r a n t e d
1 .  i ,  5 7 .  M urp hy ,  i n  t h e  f i r s t  o f  t h e  t h r e e  a r t i c l e s  a l r e a d y  
c i t e d ,  c r i t i c i s e d  A l e x a n d e r ’ s  a t t e m p t s  t o  r e l a t e  t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t i m e  w i t h  t h e  d i m e n s i o n s  o f  s p a c e .
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t h a t  t h i n g s  may n o t  be  w h a t  t h e y  seem ,  t h e n  i n  t h a t  c a s e  we 
c a n  h a v e  no  i n k l i n g  w h a t  t h e y  a r e ,  i f  t h e  r e a l i t y  i s  t o  be  f o r  
e v e r  h i d d e n  f r o m  o u r  a p p r e h e n s i o n .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  b e t w e e n  
o n t o l o g y  a n d  e p i s t e m o l o g y  i s  a  d a n g e r o u s  o n e ,  f o r  i t  c a n  so  
e a s i l y  be  t u r n e d  a g a i n s t  i t s  m a k e r s :  " i f  t h e  r e a l i t y  i s  s u c h  
t h a t  i t  c a n n o t  be  know n,  how do y o u  know t h i s ,  a n d  w h a t  g r o u n d s  
h a v e  y o u  f o r  y o u r  a s s e r t i o n ? "  I t  b e c o m e s  m e r e l y  a  c a s e  o f  c o n ­
f l i c t i n g  a s s e r t i o n s ,  w i t h  t h e  o n u s  p r o b a n d i  on  h im  who w o u l d  
d e n y  a n  o n t o l o g i c a l  v a l u e  t o  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  s t a t e m e n t s .  As 
A l e x a n d e r  t e r s e l y  p u t  i t  i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  c o n t e x t ,  "We c a n n o t  
b e l i e v e t  h a t  t h o u g h  t h e  s e n s e s  may c o n f u s e  o u r  a p p r e h e n s i o n  
t h e y  a r e  t h e r e  t o  p e r v e r t  i t . "  The q u e s t i o n ,  i t  w i l l  be  s e e n ,  
i s  n o t  o n l y  o f  t h i s  s i n g l e  p o i n t ,  b u t  c o n c e r n s  t h e  w h o le  r e a l i s t  
p o s i t i o n ;  a n d  i t  s e e m s  t o  me t h a t  t h e  c r i t i c i s m  f a i l s .
H a v i n g  show n t h e  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  o f  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e ,  
A l e x a n d e r  r e t u r n s  t o  t h e i r  u n i o n  i n  S p a c e - T i m e ,  a n d  sums u p  h i s  
p o s i t i o n ,  t h u s  : -  "T he  e l e m e n t s  o f  t h e  o n e  r e a l i t y  w h i c h  i s
S p a c e - T i m e , a n d  n o t  e i t h e r  S p a c e  o r  Time a l o n e ,  owe t h e i r  d i s -
2
t i n c t n e s s  i n  e i t h e r  k i n d  t o  t h e  c o m p l e m e n t a r y  e l e m e n t . "  T h i s  
p a s s a g e  sh ow s  v e r y  c l e a r l y  t h e  e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t  w h i c h h h e  t h e r e ­
a f t e r  t a k e s  a s  p r o v e d ,  t h a t  s p a c e - t i m e  i s  t h e  r e a l i t y  on  w h i c h  
b o t h  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e  a r e  d e p e n d e n t  -  i n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  t h a t  s p a c e ­
t i m e  i s  l o g i c a l l y  p r i o r  t o  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e .
I  h a v e  k e p t  c l o s e l y  t o  A l e x a n d e r ’ s a r g u m e n t s  so  f a r ,
1 . i ,  7 3 .  2 .  i ,  6 0 .
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s i n c e  t h e i r  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  i s  n e c e s s a r y  b e f o r e  an y  c r i t i c i s m  i s  
p o s s i b l e .  B u t  now t h e  i m p o r t a n t  q u e s t i o n  a r i s e s ,  a s  t o  t h e  
e x a c t  r e l a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e  a n d  s p a c e - t i m e  on  h i s  
t h e o r y .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  a s  w e l l  a s  b e i n g  i m p o r t a n t ,  i t  i s  d i f ­
f i c u l t  t o  a n s w e r ,  a n d  i n d e e d  i t  i s  one o f  t h e  m o s t  t e l l i n g  
c r i t i c i s m s  a g a i n s t  A l e x a n d e r  t h a t  h e  h a s  l e f t  t h e s e  e s s e n t i a l  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o b s c u r e .
F i r s t ,  h e  h o l d s  t h a t  s p a c e - t i m e  i s  t h e  r e a l i t y  f r o m  
w h i c h  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e  a r e  d e r i v e d .  B u t  w h a t  3 ^  s p a c e - t i m e ?  
O b v i o u s l y ,  we m u s t  n o t  f a l l  i n t o  t h e  c r u d e  e r r o r  o f  t a k i n g  
’ d e r i v e d ’ i n  a  t e m p o r a l  s e n s e ,  a n d  o f  s a y i n g  i n  e f f e c t ,  " f i r s t  
t h e r e  was s p a c e - t i m e ,  a n d  t h e n  t h e r e  was .  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e " ,  
w h i c h  w o u l d  i n v o l v e  a  s u p e r - t i m e  i n  w h i c h  a l l  t h i s  h a p p e n e d ,  
a n d  h e n c e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  On t h e  o t h e r  h a n d ,  A l e x a n d e r  i s  n o t  
d e n y i n g  t h a t ,  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y , we a r e  m ore  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  s p a c e  
a n d  t i m e  t h a n  w i t h  s p a c e - t i m e . N or  i s  h e  m e r e l y  a s s e r t i n g  t h e  
t r u i s m  t h a t  we d o ,  a s  a  m a t t e r  o f  f a c t ,  a l w a y s  p e r c e i v e  t h i n g s  
a s  ’ i n '  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e  -  n e v e r  i n  one o r  t h e  o t h e r  a l o n e .
A g a i n ,  t h o u g h  h e  t a k e s  a d v a n t a g e  o f  m o d e r n  p h y s i c a l  t h e o r i e s  
r e g a r d i n g  t h e  i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e  o f  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e ,  h i s  s p a c e - t i m e  
i s  n o t  t h e  same a s  t h a t  o f  p h y s i c s ,  a s  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  s a i d .  
L a s t l y ,  s p a c e - t i m e  i s  n o t  m o t i o n ,  t h o u g h  i t  i s  t h e  s o u r c e  o f  
m o t i o n .  B u t  s u c h  i n f o r m a t i o n  i s  m e r e l y  n e g a t i v e ,  and^^he p r i o r  
q u e s t i o n ,  w h a t  s p a c e - t i m e  3 ^ ,  s t i l l  r e m a i n s  u n a n s w e r e d .  A 
g e n e r a l  a n s w e r  t o  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  c a n  b e  g i v e n ,  b u t  o n l y  a  g e n e r a l  
o n e .  I t  i s  e a s y  e n o u g h  t o  s a y  g l i b l y  t h a t  s p a c e - t i m e  i s  t h e
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m a t r i x  o f  b e i n g ,  t h a t  i t  i s  t h e  s t u f f  o f  w h i c h  t h e  u n i v e r s e  
i s  m ade ,  b u t  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  t o  go  i n t o  d e t a i l .  Anybody c a n  
make s u c h  a s s e r t i o n s :  a n d  a n y b o d y ,  t o o ,  c a n  s e t  u p  a s  a  c r i t i c  
o f  t h e m .  And t h a t ,  I  t h i n k ,  i s  t h e  d a n g e r  -  o f  t o o - f a c i l e  
c r i t i c i s m  o f  A l e x a n d e r  on  t h e  g r o u n d  o f  o b s c u r i t y .  F o r  t h o u g h ,  
i n  n i n e  c a s e s  o u t  o f  t e n ,  i t  i s  l e g i t i m a t e  t o  a s su m e  t h a t  a  
n o t i o n  t h a t  c a n  o n l y  be  e x p r e s s e d  i n  v a g u e  a n d  g e n e r a l  t e r m s  
i s  o f  l i t t l e  v a l u e ,  i n  t h e  t e n t h  c a s e  i t s  v e r y  i m p o r t a n c e  
m i g h t  p r e c l u d e  a  c u t - a n d - d r i e d  s t a t e m e n t . A l e x a n d e r ' s  p o s i t i o n ,  
i t  seem s  t o  me, i s  t h a t  s p a c e - t i m e  i s  so  f u n d a m e n t a l  t h a t  
l i t t l e  c a n  be  s a i d  o f  i t ,  e x c e p t  by a n a l o g i e s  a n d  i n  l a n g u a g e  
t h a t  i s  b o u n d  t o  be  m i s l e a d i n g .  W h e t h e r  he  i s  r i g h t  i n  h o l d i n g  
t h a t  i t  i s  f u n d a m e n t a l  i s  t h e  m a in  p o i n t  a t  i s s u e .  I f  h e  i s ,  
t h e n  i t  w o u l d  b e  u n g r a c i o u s  t o  t a l k  t o o  much o f  o b s c u r i t y  : 
i f  he  i s  n o t ,  h i s  w h o l e  m e t a p h y s i c  c o l l a p s e s  a t  o n c e ,  a n d  t h e  
m a t t e r  o f  o b s c u r i t y  d o e s  n o t  e n t e r .  E v i d e n t l y ,  t h e  v e r d i c t  on  
t h e  q u e s t i o n  i s  t h e  v e r d i c t  on  h i s  s y s t e m ,  a n d  i t  c a n n o t  be  
g i v e n  now . We a r e  b o u n d  t o  t a k e  ' s p a c e - t i m e ' f o r  g r a n t e d  a t  
p r e s e n t ,  a n d  t o  s e e  w h a t  u s e  h e  m akes  o f  i t ,  b e f o r e  d e c i d i n g  
w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  h i s  c l a i m  t h a t  i t  i s  f u n d a m e n t a l  i s  j u s t i f i e d .
A l e x a n d e r  i s  d e f i n i t e  on t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  
s p a c e - t i m e  a n d  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e  : w h a t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h e r e  a r e  
c a n  be a t t r i b u t e d  e n t i r e l y ,  I  t h i n k ,  t o  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  we 
f i n d  i n  c o n c e i v i n g  o f  h i s  s p a c e - t i m e .  " T h e r e  i s  no  m ere  S p a c e  
o r  m ere  T ime b u t  o n l y  S p a c e - T i m e . . . .  S p a c e  a n d  Time by t h e m ­
s e l v e s  a r e  a b s t r a c t i o n s  f ro m  S p a c e - T i m e ,  a n d  i f  t h e y  a r e  t a k e n
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t o  e x i s t  i n  t h e i r  own r i g h t  . . .  t h e y  a r e  i l l e g i t i m a t e  a s s u m p ­
t i o n s .  . . .  They  a r e  n o t  m e r e l y  tw o  c o n c u r r e n t  t h o u g h  c o r r e l a t e d
c o n t i n u a .  Tne r e a l  e x i s t e n c e  i s  S p a c e - T i m e ,  t h e  c o n t i n u u m  o f
1
p o i n t - i n s t a n t s  o r  p u r e  e v e n t s . "
B u t  t h e r e  i s  a n o t h e r  way i n  w h i c h  we c a n  t h i n k  o f  
S p a c e - T i m e  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e ,  a n d  t h i s  i s  a  way 
i n  w h i c h  i t  i s  p e r h a p s  e a s i e r  f o r  u s  t o  t h i n k ,  b u t ,  a s  A l e x ­
a n d e r  m u s t  i n  c o n s i s t e n c y  h o l d ,  i t  i s  l e s s  f u n d a m e n t a l .  T h i s  
i s  t o  t h i n k  o f  t h e  w h o le  o f  S p a c e - T im e  a s  t h e  t o t a l  o f  a l l  
" p e r s p e c t i v e s "  i n  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e .  "A p e r s p e c t i v e  f r o m  a n  i n ­
s t a n t  g i v e s  u s  a  p i c t u r e  o f  S p a c e :  a  p e r s p e c t i v e  f r o m  a  p o i n t  
g i v e s  u s  a  p i c t u r e  o f  T im e .  I f  we a t t e m p t e d  t o  c o m b in e  t h e  tw o  
p i c t u r e s ,  a n d  t o  g e t  a  " p e r s p e c t i v e "  o f  S p a c e - T im e  f ro m  t h e  
p o i n t  o f  v i e w  b o t h  o f  t h e  p l a c e  a n d  t i m e  o f  t h e  p o i n t - i n s t a n t
0 0 ,  we s h o u l d  h a v 4 ,  a s  a  l i t t l e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  w i l l  show, n o t  a
2
p e r s p e c t i v e  a t  a l l  b u t  t h e  w h o l e  o f  S p a c e - T i m e . " And a g a i n  -
" T o t a l  S p a c e - T i m e  i s  t h e  s y n t h e s i s  o f  a l l  p a r t i a l  s p a c e - t i m e s
3
o r  p e r s p e c t i v e s  o f  S p a c e - T i m e . "  S p a c e - T i m e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  c a n n o t ,
c o n s i s t e n t l y  w i t h  A l e x a n d e r ’ s m a in  p o s i t i o n ,  be  c o n c e i v e d  o f
m e r e l y  a s  a  s y n t h e s i s ,  n o r  c a n  i t s  r e l a t i o n  t o  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e
b e  a n a l o g o u s  t o  t h e  r e l a t i o n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  b e t w e e n  a  h e a p  o f
4
b o o k s  a n d  one  o f  t h e  b o o k s .  A l e x a n d e r  s e e s  t h a t  c l e a r l y ,  a n d  
a l s o  t h a t  s u c h  a  p r o c e s s  i s  i t s e l f  s e c o n d a r y ,  p r e s u p p o s i n g
1 .  i ,  4 8 .  2 .  i ,  7 6 .  3 .  i ,  7 6 .
4# N o r  c o u l d  i t  b e  s o ,  e v e n  i f  s p a c e  a n d  t i m e  w e r e  n o t  t h e m ­
s e l v e s  i n f i n i t e .
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(no t  presupposed by) s p a c e - t im e . "From c o n s id e r in g  the  t r u e
p e r s p e c t i v e s  of Space-Time we can a r r i v e  a t  the  n o t io n  of
Space o c c u r r in g  a t  one time o r  Time occupying one p l a c e . But
from th e s e  s e c t io n s  we cannot a r r i v e  a t  th e  n o t io n  of t ru e
1
p e r s p e c t i v e s  o r  a t  t r u e  Space-Time." "These p e r s p e c t iv e s  are
o f  them selves  connected  w ith  one a n o th e r ,  so t h a t  the s y n th e s i s
o f  them i s  not  an o p e ra t io n  which we, human s u b j e c t s  who t h i n k ,
perform upon them, but one which they ,  as  i t  were, perform on
th em se lv es .  For a p e r s p e c t iv e  o f  Space-Time i s  merely the
whole of Space-Time as  i t  i s  r e l a t e d  to  a p o i n t - i n s t a n t  by
v i r t u e  of the  l i n e s  of con nec t ion  between i t  and o th e r  p o i n t -  
2
i n s t a n t s . "  I t  i s  ev id e n t  t h a t  no c r i t i c i s m  can be made a g a in s t  
Alexander on the  score  of in c o n s is te n c y  h e re .
T h i rd ly ,  t h e r e  i s  th e  problem o f t  he r e l a t i o n  be­
tween time and space .  Here, up to  a p o i n t ,  the  remarks made 
e a r l i e r  apply -  t h a t  i t  would be a m istake to  lay  too much 
s to r e  on o b s c u r i ty  as a c r i t i c i s m .  For whatever i t s  s h o r t ­
comings, t h e r e  can be no doubt t h a t  A lexander’ s a t tem pt to 
re la tq :  space and t  ime i s  im p o r tan t .  I t  i s  in  ways l ik e  th e se  
t h a t  Alexander has the  advantage over Bergson, whom in  some 
ways he resem bles .  For Bergson, though he may have been the  
f i r s t  p h i lo s o p h e r  t o  " take  Time s e r io u s ly "  c e r t a i n l y  d id  not  
tak e  Space s e r io u s ly  enough, and t h i s  i s  h i s  g r e a t  d e f e c t .  
Alexander put th e  p o in t  a t  i s s u e  between h im se l f  and Bergson
1. i ,  81. 2. i ,  76-7» I t a l i c s  mine.
3 .  1, 44.
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c o n c is e ly  v/hen he s a i d : -  "The main r e s u l t  of our d i s c u s s io n
has been to  show t h a t  Time i s  r e a l l y  l a i d  out in  Space, and
i s  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  s p a t i a l #  The r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of Time as s p a t i a l ,
Mr Bergson reg a rd s  as d e p r iv in g  Time of i t s  r e a l  c h a r a c t e r .
What he r e g a rd s  as a h a b i t  founded upon the  weakness of our
im ag in a t io n  has nov/ been shown to  be v i t a l  to  the  n a tu re  of 
1
Time." We need not go as f a r  as t h a t  t o  agree w i th  him, as 
a g a in s t  Bergson. I t  i s  one of Alexander*s most im portan t  
achievements  t h a t  he should have seen t h a t  a o n e -s ided  g l o r i ­
f i c a t i o n  of  time i s  as u n d e s i r a b le  as i t s  d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  and 
t h a t  time i s ,  a t  l e a s t  e m p i r i c a l l y ,  connected  w i th  space, and 
t h a t  t h i s  conn ec t ion  needs e x p la n a t io n .  For i t  i s  not  s u f f i c i e n t  
to  say : " th e  mutual r e l a t i o n  of Time and Space i s  so c lo se  and 
ra m if ie d  t h a t  they cannot be con s id e red  as s e p a ra te  e n t i t i e s
b u t  only, as  th e  same e n t i t y  d e s c r ib e d  in  terms of i t s  d i f f e r e n t  
2
e l a m e n t s , " Im portan t  though t h i s  in te rdependence  i s ,  in v o lv ing  
Space-Time (and ad m it te d ly  n ev e r  complete ly  dem ons trab le ) ,  t h i s  
i s  one of the  p la c e s  where we are  J u s t i f i e d  in  ask ing  f o r  
f u r t h e r  d e t a i l s .  The mere mention of " space- t im e"  i s  not to  be 
regarded  as "Shut,  Sesame!" to  a l l  q u e s t io n s ,  or  i t  would be 
v i c i o u s .  I t  i s  only by i t s  success  in  c o o rd in a t in g  and p ro v id in g  
a p o s s ib le  e x p la n a t io n  of v a r io u s  q u e s t io n s  t h a t  Alexander*s,  
and any o th e r  m e tap hy s ica l  t h e o ry ,  s tan d s  or f a l l s .  Only so 
can i t s  major premise be j u s t i f i e d .  I t  i s  n o t ,  th en ,  i n c o n s i s t e n t
1. i ,  143* See a l s o  p p . 148-150. 2. i ,  58.
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t o  be in d u lg e n t  w i th  s o - c a l l e d  " o b s c u r i ty "  in  the  no t ion  of 
s p ac e - t im e ,  and a l s o  t o  be r ig o ro u s  in  r e j e c t i n g  o b sc u r i ty  in  
any th in g  e l s e .  Space-time we do not know, u n t i l  Alexander i n t r o ­
duces i t  to  us ,  so we must not  h a s t i l y  c r i t i c i s e :  but space we 
know, and time v/e know, and f a m i l i a r i t y  b reed s ,  i f  not contempt, 
a t  l e a s t  a d e s i r e  t o  c r i t i c i s e .  I t  i s  v i t a l  to  Alexander t h a t  
he should make c l e a r  how space and time are  r e l a t e d  on h i s  
th e o ry ,  s in ce  only so can he j u s t i f y  th e  appearance of Space- 
Time. O bscu r i ty  here  cannot bu t  be f a t a l .
F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  the  connect ion  between tn e  dimensions 
of space and the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t im e ,  an i n t e r e s t i n g  id ea  
which Alexander worked out in  d e t a i l .  Secondly, he expressed  
th e  r e l a t i o n  between time and space more g e n e ra l ly  as being in  
some sense comparable to  th e  r e l a t i o n  between i d e n t i t y  and 
d i v e r s i t y .  ’‘E i t h e r  of t h e  two" (space and time) "we may reg ard  
as p la y in g  th e  p a r t  of i d e n t i t y  to  th e  o t h e r ’ s p a r t  of d i v e r s ­
i t y .  I t  i s  worth w hile  observ ing  t h i s ,  because p re v io u s ly  
Time was shovfn to  apply d i s c r i m i n a t i o n  in  the  o therw ise  b lank  
Space. But Space may equa l ly  w e l l  be rega rded  as in t ro d u c in g  
d i v e r s i t y  in to  Time. For w i th ou t  Space Time would be a bare  
*now* always r e p e a te d ,  and t h e r e  would be no such th in g  as 
d i v e r s i t y . "  And he adds,  s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  "But th e  r e a l i t y  of
Space and Time i s  in  P la to n ic  phrase the  * s u b s ta n c e ’ which
1
c o n ta in s  th e  i d e n t i t y  a n ^ t  he d i v e r s i t y  in  one."
But i t  i s  no t  u n t i l  the  Th ird  Book - and t n i s  i s
1. i , 60.
224
perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t  - t h a t  Alexander r e a l l y  t r e a t s  of th e  
r e l a t i o n s  between time and space ,  in  an o f t -q u o te d  s ta tem en t .  
"Time as a whole and in  i t s  p a r t s  bea rs  to  Space as a whole 
and in  i t s  co rresp on d in g  p a r t s  a r e l a t i o n  analogous to  the  
r e l a t i o n  of  mind to  i t s  e q u iv a le n t  bod i ly  o r  nervous b a s i s ,  
o r  t o  put the  m a t te r  s h o r t l y ,  t h a t  Time i s  the  mind of Space, 
and Space th e  body or Time. . . .  In  any p o i n t - i n s t a n t  the  i n s t a n t  
i s  th e  mind or  so u l  of i t s  p o in t  : i n  a group of p o in t s  t h e r e  i s  
a mind of those  p o i n t s ,  which upon the  primary l e v e l  of  Space- 
Time i t s e l f  i s  the  co r respond ing  time of  t h a t  complex. Qual­
i t i e s  w i l l  be seen to  be the  s p e c i a l  form which on each su c ­
c e s s iv e  l e v e l  of e x i s t e n c e  th e  mind element assumes. In  Space-
1
Time as a whole th e  t o t a l  Time i s  the  mind of t o t a l  Space."
On th e  face  of  i t ,  t h i s  i s  no t  very s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  f o r  though
we have some ( s u f f i c i e n t l y  vague) n o t io n  of the  r e l a t i o n
between mind and body, i t  i s  no t  obvious t h a t  th e  r e l a t i o n
between t ime and space i s  i d e n t i c a l  w i th ,  or  analogous t o ,
t h i s .  Secondly, and more im p o r tan t ,  Alexander h im se l f  admits
tljiat " th e  s ta tem en t  i s  b e t t e r  made in  th e  r e v e rse  and t r u e r
form t h a t  we are  examples of a p a t t e r n  which i s  u n i v e r s a l  and
2
is '  fo l low ed  not only by th in g s  but by Space-Time i t s e l f . "  In  
t h a t  c a s e ,  the  s i m i l a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  between space and t im e,  
and between body and mind a re  s u re ly  b e t t e r  exp ressed  in  terms 
o f  the  former? -  e s p e c i a l l y  as Alexander t a k e s  space and t ime 
as  primary d a ta ,  r a t h e r  than  body or mind. But i f  expressed
1. i i ,  38-9 .  2. i i ,  39.
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in  the  form, "Mind i s  the  time of body, and body the  space 
o f  mind", i t  i s  e v id e n t  t h a t  th e  exac t  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
time and space i s  s t i l l  t o  be sought.  The c e l e b r a t e d  'formula* 
lends  p r e c i s e l y  n o th in g  to  an exact  fo rm u la t io n .  Alexander, 
of  c o u rse ,  never meant i t  as such, and he would urge t h a t  th e  
ex p re s s in g  of a more fundamental i n  terms of a l e s s  fundamental 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  was not  in ten d ed  as c l a r i f i c a t i o n  in  th e  l o g i c a l  
sense ,  bu t  simply as  a metaphor t o  enab le  h i s  p o s i t i o n  to  be 
more e a s i l y  un ders to od .  But n e v e r th e l e s s  I t h in k  t h a t  the  
c r i t i c i s m  s ta n d s ,  a t  l e a s t  in  a modified form. I t  was n e c e s s ­
ary  f o r  Alexander t o  show how time and space are  r e l a t e d  and 
he d id  no t  do so. I t  may be r e p l i e d  t h a t  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  i s  
unique and in d e f i n a b l e .  Up to  a p o in t  ( a s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  
th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  can never be complete ly  adumbrated), the p l e a  
might be accep ted .  But the  w ho lesa le  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of " u l t im a te s "  
i s  u n d e s i r a b le  as le a d in g  to  i n t e l l e c t u a l  d e fea t i sm :  and in  
such case th e  m etap hy s ica l  u t i l i t y  of  "Space-Time" i s  bound 
to  be q u e s t io n e d .
But the  c r i t i c i s m ,  t h a t  Alexander has no t  made c l e a r  
th e  r e l a t i o n  of t ime and space,  does no t  d e t r a c t  a t  a l l  from 
the  i n t e r e s t  and importance of h i s  comparison w i th  the  mind- 
body r e l a t i o n .  As he p o in ts  o u t ,  the  r e l a t i o n s  a re  not i d e n t ­
i c a l ,  s in ce  the  mind-body r e l a t i o n  i s  more developed than  th e  
t im e-sp ace  one -  "Space does not  e x i s t  of  i t s  own r i g h t ,  and 
th e r e f o r e  Time i s  no t  a new q u a l i t y  which emerges from S p a c e . . . .
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The r e l a t i o n  of Time to  Space i s  t h e r e f o r e  something c l o s e r
th a n  t h a t  of be ing  merely analogous to  th e  r e l a t i o n  of mind.
and i t s  n e u r a l  b a s i s ,  and something l e s s  th an  t h a t  of being
i d e n t i c a l  w i th  i t . "  And - " i n  the  m a tr ix  of a l l  e x i s te n c e ,
Space-Time, th e re  i s  an element Time which performs the  same
fu n c t io n  in  r e s p e c t  of  the  o th e r  element Space as mind p e r -
2
forms in  r e s p e c t  o f  i t s  b o d i ly  e q u i v a l e n t . "  F i n a l l y ,  Alex­
ander makes h i s  p o s i t i o n  q u i te  c l e a r ,  and shows t h a t  though 
he i s  open to  th e  im portan t  n eg a t iv e  c r i t i c i s m  above, on the  
p o s i t i v e  s ide  h i s  p o s i t i o n  i s  u n a s s a i l a b l e .  "Our hypo thes is  
i s  merely t h a t  a l i k e  in  the  m a tr ix  of f i n i t e  th in g s  and in  a l l  
f i n i t e  t h i n g s  t h e r e  i s  something of which, on the  h ig h es t  
l e v e l  we know of f i n i t e  e x i s t a n t s ,  mind i s  the  c o u n te rp a r t  o r  
c o r re sp o n d en t .  So f a r  as the  p h i lo so p h e r  i s  concerned w ith  
e m p i r i c a l  f a c t s ,  i t  i s  h i s  b u s in e s s  to  i n d i c a t e  what t h i s  
element i s  on each l e v e l .  On the  bare l e v e l  of Space-Time,
i t  i s  Time. Rather  than  hold  t h a t  Time i s  a form of mind we
3
must say t h a t  mind i s  a form of  Time." To sum up, the  view 
t h a t  time and mind are  analogous i s  a b r i l l i a n t  s p e c u la t io n ,  
coheren t  w i th  the  r e s t  of A lex an d er 's  work, and sugges t ive  to  
many whose views a re  very d i f f e r e n t  from A lex a n d e r 's :  but i t  
does not r e l e a s e  Alexander from the charge of o b s c u r i ty  in  
th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  of  space and t ime, an o b s c u r i ty  which even 
b r i l l i a n t  an a lo g ie s  cannot d i s p e l .  U n t i l  i t  i s  c l e a r e d  up,
1. i i ,  4 0 . 2. i i .  44- 3. i i ,  44.
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t h e r e  i s  no reason  ( a p a r t  from the  n e g a t iv e  one of con s is ten cy )  
why we should  accep t  "Space-Time". I t  may be a changel ing .
Even, however, i f j t  he d o c t r i n e s  of space and time 
had been complete ,  we could  no t  have hoped to  l e a r n  ev e ry th ing  
about "Space-Time." For i t  was the  second g re a t  p o in t  emphas­
ized  in  "Space, Time, and D ei ty"  t h a t  Space-Time i s  more than  
the  mere sum of Space and Time. As a c o r o l l a r y  to  t h i s  i s  the 
g e n e ra l  d o c t r in e  of  "emergence", of  ever-new forms emerging 
from the common m a t r ix .  Space-Time. This  d o c t r in e  i s  of s p e c i a l  
importance ffir t im e ,  s ince  i t  i s  time which, fo l low ing  Bergson, 
Alexander c o n s id e r s  to  be th e  g e n e ra to r  of change and n o v e l ty .  
"Time i s  th e  p r i n c i p l e  of motion and change. . . .  Commonly i t  i s  
p e r s o n i f i e d  in  the  f i g u r e  of a scythe-man mowing down the  o ld  
t o  make room fo r  the  young. This  f ig u re  r e p r e s e n t s  r a t h e r  the  
t r a n s i t o r i n e s s  of th in g s  th an  the  r e a l  n a tu re  of Time. . . .  I t  
f o r g e t s  t h a t  the same Time which mows down the  g r a s s  produces
the  new crop .  . . .T im e  i s  in  t r u t h  the  a b id in g  p r i n c i p l e  of im-
1
permanence which i s  the  r e a l  c r e a t o r . "  Nobody d i s p u te s  the  
conn ec t ion  of time w ith  change: i t  i s  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of the  
n o t io n  of c r e a t i n g  new forms, of n o v e l ty ,  t h a t  i s  e s p e c i a l ly  
i n t e r e s t i n g  he re .  In  a sense ,  of  co u rse ,  a l l  change i s  n o v e l ty ,  
and a v e r b a l  case could  be made out f o r  anyone who he ld  t h a t  
th e  re -a rrangem ent  of a hand of cards  was a n o v e l ty .  But i t  i s  
more convenien t  to  keep the  wide sense of ' change ' as in c lu d in g
1. i i ,  48. See a l s o  i i ,  337. Time " i s  c r e a t i v e :  something crimes 
i n to  be ing  which be fo re  was n o t . "
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mere s h u f f l i n g ,  and t o  use 'n ov e l ty *  i n  a narrow er sense which
ex c lud es  s h u f f l i n g .  Nobody doub ts  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  changes.  'But
have
s c i e n t i s t s  and phi losophers/^from  the  t ime of th e  Greeks been 
d iv id e d  on th e  q u e s t i o n  whether  a l l  changes a re  u l t im a t e ly  
r e d u c ib le  t o  s h u f f l i n g s ,  or  whether  an element o f  no v e l ty  some­
t im es  e n t e r s  in.Atomism, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  adm its  t h a t  th e r e  a re  
changes,  bu t  r e j e c t s  n o v e l ty :  while  on t h e  o th e r  hand t h e o r i e s  
o f  emergence i n s i s t  t h a t  the  a t tem p t  t o  t r e a t  t h e  u n iv e rse  as 
a l a r g e  sum in  a r i t h m e t i c  to  whiclî^he answer i s  always th e  
same i s  a m is ta k e .  Ordinary language can g ive l i t t l e  h e lp  here ,  
For  our usage of  " t h i s  i s  a new th in g "  and " t h i s  i s  an o ld  
t h i n g  i n  a d i f f e r e n t  gu ise"  depends upon p r a c t i c a l  c o n s id e r ­
a t i o n s ,  and not  upon l o g i c a l  ones. Even when everyone would 
admit on r e f l e c t i o n  t h a t  s h u f f l i n g  i s  a l l  t h a t  has  happened, 
th e  r e s u l t i n g  m ix tu re  may p o s s e s s  p r a c t i c a l  u t i l i t y ,  and so i s  
g iven  a name of i t s  own. We t a l k  of ' mincemeat ' r a t h e r  th a n  of 
' c u r r a n t s , r a i s i n s ,  s u e t ,  and t h e  r e s t ' :  we say o f  a d i s t r i b ­
u t i o n  a t  b r id g e  t h a t  A has a good hand, B and C moderate ones ,  
and D a poor  one. But the  mincemeat i s  e x a c t ly  th e  same as th e  
m ixture  o f  i t s  v a r io u s  i n g r e d i e n t s  : th e  new name does not mean 
a new t h i n g ,  i f  by "new th in g "  i s  meant, no t  th e  s l ip s h o d  
commonsense usage ,  but something o th e r  th an  what has  a l re ad y
lo The extreme view t h a t  t job re  i s  always novelty^., even in  s u c ­
c e s s iv e  rea r rangem en ts  of  t h r e e  c a r d s ,  i s  r a r e l y  he ld ,  and 
depends upon a h y p o s t a t i s e d  view o f  time as " c r e a t i v e " ,  
even i n  a vacuum.
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been g iv e n .  The a to m is t  i s  q u ick  t o  t a k e  advantage of t h i s  
i l l o g i c a l i t y  i n  o rd in a ry  u sage ,  and he p o i n t s  out t h a t  mince­
meat i s  'n o t h i n g  b u t ' th e  m ix tu re  of i t s  i n g r e d i e n t s .  In  a 
s i m i l a r  way, he c o n f id e n t l y  a s s e r t s ,  every change i s  the  r e s u l t  
o f  s h u f f l i n g .  The U niverse  i s  a g i g a n t i c  pack of  ca rd s  and the  
changes t h a t  we t a l k  of in  t h i n g s  a re  only d i f f e r e n t  c o l lo c a t io n s .  
I t  may be o b je c te d  t h a t  such a view would not  account f o r  th e  
o r d e r l i n e s s  and coherence of  t h e  w orld ,  and t h a t  th e  changes 
which o ccu r  are  no t  th e  r e s u l t  of mere haphazard  s h u f f l i n g ,  but 
a re  connected  w i th  one a n o th e r .  N e v e r th e l e s s ,  the  a to m is t  need 
n o t  be,  as  t h i s  argument would appear t o  assume, a tysffhist. On 
th e  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  i s  q u i te  c o n s i s t e n t  to  b e l i e v e  in  atomism and 
de term in ism  t o g e t h e r .  The use of th e  v/ord ' s h u f f l i n g *  here i s  
perhaps m is le ad in g  : bu t  a l l  t h a t  i t  need invo lve  i s  t h a t  the  
number of th e " c a rd s "  remains unchanged, w ithou t  ex c lud ing  th e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  s h u f f l i n g  p rocess  i s  one in  
which c e r t a i n  changes de term ine  o t h e r s .  E v id e n t ly ,  t h i s  t o l e r ­
ance of de te rm in ism  makes atomism much more a t t r a c t i v e  to  
s c i e n t i s t s  th an  i t  would be i f  i t  p o s t u l a t e d  only chance con­
c u r r e n c e s .  One argument,  th e n ,  a g a in s t  atomism, t h a t  i t  i s  i n ­
com pat ib le  w i th  c a u s a l i t y ,  cannot s t a n d .
1. Some such view i s  assumed in  ch e m is t ry ,  and ind eed ,  the  
g e n e r a l  atomic view i s  an e x te n s io n  from th e  "Water i s  
hydrogen and oxygen" of ch em is t ry .  In  what fo l lo w s ,  I use 
"atomism" in  a very  . .general  sense ,  and no t  i n  a s p e c i f i c a l l y  
chem ica l  one.
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But, i t  may be u rg ed ,  wnereas th e  p l a i n  man g iv es  a 
s e p a ra te  name to  any c o l l e c t i o n  t h a t  has p a r t i c u l a r  u t i l i t y  f o r  
him, even i f  i t  i s  g r a n te d  t h a t  the  s o - c a l l e d  "new th in g "  i s  
merely a reg ro u p in g  of th e  o l d ,  the  a to m is t  ru s h e s  to  the  o th e r  
extreme, and r a t h e r  trian be c o n te n t  w i th  say ing  "This  i s  some­
t h i n g  new", goes to  e n d le s s  t r o u b l e  to  e x h i b i t  i t  a s  a r e g ro u p ­
in g .  And, on the  f a c e  of  i t ,  th e  t r o u b le  seems i l l - s p e n t ,  i f  
as  u s u a l ly  happens,  the  a to m is t  cannot c om plete ly  re so lv e  tn e  
givGPn i n t o  known e lem en ts .  To say "M i s  made of  ax +  b y + c z "  i s  
a l l  very  w e l l  as long  as we know what x, y , and z a r e :  but i f  
even one o f  th e se  i s  unknown, th e  whole q u e s t io n  o f  no ve l ty  
c rops  up ag a in  w i th  r e g a rd  to  z ,  th e  unknown. The s c e p t i c  can 
so e a s i l y  r e t o r t :  "You c a n ' t  t e l l  me what z i s ,  and I f in d  no 
re a so n  to  b e l i e v e  i n  your  h y p o t h e t i c a l  z : i t  seems to  me t h a t  I 
might as w e l l  admit n o v e l ty ,  i n  M, f i r s t  as l a s t .  I admit t h a t  
I  can n ev e r  d isp ro v e  what you say ,  f o r  every time t h a t  you a re  
a t t a c k e d  you s h i f t  yo u r  ground. I f  on one occas ion  the  promised 
eq u iv a len c e  of M w i th  i t s  ' e l e m e n t s '  does not m a t e r i a l i s e ,  you 
p o s t u l a t e  a n o th e r  'unknown',  and approximate ever  c l o s e r  to  tne  
d e s i r e d  e q u iv a le n c e .  But u n t i l  you re a c h  i t  - i f  you ever  do - 
tn e  t h e o r e t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t y  i s  as  g r e a t  f o r  you as i t  i s  r o r  me." 
The s c e p t i c  i s  r i g h t  h e r e ,  f o r  the  q u e s t io n  a t  i s s u e  i s  not 
w nether M i s  p a r t i a l l y  r e s o l v a b le  i n t o  known e lem en ts ,  and i f  
even a sm al l  d isc re p an cy  rem ains ,  tne  l o g i c a l  consequences of 
t h e  adm iss ion  of n o v e l ty  are  as momentous as  e v e r .
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Meyerson d e a l s  in  g r e a t  d e t a i l  w i th  th e  p o s t u l a t e  
o f  I d e n t i t y  in  s c i e n c e :  and he shows, g iv in g  d e f i n i t e  examples, 
now s c ien c e  seeks by s u c c e s s iv e  approx im ations  to ^ ea ch  the 
i d e a l  or e q u a l i t y  between l e f t  and r i g h t  hand s i d e s  of a 
chem ica l  "equation .* '  “beyond and b en ea th  th e  produced phenom­
enon . . .  we b e l i e v e  t h a t  we see something e l s e :  we b e l i e v e ,  we 
a t  l e a s t  wish to  b e l i e v e ,  t h a t  th e  t o t a l i t y  of th e  a n te c e d e n ts  
i f  we Here ab le  to  embrace them a t  a g lance  and re co g n ise
t n e i r  i n t im a te  n a t u r e ,  would be r e co g n ised  as  eq u a l  to  th e
2
t o t a l i t y  o f  th e  consequen ts  and i d e n t i c a l  w i th  i t . "  But,  a s  
he p o in te d  o u t ,  p r i n c i p l e s  o f  c o n s e rv a t io n  are  c o n t r a d i c t e d  
by th e  d i s s i p a t i o n  o f  h e a t .  The h e a t ,  once d i s s i p a t e d ,  i s  l o s t :  
so t h a t  th e  l a s t  s t a t e  i s  n o t ,  as what I have c a l l e d  'atomism* 
assumes, q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  eq ua l  t o  th e  f i r s t .  Th is  i s  th e  f i r s t  
r e a l  check to  atomism.
Secondly, and more p o s i t i v e l y  from th e  p o in t  o f  view 
o f  th e  u p h o ld e r  o f  n o v e l ty ,  t h e r e  i s  a c e r t a i n  c l a s s  of o b j e c t s  
f o r  which a n a l y s i s  i n t o  * elements* i s  c u r io u s ly  i n s u f f i c i e n t .  
The whole forms a u n i t y  which i s  i n t e g r a l ,  and which i s  more 
t h a n  th e  mere sum o f  i t s  p a r t s .  L iv ing  m a t t e r  forms the  most 
f a m i l i a r  example o f  t h i s .  A l i v i n g  body i s  not merely head 
p lu s  arms p lu s  t r u n k  p lu s  l e g s :  i t  i s  a l s o  -  l i v i n g .  The 
an a to m is t  who d i v i d e s  the  body may make an exac t  in v en to ry  of  
t h e  s e p a r a t e  p a r t s :  bu t  l e t  him t r y  to  pu t  them t o g e t h e r  a g a in
1. In  " i d e n t i t y  and R e a l i ty "  passim.
2 . Op.c i t .  p . 226.
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e x a c t ly  a s  th ey  were ,  and he w i l l  f a i l .  "L i fe  has  gone out of
th e  body ,"  we say, ou r  language v a in ly  ap in g  ou r  a t o m i s t i c
p r e p o s s e s s io n s .  But what and where i s  t h i s  ' l i f e * ?  The an a to m is t
made a l i s t  o f  th e  p a r t s :  ' l i f e *  was n o t  on t h a t  l i s t .  The
t r u t h  o f  t h e  m a t t e r  i s  t h a t  we cannot t a l k  of  ' l i f e *  as  i f  i t
were a s e l f - e x i s t e n t  enti ty .^  a m a t e r i a l  element t h a t  goes ,  l i k e
carbon ,  t o  th e  making of John Smith. On t h e  c o n t r a r y ,  John
Smith i s  more th a n  th e  mere sum of h i s  p a r t s :  he i s  a l i v e ,  and
he i s  an o rg an ic  u n i t y .  Examples of  i n t e g r a l  w holes ,  though
most f a m i l i a r  i n ,  a r e  no t  c o n f in e d  t o ,  l i v i n g  o rgan ism s.  Organic
u n i t i e s  a r e  well-known in  e t h i c s ;  and i n  works o f  a r t  t h e i r
1
p a r t s  a re  fu sed  i n t o  a s i n g l e  whole.
"Turn away no more 
Why w i l t  th o u  t u r n  away?
The s t a r r y  f l o o r  
The watery  shore
I s  g iv en  th e e  t i l l  th e  b re a k  of  d ay ."
I t  would be madness t o  a t tem p t  to  a n a ly s e  t h i s  i n t o  
" p a r t s " .  Meaning, ( e s p e c i a l l y  perhaps  a e s t h e t i c  meaning) no more 
th an  l i f e  i s  t o  be i n t e r p r e t e d  in  te rm s of an a t o m i s t i c  ad d ing -  
machine .
There a r e ,  t h e n ,  two s e p a ra te  grounds f o r  r e j e c t i n g  
atomism: th e  f i r s t  i s ,  t h a t  i t  does no t  a l low f o r  i r r e p a r a b l e  
l o s s ;  th e  second i s ,  t h a t  i t  cannot measure i n c a l c u l a b l e  g a in .
I have d e a l t  w i th  t h e  f i r s t  f o r  completeness* sake ,  though 
Alexander i s  c h i e f l y  concerned  w i th  th e  l a t t e r ,  a s  i t  i s  a good
1. Compare th e  r e c e n t  newspaper c o n t ro v e r sy  on " th e  i n e v i t a b l e "
Bachl His d e c r i e r s  d id  no t  appear  to  r e a l i s e  - t h e  in v o lu n ta ry  
compliment.
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o p p o r tu n i ty  g e t  c l e a r  on th e  g e n e r a l  q u e s t io n  what i s  
in vo lved  by n o v e l ty  as  aga ins t-  atomism, b e fo re  c o n s id e r in g  
A le x a n d e r ' s  s p e c i f i c  v iews.
I t  should  be n o t i c e d  t h a t  th e  two r e j e c t i o n s  of  atom­
ism are  d i s t i n c t ,  and t h a t  only th e  l a t t e r  in v o lv e s  n o v e l ty .  
C onsequen t ly ,  i t  would be no argument a g a i n s t  n o v e l ty  as such,  
i f  a chem is t  were t o  d i s c o v e r  t h a t  th e  energy ' l o s t '  i n  c o o l in g  
was r e a l l y  co nse rv ed ,  and t h a t  th e  p r o c e s s  of  th e  d e g r a d a t io n  
o f  ene rgy ,  l e a d in g  u l t i m a t e l y  t o  th e  " h e a t  d e a th " ,  need no 
lo n g e r  be f e a r e d .  B u t ,  on th e  o th e r  hand,  as long a s  th e  Second 
Law of Thermodynamics i s  t a k e n  s e r i o u s l y  -  as lo ng ,  t h a t  i s ,  
as  th e  i d e a l  of a f r i c t i o n l e s s  machine of  p e r f e c t  e f f i c i e n c y  
i s  r e g a rd e d  as a m a them at ica l  f i c t i o n  -  i n d i r e c t  suppor t  i s  
g iv en  t o  th e  u p h o ld e rs  o f  n o v e l ty  i n  making atomism l e s s  
p l a u s i b l e .  I t s  r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  a tom ism 's  g r e a t e s t  advan tage ,  and 
t h a t  e x p l a i n s  the  a t t r a c t i o n  i t  has  had f o r  s c i e n t i s t s .  But 
s c i e n c e ,  as  soon as  i t  d e a l s  w i th  th e  c o n c r e t e ,  i s  fo rc e d  
t o  i n t ro d u c e  makeweights and camouflag ing  f a c t o r s  such as 
" f r i c t i o n " ,  atomism im media te ly  lo s e s  a g r e a t  p a r t  of i t s  ad ­
v an ta g e .  The d e g r a d a t io n  of en e rg y ,  t h e n ,  can be used as an 
i n d i r e c t  argument f o r  n o v e l ty  ; i t s  d e n i a l  can neve r  be an 
argument a g a i n s t  i t .
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  cannot  be den ied  t h a t  th e  d i f f i c u l t y ,  
i f  no t  i m p o s s i b i l i t y ,  of f o rm u la t in g  any d o c t r i n e  of no v e l ty
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in  a l o g i c a l  form i s  a t  f i r s t  s i g h t  a g rave  d i s a d v a n ta g e • We
have t o  be very su re  of  o u r s e lv e s  b e fo re  we can a f f o r d  to
ig no re  t h e  maxim "ex n i h i l o  n i h i l  f i t " ,  and t o  t u r n  a d ea f  e a r
t o  th e  d e v a s t a t i n g  q u e s t i o n ,  "By what l o g i c a l  p ro c e s s  do you
a r r i v e  a t  th e  id e a  o f  n o v e l ty ? "  I t  simply cannot be answered:
th e  n o t io n  of  n o v e l ty  i s  i r r e d u c i b l e  t o  th e  laws o f  l o g i c .  By
h y p o th e s i s ,  no p o s s i b l e  com bina t ion  of known p rem ises  can
y i e l d  the  c o n c lu s io n ,  f o r  t h e r e  i s  fundam enta l  d i s c o n t i n u i t y
between them. This  c e r t a i n l y  w i l l  not  s a t i s f y  t h e  l o g i c i a n ,
and he o b j e c t s .  (Sometimes w i th  re a so n ,  when th e  e v o l u t i o n i s t
ad op ts  s t a r t l i n g  methods to  d i s p l a y  h i s  fu n dam en ta l ly  a l o g i c a l
1
p o s i t i o n  as  be ing  l o g i c a l l y  d e m o n s t rab le .  ) But t h e r e  i s  no 
reaso n  why th e  e v o l u t i o n i s t  shou ld  th u s  d e l i v e r  n i m self  bound 
i n t o  tn e  hands of  t h e  enemy : once he t r i e d  to  f i g h t  the b a t t l e  
on l o g i c a l  grounds,  ne i s  done ro r .  On th e  o th e r  hand, as 
a g a in s t  t h e  d i s a d v a n ta g e  of i r r e d u c i b i l i t y  to  l o g i c ,  he has  
t h e  very  s t ro n g  weapon of a b i l i t y  t o  p o in t  t o  examples of  
n o v e l ty  in  the  w o r ld .  By t h i s  I do no t  merely mean what common 
sense r e g a r d s ,  f o r  p r a c t i c a l  p u rp o s e s , as a ' new t h i n g ' :
1. As when L e ib n iz  hoped, by c o n s t r u c t i n g  an a r i tn rn e t i c  w i tn  
only th e  two numbers 0 and 1, t o  e x p l a i n  c r e a t i o n  mathe­
m a t i c a l l y  - e v i d e n t l y ,  th e  whole p o i n t  i s  in  t h e  passage 
from 0 to  1, no t  in  th e  subsequen t  p ro c e d u re . Or, worse, 
when Burke c la im ed  ( i n  "The Mystery of L i f e " )  t h a t  from un­
r e a l i t y  we can deduce r e a l i t y ,  j u s t  as  from i  (an imaginary 
number) we can p a s s  to  -1  (a  r e a l  number).  N eed less  to  say ,  
th e  ' p a s s a g e ' i s  tn e  o tn e r  way' round: *i* i s  only a mathe­
m a t i c a l  d ev ice  f o r  d e a l in g  w i th  a problem t h a t  was a l r e a d y  
. the  r e .
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f a r  s t r o n g e r  examples can be t a k e n  or  l i v i n g  organ ism s,  of  
a r t i s t i c  c r e a t i o n s  ( th e  te rm  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t ) ,  and of v a lu e s .
I f  th e s e  a re  no t  s u f f i c i e n t  to  g ive  him co n f id en ce  to  ig n o re  
l o g i c ,  and t o  a s s e r t  bo ld ly  th e  c o u n te r c la im  t h a t  th e  a b s t r a c t  
r u l e s  or l o g ic  a re  i n s u f f i c i e n t  t o  accoun t  f o r  c o n c re te  r e a l i t y ,  
th e n  a l l  t h e o r i e s  o f  emergence must break  down.
A l l  t h i s  may seem a f a r  cry  from "Space, Time, and 
D e i t y . "  I  have, however, been t r y i n g  to  make c l e a r  tn e  p o s i t i o n  
o f  emergence w i th  r e g a r d  t o  l o g i c ,  and to  show t h a t  though a 
b e l i e f  i n  n o v e l ty  can  n eve r  be l o g i c a l l y  j u s t i f i e d ,  t h e r e  a re  
f a i r l y  s t r o n g  e m p i r i c a l  grounds f o r  ig n o r in g  l o g i c .  The v i t a l  
q u e s t i o n ,  which each  must s o lv e  f o r  h i m s e l f ,  i s  -  Are t h e s e  
grounds s u f f i c i e n t l y  s t ro n g ?  I f  you answer.  Yes, you must be 
r e s ig n e d  n eve r  to  be ab le  t o  r e f u t e  y o u r  opponen ts ,  and n ev e r  
t o  be a b le  t o  r e a c h  agreement w i th  them. But once you have 
t a k e n  th e  v i t a l  s t e p ,  you r  way i s  c l e a r  t o  u s in g  n o v e l ty  i n  
alm ost  any way you l i k e ,  f o r  no f u r t h e r  t h e o r e t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t y  
i s  in v o lv e d .  That i s  why iÿ  h as  seemed t o  me im p o r tan t  t o  d e a l  
i n  d e t a i l  w i th  th e  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s  on which a l l  t h e o r i e s  of 
emergence a re  b ased ,  i n  o rd e r  t o  avo id  m isco n cep t io n s  and t o o -  
f a c i l e  c r i t i c i s m s  on th e  s c o re  o f  ' i r r a t i o n a l i t y * .  The r e s t  
can  be more q u ick ly  d e a l t  w i t h ,  s in ce  i n  s p i t e  o f  th e  b r i l l i a n c e  
and o r i g i n a l i t y  of  A le x a n d e r ' s  s p e c u l a t i o n s ,  no new c o n s i d e r a ­
t i o n s  a r i s e .  The u n iv e r s e  o f  Space-Time i s  c r e a t i v e ,  and i s  
c o n s t a n t l y  evo lv ing  eve r  new forms, o f  which th e  n ex t  h ig h e r  
t o  the  h i g h e s t  y e t  a t t a i n e d  i s  D e i ty .  But even D e i ty  i s  capab le
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o f  f u r t h e r  e v o l u t i o n .  "There i s  a n i s u s  i n  Space-Time which, 
a s  i t  h as  borne i t s  c r e a t u r e s  fo rw ard  th ro u g h  m a t t e r  and l i f e  
t o  mind, w i l l  b e a r  them fo rw ard  to  some h ig h e r  l e v e l  o f  ex­
i s t e n c e .  There i s  n o th in g  i n  mind which r e q u i r e s  us to  s to p  
and say t h i s  i s  t h e  h i g h e s t  e m p i r i c a l  q u a l i t y  which Time can 
produce from now th ro u g h o u t  t h e  i n f i n i t e  Time to  come. I t  i s  
only th e  l a s t  e m p i r i c a l  q u a l i t y  which we who a re  minds happen 
t o  know. Time i t s e l f  compels us to  t h i n k  o f  a l a t e r  b i r t h  of 
Time. . . .  D ei ty  i s  t h e  nex t  h i g h e r  e m p i r i c a l  q u a l i t y  to  mind, 
which th e  u n iv e r s e  i s  engaged i n  b r in g in g  to  b i r t h .  That t h e  
u n iv e r s e  i s  p reg n an t  w i th  such a q u a l i t y  we are  s p e c u l a t i v e l y  
a s s u re d .  What t h a t  q u a l i t y  i s  we cannot know; s t i l l  l e s s  can
we con tem pla te  i t .  Our human a l t a r s  s t i l l  a re  r a i s e d  t o  th e  
1
unknown God." And, " i n  th e  h i e r a r c h y  o f  q u a l i t i e s  th e  nex t
h i g h e r  q u a l i t y  t o  th e  h i g h e s t  a t t a i n e d  i s  d e i t y .  God i s  th e
whole u n iv e r s e  engaged i n  p ro c e s s  towards th e  emergence of
t h i s  new q u a l i t y ,  and r e l i g i o n  i s  th e  s en t im en t  i n  us t h a t  we
a re  drawn towards  him, and c a u g h t  i n  th e  movement o f  th e  world
2
t o  a h ig h e r  l e v e l  o f  e x i s t e n c e . "
F i n a l l y ,  t h i s  n i s u s  i s  conce ived  as bound up w i th  th e
n o t io n  o f  t im e .  "Time i s  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  g ro w th :" i t  i s  " th e
'  4a b id in g  p r i n c i p l e  o f  impermanence which i s  t h e  r e a l  c r e a t o r .  
Again, " th e  r e s t l e s s  movement o f  Time . . .  i s  no t  t  he mere 
t u r n i n g  o f  a s q u i r r e l  i n  i t s  cage ,  but th e  n i s u s  towards a
1.  i i ,  3 4 6 - 7 .  2 .  i i ,  4 2 9 .  3 .  i i ,  3 4 6 .  4 .  i i , 4 8 .
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h i g h e r  b i r t h . " T h is  view o f  t ime as  e s s e n t i a l l y  c r e a t i v e  has  
much in  common w i th  t h a t  of Bergson, and i t  i s  an ex ceed in g ly  
a t t r a c t i v e  view. I f  we dec ide  t o  f l o u t  l o g i c  and admit the  
r e a l i t y  of  p ro c e s s  and n o v e l t y ,  i t  i s  i n  keeping w i th  economy 
t o  ho ld  t h a t  th e s e  a r e  co n nec ted  -  i t  g iv e s  us one s i n  of  i r ­
re v e ren c e  r a t h e r  t h a n  two! In  common w i t h  Bergson, to o ,  A lex­
an d e r  s t r e s s e s  r a t h e r  th e  c r e a t i v i t y  of t ime th a n  i t s  d e s t r u c t -  
ivéh,@ss. C e r t a i n l y ,  as  he s a y s ,  th e  view of  t ime as  a d e s t r u c t i v e  
fo rc e  i s  r a t h e r  too  much emphasized, and b o th  a s p e c t s  should  
be borne i n  mind. But i t  might perhaps  be h e ld  a s  a c r i t i c i s m  
a g a i n s t  him t h a t  he went too  f a r  in  th e  o p p o s i te  d i r e c t i o n :  
and t h a t  he might have s t r e n g th e n e d  h i s  p o s i t i o n  a g a in s t  th e  
a to m is t s  by c o n s id e r in g  the  d e g r a d a t io n  t h a t  t ime b r i n g s .  ( I t  
i s  no a c c i d e n t ,  i t  may be remarked in  p a s s i n g ,  t h a t  from the  
s c i e n t i s t  * s p o in t  of view, Edding ton  has  connec ted  th e  i n c r e a s e  
o f  en t ropy  w i th  th e  p a s s in g  of t im e . )  There i s  much to  be s a id  
f o r  th e  commonsense view t h a t  t ime b o th  c r e a t e s  a n d  d e s t r o y s .  
T h i s ,  however, i s  a c r i t i c i s m  of s l i g h t  account i n  comparison 
w i th  th e  sp lend ou r  of Alexander* s c o n c e p t io n  o f  t h e  u n iv e rse  
o f  Space-Time e v o lv in g  ev e r  h ig h e r  and h ig h e r  forms. There can 
be no doubt t h a t ,  even to  th o s e  who do n o t  accep t  the  p rem ises  
o f  A lexander*s  m etaphys ic ,  h i s  work i s  o f  the  h i g h e s t  im p o r t ­
ance .
1. i i ,  348.
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CHAPTER V II .  MG.TAGGART.
The d e n i a l  of r e a l i t y  to  time i s  by no means a 
s t a r t l i n g  r e s u l t  f o r  anyone t o  ach iev e :  i t  i s  a lm ost  a common­
p lace  i n  p h i lo so p h y .  Parmenides and P l a t o  among th e  Greeks : 
Spinoza and L e ib n iz  and p o s s i b l y  Kant among th e  l e a d e r s  of 
modern th o u g h t  : Hegel and B rad ley  i n  s t i l l  more r e c e n t  t im es  - 
a l l  have d en ie d ,  w i t h  more o r  l e s s  vehemence, th e  c la im s o f  
t ime to  be reckoned among th e  a t t r i b u t e  s.? of  R e a l i t y .  Me T aggar t  
has  been l i k e  most o th e r  i d e a l i s t s  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t .  But where 
he i s  i n  v e ry  s t r i k i n g  c o n t r a s t  to  th e  o t h e r s  i s ,  t h a t  he i s  
no t  c o n te n t  merely t o  deny t h e  r e a l i t y  of Time -  though  h i s  
arguments i n  th e  im p o r ta n t  c h a p t e r  in  th e  second volume of th e  
"Nature o f  E x i s te n c e "  a re  w id e ly  known and o f t e n  quoted -  bu t  
t h a t  he s ee s  th e  need  a l s o  o f  e x p la in in g  how we have (as  we 
u n q u e s t io n a b ly  dp have) th e  i l l u s i o n  t h a t  makes us a t t r i b u t e  
tem po ra l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  to  e x i s t e n t s .  I t  i s  in  t h i s  t h a t  h i s  
g r e a t  o r i g i n a l i t y  c o n s i s t s .
McTaggart*s remarks on time t h e r e f o r e  f a l l  under two 
head ings  -  f i r s t ,  h i s  p ro o f  t h a t  time i s  u n r e a l :  and secondly ,  
h i s  e x p la n a t io n  o f  th e  "m isp e rc e p t io n "  by which we a t t r i b u t e  
tem p o ra l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  to  a s e r i e s  t h a t  i s  r e a l l y  n o n - tem po ra l ,  
and th e  consequences  of  t h a t  e x p la n a t io n .  The second, c o n s t r u c t ­
ive  p a r t  i s  n a t u r a l l y  i n  te rm s of h i s  own system, and cou ld  no t  
be ac c e p te d  w i th o u t  m o d i f i c a t i o n ,  i f  a t  a l l ,  by th o se  who
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r e j e c t e d  h i s  p r i n c i p l e s  ( a s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  o f  D ete rm in ing  
C orre sp on d en ce ) .  The f i r s t ,  on th e  o t h e r  hand, s t a r t s  from 
commonsense views o f  t ime i n  an a t tem p t  t o  show t h a t  t ime i s ,  
i n  B r a d l e y ' s  p h r a s e ,  " r i d d l e d  w i th  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s " ,  and i s  i n ­
dependen t  o f  t h e  main t e n e t s  o f  M cT ag g ar t 's  sys tem , so t h a t  
t h e  cogency o f  i t s  argument can  be a d m i t te d  even by th o s e  n o t  
i n  agreem ent w i th  h i s  v iew s.  But t h e  g r e a t e r  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  of  
t h e  second p a r t  -  s in c e  i t  may be f a l s e  and th e  f i r s t  t r u e ,  
b u t  i f  t h e  f i r s t  i s  f a l s e  th e  second must a l s o  be f a l s e  -  does 
n o t  d e t r a c t  from i t s  im portance  as  an amazingly w e l l  th o u g h t -  
th ro u g h  d o c t r i n e .
1
M cT aggart 's  arguments  i n  th e  c h a p te r  on Time a re  
d i r e c t e d  t o  show t h a t  the  n o t i o n  of Time i s  f u l l  o f  c o n t r a d i c ­
t i o n s ,  and t h a t  t h e s e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  a r e  no t  r e s o l v a b l e ,  b u t  
e s s e n t i a l  and u l t i m a t e ,  as  long  as we c o n t in u e  t o  use  th e  
n o t i o n  o f  t im e .  He assumes t h a t  n o th in g  which i s  s e l f - c o n t r a ­
d i c t o r y  and im p o s s ib le  t o  th o u g h t  can e x i s t ,  and hence he con­
c lu d e s  t h a t  t ime does  no t  e x i s t .
We commonly d i s t i n g u i s h  p o s i t i o n s  i n  t im e  as  hav ing  
p l a c e s  i n  th e  s e r i e s  g e n e ra te d  by th e  r e l a t i o n  " e a r l i e r  t h a n " ,  
( o r ,  c o n v e r s e l y ,  " l a t e r  t h a n " ) ,  o r  in  t h e  s e r i e s  p a s t - p r e s e n t -  
f u t u r e .  The l a t t e r  McTaggart c a l l s  t h e  A s e r i e s ,  th e  former
th e  B s e r i e s .  A l though  th e  d i s t i n c t i o n s  t o  which th e  B s e r i e s
2
g iv e s  r i s e  a re  perm anent ,  and th o s e  o f  th e  A s e r i e s  a re  no t  so,
1. R e p r in te d  w i th  a few a l t e r a t i o n s  from "Mind", 1908.
2. M e .T a g g a r t ' s  own lang uage .  He means by - "permanent" t h a t  " i f  
an^ e v e n t  i s  e v e r  e a r l i e r  th a n  a n o th e r  even t  i t  i s  always
p e a r l i e r .  * "Nature  o f  E x i s t e n c e "  s e c . 305 (my i t a l i c s ) .
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( s in c e  of  two e v e n t s ,  L and M, th e  fo rm er may be p a s t  and th e
l a t t e r  p r e s e n t ,  y e t  a t  a l a t e r  t im e ,  b o th  a re  p a s t ) ,  th e  A
s e r i e s  i s  more fundam enta l  t o  t ime th a n  th e  B s e r i e s .  McTaggart
goes on t o  prove t h a t  the  A s e r i e s  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t o  t im e ,  and
th e  B s e r i e s  only d e r i v a t i v e ,  s i n c e ,  he a s s e r t s ,  change Xsl
e s s e n t i a l  t o  t im e ,  and t h e  B s e r i e s  a lone  cou ld  n ev e r  g ive
1
change. T h is  p a r t  o f  h i s  argument may be g r a n te d ,  and a l s o  h i s  
c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  th e  A s e r i e s  i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  t im e .  The second 
s ta g e  i s  t o  show t h a t  th e  A s e r i e s  i s  i n h e r e n t l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,  
o r  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h a t  t o  a v o id  t h e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  we must i n ­
dulge i n  a v i c i o u s  c i r c l e  o r  a v i c io u s  i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s .
P a s t ,  p r e s e n t  and f u t u r e  a re  n o t  q u a l i t i e s  o f  o b j e c t s
OjJ
o r  e v e n ts  M k e red  and hard  a r e .  T h is  i s  u n d e n ia b le .  T h e r e f o r e , 
says  McTaggart,  th e y  a re  r e l a t i o n s  -  th e  r e l a t i o n s  i n  which
e v e n ts  s t a n d  to  something  o u t s i d e  th e  t ime s e r i e s .  This  unknown
term  canno t  be i n  t im e ,  y e t  i t  p la y s  an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  in  th e  
d e te rm in in g  of  t e m p o ra l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s .  McTaggart * s f i r s t  
c r i t i c i s m  i s  t h a t  t h i s  term shou ld  be d i s c o v e r e d ,  and t h a t  i f  
t h i s  p ro v es  im p o s s ib le ,  as  he s u s p e c t s ,  i t  r e f l e c t s  upon th e  
g en u in en e s s  of the  A s e r i e s .  Seocindly, p a s t ,  p r e s e n t ,  and 
f u t u r e  a re  in c o m p a t ib le  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  y e t  every  event  has  
them a l l  -  an obvious  c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  And# McTaggart c o n t in u e s ,  
we cannot a v o id  t h i s  in  a way ana logous  to  t h a t  we should
1. There can be no change w i th o u t  t im e .  I t  may be h e ld  t h a t  the
conve rse  does n o t  a l s o  h o ld ,  s ince  we can t a l k  of th in g s  
en d u r in g  unchanged th ro u g h  t im e .  But* McTaggart a s s e r t s ,  
t h e r e  cou ld  be no time i f  n o th in g  changed. T h is  a s s e r t i o n ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  cannot  be e i t h e r  proved o r  r e f u t e d .  But p robab ly  
i t  i s  j u s t i f i e d .
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take  In  e x p la in in g  the prima f a c i e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  of ”X i s  red"  
and ”X IS not red"  - t h a t  the  re d n ess  and the  no n -redn ess  a re  
a t  d j T f e r e n t  t im e s .  B esides  committ ing the  f a l l a c y  of r e g a r d ­
in g  p a s t ,  p r e s e n t ,  and f u t u r e  as i f  they  were q u a l i t i e s ,  i t  
i s  u s e l e s s  to  b r in g  in  " a t  d i f f e r e n t  t im es"  because i t  begs 
the  q u e s t io n  a t  once .  I f  i t  i s  r e g a rd e d  as no t  q u e s t i o n - b e g ­
g in g ,  we must f u r t h e r  a n a ly se  what we mean by say in g ,  "M i s  
p r e s e n t  and L i p  p a s t  i s  f u t u r e  to M i p  f u t u r e  and L i p  p r e s e n t  
which s t a r t s  us o f f  on an i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s .  Both the  c i r c l e  
and the r e g r e s s  a re  v i c i o u s ,  and they c a n n o t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  be 
s a i d  to  have e x o r c i s e d  the  o t h e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  - t h a t  p a s t ,  
p r e s e n t ,  and f u t u r e  a re  f r a n k l y  c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  Hence the  A 
s e r i e s  d i s s o l v e s  i n  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , and so time i s  u n r e a l .
The c r i t i c i s m s  t h a t  I w ish  to  make about t h i s  second 
and e s s e n t i a l  s ta g e  of the  'argument a re  t h r e e f o l d .  They r e l a t e ,  
f i r s t l y ,  to  the  unknown "som eth ing ,"  s e c o n d ly ,  to  the  a l l e g e d  
r e g r e s s ,  and l a s t l y ,  to  what seems to  be a log ica . l  co n fu s io n  
between t h e  tem pora l  and non-tem pora l  u ses  of language .
McTaggart s a i d  t h a t  p a s t ,  p r e s e n t ,  and f u t u r e  are
r e l a t i o n s  i n  which e v e n ts  s t a n d  to  something o u t s id e  the  t ime-
T
s e r i e s .  I  t h in k  t h a t  t h i s  i s  q u e s t i o n a b l e .  To p o s t u l a t e  an 
e n t i t y  e n t i r e l y  o u t s id e  the  t i m e - s e r i e s  i s  tan tam ount  to adm it­
t i n g  t h a t  t h e re  can he r e a l i t y  w i th o u t  t i m e > and t h i s  i s  su s ­
p i c i o u s l y  l i k e  begging the  q u e s t i o n .  McTaggart says  t h a t  the
1 .  Compare a l s o  the c r i t i c i s m s  made by G otsha lk  in  a sound 
a r t i c l e  i n  "Mind" (1 9 3 0 ) .
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r e l a t i o n  must be to  something o u t s id e  the  s e r i e s  because i t
1
i s  not  to  something i n s i d e  the s e r i e s .  But why no t?  I t  i s  
n o t ,  because i t  cannot be,  s in ce  p u r e ly  tem poral  r e l a t i o n s  
cannot  change.  He s a y s : -  "The r e l a t i o n s  of the A s e r i e s  are
changing r e l a t i o n s ,  and no r e l a t i o n s  which a re  e x c l u s i v e l y
2
between members of t h e ' t i m e - s e r i e s  can eve r  change ."  I t  seems
to  me t h a t  he i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  h e r e ,  f o r  the  second h a l f  of the
sen tence  assumes what he had d en ied  i n  the e a r l i e r  p a r t  of
h i s  argument, t h a t  the  "unchanging" B s e r i e s  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to
3
c o n s t i t u t e  a t i m e - s e r i e s .  Thus the  example which he t a k e s  
r e f e r s  to  the B s e r i e s  o n ly ,  though the A s e r i e s  i s  o s t e n s i b l y  
m en t ioned .  I f  he meant what he s a i d  e a r l i e r ,  t h a t  the  A s e r i e s  
i s  e s s e n t i a l ,  th en  he i s  wrong h e r e ,  f o r  a r e l a t i o n  between 
the  A s e r i e s  and an e n t i t y  i n  time - say you or  m%, - i s  
capab le  of ch ang in g .  I n  r e l a t i o n  to  my e x p e r i e n c e ,  t h i s  
moment now i s  p r e s e n t :  two y e a r s  hence i t  w i l l  be p a s t .  This 
view a c co rd s  w i th  the commonsense n o t io n  t h a t  ev e n ts  are  p a s t ,  
p r e s e n t ,  f u t u r e ,  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  a g iv en  e v e n t ,  the  now, 
whereas M cTaggart’ s view i s  p a r a d o x ic a l  to  e x p e r ie n c e ,  and 
g e t s  i t s  recommendation from the f a c t  t h a t  any o th e r  view i s  
sup po sed ly  im p o s s ib l e .  McTaggart,  th e n ,  c o n t r a d i c t s  h im s e l f  
when he says  t h a t  no r e l a t i o n s  which a re  e x c l u s i v e l y  between 
members of the  t i m e - s e r i e s  can ev e r  change; and he i s  wrong 
i n  suppos ing  t h a t  the  o t h e r  term i n  the  t i m e - r e l a t i o n  must
1. I  a p o lo g i s e  f o r  the language ,  and hope t h a t  the  meaning
i s  c l e a r .
2 .  op*c i t .  s e c . 327. 3 .  sec. 327.
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be something o u t s id e  the  t i m e - s e r i e s .  The A s e r i e s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
i s  " r i d d l e d  w i th  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s "  i t  i s  tak en  as be ing  a 
r e l a t i o n  to  an e n t i t y  o u t s id e  the t i m e - s e r i e s  - hut no t  
o t h e r w i s e .
But i t  would be s i l l y  to suppose t h a t  such a small  
change i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  take the  s t i n g  out of  a l l  McTaggart’ s 
arguments  a g a i n s t  the r e a l i t y  of t i m e . On the c o n t r a r y ,  on ly  
one of  them i s  a t  a l l  a f f e c t e d  (even i f  the  su g g es ted  sub­
s t i t u t i o n  be v a l i d ) .  I f  we g r a n t ,  f o r  a rgum en t’ s sake ,  t h a t  
the  s u g g e s te d  p rocedure  does do away w i th  the c o n t r a d i c t i o n , 
we are s t i l l  l e f t  to  d e a l  w i th  a r e g r e s s .  F o r ,  o b v io u s ly ,  to  
say :  " In  r e l a t i o n  to  me, t h i s  moment now i s  p r e s e n t ;  two 
y e a r s  hence i t  w i l l  be p a s t " ,  does no t  a t  a l l  account  f o r  
the main p o i n t  a t  i s s u e ,  which i s  the  r e c e s s i o n  i n t o  the 
p a s t  of the  "no^" ,  any more th an  does the o th e r  f o rm u la t io n  
which McTaggart c r i t i c i s e d .  Both a re  on a l e v e l  as re g a rd s  
the  p r im ary  m i r a c l e ,  and b o th  leave  i t  b la n d ly  u n e x p la in e d .  
What ’ i s ’ ’ now’ f o r  m e , ’w i l l ’ i n  a week be ’p a s t ’ . There i s  
no d i f f i c u l t y  here  on ly  i f  the q u e s t io n  i s  begged a t  the  
s t a r t  -  o th e rw ise  we have s t a r t e d  a g a in  on the  r e g r e s s  to
which McTaggart o b j e c t e d .
Here i s  where the  second c r i t i c i s m  comes i n .  I
know t h a t  i t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  ta k e n  f o r  g r a n te d  - no t  only by
5icîron'%im:T%c^r^^^^  ^ Tlr%tol:uan
S o c ie ty  P ro c e e d in g s ,  1928-29.)
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McTaggart -  t h a t  a c e r t a i n  type of  a n a l y s i s  of tem pora l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  l e a d s  to  an i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s ,  and a l l  th e  con­
se q u e n c e s ,  welcome o r  unwelcome, which a r e  supposed  to  f o l lo w  
from t h a t  r e g r e s s .  But I  canno t  h e lp  t h i n k i n g  t h a t  such  an 
a n a l y s i s  m is se s  the  p o i n t  somewhere, and t h a t  the  r e g r e s s  i s  
n o t  th e  l a s t  word on the  s u b j e c t ,  bu t  a r i s e s  from a wrong con­
c e p t i o n  o f  t im e .  I n  the  n ex t  c h a p t e r ,  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  w i l l  be 
more f u l l y  t r e a t e d ,  bu t  the  main c o n c lu s io n s  may be b r i e f l y  
summarised h e r e .
An i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s  i s  i n e v i t a b l e  i f  v/e s t a r t  from 
the  i d e a  of ’ now’ as  moving, and as  t a k i n g  time over  i t s  move­
ment:  t h a t  i s ,  i f  we c o n s i d e r  the  s o - c a l l e d  movement of the  
’ now’ as  an a lo g ou s  to  the  movement of an o b j e c t  i n  s p a c e . I  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h i s  id e a  i s  w i th o u t  f o u n d a t i o n ,  and t h a t  i t  
a r i s e s  from an e n t i r e l y  wrong view of  t im e .  The f a l l a c y  i s  i n  
r e g a r d i n g  "E i s  o c c u r r i n g  now" a s  a n a ly s a b le  i n  a  way s i m i l a r  
to  the  a n a l y s i s  of "X i s  r e d " :  n o t  on ly  i s  ’ now’ r e g a rd e d  as 
a q u a l i t y  l i k e  ’ r e d ’ , bu t  a c o n fu s io n  i s  made between E, an 
e v e n t ,  and X, a su b s tan ce»  This  i s ,  of c o u r s e ,  s p e c u l a t i v e  
and open to  c r i t i c i s m .  But the  th o ro u g h -g o in g  R e a l i s t ,  i f  he 
be d a r in g  enough, has  one s im ple  and e f f e c t i v e  means l e f t  of  
c u t t i n g  the  r e g r e s s i v e  k n o t .  He may r e l l o r t  to  M cTaggart .  "A ll  
t h a t  you have s a i d  o n ly  shows what I  have a l l  a lo n g  i n s i s t e d ,  
t h a t  t h i s  p assag e  of  the  p r e s e n t  i n t o  th e  p a s t  which i o r  you 
i s  i n e x p l i c a b l e ,  i s  fundam en ta l  and i r r e d u c i b l e .  The whole
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ol the problem o± time i s  t h e r e .  You have t r i e d  to  e x p l a i n  i t  
in  terms of something e l s e  and have f a i l e d ,  so you c a l l  i t  
c o n t r a d i c t o r y  and r e g r e s s i v e .  I ,  on the  o t h e r  hand, p o s t u l a t e  
t h a t  t h i s  i r r e d u c i b i l i t y  i s  the  fundam enta l  f a c t  from which 
we must s t a r t :  hence t h e r e  a r i s e s  no r e g r e s s  f o r  me." In  o th e r  
v/ords, the c r i t i c i s m  i s  t h a t  McTaggart (and o th e r  i d e a l i s t s )  
f i n d  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  because th ey  a re  no t  t a k in g  time s e r i o u s l y ,  
enough, and t h a t  to  take time s e r i o u s l y ,  we have to  beg in  w i th ,  
no t  e x p l a i n  away, t h i s  i d e a  of " p a s s a g e . "
Now, e v i d e n t l y ,  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  cannot be r e g a rd e d  
as f i n a l :  because a l l  t h a t  i t  does i s  to  oppose to  McTaggart’ s 
remarks abou t  i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s e s  a c o n t r a d i c t o r y  a s s e r t i o n  
t h a t  no r e g r e s s  i s  r e q u i r e d .  I say " a s s e r t i o n " ,  because no 
p ro o f  can be g iv en  f o r  i t :  any d isag reem en ts  t h a t  remain are  
u l t i m a t e  o n es .  And though,  as  an u n su pp o r ted  a s s e r t i o n  i t  
cannot  be a c c e p te d  o u t r i g h t ,  u l t i m a t e ^ l y  I  t h i n k  t h a t  on ly  
t h i s  type of argument can weigh a g a i n s t  McTaggart’ s .  The 
o th e r  rem arks ,  summarised e a r l i e r ,  on i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s e s ,  in  
the  end depend upon the  ac cep tan ce  of some such view as t h i s  
t h a t  any co n c e p t io n  of time which l e a d s  to  a r e g r e s s  i s  p a r t -  
i a l  and in c o m p le te .  To McTaggart h i s  c r i t i c  can only  r e t o r t ,  
when a l l  i s  s a i d  and done - "Time i s  so fundam enta l  t h a t  i t  
must be assumed. This  you c a l l  begging th e  q u e s t i o n .  I  c a l l  
i t  common s e n s e . "  But t h i s ,  u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  i s  no r e f u t a t i o n l
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The t h i r d  and l a s t  c r i t i c i s m  has to  do w i th  McTag- .. 
g a r t ' s  o c c a s i o n a l l y  m is le a d in g  use of  tem pora l  and n on- tem pora l  
lan g u a g e .  This  may seem a sm all  m a t t e r  a f t e r  th e  l a s t  t o p i c ,  
and, a s  has a l r e a d y  been s a i d ,  an u l t i m a t e  d isag reem en t  has 
been r e a c h e d ,  so t h a t  h i s  main p o s i t i o n  i s  s e c u re d  from r e ­
f u t a t i o n ;  but a l l  the same, secondary  p o s i t i o n s  may be a t t a c k e d  
and minor but  i n s i d i o u s  c o n fu s io n s  c l e a r e d  up*
F i r s t l y ,  as r e g a rd s  McTaggart’ s use of the  n o t io n  
of  "change" i n  c o n n e c t io n  w i th  the  B s e r i e s *  The B s e r i e s  i s  
tem pora l  in  the sense  t h a t  the terms i t  r e l a t e s  a re  tem pora l :  
b u t  the r à l a t i o n  i t s e l f  i s  no t  a t em p o ra l ,  bu t  a l o g i c a l  r e ­
l a t i o n .  I t  i s  s t r i c t l y  ana logous  to  the  " in  f r o n t - b e h i n d "  of 
s p a c e .  The fundam enta l  p o i n t  abou t  th e  B s e r i e s  i s  t h a t  i t  i s  
an o r d e r , and i t  i s  i t s e l f  no more tem pora l  than  i s  the o rd e r  
of the h u m b e r - s e r i e s . I t  i s ,  i n  the  s t r i c t  s e n s e ,  nonsense to  
say  e i t h e r  t h a t  the o rd e r  of p o s i t i o n s  i n  the  B s e r i e s  changes 
or  t h a t  i t  does no t  change: when McTaggart says  t h a t  the  d i s ­
t i n c t i o n s  of the B s e r i e s  a r e  "perm anen t" ,  h i s  language i s  
u n f o r t u n a t e ,  because we g e t  the  n o t io n  of c o n t r a s t i n g  i t  w i th  
"changing" - whereas the  on ly  sense  i n  which i t  i s  "permanent" 
i s  t h a t  the  n o t io n  of change i s  i n a p p l i c a b l e  to  i t .  What 
McTaggart meant by say in g  t h a t  i t  i s  unchanging ,  i s  t h a t  i t
1. I  am in d e b te d  f o r  the fo l lo w in g  p o i n t s  to  P r o f e s s o r  
L .S .S t e b b in g ,  who k i n d l y  a l low ed  me to  s e e ,  i n  Mo., an 
a r t i c l e  on "Some A m bigu i t ie s  i n  Recent D is c u s s io n s  on 
Time", s h o r t l y  to  be p u b l i s h e d  i n  a volume e n t i t l e d  
"P h i lo so p hy  and H i s t o r y " .
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IS f i x a d , in  the sense  t h a t  i t  has n o th in g  to  do w i th  time 
o r  p l a c e ,  hut i s  d e f in e d  hy r e f e r e n c e  to  l o g i c a l  r e l a t i o n s .
I t  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  the  case t h a t  the s t a t e m e n t  "The b a t t l e  of 
H a s t in g s  i s  e a r l i e r  than  the  b a t t l e  of A g in cou r t"  ho lds  good 
i n  1500, 1600, 1700, and on any o cc as io n  when we l i k e  to  ex­
amine i t ;  bu t  a l th o u g h  i t  i s  no t  a  f a l s e h o o d  to  say  t h a t  
H a s t in g s  i s  "always e a r l i e r "  th an  A g in c o u r t ,  s in ce  a t  any time 
W0 l i k e  to t a k e ,  the s t a t e m e n t  h o ld s  good, i t  i s  y e t  an un­
s a t i s f a c t o r y  way of e x p r e s s in g  i t ,  and one which i s  p e r i l o u s l y  
n e a r  n o n s e n s e . The p o i n t  has been d e a l t  w i th  f u l l y  in  an 
e a r l i e r  c h a p te r ,  and r e f e r e n c e  he re  i s  s u f f i c i e n t , But a second 
p o i n t  may be b r i e f l y  m en t ion ed .  I f  a l l  we mean by "The b a t t l e  
of H a s t in g s  i s  always e a r l i e r  th a n  the  batt&e of A g incour t"  i s ,  
t h a t  a t  the time x (where x  s t a n d s  f o r  any time) the s ta te m e n t  
" the  ev en t  H i s  e a r l i e r  th an  the  e v e n t  A" i s  t r u e :  th en  by 
p a r i t y  of  r e a s o n in g  a l l  t h a t  we mean by "The ev en t  H i s  always 
p a s t  to  the e v e n t  A" would be " a t  the time x  (where x s ta n d s  
f o r  any time) the  s t a t e m e n t  the e v e n t  H i_s p a s t  ^  the_ event  A 
i s  t r u e " .  How th e r e  i s  ob v io u s ly  something b ad ly  wrong w i th  
t h i s :  t h e r e  a re  two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,  and bo th  a re  u n d e s i r a b l e .  
On the  f i r s t ,  i t  would commonly be s a i d  t h a t  the  r e i e r e n c e  to 
the  time x i s  u n n e c e s s a ry :  on the  second, t h a t  the s ta te m e n t
i s  f a l s e  f o r  some v a lu e s  of  x .
There i s ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  an e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  the
ty p es  of a n a l y s i s  of which the  A and the  B s e r i e s  a re  s u s c e p t -
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I b l e .  McTaggart saw t h i s ,  bu t  he e x p re s s e d  i t  i n  m is le a d in g  
lan g u ag e .  The p o i n t  i s  n o t , t h a t  the d i s t i n c t i o n s  of  the 
terms of  the  B s e r i e s  a re  "perm anent" ,  w hile  those  of the  A 
s e r i e s  a r e  "c h ang ing " :  bu t  t h a t  the  sense  i n  which the  form er 
a r e  "permanent" i s  no t  one which can be p r o p e r l y  opposed to  
"change" .  "Permanent" i s  ambiguous: s t a n d in g  bo th  f o r  " c o n t in ­
u ing  unchanged" ( i n  t im e ) ,  and f o r  " f ix e d  w i th  r e g a r d  to  . . . " .  
The d i s t i n c t i o n s  of  the  B s e r i e s  a re  of  t h i s  l a t t e r  ty p e :  i t  
i s  on ly  the  tem pora l  r e f e r e n c e  i n  the terms of  the B s e r i e s  
t h a t  makes the  o th e r  view, and the  consequen t  c o n fu s io n ,  as 
p l a u s i b l e  as i t  i s .
S econd ly ,  i t  may be h e ld  - p e rhaps  u n j u s t l y  - t h a t  
McTaggart in  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  of the  "changing  d i s t i n c t i o n s  of 
the A s e r i e s "  i s  c o n fu s in g  the  two r a d i c a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  typ es  
of change, passage  and a l t e r a t i o n .  S e v e ra l  p a s sag e s  can be 
adduced in  s u p p o r t  of  t h i s  v iew . "Can we say t h a t ,  i n  a time 
which formed a B s e r i e s  bu t  n o t  an A s e r i e s ,  the change con­
s i s t e d  i n  the f a c t  t h a t  the  ev e n t  ceased  to  be an e v e n t ,  w hile
1
a n o th e r  ev e n t  began to  be an even t?"  "Change, th e n ,  cannot 
a r i s e  from an ev e n t  c e a s in g  to  be an e v e n t ,  nor from one ev en t  
changing  i n t o  a n o t h e r .  I n  what o th e r  way can i t  a r i s e ?  I f  the  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of an even t  change, th en  th e r e  i s  c e r t a i n l y  
change.  But what c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of an ev en t  can change? I t
1 .  "Hatu  re of E x i s t e n c e " ,  s e c . 310.
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aeams to  me t h a t  th e re  i s  on ly  one c l a s s  of  such c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s .  And t h a t  c l a s s  c o n s i s t s  of the  d e t e r m in a t io n s  of the 
ev e n t  i n  q u e s t io n  by the  terms of the  A series . " N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
I t  co u ld  p l a u s i b l y  be h e ld  t h a t  v e r b a l  a l t e r a t i o n s  would s u f ­
f i c e  to  c l e a r  McTaggart of t h i s  c h a rg e .  S i m i l a r l y ,  the  c r i t i c ­
ism of  h i s  view of change t h a t ,  l o o s e l y  e x p re s s e d ,  " e v e ry th in g
a f f e c t s  e v e r y th in g  e l s e " ,  o r  t h a t  a l l  r e l a t i o n s  a re  i n t e r n a l
2
i n  the sense t h a t  Moore d e f in e d  and c r i t i c i s e d ,  though j u s t ­
i f i e d ,  i s  no t  v e ry  p e r t i n e n t .  A more im p o r ta n t  c r i t i c i s m ,  i n  
t h i s  c o n n e c t io n ,  of h i s  view of "change" ,  i s  the  obverse  to  
the  c r i t i c i s m s  a l r e a d y  d i s c u s s e d  of h i s  view of the  n a tu re  of 
the B s e r i e s .
L a s t l y ,  t h e r e  i s  the l o g i c a l  a s p e c t  of h i s  a n a l y s i s  
of the A s e r i e s  which l e d  him to  h i s  i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s .  His 
method of  a n a l y s i s  o f ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  "The B a t t l e  of W aterloo  
i s  p r e s e n t "  c o n s i s t s  e s s e n t i a l l y  i n  r e g a r d in g  the  " B a t t l e  of 
W ater loo"  as  a f i x e d  and d e te rm in a te  o b j e c t ,  and the "now" 
as  a c u r io u s  p r o t e a n  m ys te ry  t h a t  moors i t s e l f  on to  d i f i e r e n t  
and e v e r  d i f f e r e n t  of  th e se  c o n v e n ie n t ly  s o l i d  e v e n t s .  But
1 . I b i d .  sec.311. See also G-otshalk’s remarks (loc.cit.) on
McTaggart*8 view of change.  ,   ^  ^ ^
2 .  See his conclusive paper on "External and Internal Rela­
tions", in "Philosophical Studies." McTaggart*s remark,
• which i s  open to  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m ,  was: " I f  an y th in g  changes ,  
th e n  a l l  o t h e r  t h in g s  change w i th  i t .  For i t s  change ^  
change some of t h e i r  r e l a t i o n s  to  i t ,  and so i t s  r e l a t i o  
a l  q u a l i t i e s .  The f a l l  of a sand c a s t l e  on the  l i n g l i s h  
c o a s t  changes the n a tu re  of  the G rea t  Pyram id ,  i b i d .




th e r e  i s  a n o th e r  p o i n t  of view, no l e s s  l e g i t i m a t e ,  which 
h o ld s  t h a t  " the  b a t t l e  of W aterloo"  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  in d e te  
i n a t e ,  a d e s c r i p t i v e  phrase  whose p ro p e r  a n a l y s i s  demands 
p r e p o s i t i o n a l  f u n c t i o n ,  and t h a t  the n o w -re fe rsn ee  i s  the  
on ly  d e te rm in a te  p a r t  of i t *  There a r e ,  of c o u r se ,  two s e p a r a te  
p a r t s  to  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m ,  and one might be u rg ed  in d e p e n d e n t ly  
o f  the  o th e r*  The f i r s t  p a r t  i s  the  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  e v e n ts  a r e  
n o t  such f i x e d  and s t a t i c  t h i n g s ,  and t h a t  to  conceive  them 
as  such i s  h a l f  way to  the o ld  id e a  of ev e n ts  s t a n d in g  in  
d e f i n i t e  r e l a t i o n s  to  eacb  o t h e r  and to  the  * time* *in* which 
they  o cc u r ,  and to  the  consequent  h y p o s t a t i s a t i o n  of t im e .
The second one says  s im ply  t h a t  i t  i s  a m is take  to  r e g a r d  *now* 
as  need ing  f u r t h e r  a n a l y s i s  a long  the  l i n e s  of " the  now i s  
what i s  now now" , which w i l l  never  y i e l d  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,  but 
t h a t  the r e f e r é n c e  to  the * now* i s  fundam enta l  and s u f f i c i e n t .  
This  v iew , of c o u r se ,  i s  s i m i l a r  to  the  e a r l i e r  one which 
would make s h o r t  work of a l l  r e g r e s s e s ,  and l i k e  i t ,  i t s  
p rem ises  a re  e s s e n t i a l l y  m e ta p h y s ic a l  ( though couched i n  l o g i c ­
a l  t e r m s ) .  We have to  choose between t h i s  view and McTaggart*s: 
f o r  t h e i r  d ive rgence  i s  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e .
Thé c o n c lu s io n  r e a c h e d ,  th e n ,  about  McTaggart*s 
arguments  to  prove the  u n r e a l i t y  of t im e ,  cannot be a d e c i s iv e  
one.  I t  i s  su g g e s te d  t h a t  he I s  d e f i n i t e l y  wrong on one p o i n t ,  
t h a t  the  A s e r i e s  és c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,  and th a t  on s e v e r a l  o t h e r s .
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some of  h i s  s t a t e m e n t s  can be q u e s t i o n e d .  But the  d e n i a l  of 
the  need  to  s e a r c h  f o r  a h y p o t h e t i c a l  " t i m e l e s s  e n t i t y "  does 
n o t  leav e  us any b e t t e r  o f f  w i th  r e g a r d  to  the  a l t e r n a t i v e s  
of  begging  the  q u e s t i o n  and s t a r t i n g  on a v i c i o u s  i n f i n i t e  
r e g r e s s ,  and to  t h a t  fundam en ta l  q u e s t i o n ,  no d e f i n i t e  answer 
can be g i v e n .  To some i t  w i l l  seem t h a t  McTaggart was e v i d e n t ­
l y  r i g h t  on t h i s  p o i n t :  to  o t h e r s  i t  w i l l  be j u s t  a s  e v i d e n t  
t h a t  he was wrong. And t h a t  i s  a s  f a r  as we can go .
The sec'ond p a r t  of M cT ag g ar t 's  rem arks  on time i s  on 
an e n t i r e l y  d i f f e r e n t  f o o t i n g .  McTaggart ,  u n l i k e  most i d e a l i s t ,  
p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  saw c l e a r l y  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t  to  d i s ­
m iss  time con tem p tu ou s ly  from R e a l i t y  as  b e in g  ( i n  B ra d le y ’ s 
p h ra se )  " r i d d l e d  w i th  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s "  -  an e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  
needed to  show how i t  i s  t h a t  we come, a s  we ^  come, to  
p e r c e i v e  t h i n g s  a s  i f  happen ing  i n  t i m e . M cT agg ar t 's  b r i l l ­
i a n t l y  s p e c u l a t i v e  a t t e m p t  to  p ro v id e  t h i s  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  one 
o f  the  most im p o r ta n t  ach iev em en ts  of  modern th o u g h t .
At th e  o u t s e t ,  i t  w i l l  be w e l l  i f  one or two nec ­
e s s a r y  w arn ings  a re  made c l e a r .  The f i r s t  i s ,  t h a t  we canno t  
t a k e  the  l i n e  of c r i t i c i s m  which a g a i n s t  ev e ry  o t h e r  p h i l o ­
sop h er  i s  so e a s y  and e f f e c t i v e .  We canno t  say  to  McTaggart 
t h a t  he i s  p r e s u p p o s in g  the  n o t io n  of time a l l  a lo n g  the 
l i n e ;  f o r  i t  i s  an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  of h i s  c la im  t h a t  he can 
do t h i s  w i th  im p u n i ty .  A g a in s t  R u s s e l l ,  f o r  example,  i t  can
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be p e r t i n e n t l y  o b j e c t e d  t h a t  he i s  a l l  the  time p re su p p o s in g  
som ething  more fundam enta l  than  the c o g n i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s  which 
he g iv e s  u s .  A b e t t e r  example i s  t h a t  of A r i s t o t l e ,  who de­
f i n e d  time as  the number of m otion ,  w i th o u t  a p p a r e n t l y  r e a l ­
i s i n g  t h a t  m otion  e s s e n t i a l l y  depends on the  n o t io n  of t i m e .- 
But such a l i n e  of c r i t i c i s m  i s  no t  open a g a i n s t  McTaggart, 
s in c e  he was n e i t h e r  denying time co m p le te ly ,  nor s ee k in g  to 
d e f in e  i t .  He f r e e l y  adm its  t h a t  what we c a l l  time i s  r e a l l y  
an a p p e a ran c e ,  though he a s s e r t s  t h a t  our p e r c e p t i o n  of th in g s  
as  i n  time i s  a mispe r c e p t i o n  of  a R e a l i t y  t h a t  i s  fundament­
a l l y  n o n - t e m p o r a l . I t  may v e ry  w e l l  be the case t h a t  tem pora l  
language and tem pora l  a n a l o g i e s ,  though i n s u f f i c i e n t  to  e x p re s s  
the  f u l l  n a tu re  and g l o r y  of R e a l i t y ,  a re  b e s t  s u i t e d  to  f i n i t e  
i n t e l l e c t s ,  and so ,  in  s p i t e  of t h e i r  im p e i t f a c t io n s , t h e r e  i s  
a d e f i n i t e  advan tage  in  u s in g  them. I t  would be s t u p i d  to  
c r i t i c i s e  McTaggart f o r  u s in g  o c c a s io n a l  tem pora l  a n a l o g i e s .  
C o n se q u e n t ly , w i t h i n  l i m i t s ,  we must a l lo w  McTaggart more 
l a t i t u d e  th an  we would a l lo w  anyone e l s e .
W ith in  l i m i t s . For t h e r e  comes a p o i n t  when t h i s  
t o l e r a n c e  must be w ithdrawn, and t h i s  i s  n o t  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n .  
A l l  the  fo r e g o in g  i s  no t  to  he i n t e r p r e t e d  as a s s e r t i n g  f r e e ­
dom from c r i t i c i s m  on th e se  g rounds ,  but only  t h a t  we must be 
more c i rc u m sp e c t  th an  u s u a l  b e fo re  o b j e c t i n g .  But i t  i s  p e r ­
f e c t l y  l o g i c a l  to  h o ld  t h a t  McTaggart may use tem pora l  language 
to  make h i s  meaning more e a s i l y  a p p r e h e n s i b l e ,  and a l s o  to
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h o ld  t h a t  he dan be c r i t i c i s e d  l i k e  àny o t h e r  i d e a l i s t  i f  
h i s  meaning i s  on ]^  to  be apprehended w i th  a tem pora l  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n .  Thus, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  as  w i l l  ap p e a r  l a t e r ,  though 
we cannot  ru s h  madly in  to  c r i t i c i s e  when he t a l k s  about  
e t e r n i t y *  as  be ing  in  * the f u t u r e  *, -  as  long a s  t h e r e  i s  a 
r e a s o n a b le  doubt he must be g iv e n  the  b e n e f i t  o f  i t  -  i f  h i s  
c o n c e p t io n s  a re  fu n d a m e n ta l ly  tem pora l  he can and must be 
c r i t i c i s e d .  But where the  l i n e  i s  to  be drawn I  do no t  know: 
p ro b a b ly  no two peop le  would ag ree  on t h i s .
L a s t l y ,  i t  sh o u ld  be remembered t h a t  t h i s  p o r t i o n  of 
McTaggart*s work, more th a n  h i s  arguments a g a i n s t  the r e a l i t y  
of  t im e ,  i s  d e f i n i t e l y  l i n k e d  up w i th  h i s  g e n e r a l  m e ta p h y s ic a l  
p o s i t i o n ,  and depends on the  a d o p t io n  of  c e r t a i n  p o s t u l a t e s  
t h a t  a re  by no means u n i v e r s a l l y  a c c e p t e d .  Consequently  i t  i s  
p ro b a b le  t h a t  many peop le  w i l l  soon f i n d  them se lves  i n  a 
p o s i t i o n  of u l t i m a t e  d i s a g re e m e n t .  Hence t h e i r  on ly  chance of 
coming to  a d e f i n i t e  c o n c lu s io n  would be by the  way m entioned 
e a r l i e r ,  of  s e e in g  w he the r  o r  n o t  h i s  i d e a s  e s s e n t i a l l y  p r e ­
suppose tem pora l  n o t i o n s ,  i n  s p i t e  oi i t s  d i f f i c u l t y .
A f t e r  t h i s  p r e l i m i n a r y ,  a summary of McTaggart’ s 
views on time as c o n ta in e d  i n  Book VI of "The Hature of  Bx-
i s t a n c e "  can now be g iv e n .
" I f  we a re  to f i n d  a s i n g l e  cause f o r  e r r o r ,  we must
f i n d  i t  i n  c lo se  c o n n e c t io n  w i th  the appearance  of t im e ,  and
1 . See h i s  a r t i c l e  i n  "Mind" 1909, which was l a t e r  i n c o r p o r ­
a t e d  in  "The Hat u re of E x is te n c e "  Ch. LXI.
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w ith  the  r e a l i t y  on which t h a t  s e r i e s  i s  b a s e d . "1 This b r i e f  
sen ten ce  i s  the key to  McTaggart*s t r e a tm e n t  of t im e ,  s in ce  
i t  b r in g s  out  th re e  im p o r ta n t  p o i n t s .  The f i r s t  i s  t h a t  t im e ,  
though no t  i t s e l f  r e a l ,  i s  r e a l l y  an ap p e a ra n c e :  and the 
second i s  t h a t  t h in g s  ap p ea r  to  us as  i n  time as  the r e s u l t  
of  m i s p e r c e p t i o n .  L a s t l y ,  tem pora l  appearance  i s  of v e ry  g r e a t  
im portance  (as  w i tn e s s  the  l e n g t h  w i th  which McTaggart d e a l s  
w i th  i t ) , s in ce  a l l  e r r o r  i s  c l o s e l y  connec ted  w i th  the  p r im ­
a ry  i l l u s i o n  t h a t  we have t h a t  e v e n ts  a re  ’ in* t im e .  But to  
say  t h a t  m i s p e rc e p t io n  i s  a t  the r o o t  of our e x p e r ie n c e  of 
time i s  n o t  s u f f i c i e n t ,  as  McTaggart c l e a r l y  say :  i n  o rd e r  
t h a t  m is p e rc e p t io n  sh ou ld  produce an A s e r i e s ,  i t  must be a 
m i s p e r c e p t io n  of something t h a t  i s  a s e r i e s  a l r e a d y ,  though 
n o t  a time s e r i e s .  This r e a l ,  non - tem p ora l  s e r i e s  McTaggart 
c a l l s  the  C s e r i e s .  Of c o u r s e ,  the  m is p e rc e p t io n  must be 
a t t r i b u t e d  to  the  p e r c i p i e n t  and not  to  the  t h in g  p e r c e iv e d :  
thu s  the  C s e r i e s  which i s  m is p e rc e iv e d  by G as  a t i m e - s e r i e s  
i n  H i s  i n  H, but the  f a c t  of  the  m i s p e r c e p t io n  can only  be 
acco u n ted  f o r  by the  C s e r i e s  i n  G. I t  f o l lo w s  from t h i s  view 
of time as  an e r r o r  i n  p e r c e p t i o n  t h a t  t h e re  a re  as many t im e-  
s e r i e s  as  th e re  a re  s e l v e s  who p e r c e iv e  th in g s  i n  t im e ,  s in ce  
the on ly  r e a l  s e r i e s  i s  the s e r i e s  of m is p e rc e p t io n s  i n  the 
p e r c i p i e n t .  (B u t ,  in  f a c t ,  they  a re  c l o s e l y  enough c o r r e l a t e d
1 . O p . c i t .  se£i.521.
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tô-sènàble d i f f e r e n t  peop le  to  t a l k  as  i f  t h e r e  were one s e r i e s ,  
common to  a l l . )
The n ex t  q u e s t i o n  i s ,  i»hat t h i s  G s e r i e s  can be.  I t  
as of l i t t l e  use to  p o s t u l a t e  such a s e r i e s ,  and leav e  i t  a t  
t h a t ;  the r e j o i n d e r  cou ld  too e a s i l y  be made t h a t  we have no 
re a s o n  to  b e l i e v e  in  such a h y p o t h e t i c a l  s e r i e s ,  and t h a t  we 
have ,  e m p i r i c a l l y ,  r e a s o n  to  b e l i e v e  i n  the  t i m e - s e r i e s .  The 
p re sum p tio n  must be a g a i n s t  such a vague " e x p la n a t i o n " ,  u n t i l  
more p r e c i s e  i n fo rm a t io n  abo u t  the  C s e r i e s  i s  g iv e n .  McTaggart 
l a y s  down, a l t o g e t h e r ,  twelve c o n d i t i o n s  which must be s a t i s ­
f i e d  b e fo re  any th e o ry  can s t a n d .  These a r e ; -  1 .  the  te rm s 
must be p a r t s  o f  a  s p i r i t u a l  s u b s ta n c e ,  d iv id e d  i n t o  i n f i n i t e  
p a r t s  by d e te rm in in g  c o r re sp o n d e n c e .  2 .  the th e o ry  must a l lo w  
b o th  f o r  c o r r e c t  and f o r  e r ro n eo u s  c o g n i t i o n s .  3 .  the  d i f f e r ­
e n t  k in d s  of e r r o r  must be ac co u n ted  f o r .  4 .  the  s e r i e s  must 
be o n e -d im e n s io n a l ,  t r a n s i t i v e ,  and a s y m m e tr ic a l .  5 .  i t  must 
have a t  l e a s t  as many term s as  the B s e r i e s .  6 .  the  th e o ry  
must e x p l a i n  how i t  i s  t h a t  we do no t  p e r c e iv e  th in g s  as  be ing  
i n f i n i t e l y  d i v i d e d .  7 .  i t  must a l lo w  f o r  the  r e c u r r e n c e  o f  
c e r t a i n  c o n te n t s  of p r e s e n t  e x p e r i e n c e . 8 .  i t  must a l lo w  i o r  
the  a p p a re n t  o s c i l l a t i o n s  i n  the  e x t e n t  of  our e x p e r i e n c e ,  i n  
c l e a r n e s s  of p e r c e p t i o n  ( 9 ) ,  and i n  a c cu rac y  of knowledge ( l O ) .
11. i t  must e x p l a i n  the  r e l a t i o n  of the  C s e r i e s  to  the  ap­
p a r e n t  t i m e - s e r i e s .  12. l a s t l y ,  no two terms of the  s e r i e s
1 .  I b i d .  Chaps. XLVI & XLVIII•
250
can be i n  the same s e t  o f  i t s  p a r t s ,  f o r  though the terms of  
the C s e r i e s  a re  a l l  p a r t s  o f  the s e l f  i n  which th ey  f a l l ,  
th ey  do not  form a s e t  of p a r t s  of t h a t  s e l f .
The c o n d i t i o n s  hav ing  been s t a t e d ,  McTaggart goes 
on to  d i s c u s s  the n a tu re  of the terms and the n a tu r e  of the 
r e l a t i o n s  i n  the  C s e r i e s .  At f i r s t  s i g h t ,  i t  would seem 
p l a u s i b l e  t h a t  the terms i n  the C s e r i e s  shou ld  be those  of  
the  D ete rm in ing  Correspondence s e r i e s ,  but  t h i s  McTaggart 
r e j e c t s . For the  G s e r i e s  i s  o n e - d im e n s io n a l , the  d e te rm in in g  
cor respondence  s e r i e s  tw o -d im en s io n a l :  i n  the  l a t t e r  the  
terms have no d e f i n i t e  p l a c e , as  th e y  have i n  the  p rd e re d  
C s e r i e s :  and ,  most im p o r ta n t ,  on ly  one p a r t  w i t h i n  any p r im ­
a r y  p a r t  of the d e te rm in in g -c o r re s p o n d e n c e  s e r i e s  can have 
the same d i r e c t  d e t e r m i n a n t . Hence, i f  the C s e r i e s  i s  d i s ­
t i n c t  from the  d e t e rm in in g -co r re sp o n d en ce  s e r i e s ,  i t s  terms 
must be s imple and i n d i v i s i b l e ,  because i n f i n i t e  d i v i s i b i l i t y  
i s  on ly  p o s s i b l e  i f  the  p a r t s  a re  d e te rm ined  by d e te rm in in g  
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e . "My view i s ,  t h e n , t h a t  whenever a s e l f  (o r  
a p a r t  of  a s e l f  d e te rm in ed  by d e te rm in in g  co r respondence ;  
a p p e a rs  as  be ing  i n  t im e ,  i t  i s  d iv id e d  in  a n o th e r  dimension 
b e s id e s  those  o f  i t s  d e te rm in in g  co rrespondence  p a r t s ,  and^ 
t h a t  the terms in  t h i s  f r e s h  dimension form the  C s e r i e s . "
The r e l a t i o n s  of  the  G s e r i e s  a re  t r a n s i t i v e ,  
a sy m m e tr ic a l ,  o n e - d im e n s io n a l , and one i s  the  converse  of
1 .  O p . c i t .  s e c .  5 4 1 .
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the  o t h e r  ( a s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  " e a r l i e r "  i n  the  B s e r i e s  i s  the  
converse  of  " l a t e r " . ) .  McTaggart r e j e c t s  the r e l a t i o n s  of  
*more a c c u r a t e "  and " l e s s  a c c u r a t e " ,  "more e x t e n s iv e "  and " l e s s  
e x t e n s i v e " ,  and "more c l e a r "  and " l e s s  c l e a r " ,  i n  f a v o u r  of 
" j j o c l u ^  in"  and " i n c l u s i v e  of" . A lthough  the terms of  the 
C s e r i e s  have i n t e n s i v e  magnitude o n ly ,  the  e x i s te n c e  of a n o th e r  
s e r i e s  -  the D s e r i e s  - whose terms have e x t e n s iv e  m agn i tudes ,  
i s  in v o lv e d  by i t .  The n a tu r e  of  the  in c re m e n ts  i s  no t  an i n ­
c re a se  or  d ec rea se  i n  the  e x t e n t ,  c l e a r n e s s ,  or  a c cu rac y  of
p e r c e p t i o n s  -  but  an " a d d i t i o n a l  p e r c e p t i o n  of the  p e r c e p t i f "
1
( i n  a s p e c i a l i s e d  sense  which he e x p l a i n s ) .
G ran ted  t h a t  h i s  t r e a tm e n t  so f a r  i s  c o r r e c t ,  
M cTaggart* 3 n ex t  t a s k  i s  to  d i s c u s s  the  r e l a t i o n s  between the
2  i
C s e r i e s  and the  two m is p e rc e p t io n  s e r i e s .  Im p o r tan t  as t h i s  
c h a p te r  i s ,  no new p o i n t s  a re  r a i s e d  i n  i t ,  and i t s  c o n te n t s  
can be b r i e f l y  summarised by tv/o q u o t a t i o n s .  "When any s e l f ,
G, a t  any p o i n t  i n  h i s  own m i s p e r c e p t i o n - s e r i e s  obse rves  H 
as  i n  time -  t h a t  i s ,  as  a B s e r i e s  -  th en  i t  w i l l  be the 
case t h a t  some te rm s ,  a t  l e a s t ,  of the i n c l u s i o n  s e r i e s  o f  
fo rm rai^SoBsri 'es ifor  G - t h a t  i s ,  a re  the  b a s i s  of G*s 
e r ro n e o u s  p e r c e p t i o n s  of a B s e r i e s . "  "We know of no o th e r  
s o r t  of  r e l a t i o n ,  ex c ep t  t im e ,  as  which i t  would be p o s s i o l e  
t h a t  the r e l a t i o n  of i n c l u s i o n  sh ou ld  be m i s p e rc e iv e d ."
Though i t  i s  no t  im p o s s ib le ,  i t  i s  v e ry  im probab le ,  t h a t  a
1. I b i d ,  s e c . 572. 2 .  Chap. XLIX. 3 .  i b i d .  s e c . 581.
4 .  S e c .  5 8 8 .
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s e l f  sho u ld  m is p e rc s iv e  the i n c l u s i o n  s e r i e s  of a n o th e r  s e l f ,  
o r  i t s  own, o th e rw ise  than  as i n  t im e .  "The th e o ry  of e r r o r  
i s  v e ry  c l o s e l y  connec ted  w i th  the i l l u s i o n  of t im e ." ^
The r e s t  o f  the e x p o s i t i o n  can be b r i e f l y  d e a l t  
w i th ,  i n  s p i t e  of  i t s  im p o r ta n c e .  McTaggart goes on to  show 
t h a t  the i n c l u s i o n  sauries f u l f i l s  a l l  the c o n d i t i o n s  l a i d  
down e a r l i e r  f o r  the C s e r i e s ;  the p re sum p t io n  th en  i s  t h a t  
t h e i r  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  i s  c o r r e c t .  He n ex t  d e a l s  w i th  fo u r  
p o i n t s  t h a t  have p roved  s tu m b l in g -b lo c k s  to  many t h e o r i e s  of 
t im e ,  and i n  an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  f a s c i n a t i n g  c h a p te r  shows 
how th e y  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  on h i s  t h e o r y .  F i r s t ,  he r e v e r t s  
to  the q u e s t i o n  r a i s e d  e a r l i e r ,  how, i f  t i m e - p e r c e p t io n  i s  
a s u b j e c t i v e  e r r o r  and the number of t i m e - s e r i e s  i s  very  
g r e a t ,  we can have any k in d  of a common t i m e - s e r i e s .  The 
answer i s ,  t h a t  though time i s  on ly  an ap p e a ran c e ,  i t  i s  
none the  l e s s  a r e a l  appearance  - i f  the  a p p a re n t  c o n t r a d i c ­
t i o n ^  can be f o r g i v e n .  I n  Leibn iz*  p h r a s e ,  time i s  a "phe­
nomenon bene funda tum ."  Again ,  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  we commonly 
make between " r e a l "  and " a p p a re n t"  d u r a t i o n  can be m a in ta in e d .  
Though bo th  a re  " a p p e a r a n c e s " , i n  a second sense of * appears* 
we can r i g h t l y  say  t h a t  one i s  more fundam enta l  th an  the 
o t h e r ,  s in c e  i t  i s  a "phenomenon bene funda tum ", and the 
o th e r  i s  n o t .  As r e g a rd s  the  d i f f i c u l t  q u e s t i o n  of the î n i i n -  
i t y  of t im e ,  McTaggart r e p l i e s  t h a t  ev e ry  i n c l u s i o n  s e r i e s
1 .  s e c .  6 1 0 .
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i s  bounded i n  b o th  d i r e c t i o n s ,  and so ,  "While the  s e r i e s  o f
such s t r e t c h e s  ap p e a rs  as a s e r i e s  of p e r io d s  i n  t im e ,  t ime
1
w i l l  ap p ea r  as  be ing  f i n i t e  i n  eabh d i r e c t i o n . "  L a s t l y ,  the  
q u e s t i o n  w hethe r  time i s  or i s  no t  i n f i n i t e l y  d i v i s i b l e  
McTaggart l e a v e s  open: f o r ,  as he p o i n t s  o u t ,  the f a c t  t h a t  
t ime has  s imple p a r t s  -  which i s  a l l  he i s  concerned  to  main­
t a i n  -  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  any h y p o th e s i s  abou t  d i v i s i b i l i t y .
The whole p o s i t i o n  t h a t  he ta k e s  up i n  Book VI i s  
summed up a t  the  end when he s a y s : -  "This  e x p l a n a t i o n  of  the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  of  e r ro n eo u s  p e r c e p t i o n  depends,  in d eed ,  as  has 
j u s t  been s a i d ,  on the u n r e a l i t y  of  t im e .  But the a s s e r t i o n  o f  
the  u n r e a l i t y  of time can s c a r c e l y  be s a i d  to  be so improbable 
as to  throw doubt on any th e o ry  which in c lu d e s  i t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
when we c o n s id e r  how many p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  from D e s c a r te s  to  the
p r e s e n t  day, have a g re e d ,  w hile  d i f f e r i n g  on so many o th e r
2
p o i n t s ,  to  deny the  r e a l i t y  of t im e ."
Before go ing  on to  d i s c u s s  the  " P r a c t i c a l  Con­
sequences"  i n  Book V II ,  i t  w i l l  be as w e l l  to  h a l t  and ex­
amine how f a r  McTaggart i s  open to  c r i t i c i s m  on the  counts  
m entioned  e a r l i e r .  I do no t  t h i n k  t h a t  McTaggart has ev e r  
l a i d  h im s e l f  open to  the c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  h i s  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s  
a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  te m p o ra l ,  though i t  i s  to  be e x p e c ted  t h a t  
t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  would be more l i k e l y  to  e n t e r  i n  co n n e c t io n  
w i th  P r a c t i c a l  Consequences,  n e v e r t h e l e s s , a s l i g h t  s u s p i c i o n
1 .  S e c . 620. The " s t r e t c h e s "  r e f e r r e d  to  a re  s t r e t c h e s  of  the  
i n c l u s i o n  s e r i e s .
2 .  S e c . 692.
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rem ains  t h a t  though he has  not  p re su pp osed  t im e ,  he has  no t  
succeeded  in  e l i m i n a t i n g  i t .  I t  would seem, a t  f i r s t  s i g h t ,  
p o s s i b l e  to  say  "But i s  the  "most i n c l u s i v e "  term e a r l i e r  o r  
l a t e r  than  the " l e a s t  i n c l u s i v e "  term?" He h i m s e l f ,  does ,  as 
i t  happens ,  r a i s e  t h i s  q u e s t i o n .  We s h a l l  have to  s c r u t i n i s e  
w i th  p a r t i c u l a r  ca re  h i s  f o r m u la t i o n  o f ,  and h i s  answer t o ,  
t h i s  q u e s t i o n ,  f o r  i t  i s  v e ry  i m p o r t a n t .  He would say t h a t  i n  
answ ering  t h i s  q u e s t i o n  he i s  on ly  say in g  which r e l a t i o n  in  
the C s e r i e s  c o r re sp o n d s  to  which r e l a t i o n  i n  the  B s e r i e s :  
on the  o t h e r  hand, i t  might be p o s s i b l e  to  m a in ta in  t h a t  the 
q u e s t i o n  i s  im p o r ta n t  as  b r in g in g  i n  e x t ra n e o u s  n o t io n s  be­
tween which a l l  th ou g h t  of  " c o r re s p o n d e n c e " i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  
to  e x p l a i n  t h e i r  j u x t a p o s i t i o n .
There i s  l i t t l e  t h a t  can be s a i d  about  th e se  op­
p o s in g  v iew s .  I t  i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  the  m e ta p h y s ic a l  p o s t u l a t e s  
on which McTaggart*s arguments depend a re  no t  such as to  be 
im m edia te ly  a c c e p ta b l e  to  a l l .  A lthough he does n o t ,  f o r  i n ­
s t a n c e ,  a s s e r t  a s p e c i f i c  c o n n e c t io n  between the  h y p o t h e t i c a l  
C s e r i e s  and the  d e te rm in in g  correspondence  s e r i e s ,  y e t  h i s  
view of  the  C s e r i e s  i s  dependent upon the  l a t t e r ,  i n  the  
sense  t h a t  i f  t h e r e  were no d e te rm in in g  correspondence  s e r i e s ,  
the G s e r i e s  would have to  be m o d i f ie d ,  s in ce  in  h i s  system 
e v e r y th in g  i s  bound up w i th  e v e ry th in g  else .How th e re  a re  
many who would a s s e r t  t h a t  McTaggart*s view of d e te rm in in g
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co rrespondence  i s  l o g i c a l l y  unsound, and who would t h e r e f o r e  
look on h i s  view of  time w i th  a s c e p t i c a l  e y e .  O th ers ,  con­
f i rm ed  r e a l i s t s ,  deny the  a p r i o r i  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  a view 
which s t a r t s  by a s s e r t i n g  the  u n r e a l i t y  of t im e .  Yet ag a in  
o t h e r s ,  who have no p a r t i c u l a r  p r e ju d i c e  e i t h e r  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  
t im e ,  p o i n t  ou t  the  l a c k  of economy in v o lv ed  i n  p o s t u l a t i n g  a 
C and a D s e r i e s  as  w e l l  as  a p p a re n t  A and B s e r i e s ,  i n s t e a d  
of  the  p l a i n  man’ s A and B s e r i e s .  But th e s e  a re  m e ta p h y s ic a l  
o b j e c t i o n s ,  and cannot be l o g i c a l l y  c o n c lu s iv e ,  s in c e  th ey  
c o n s i s t  i n  denying p r e m i s e s . But the  p r i o r  q u e s t i o n  s t i l l  r e ­
mains ,  w hether  th e  p rem ises  of  McTaggart o r  o f  h i s  c r i t i c  a re  
the  b e t t e r  ones ,  and h e r e ,  as  may be ex p e c te d ,  an u l t im a t e  
d isag reem en t  i s  r e ach ed ,  beyond which f u r t h e r  p ro g re s s  i s  
i m p o s s i b l e .
In  Book V II ,  McTaggart goes on to  deduce two con­
sequences of h i s  th e o ry  of  the  C s e r i e s  t h a t  a re  im p o r ta n t  « 
f o r  h i s  view of  t im e .  The f i r s t  concerns  the  answer to  the 
q u e s t i o n  "Which r e l a t i o n  of the B s e r i e s  co r responds  to  which 
r e l a t i o n  of the  C s e r i e s ? "  and the  second d e a l s  w i th  th e  im-^ 
p o r t a n t  bu t  obscure  d o c t r in e  of the  " F u t u r i t y  of the  Whole."
He p o i n t s  ou t  t h a t  the d i r e c t i o n  from e a r l i e r  to  l a t e r  i n  
the B s e r i e s  i s  more im p o r ta n t  t h a t  the d i r e c t i o n  from l a t e r
'  mmmsmmik...
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to  e a r l i e r :  and a l s o  t h a t  the  passage  from l e s s  i n c l u s i v e  to
more i n c l u s i v e  i n  the C s e r i e s  i s  more im p o r ta n t  than  i t s
c o n v e rs e .  Hence, he a r g u e s ,  i t  i s  p l a u s i b l e  to  suppose t h a t
the more im p o r tan t  sense  in  each case co r responds  to  the o th e r
We may say ,  though not  w i th  c e r t a i n t y ,  w i th  g r e a t  p r o b a b i l i t y ,
t h a t  i t  i s  the  r e l a t i o n  " i n c l u s i v e  of"  which ap pears  as  " l a t e r
t h a n " .  From t h i s  fo l lo w s  d i r e c t l y  the co n c ep t io n  of a f i n a l
s t a t e  i n  which e v e r y th in g  i s  in c lu d e d ,  and in  which, u n l ik e
the  e a r l i e r  te rm s ,  which a re  u n s t a b l e  in  the  d i r e c t i o n  of the
f i n a l  term , th e r e  i s  p e r f e c t  s t a b i l i t y .  This i s  the  t ru e
e t e r n i t y .  McTaggart remarks : -  "The p e r c e p t i o n  of the whole
from i t s  own s t a n d p o i n t  i s  never  a p e r c e p t i o n  of i t ^ a s  p r e s e n t ,
y e t  i t  i s  a p e r c e p t i o n  which has an im p o r ta n t  s i m i l a r i t y  w i th
1
the p e r c e p t i o n  of  a n y th in g  as  p r e s e n t . "  This s i m i l a r i t y  i s ,  
t h a t  the p e r c e p t i o n  i s  c o r r e c t  and f r e e  from e r r o r .  But a p a r t  
from t h i s  r a t h e r  m e ta p h o r ic a l  sense i n  which McTaggart a g r e e s  
t h a t  e te rn i ty v m a y  be spoken of as  k p r e s e n t , he i n s i s t s  t h a t  
i t  i s  a m is take  to  conceive of i t  ande r  the  tem poral  ana logy  
of p r e s e n t .  "The view which connec ts  the e t e r n a l  as such,  or
the  u n iv e r s e  as  a  whole,  w i th  p r e s e n t n e s s  r a t h e r  than  w i th
2
p a s t n e s s  or  f u t u r i t y  i s  wrong." I f  a tem poral  ana logy  i s  to  
he u s e d ,  i t  i s  more c o r r e c t  to  say t h a t  e t e r n i t y  i s  i n  the 
f u t u r e  than  t h a t  i t  i s  i n  the p r e s e n t :  s in ce  the l a s t  term 
i n  the  C s e r i e s ,  which i s  com ple te ly  i n c l u s i v e ,  i s  what
1 .  S e c .  7 2 8 .  2 .  S e c .  7 3 7 .
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would be c a l l e d ,  in  the language of the B s e r i e s ,  the  " l a t e s t  
e v e n t " .
An obvious c r i t i c i s m  to  t h i s ,  t h a t  McTaggart d en ie s  
time and y e t  t a l k s  of e t e r n i t y  as " f u t u r e " ,  i s  f o r e s t a l l e d  by 
McTaggart h i m s e l f .  "Of c o u r se ,  i f  heaven i s  t im e le s s  i t  cannot 
be r e a l l y  f u t u r e . But,  as  we have seen ,  i t  may, i f  c e r t a i n  
c o n d i t i o n s  a re  f u l f i l l e d ,  be as  much f u t u r e ,  and as l i t t l e  
p a s t  and p r e s e n t ,  as b r e a k f a s t  tomorrow i s .  . . .  The c o n d i t i o n s  
i n  q u e s t i o n  were t h a t  n o th in g  shou ld  be r e a l l y  in  t im e ,  t h a t  
w hatever  appeared  to  be l a t e r  than  a n o th e r  th in g  shou ld  r e a l l y  
have to  i t  a c e r t a i n  non- tem pora l  r e l a t i o n ,  and t h a t  t h i s  r e ­
l a t i o n  shou ld  h o ld  between the  e v e n ts  of today  and heaven, as
1
i t  h o ld s  between the e v e n ts  of today  and tomorrow’ s b r e a k f a s t . "  
This  answer i s  s a t i s f a c t o r y :  but n e v e r t h e l e s s  I  do no t  f e e l  
t h a t  the  l a s t  word has been s a i d  upon the  s u b j e c t . Expressed  
s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  the  c r i t i c i s m  would be t h a t  the concep­
t i o n  on ly  g a in s  meaning because we know what " f u tu r e "  i s ,  and 
t h a t  the appearance  of the  word " f u tu r e "  i s  no t  a mere i n -  
c idence  to  be e x p la in e d  away by our p s y c h o lo g ic a l  p r e d i l e c t i o n  
to  p e r c e iv e  t h in g s  "as i f "  i n  t im e .  The same c r i t i c i s m  a p p l i e s  
more s t r o n g l y  to  the  t a l k  of a  " f i n a l  s ta g e "  and of a " l a s t  
te rm ":  I  would su g g es t  t h a t  th ese  bo th  presuppose  the  n o t io n  
of t i m e . I f  th ey  do, th en  the p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  i s  v i c i o u s ,
1 .  S e c .  7 3 9 .
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because they  occur in  fundam enta l  p l a c e s  i n  the argument 
where t h e i r  occu rrence  cou ld  no t  be excused as  due to  an a t ­
tempt to  make the  argument more e a s i l y  co m p reh en s ib le .  On the 
c o n t r a r y ,  the  words " l a s t "  and " f i n a l "  a re  used  to  ap p ly  to  
the  terms of the C s e r i e s  w e l l  as to  those  of the B s e r i e s .  
I f  t h i s  i s  so ,  then  tem pora l  n o t io n s  a r e ^  ip so  f a c t o ,  assumed 
to be more fundam enta l  th a n ,  o r ,  a t  the  v e ry  l e a s t ,  d i f f e r e n t  
from, the  C s e r i e s .  I t  i s  one t h in g  to  s a y : "Temporal language 
i s  m e ta p h o r i c a l  and m is le a d in g ,  but  i f  you must use i t ,  then  
i t  i s  l e s s  wrong to  say t h a t  e t e r n i t y  i s  f u t u r e  th a n  t h a t  i t  
i s  p r e s e n t  o r  p a s t " :  i t  i s  q u i t e  a n o th e r  to  use as  p re sup p os­
i t i o n s  o f  the whole argument the tem pora l  n o t io n s  t h a t  a re  
l a t e r  den ied  - and i t  i s  t h i s  l a s t  which i s  here  c r i t i c i s e d .
Second ly ,  as  su g g e s te d  e a r l i e r ,  i t  may be o b je c t e d  
t h a t  McTaggart*s c o r r e l a t i o n  of " e a r l i e r "  w i th  " l e s s  i n c l u s i v e "  
and of " l a t e r "  w i th  "more i n c l u s i v e "  i s  a d i s c o v e r y # t h a t  i s ,  
i t  i s  by no means an a n a l y t i c a l ,  but  a s y n t h e t i c  s t a t e m e n t .
I n  one s e n s e ,  the  c r i t i c i s m  f a l l s  to  the ground a t  ohce . For 
McTaggart never  meant to  say  t h a t  the  s ta te m e n t  " S a r l i a r  c o r ­
re sponds  to  l e s s  i n c l u s i v e "  i s  a  t a u t o l o g y ,  o th e rw ise  he would 
s t i l l  be s a d d le d  w i th  the  tem pora l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  he was 
t r y i n g  to  e r a d i c a t e .  But even a l lo w in g  f o r  a d i f f e r e n c e  of 
em phas is ,  which he cou ld  s a f e l y  adm it ,  I  t h in k  t h a t  the d i s ­
crepancy  between the two n o t io n s  i s  more than  he cou ld  a l lo w .
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In  o th e r  words, i t  i s  by no means t a u to lo g o u s  to  ask  the
q u e s t i o n ,  " I s  a more i n c l u s i v e  term e a r l i e r  o r  l a t e r  than  a
l e s s  i n c l u s i v e  one?" and McTaggart does i n  f a c t  a sk  t h a t  v e ry
q u e s t i o n .  I t  would, however, be u n f a i r  to  condemn him f o r
a sk in g  the  q u e s t i o n ,  s in c e  the same o b j e c t i o n  cou ld  be # w is te d
round to  ap p ly  to  a l l  s p e c u la t i v e  p h i lo s o p h y .  But i f  i t  be
d ec id e d  t h a t  h i s  q u e s t io n  was not  m ere ly  r h e t o r i c a l ,  t h a t  he
1
might ( though he d id  no t  ) have g iv en  the o p p o s i te  answer to  
the  q u e s t i o n ,  we must ,  I  t h i n k ,  ^ r a n t  t h a t  he was g iv in g  us 
new in fo rm a t io n  when he s a i d  t h a t  " i n c l u s i v e  of"  co r responds  to 
" l a t e r " .  I n  t h a t  c a s e ,  time and tem poral  n o t io n s  a re  s t i l l  
be ing  c o v e r t l y  re g a rd e d  as e x t ra n e o u s  and i r r e d u c i b l e  -  no t  
because th ey  mean n o th in g ,  but  because th ey  mean too much.
The c r i t i c i s m  i s  an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  d i f f i c u l t  one, because i t  
i s  so e a s y  to  s t a t e  i t  i n  a manner u n f a i r  to  McTaggart: and 
when i t  has been d i s c o u n te d  s e v e r a l  t im es  we are  r a t h e r  a p t  
to  ru s h  to  the  o p p o s i te  extreme and d e c la r e  t h a t  t h e re  i s  
n o th in g  in  i t .  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  when a l l  due a l low ances  have 
been made, I  t h i n k  t h a t  the  r e s id u e  i s  j u s t i f i e d ,  and t h a t  
McTaggart does l a y  h im s e l f  open to  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m .
T h i r d l y ,  i t  i s  pe rhaps  s u s p ic io u s  t h a t ,  whereas in  
the  c h a p te r  denying the r e a l i t y  of  t im e ,  i t  i s  r e p e a t e d l y
and i t  i s  j u s t i f i a b l e ,  indeed  n e c e s s a ry ,  to  d e p a r t  from 
i t  to  c r i t i c i s e  him.
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i n s i s t e d  t h a t  the A s e r i e s  i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  t im e ,  y e t  i n  th e  
l a t e r  p a r t s  the B s e r i e s  does du ty  a lm ost  e x c l u s i v e l y  f o r  
t im e ,  and the  A s e r i e s  i s  h a r d ly  m en t ioned .  By i t s e l f ,  t h i s  
cou ld  h a r d ly  be c a l l e d  a c r i t i c i s m ,  but taken  i n  co nn ec t io n  
w i th  o th e r  d u b i e t i e s ,  i t  has c o n s id e r a b le  w e ig h t .  I t  i s  d i f ­
f i c u l t  to  s e e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  how the  correspondence  between 
the A s e r i e s  and the G s e r i e s  cou ld  be worked o u t .  A p o s s i b l e  
C r i t i c i s m  i s ,  t h a t  the cho ice  of the B s e r i e s  to  m ed ia te  the  
t r a n s f o r m a t io n  of tem poral  u n r e a l i t y  i n t o  i n o f f e n s iv e  C and D 
s e r i e s  i s  s i g n i f i c a n t  -  i s  i n  f a c t  a lm ost  an adm iss ion  t h a t  
a l l  i s  no t  q u i t e  what i t  app ears  to  be .  For the B s e r i e s  i s  
no t  a tem pora l  s e r i e s , though the terms which i t  r e l a t e s  a re  
e v e n t s .  I  would su g g es t  t h a t  the passage  from the B to  the  C 
s e r i e s  i s  s u c c e s s f u l  in  so f a r  as the  B s e r i e s  i s  not  tem po ra l :  
and t h a t  the d i f f i c u l t i e s  m entioned above are  due to  the 
o c c a s io n a l  ap pearances  of the  s k e l e t o n  i n  the  cupboardl  As 
long  as  the B s e r i e s  i s  taken  as a s e r i e s ,  a l l  i s  w e l l :  bu t  
as soon as r e f e r e n c e  i s  made to  the  s p e c i f i c a l l y  temporal. 
c o n n o ta t io n  of the s e r i e s ,  t r o u b le  b e g in s .  The gho s t  of time
cannot  be pe rm anen t ly  l a i d .
I t  w i l l  be seen  t h a t  th e se  c r i t i c i s m s ,  however 
th ey  t r i c k  them se lves  out  in  l o g i c a l  garV, d e p e n d .u l t im a te ly  
on a m e ta p h y s ic a l  p o s t u l a t e ,  which i s  n o th in g  more im p ress iv e
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than  a mere i n c r e d u l i t y , a d i s i n c l i n a t i o n  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  a 
complete e l i m i n a t i o n  of time i s  p o s s i b l e .  I f  i t  were no t  f o r  
t h a t  accompanying b e l i e f ,  the  c r i t i c  would f i n d  no cogency in  
the  o b j e c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  McTaggart on t h a t  s c o re :  on the con­
t r a r y ,  he would w i l l i n g l y  a c c e p t  McTaggart*s b r i l l i a n t  a r ­
guments, and see no need to  q u e s t io n  them. Ho one, however, 
whetlB r  sym pa th e t ic  or  q u e s t i o n in g ,  can f a i l  to  admire the  
s p l e n d i d l y  courageous and o r i g i n a l  a t te m p t  to  do what i d e a l ­
i s t s ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  have so s i g n a l l y  f a i l e d  to  do - to  b u i ld  up 
a co h e re n t  and s a t i s f y i n g  e x p l a n a t i o n  of  temporal  a p p e a ran c es ,  
on the  fo u n d a t io n  of a m etaphysic  which d en ies  the  r e a l i t y  
of Time.
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CHAPTER V I I I .
A s ig n  of the growing im portance of  time in  modern 
though t  i s  the  i n t e r e s t  a ro u se d  by the p u b l i c a t i o n  of  Mr.J.W. 
Dunne’ s two books,  "An Experiment w i th  Time", and "The S e r i a l  
U n i v e r s e " . The f i r s t  i s  d iv id e d  i n t o  two h a l v e s ,  one of  which 
i s  a d e t a i l e d  and i n t e r e s t i n g  accoun t  of  some remarkable  dreams, 
which l e d  Mr. Dunne to  fo rm u la te  a th e o ry  of the f u t u r e .  Having 
gone so f a r ,  he dec ided  to  see w hether  i t  l i n k e d  up i n  any way 
w i th  a c c e p te d  f a c t s  of everyday  l i f e ,  and whether  i t  cou ld  bo 
deduced from th ese  f a c t s .  He came to  the  c o n c lu s io n  t h a t  i t  
cou ld ,  and the second p o r t i o n  of the book i s  an a t te m p t  l o g i c ­
a l l y  to  deduce from a g re e d  f i r s t  p r i n c i p l e s ,  a  m e tap h y s ica l  
th e o ry  of t i m e . This th e o ry  i s  i n  agreement w i th  the r e s u l t s  
o f  h i s  fo rm er  e m p i r i c a l  and p s y c h o lo g ic a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,  b u t ,  
as Dunne h im s e l f  p o i n t s  o u t ,  i t  i s  l o g i c a l l y  independen t  of 
them. Thus i t  i s  u s e l e s s  to  c r i t i c i s e  h i s  m e tap h y s ica l  th e o ry  
mere ly  by say ing  t h a t  the d r e a m - r e s u l t s  a re  not s c i e n t i f i c :  
e q u a l l y  we cannot  d i s c r e d i t  the d r e a m - r e s u l t s  by showing a n e a t  
a r r a y  of f a l l a c i e s  on which the m e ta p h y s ic a l  t h e o ry  i s  a l l e g e d  
to  be b a se d .  I f  the d r e a m - r e s u l t s  can be s u b s t a n t i a t e d  -  and 
Dunne 's  r e s u l t s  a re  s u f f i c i e n t l y  i n t e r e s t i n g  to  s t i m u l a t e  i n ­
v e s t i g a t i o n  -  i t  w i l l  mean t h a t  a l l  f u t u r e  m e ta p h y s ic a l  t h e o r i e s  
about  time must f i n d  room f o r  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  c o n c e p t io n s .
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T h eo r ie s  (such  as B road’ s ,  f o r  example) which h o ld  t h a t  the 
f u t u r e  i s  no th in g  a t  a l l ,  w i l l  be r u l e d  o u t ;  but t h a t  does n o t  
mean t h a t  Dunne’ s own th e o ry  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d .
Dunne’ s second book, "The S e r i a l  U n iv e r se " ,  r e p e a t s  
in  an a l t e r n a t i v e  form the  arguments on which the  th e o ry  of 
S e r i a l i s m  r e s t s ,  and th en  a p p l i e s  the f i n d i n g s  of  S e r i a l ! s m  to 
modern s c i e n c e .  I t  i s  c la im ed  t h a t  the  quantum Theory, f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  can be e x h i b i t e d  as  a consequence of  S e r i a l i s m .
About t h i s  t e c h n i c a l  p a r t ,  l i t t l e  w i l l  be s a i d ,  f i r s t l y ,  because 
I am not  q u a l i f i e d  to  d ea l  w i th  i t ,  and seco n d ly ,  because i t  
s t a n d s  or f a l l s  w i th  the th e o ry  of t i m e . This c h a p te r ,  th en ,  
w i l l  be m ain ly  concerned w i th  the th e o ry  of s e r i a l  t im es  as 
i t  i s  developed  in  these  two books.
The n o t io n  of a r e g r e s s  as c o n ta in e d  i n  time may be
1
i n t ro d u c e d  by two q u o t a t i o n s  from Broad. "We a re  n a t u r a l l y  
tempted to  r e g a rd  the  h i s t o r y  of the w orld  as e x i s t i n g  e t e r n ­
a l l y  in  a c e r t a i n  o rd e r  of e v e n t s .  Along t h i s ,  and i n  a f i x e d  
d i r e c t i o n ,  we imagine the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of p r e s e n t n e s s  as 
moving. . . .  I t  i s  p r e s e n t  a t  B when i t  i s  p a s t  a t  A. Thus 
a l l  the problems which t h i s  ana logy  was in v e n te d  to  so lve  
a re  s im ply  ta k e n  out of o th e r  e v e n ts  to  be heaped on t h a t  
p a r t i c u l a r  s e r i e s  of e v e n ts  which i s  the  movement." And 
"We can h a r d ly  ex p ec t  to  reduce changes o f  time to  changes
1. " S c i e n t i f i c  Thought" ,  p p . 59-60 & 65.
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i n  t im e ,  s in ce  time would then  need another Time to  change i n ,  
and so on to  i n f i n i t y . "
The i d e a ,  th e n ,  t h a t  a c e r t a i n  method of a n a ly s in g  
tem pora l  p r e d i c a t e s  le a d s  to  an i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s  i s  not p e c u l i a r  
to  Dunne. But Dunne d i f f e r s  from Broad and McTaggart i n  h i s  
a t t i t u d e  to  the r e g r e s s .  McTaggart r e g a rd s  i t  as a s t ro n g  a r ­
gument a g a i n s t  the r e a l i t y  of t im e .  Broad, though he does no t  
go as  f a r  as  McTaggart, c o n s id e r s  a r e g r e s s  u n d e s i r a b le  p e r  se ,  
and su g g e s t s  t h a t  t h i s  type of a n a l y s i s  i s  f r u i t l e s s  because 
i t  l e a d s  to  a r e g r e s s .  But Dunne not on ly  c o n s id e r s  a r e g r e s s  
no t  u n d e s i r a b l e ;  he see s  in  i t  the  v e ry  n a tu re  of time i t s e l f ,
and the key to  c e r t a i n  u l t im a te  q u e s t i o n s  of psycho logy ,  and
1
p h y s i c s ,  and the p h i lo so p h y  of r e l i g i o n .  He re a c h e s  the i n ­
f i n i t e  r e g r e s s  from an a n a l y s i s  of  what we mean by ’now*. Ob­
v i o u s l y  i t  i s  a r e l a t i v e  term , be lo ng ing  by d iv in e  r i g h t  to  
no e v e n t ,  and c o n s t a n t l y  changing:  what was p r e s e n t ,  i ^  no 
lo n g e r  p r e s e n t ,  and what ij_ p r e s e n t ,  w i l l  no t  always be so .
The ten se  r e f e r e n c e  rem a ins :  we must go a s ta g e  f a r t h e r  back 
in  our e f f o r t  to  f i n d  a unique r e fe re n c e  f o r  the ’ now’ . And 
so on ad i n f i n i t u m  -  th e re  ( i s )  no such unique r e f e r e n c e .
Dunne makes t h i s  c l e a r e r  by t a k in g  the  example of th r e e  ev e n ts  
L, M, and H, of which the f i r s t  i s  p a s t ,  the second happening 
now, the t h i r d  i n  the f u t u r e .  Then I may w r i t e  them 
w i th  a mark round the p r e s e n t  even t  M to  show t h a t  i t ,
1 .  See " S e r i a l  U n iverse"  p p . 34-6 ,  f o r  a c l e a r  s ta te m e n t  of  h i s  
views on the u t i l i t y  of r e g r e s s e s .
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and no t  ono of  the o t h e r s ,  I s  now happ en in g .  Y es te rday  I  
shou ld  have w r i t t e n  H, and tomorrow, p e rh a p s ,  I  s h a l l
w r i t e  L M 0 .  But now I  am w r i t i n g  L 0 Î I .  I t  i s  obvious from 
t h i s  t h a t  the r e f e r e n c e  to  ten se  i s  s t i l l  no t  e l i m i n a t e d :  
f a c e d  by the a l t e r n a t i v e s  H, L(g)H, and L M g ) ,  we have 
no v a l i d  re a s o n  f o r  d i s c r i m i n a t i n g  between them on t h a t  e v id ­
ence a l o n e .  To show t h a t  the  second of them i s  the  c o r r e c t  one, 
we have to  add a n o th e r  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  mark - say by under -  
l i n i n g  1 @ H .  B ut ,  s i m i l a r l y ,  a t  a p a s t  d a t e ,  ( p M  H would be 
u n d e r l i n e d  . . . ,  and so on. The i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s  i s  f u l l y  
lau nch ed .
The p r e c e d in g  accou n t  i s  taken  from "The S e r i a l
1
U n iv e r s e " .  I n  the  "Experiment w i th  Time", the  same r e s u l t  i s  
r e a c h e d ,  but the  language used  o f t e n  l e a v e s  Dunne open to  the 
charge t h a t  he h e ld  an u n d e s i r a b ly  s p a t i a l  view of t i m e . As 
he e x p re s s e s  i t  i n  the "Experiment w i th  Time", "We have seen 
t h a t  i f  time p a s s e s  or  grows or  accum ula tes  or expends i t s e l f  
or  does an y th in g  w hatsoever  e x c e p t  s t a n d  r i g i d  and c h a n g e le s s  
be fo re  a T im e-f ix ed  o b s e rv e r ,  th e r e  must be a n o th e r  Time which 
t imes the  a c t i v i t y  o f ,  or a lo n g ,  the f i r s t  Time, and a n o th e r  
Time which t im es t h a t  second Time. and so on i n  an ap p a re n t  
s e r i e s  to  i n f i n i t y . "  The e s s e n t i a l  i d e a  i n  "An Experiment 
w i th  Time" i s  a development of the view of C.H. H in ton ,  as
1. C hap ters  VII & V I I I .
2 .  p . 158. (R e fe rences  a re  to  the T h i rd  E d i t i o n . )
272
e x p re s s e d  i n  M s  book. "What i s  the F o u r th  Dimension?" Dunne 
summarised i t  v e ry  c l e a r l y  as f o l l o w s : -  " I f  aB were to  t r a v e l  
thus"  ( i n  the  d i r e c t i o n  i n d i c a t e d  by the  a r row ),  " the  l i t t l e  
b i t s  of the  f u l l  l i n e s  where th^se_^ard i n t e r s e c t e d  a t
V 'l /V
C, D, 3 ;  (t, and H, would apÿ§âî^ as  moving e i t h e r  towards
A or towards B - as  moving, t h a t  i s  to  say ,  i n  S pace .  . . . A  
c r e a t u r e  whose f i e l d  of o b s e r v a t io n  was thus  l i m i t e d  to  AB 
would be aware,  t h e r e f o r e ,  of a l i t t l e  w orld  of moving p a r t ­
i c l e s .  But you and I ,  whose f i e l d  of o b s e r v a t io n  covers  the 
whole d iagram, p e r c e iv e  t h a t  the a c t u a l  b i t s  of the  f u l l  
l i n e s  i n t e r s e c t e d  do no t  r e a l l y  move about  on the  page:  what
happens i s  m ere ly  t h a t  the s e c t i o n a l  views of the l i n e s  move
as our eyes fo l lo w  the  movement of AB. And the  on ly  th in g  
which seems to  us r e a l l y  to  move over the page i s  the l i n e
AB. So, a c c o rd in g  to  H in to n ’ s t h e o r y ,  a be ing  who cou ld  see
1
Time’ s e x t e n s io n  as  w e l l  as t h a t  of Space would r e g a rd  the 
p a r t i c l e s  of our t h r e e -d im e n s io n a l  world  as m ere ly  s e c t i o n a l  
views of f i x e d  m a t e r i a l  th re a d s  e x ten d in g  i n  a f o u r t h  dimen­
s i o n ,  and would c o n s id e r  t h a t  the on ly  th in g  in  the  e n t i r e
1 .  This  p h rase  seems s u s p i c i o u s l y  to  begging the"
q u e s t i o n .
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Cosmos t h a t  r e a l l y  moved was t h a t  t h r e e -d im e n s io n a l  f i e l d  of
o b s e rv a t io n  which we c a l l  ' t h e  p r e s e n t  moment' .  Hinton assumes
thus  t h a t  the p a s t  and the f u t u r e  ’ c o - e x i s t ’ , and t h a t  our
e x p e r ie n c e  of change i s  due to  a r e l a t i v e  motion between t h i s
time e x t e n s io n  and t h a t  'na r row  space and s in g l e  moment’ which
i s  the p r e s e n t .  But he r e f r a i n e d  from n o t in g  t h a t  such r e l a t i v e
1
motion must take Time."
The e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t  i s  the s i m p l i f i c a t i o n  such a 
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n  of  movemenljproduces. I n s t e a d  of numerous atoms 
’moving in  ’ space we have o b j e c t s  p e r s i s t i n g ; a l l  t h e i r  ap­
p a r e n t  movements be ing  r e p la c e d  by the s in g l e  movement of the 
p r e s e n t  ( t h a t  i s ,  of time 1 in  time 2 ) .  I t  does n o t ,  of co u rse ,  
g e t  r i d  of a l l  movement, and i t  i s  t h a t  f a c t  t h a t  l e a d s  on to  
an i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s .  At each s tag e  i n  the r e g r e s s  the  p re c e d ­
ing  t im e-d im en s ion  w i l l  be found to  have ’ tu rn e d  i n t o  s p a c e ’ - 
bu t  the  r e ig n i n g  t im e-d im ens ion  i t s e l f  ’ ta k e s  t im e ’ over i t s  
movement, and i s  co n se q u en t ly  s u p e r s e d e d .  As r e g a rd s  the 
’ tu r n in g  i n t o  s p a c e ’ , the  co n c ep t io n  may be i l l u s t r a t e d  by 
the f a m i l i a r  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  of time as a j o u r n e y .  The movement 
of time i s  l i k e  a man w alk ing  a long  a ro a d :  eve ry  minute he
1 .  "Experiment w i th  Time” , p p . 139-40. A s i m i l a r  id e a  i s  ex­
p r e s s e d  ( i n  a much more re a d a b le  form th an  i n  Hinton) i n  
A b b o t t ' s " B l a t l a n d ” , where t h e - B l a t l a n d e r s ’ m y s te r io u s  
c i r c l e ,  i n c r e a s i n g  and d e c re a s in g  i n  s i z e ,  i s  ’ r e a l l y |  a 
sphere  p a s s in g  s low ly  through  t h e i r  p l a n s .  The e x te n s io n  
of the id e a  to  many dimensions i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  no tew or thy .
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has gone a b i t  i u r t h e r  than  the p re c e d in g  minute* F i n a l l y ,  he 
looks  back and r e g a rd s  the  d i s t a n c e  he has t r a v e r s e d  as a 
whole,  a r t i f i c i a l l y  d iv id e d  by him i n t o  wha,t has been t r a ­
v e r s e d  ( p a s t )  and what i s  s t i l l  to  be t r a v e r s e d  ( f u t u r e )  • I t  
i s  an e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t  i n  Dunne’ s th e o ry  t h a t  the d i s t i n c t i o n  
between p a s t  and f u t u r e  i s  e n t i r e l y  s u b j e c t i v e  and ep is tem o-  
l o g i c a l ,  and t h a t  bo th  have the  same o n t o l o g i c a l  s t a t u s .  But 
the o r i g i n a l i t y  and the f a s c i n a t i o n  of Dunne’ s th e o ry  l i e s  in
h i s  a t t e m p t  to r e c o n c i l e  p r e d i c t i o n  w i th  i n t e r f e r e n c e  to  f a l s -
1
i f y  t h a t  p r e d i c t i o n .  I t  i s  e v id e n t  t h a t  i f  i n  a  dream I  saw
m yself  i n  a motor a c c i d e n t ,  I  shou ld  keep away from motors  f o r
a c o n s id e r a b le  time I Yet the p r e d i c t i o n  might none the  l e s s
have been genu ine ,  Dunne i n s i s t s ,  as showing what would have
happened I had not i n t e r f e r e d .  Although the f u t u r e  i s  as
o b j e c t i v e  as the p a s t ,  I  can i n t e r f e i e now i n  such a way as  to
2
modify the subsequen t  course  of the su b s t ra tu m .
C orresponding  to  the r e g r e s s  of t i m e s , t h e re  i s  a 
s i m i l a r  r e g r e s s  in  the  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s  o b s e r v e r .  I  am not  on ly  
c o n s c io u s ,  bu t  consc ious  t h a t  I  am c o n sc io u s ,  and consc ious  
t h a t  I am consc ious  t h a t  I am consc ious  .••> and so on e n d l e s s ­
l y ,  as Dunne shows i n  h i s  example of the a r t i s t ,  a t  the
1. "Experiment w i th  Time", p . 126 & p p . 219 f f .
2 .  I t  seems to  me t h a t  the word "subsequen t"  here  begs the  
q u e s t i o n ,  and i s  a r e t u r n  to the commonsense view of the 
f u t u r e .  This  p o in t  w i l l  be r e tu r n e d  to  l a t e r .
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b e g in n in g  of  "The S e r i a l  U n iv e r s e " .  But.  he p o i n t s  o u t .  the  
f i r s t  term o f j ^ e r i e s  d i f f e r s  from a l l  succeed ing  terms in  the  
im p o r ta n t  r e s p e c t  o f  i t s  l o p s i d e d n e s s .  " In  the f i r s t  term of 
a s e r i e s ,  the r e l a t i o n  which l i n k s  the terms i s  a b s e n t  on one 
s i d e ;  and t h i s  lo p s id e d n e s s  may have a ve ry  p r a c t i c a l  s i g n i f ­
icance*  Thus the f i r s t  swing of a pendulum has no p re v io u s  
swing to  de term ine i t :  i t  must be s t a r t e d  by an e x t e r n a l  
agency* The f i r s t  fu rrow  in  a p loughed s t r e t c h  d i f f e r s  i n  s e c ­
t i o n  from a l l  the o th e rs*  And the f o r c e s  a c t i n g  on the end 
members of our c a n t i l e v e r  g i r d e r  a re  b a lan ced  a t  the  o u te r  
en ds ,  no t  by pushes and p u l l s  in  s i m i l a r  members, as  e l s e ­
where i n  the  s e r i e s ,  bu t  by the  e x t e r n a l l y  a p p l i e d  e n d - lo a d . "  
From t h i s  he deduces the unend ingness  of both  o b s e rv e r  and 
t i m e - s e r i e s  in  a l l  t im es  ex cep t  time 1 -  and t h i s  i s ,  he
2
c la im s ,  " th e  f i r s t  s c i e n t i f i c  argument f o r  human i m m o r t a l i t y ."
Added to  which, i n  the " S e r i a l  U n iv e r se " ,  he r e l a t e s  
h i s  th e o ry  to  modern s c i e n t i f i c  d o c t r i n e s  such a r e l a t i v i t y ,  
the  quantum th e o ry ,  H e is e n b e rg ’ s P r i n c i p l e  of In d e te rm in a c y : 
so t h a t  i t s  im por tance ,  i f  i t  be s u b s t a n t i a t e d ,  cannot be 
d oub ted .  And even as f a r  as time a lone  i s  concerned ,  when i t  
i s  remembered t h a t  i t  t r e a t s  of problems t h a t  are  c e n t r a l  to  
any m e ta p h y s ic a l  th e o ry  of time (such  as the A s e r i e s ,  the 
i n e x p l i c a b l e  ’movement’ of the ’ now’ , the i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  of 
t im e ,  the s t a t u s  of the f u t u r e ) ,  i t s  importance i s  i n  no
1. "Experiment w i th  Time", p . 158. 2 .  I b i d .  p . 5 .  See a l s o
p . 197.
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danger of  be ing  u n d e r e s t im a te d .  The p reponderance  of d e s t r u c t ­
ive  c r i t i c i s m  in  what fo l lo w s  i s  no t  to  be i n t e r p r e t e d  as  a 
l a c k  of a d m ira t io n  f o r  a  v e ry  i n t e r e s t i n g  s y n t h e s i s .
The f i r s t  c r i t i c i s m  t h a t  can be b rought  a g a i n s t  
Dunne i s  t h a t  h i s  co n c ep t io n  of time i s  too s p a t i a l .  As f a r  as 
the " S e r i a l  U n iverse"  (which i s ,  i n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  the b e t t e r  
book) i s  concerned ,  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m  i s  f a r  from j u s t i f i e d  a t  
f i r s t  s i g h t ,  and Dunne r e p e a t e d l y  warns h i s  r e a d e r s ,  t h a t  
though he u ses  s p a t i a l  i l l u s t r a t i o n s ,  th ey  must no t  be i n t e r ­
p r e t e d  too l i t e r a l l y .  "We have now^here used  space o rd e r  to
r e p r e s e n t  time o r d e r . I t  i s  t ru e  t h a t  the c o u n te r s  i n  our 
1
bags a re  s p a t i a l l y  s e p a r a t e d ,  bu t  t h e i r  space o rd e rs  i n  the
bags may be c h a n g e d . . .  IText, we were p a r t i c u l a r l y  c a r e f u l  no t
to  say  t h a t  the now-marks moved from one s t a t e  to  a n o th e r :
f o r  to  do t h i s  would have been to  d e c la re  t h a t  the s t a t e s
were be in g  presumed to  be s p a t i a l l y  s e p a r a t e d .  We s a i d ,  i n -
s t e a d ,  t h a t  the marks ’ changed from a s s o c i a t i o n  w i t h '  the nex t
in  w hatever  s e r i e s  we had been h o p in g , p r e v i o u s l y ,  to  r e g a r d
as r e a l  t i m e - o r d e r .  The change, a g a in ,  was no t  p resupposed ;
i t  was d i s c o v e re d  to  be an e m p i r i c a l  f a c t  t h a t  our chance of
i n t e r f e r i n g  w i th  any p a r t i c u l a r  ’ s t a t e ’ o f  the o b j e c t  system
would v a n i s h ,  and would be r e p la c e d  by a chance of i n t e r f e r -
inF  w i th  the ’ s t a t e ’ which came next  i n  what we were t r y i n g
2
to  r e g a r d  as t i m e - o r d e r . "
1 .  An example which he had tak en  as an i l l u s t r a t i o n .
2 .  " S e r i a l  U n i v e r s e " , p . 8 1 .
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I t  must be remembered, to o ,  t h a t  Dunne emphasizes 
the  fundam enta l  im portance  of  the  A s e r i e s ,  and beg ins  h i s  
a n a l y s i s  from i t ,  and so we can assume t h a t  he d id  not  s t a r t  
from a w ho lly  s p a t i a l  c o n c e p t io n .  I t  may be o b j e c t e d  t h a t  h i s  
view e l i m i n a t e s  t im e ,  s i n c e ,  a t  each s t a g e ,  the p re c e d in g  
t im e-d im ens ion  tu r n s  i n t o  space ,  and i f  we s to p  the r e g r e s s  
a t  any one p o i n t ,  we g e t  an a b s o lu te  and e t e r n a l  ’now’ . B u t , 
the f a c t  of the  r e g r e s s  remains u n e x p la in e d  and e s s e n t i a l l y  
tem p o ra l :  a f t e r  a l l ,  what i s  meant by ’p re c e d in g  t im e-d im ens­
i o n ’? The v a r io u s  dimensions a re  o b v io u s ly  i r r e v e r s i b l e .
The e a r l i e r  book g iv e s  much more cause f o r  the 
a c c u s a t i o n .  The q u o t a t i o n  of pa ssag e s  s a i d  to  exem plify  
s p a t i a l i s a t i o n ,  b e s id e s  be ing  i r r i t a t i n g ,  i s  r a t h e r  f u t i l e ,  
s in c e  i s o l a t e d  p assag e s  may be made to prove a n y th in g :  n ev e r ­
t h e l e s s  dubious remarks are  f r e q u e n t .  A more im p o r tan t  ques­
t i o n  to  ask  i s  w hether  Dunne’ s whole c o n c ep t io n  i s  s p a t i a l  
i n  i t s  e s s e n c e .  The use of s p a t i a l  diagrams i n  i t s e l f  p roves  
n o th in g ;  n e i t h e r  does the  use of s p a t i a l  language ;  but t h e s e ,  
t a k e n  t o g e t h e r  w i th  the  ’ t u r n i n g '  of time i n t o  space ,  the 
movement of  the  ’ now’ (seeming to  p o s i t  a  homogeneous medium 
th rough  which the  ’ now’ t r a v e l s ) ,  and the  c i t a t i o n  of the  
P h y s ic a l  scheme of  H in to n ,  a re  more than  s u s p i c i o u s .
The tu r n i n g  of time i n t o  space seems to  me the 
c r u c i a l  p o i n t ,  as  i t  r e a p p e a r s ,  i n  a l e s s  b l a t a n t  form, in
1 . For  example, p p . 131, 148, 158, 165.
278
the " S e r i a l  U n iv e r s e " .  We may take  i t  f o r  g ra n te d  t h a t  i t  i s  
an e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t  i n  Dunne 's  th e o ry ,  and see whethesr i t  can 
be shaken .  At f i r s t  s i g h t ,  the c r i t i c i s m  I wish to  make ap­
p e a r s  m ere ly  a v e r b a l  one.  I f  i t  i s  n o t ,  i t  goes to  the whole 
b a s i s  of h i s  t h e o r y .
When Dunne shows the r e g r e s s  in v o lv ed  in  the  ana­
l y s i s  of  the 'n o w ' ,  he r i g h t l y  says t h a t  you cannot d i s t i n ­
g u i s h  between the  p a s t  s t a t e  0  M IT, the p r e s e n t  s t a t e  L(M)IT, 
and the f u t u r e  s t a t e  L M ^ , by the f i r s t - t e r m  now-mark a lo n e :  
to  show t h a t  the s t a t e  L ^ I T  i s  the p r e s e n t  one you need a 
second d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  mark. But he goes on to  say t h a t  ÿ.ust as
M i s  p r e s e n t ,  i n  f i r s t - t e r m  t im e ,  so " in  the more comprehensive
1
system known to  u s " ,  L M IT i s  p r e s e n t .  As i t  s t a n d s ,  t h i s  i s  
going too f a r .  I t  i s  no t  L, M, and N t h a t  a re  p r e s e n t :  but 
D(g)lT (a s  opposed t o ( ^  M IT atod L M @ ) -  and the  d i s t i n c t i o n  
between M, and L and IT s t i l l  re m a in s .  He might mean by the 
p h r a s e ,  " p r e s e n t  i n  the more comprehensive system known to u s " ,  
t h a t  from the a s p e c t  of second- te rm  t i m e , we can see t h a t  th e r e  
( i s )  no in h e r e n t  d i f f e r e n c e  between L, M, and IT, and t h a t  each 
(have) equ a l  c la im s to  be re g a rd ed  as p r e s e n t .  Thus, though 
th e re  i s  ( a c t u a l l y )  a d i f f e r e n c e ,  and though M a lone  i s  p r e s e n t  
i t  i s  c o n t in g e n t  and might be o th e rw ise  - ind eed ,  a t  a n o th e r  
time i t  w i l l  be o th e rw is e .  I f  so ,  though i t  i s  a dubious use 
of ' p r e s e n t '  , i t  i s  v a l i d  enough. But u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  i t  forms
1. See " S e r i a l  U n iv e r se " ,  p p .77 & 90.
a co nven ien t  s t e p p in g - s to n e  to  the d i f f e r e n t  view t h a t ,  f o r  
second term t im e ,  th e re  i s  a c t u a l l y  no difference between L,
M, and IT - and t h i s  s t e p  Dunne im m edia te ly  t a k e s  by a s s e r t i n g  
t h a t  a l l  th re e  a re  " e q u a l ly  p r e s e n t " . The q u e s t io n  i s ,  I s  t h i s  
view v a l i d ?  I f  i t  i s ,  h i s  th e o ry  f o l lo w s ,  in  the  s p a t i a l i s a t i o n  
of f i r s t  te rm -t im e f o r  second- te rm  t i m e . I f  n o t ,  i t  b reaks  down.
The p h ra s e ,  "There i s  a d i f f e r e n c e  between L and M", 
i s  ambiguous, ( l )  L and M may be of d i f f e r e n t  s t u f f ,  f o r  ex­
ample, ch a lk  and c h e e s e .  This has g o t  n o th in g  a t  a l l  to  do 
w i th  t im e .  When we a re  d e a l in g  w i th  L, M, and ÎT as e v e n t s ,  we 
a re  n e i t h e r  concerned  to  a s s e r t  nor to  deny t h a t  th e re  may be 
d i f f e r é n c e s  between them in  t h i s  s e n s e .  (2) There i s  a f i r s t -  
term tem poral  d i f f e r e n c e  between L and M. M i s  d i f f e r e n t  from 
L, because i t  j a  p r e s e n t  and L i_£ p a s t .  (3) The d i f f e r e n c e  
between L and M runs  r i g h t  th rough  the tem pora l  r e g r e s s ,  a p a r t
from f i r s t - t e r m  t i m e .
ITobody i s  l i k e l y  to  deny ( 2 ) .  The c o n t r o v e r s i a l  one 
i s  (3) , and Dunne would deny t h i s . The p o i n t  a t  i s s u e ,  th en ,  
i s  no t  w hether  th e re  i s  to o rd in a r y  e x p e r ien ce  a d i f f e r e n c e  
between M, and L and q u i t e  o b v io u s ly ,  t h e re  i s .  But Dunne 
would say  t h a t  t h i s  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  w h o l ly  e x p l i c a b l e  i n  terras of 
f i r s t - t e r m  t im e ,  and t h a t  o th e rw ise  th e r e  i s  no d i f f e r e n c e :  
and in  su p p o r t  of h i s  view he adduces,  what i s  h a r d ly  l i k e l y  
to  be d e n ie d ,  t h a t  M’ s a t t r i b u t e  of p r e s e n t n e s s  i s  a c o n t in g e n t
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one, and t h a t  f o r  second- te rm  t im e ,  the f i r s t - t e r m  'now' 
does no t  be long  E i t h e r  to  L or M or The q u e s t io n  i s  w hether  
h i s  c o n c lu s io n  fo l lo w s  from t h i s .  A f t e r  a l l ,  i t  may be s a i d ,  
the  d i f f e r e n c e  does I'un through the r e g r e s s ,  i n  t h a t  we can 
n ev e r  g e t  r i d  of  the ' n o w ' . Then t h e ' p r e s e n t '  f o r  second- te rm  
time i s  no t  LMF, but L ( ^ H .  To t h i s  Dunne might r e p l y  t h a t  i t  
i s  on ly  so because the second-te rm  o b s e rv e r  i s  u s in g  the  f i r s t -  
term o b s e rv e r  a s  h i s  in s t r u m e n t ,  and so th e r e  i s  an e s s e n t i a l  
r e f e r e n c e  to  the f i r s t - t e r m  'n o w ' ,  and a d i f f e r e n c e  between 
M, and L and H t h a t  i s  on ly  then  i n t r o d u c e d .  Here we r e a c h  
two c o n t r a r y  a s s e r t i o n s :  t h a t  the d i f f e r e n c e  does run  th rough  
the r e g r e s s  and t h a t  i t  does n o t .  I  do not  t h i n k  t h a t  Dunne 
anywhere p roves  t h a t  i t  does not ( i t  may even be i n c o n s i s t e n t  
w i th  h i s  main p o s i t i o n ) , and h i s  c o n c lu s io n  does no t  fo l lo w  
l o g i c a l l y .  But t h a t  does not  mean t h a t  the c o n t r a r y  a s s e r t i o n  
i s  j u s t i f i e d ,  and Dunne may ve ry  w e l l  be r i g h t  n e v e r t h e l e s s .
The p o i n t  I wish to  make i s ,  t h a t  the om iss ion  of the f i r s t -  
term now-mark i s  not  n e c e s s a r i l y  the obvious f a l l a c y  t h a t  i t  
c e r t a i n l y  seems a t  f i r s t ,  bu t  opens up a v e ry  deep and p e r ­
p le x in g  problem . (Whether the problem a problem on any o t h e r
p rem ises  than  D unne 's ,  i s  a n o th e r  m a t t e r . )
A second c r i t i c i s m ,  r e l a t e d  to  t h a t  of undue s p a t ­
i a l i s a t i o n ,  i s  concerned w i th  Dunne 's  use of the id e a  of 
movement ' i n '  t i m e . Suppose t h a t  a man looks  back over a 
number of p a s t  e v e n t s .  There i s  an e v id e n t  and an u n ex c ep t io n ­
ab le  ana logy  between t h i s  p ro c e d u re ,  and look ing  back over a
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road  t r a v e r s e d .  We may, a f t e r  H i n t o n ' s  "narrow  moving s l i t "  
which r e p r e s e n t s  our p r e s e n t  has  p a s s e d  on, lo o k  back on p a s t  
e v e n ts  and see them, as  i t  w ere ,  a l l  s p re a d  o u t  t o g e t h e r  a t  
once:  But does i t  f o l l o w  from t h a t  t h a t  we so conceive  them 
as  t h e y  happen ing?  Dunne seems to  t h i n k  i t  do es :  he t a c i t ­
l y  assumes (what Bergson d e n i e d ) , t h a t  what i s  t r u e  of  t ime 
p a s s e d  may a l s o  be t r u e  of time p a s s i n g .  By t h i s  he may be 
begg ing  the  q u e s t i o n :  the  e s sen ce  of t im e ,  to  p u t  i t  v e ry  ' 
c r u d e l y ,  i s  i n  the  happen ing  of e v e n ts  r a t h e r  th a n  i n  t h e i r  
h av in g  happened .
F u r t h e r ,  the  n o t i o n  of a ' t h i n g  moving i n  t i m e ' i s
one t h a t  demands f u r t h e r  a n a l y s i s .  Dunne says  t h a t  a n y th in g
1
which moves i n  time must take  time f o r  i t s  movement. "We 
have seen  t h a t  i f  Time p a s s e s  or  grows o r  ac cum u la te s  o r  
expends i t s e l f  o r  does a n y th in g  w h a tso ev e r  e x c e p t  s t a n d  r i g i d  
and c h a n g e le s s  b e fo re  a T im e - f ix e d  o b s e r v e r ,  t h e r e  must be 
a n o th e r  Time which t im es  t h a t  a c t i v i t y  o f ,  or  a lo n g ,  the 
f i r s t  Time, and a n o th e r  Time which t im es  t h a t  second Time, and 
so on in  an a p p a re n t  s e r i e s  to  i n f i n i t y . "  From t h i s  comes 
the  n o t io n  of the  s ec o n d - te rm  time t h a t  i s  ' t a k e n '  by the  
movement of the f i r s t - t e r m  ' p r e s e n t ' .
There seems to  be a ' p o s s i b l e  am b ig u i ty  i n  the  
p h r a s e ,  "a t h in g  moves i n  t im e " .  I f  on ly  i t  were p o s s i b l e
1 .  "Experiment w i th  Time", g , 1 4 4 .  2 .  I b i d .  p . 158. ^
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to  f i n d  and fo rm u la te  a n o n - s p a t i a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  'moving 
i n  t i m e ' ,  h a l f  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and the  f a l l a c i e s  would be a t  
once removed, I  t h i n k .
When a m a t e r i a l  o b j e c t  moves, i t  moves i n  space and 
i t s  movement t a k e s  t i m e . But to  e x te n d  the  a n a lo g y  and to  say 
t h a t  the p r e s e n t  'moves* i n  space and t h a t  t h i s  movement can 
i t s e l f  be t im ed ,  i s  a v e ry  d o u b t f u l  c o n c e p t io n ,  and Dunne him­
s e l f  seems to  r e c o g n i s e  t h i s ,  and a t t e m p t s  to  a v o id  i t .  " I t  
may be u rg e d  t h a t  the  a d m iss io n  of  t h i s  b e h a v io u r  of the  'now- 
mark ' i s  an ad m is s io n  t h a t  the  s t a t e s  a re  s e p a r a t e d  i n  the  
same way t h a t  p o i n t s  i n  space a r e  s e p a r a t e d .  Quite  s o .  But 
t h i s  new view of  the r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the s t a t e s  i s  a 
development of our o r i g i n a l  l e s s  e x p l i c i t  view - a development 
f o r c e d  upon us by the  l o g i c a l  development of the  r e g r e s s .  The 
new view i s  one which we have endeavoured  to  a v o id ,  and had 
s u c c e s s f u l l y  av o id ed  up t i l l  t h a t  moment. I t  i s  a consequence
2
of th e  r e g r e s s ,  n o t  a p r im ary  s u p p o s i t i o n  c a u s in g  the  r e g r e s s . "  
N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  he i s  no t  w h o l ly  s u c c e s s f u l  i n  a v o id in g  the  
c r i t i c i s m .  He s a y s ,  "The employment of  r e f e r e n c e s  to  a  s o r t  
o f  Time b eh in d  Time i s  th e  l e g i t i m a t e  consequence of h av in g
1. His  b e s t  s t a t e m e n t  i s  to  be found  i b i d . ,  p . l 9 0 n .  "Hot e  the  
d i s t i n c t i o n  drawn h e re  between e v e n ts  i n  a system  o b se rv ed ,  
and o b s e r v a t i o n a l  e v e n t s .  The e n t i r e ' ' r e g r e s s '  of Time 
depends upon the f a c t  t h a t  th e s e  two c l a s s e s  of e v e n ts  can 
n o t  be a l l o t t e d  p o s i t i o n s  i n  a s i n g l e  d im e n s io n . '
2 .  " S e r i a l  U n iv e r s e " ,  p . 8 1 -2 .
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s t a r t e d  w ith  the h y p o th e s i s  of  a movement th rough Time's 
l e n g t h . "  That may be so ,  but the c r u c i a l  q u e s t io n  i s  whether  
t h i s  h y p o th e s i s  i s  l e g i t i m a t e  or n o t .  The 'movement' of the 
'now' has n o th in g  in  common w i th  the movement of o b j e c t s  i n  
space ex cep t  the  name: and i t  would be h ig h ly  d e s i r a b l e  to  
remove t h i s  v e r b a l  am b ig u i ty .  To say t h a t  the p r e s e n t  moves i s  
a bad s ta te m e n t  which i f  tak en  s e r i o u s l y ,  as Dunne t a k e s  i t ,  i s  
bound to  l e a d  to  an i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s .  Broad p o i n t s  out t h a t  i f  
we t h i n k  of  the  ' now' as a moving c i r c l e  of l i g h t  c a s t  s u c c e s s ­
i v e l y  on d i f f e r e n t  houses  in  the  s t r e e t  by a p o l i c e m a n 's  l a n -  
2
t e r n .  We can r i g h t l y  say ,  " I t  i l l u m i n a t e s  Ho.30 befo re  Ho. 3 2 . . 9
and t h a t  l e a d s  to  an i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s .  C e r t a i n l y  the  movement of
a l a n t e r n  can be re g a rd e d  as ' t a k in g  t i m e ' :  the q u e s t io n  i s
w hether  the now ( i s )  r e a l l y  ana logous  to  the movement of a
p o l i c e m a n 's  l a n t e r n .  I f  i t  i s ,  the  r e s t  f o l lo w s :  but i t  seems
3
to  be an undue hypoé t a t i s a t i o n  of t i m e . I  ag ree  w i th  Broad t h a t
i f  we take the  f i r s t  s t e p  upon the  r e g r e s s ,  t h e r e  i s  no h a l t
s h o r t  o f  i n f i n i t y ,  but t h a t  t h e re  i s  no n e c e s s i t y  a t  a l l  to  take  
t h a t  s t e p .  P u t  s h o r t l y ,  time i s  n o th ing  a p a r t  from the happen­
ing  of  e v e n ts  (p ro b a b ly  Dunne would ag ree  t o ^ h i s  ) :  a re  we
1. "Hxpariment w i th  Time", p . 131.
2. Broad, " S c i e n t i f i c  Thought",  p . 59. I  hope t h a t  i n  s u b s t i t ­
u t i n g  B ro a d 's  example f o r  D unne 's ,  where the  f a l l a c y  i s  i n ­
t e n t i o n a l l y  c l e a r e r ,  I  have no t  m is r e p r e s e n te d  Dunne. See
a l s o  B rad ley ,  "L og ic" ,  p . 54 (2nd e d i t i o n ) .
3 .  I n  h i s  a r t i c l e  4n  Dunne ("P h i lo so p h y " ,  1935) .
4 .  See "Experiment w i th  Time", p p . 140-1 .
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j u s t i f i e d ,  i n  c o n s id e r in g  t h a t  e v e n ts  happen i s  i t s e l f  an e v e n t ‘d 
I f  so ,  then  t h i s  new ev en t  has tem pora l  r e l a t i o n s ,  but on a 
d i f i e r e n t  l e v e l  1rom the o th e r s  • • •  and so on to  i n f i n i t y .  I f  
n o t ,  the ph ra se  " the  v e l o c i t y  of the now" i s  nonsense ,  ques­
t io n -b e g g in g  nonsense a t  t h a t .
Or, to  p u t  the p o i n t  in  s t i l l  a n o th e r  v/ay, Dunne i s
r e g a rd in g  'now' as an a d j e c t i v e  or p r o p e r t y  l i k e  re d  or  g re e n .
I f  we had to  r e n d e r  c o n s i s t e n t  the two s ta te m e n ts  "X i s  red"
1
and "X i s  not r e d " ,  we sh o u ld ,  as  Broad showed, say t h a t  they  
were not c o n t r a d i c t o r y  because they  were t ru e  d i f f e r e n t  
t i m e s .Dunne i s  i n c l i n e d  to a n a ly se  IE i s  now* and 'E i s  not  
now' in  a s i m i l a r  manner, say ing  t h a t  they  a re  t ru e  d i f f e r ­
e n t  t i m e s . But,  a l th o u g h  o rd in a r y  language might appear  to  
su p p o r t  t h i s ,  i t  i s  on ly  because of an ana logy  w i th  'X i s  r e d '  - 
an an a log y  which i s  bound to be m is le a d in g  because i n  the f i r s t  
case 'X ' s ta n d s  f o r  a s u b s t a n c e , while  ' E ' i s  an e v e n t , and 
because ' now' i s  no t  an a d j e c t i v e  l i k e  r e d ,  but i s  an e l l i p t i c a l  
s t a te m e n t  f o r " o c c u r r in g  now."
T h i r d ly ,  even assuming t h a t  the r e g r e s s  be v a l i d ,
Dunne i s  never  v e ry  e x p l i c i t  as to  how e x a c t l y  i t  i s  supposed 
to  be e x p la n a to r y  of t im e ,  and he l e a v e s  e s s e n t i a l  p a r t s  ve ry  
v a g u e . In  some p l a c e s  he seems to  h o ld  t h a t  time i s  the l a s t  
term of the  r e g r e s s ,  t h a t  a l l  the o th e r s  a re  masquerading as 
t i m e , but t h a t  each ,  from the p o i n t  of view of the  nex t  h ig h e r
1. " S c i e n t i f i c  Thought",  p . 62.
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dim ension ,  t u r n s  out ' r e a l l y *  to  be s p a t i a l ;  and in  o th e r
p l a c e s  he seems to  h o ld  t h a t  the r e g r e s s  i t s e l f  i s  t i m e . This
u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  shown v e ry  c l e a r l y  in  h i s  co n c ep t io n  of the
s e r i a l  o b s e rv e r ,  which, l i k e  the t i m e - s e r i e s , i s  r e g r e s s i v e .
U s u a l ly  he ho ld s  t h a t  the o b s e rv e r  i s  ' the same' to  i n f i n i t y ,
bu t  th e re  does not seem to  be much room l e f t  anywhere f o r  o t h e r
o b s e r v e r s .  A lthough Dunne says " 'O b s e rv e r  a t  i n f i n i t y *  does
not  mean an o b s e rv e r  i n f i n i t e l y  remote i n  e i t h e r  Time or Space .
' I n f i n i t y *  -here r e f e r s  m ere ly  to  the number of terms in  the
s e r i e s .  The o b s e rv e r  i n  q u e s t io n  i s  m ere ly  your o rd in a r y  eve ry -
1
day s e l f ,  'h e re*  and 'now '"  -  he does no t  always s t i c k  to  i t .  
And the d i s t i n c t i o n  between the ' o b s e rv e r  a t  i n f i n i t y "  and the 
' s u p e r l a t i v e  g e n e ra l  observer*  who app ears  a t  the  end of the 
"E x p e r im e n t" , i s  r a t h e r  d i f f i c u l t  to  f o l l o w .  But, however 
s c e p t i c a l  we may be of the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of working i t  ou t  i n  
d e t a i l ,  t h i s  co n c ep t io n  of a r e g r e s s i v e  s e l f - c o n s c i o u s  ob­
s e r v e r  i s  a v e ry  i n t e r e s t i n g  one. In  many ways, i t  i s  com- 
p a r a b le  to  t h a t  o f  L s i b n i z '  monads -  i n  bo th ,  th e re  a re  de­
g re e s  of ' c l e a r  p e r c e p t i o n ’ , the c o n t i n u i t y  from the low est  
to  the  h i g h e s t  i s  unbroken, and an e n d le s s  r e l a t i v i t y  i s  
i n v o lv e d .  As in  L e ib n iz ,  i t  i s  no t  c l e a r  whether God i s  the 
h i g h e s t  monad or o u t s id e  the s e r i e s  of monads, so in  Dunne, 
we a re  n eve r  su re  w hethe r  the  o b s e rv e r  i s  the  l a s t  term in
1. "Experiment w i th  Time", p . 188. See a l s o  p p . 190 & 200, and 
" S e r i a l  U n iv e r s e " ,  chap .  I V .
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the r e g r e s s ,  or the  whole sum of te rm s .  Then, to o ,  t h e re  i s  
the  same d i l i l c u l t y  about  i n t e r a c t i o n  among the  monads or  
o b s e r v e r s .  I t  would be v e ry  i n t e r e s t i n g  i f  the  l i k e n e s s e s  and 
d i f f e r e n c e s  between the two were f u l l y  worked o u t .
To r e t u r n  from the d i g r e s s i o n  - Dunne's  con cep t io n  
of  the  o b s e rv e r  i s  v e ry  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ,  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  
t h a t  each  o b s e rv e r  i s  im p l ie d  to  have h i s  own r e g r e s s  of t im e s ,  
d i f f e r i n g  very  s l i g h t l y  from those of o th e r  o b s e rv e r s ,  i t  i s  
t r u e ,  bu t  s t i l l  d i f f e r i n g .  The whole network Dunne d e s c r ib e s  
seems to  be a h y p o s t a t i s a t i o n  of r e l a t i v i t y  d o c t r i n e s ,  w i th  
the d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  each and a l l  i s  supposed to  have some k in d  
of o b j e c t i v e  e x i s t e n c e .  This  l a s t  sen ten ce  i s  vague, but t h a t  
cannot  be h e lp e d .
But more im p o r ta n t  f o r  our immediate purpose th an  the 
u n c l e a r n e s s  of Dunne’ s views of an ' o b s e r v e r '  i s  the co r re sp o n d ­
in g  u n c e r t a i n t y  of h i s  meaning i n  the t im e - r e g r e s s  i t s e l f .  On 
the one hand, th e r e  i s  time as  c o n t i n u a l l y  ' t u r n in g  i n t o  sp ace '  
-  "Are we to  t r y  to  imagine the more comprehensive system as 
embracing two k in d s  of t ime? C e r t a i n l y  n o t :  the more compre­
h en s ive  system p o s s e s s e s  on ly  one time o r d e r .  . . .  I t  c o n t a i n s ,  
a l s o ,  a l l  p r e s e n t ,  the i tem s of the  t im e -o rd e r  i n d i c a t e d  by 
L, M, and N: but t h a t  o rd e r  i s  not t im e -o rd e r  - i n  the  more 
comprehensive system of a f f a i r s . "  On the o th e r  hand, th e re  i s
1 . "Experiment w i th  Time", p . 231 f f •
2 .  " S e r i a l  U n iv e r se " ,  p . 77»
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time as  th e  r e g r e s s ,  " In  t h a t  way on ly  -  by the employment o f  
t h i s  f l a g r a n t l y  r e g r e s s i v e  method of d e s c r i p t i o n  - have we been 
ab le  to  c o n v e r t  our o th e rw ise  i r r a t i o n a l  knowledge i n t o  a sy s ­
te m a t ic  and s e r v i c e a b l e  scheme." Again, t h i s  u n c e r t a i n t y  as to  
h i s  r e a l  meaning i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  the th o ro u g h ly  dubious use of
" a b s o lu te  Time" and " a b s o lu te  motion" in  the e a r l i e r  book. He
2
s a y s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  "The a n a l y s i s  w i l l  co n t in ue  in  the  same
f a s h i o n  jU i n f i n i t y . There we s h a l l  have a s i n g l e  m u l t i -d im en -
s i o n a l  f i e l d  of p r e s e n t a t i o n  iji a b s o lu t e  m o t io n , t r a v e l l i n g
over a f i x e d  su b s t ra tu m  of o b j e c t i v e  e lem en ts  ex tended  i n  a l l
the d im ensions of Time. . . .  At i n f i n i t y ,  a g a in ,  we s h a l l  have
a Time which s e rv e s  to  time a l l  movements of  o r  i n  the v a r io u s
f i e l d s  of p r e s e n t a t i o n .  This  Time w i l l  be ' Absolu te  Time' ,
w i th  an a b s o lu t e  p a s t , p r e s e n t , and f u t u r e . The p r e s e n t  moment
of t h i s  a b s o lu te  Time must c o n ta in  a l l  the  moments ' p a s t ' ,
' p r e s e n t ' ,  and ' f u t h r e ' , of a l l  the s u b o rd in a te  dimensions o f
Time." This  i s  r e a l l y  a v e ry  queer  s t a t e m e n t ,  and i s  the
abandonment of  what Dunne was c h i e f l y  concerned  to  emphasize -
the  s u b j e c t i v i t y  of p a s t  and f u t u r e ,  and the unend ingness  of
3
the r e g r e s s .  As Broad remarked, i t  i s  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  to  t a l k  
of ' a b s o lu t e  Time' a t  th e  and of the  r e g r e s s ,  s in c e  the  r e g r e s s ,  
by h y p o t h e s i s ,  has  no end .  We s h a l l  be concerned l a t e r  w i th  
h i s  d o u b t fu l  view of the  f u t u r e ,  and i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  remark
1. I b i d .  p . 35. See a l s o ,  "Exja r im en t  w i th  Time", p . 159, and
" S e r i a l  U n iv e r s e " ,  p . 91.
2 .  p . 186-7 .  I t a l i c s  m in e . See a l s o ,  i b i d .  p . 204.
3 .  I n  the  a r t i c l e  r e f e r r e d  t o .
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here  t h a t  the sjnazing p e r s i s t e n c e  of p a s t  and f u t u r e  even in  
the a b s o lu t e  - amazing because of h i s  r e i t e r a t e d  a s s e r t i o n  of 
t h e i r  r e l a t i v i t y  - i s  due to  an a t te m p t  to  hedge,  and to  
smuggle the common sense n o t io n s  in  a t  the back do o r .
But even i f  Dunne had made up h i s  mind between the 
two p o s s i b l e  views of time as  r e g r e s s i v e ,  and had avo ided  a 
dubious a b s o l u t e ,  a f u r t h e r  c r i t i c i s t o  re m a in s .  I t  may be t r u e ,  
as Dunne i n s i s t s  -  though re a so n s  were g iv en  e a r l i e r  f o r  
doub t ing  i t  -  t h a t  time in v o lv e s  a r e g r e s s ,  bu t  i t  does no t  
th e re b y  fo l lo w  t h a t  the r e g r e s s  can e x p l a i n  t i m e . And i n  f a c t  
Dunne has never  p r o p e r l y  worked out  how a r e g r e s s  i s  supposed 
to  g ive  an e x p l a n a t i o n .  He and H in ton  may be r i g h t  i n  a s s e r t ­
in g  t h a t  a l l  a p p a re n t  movements of p a r t i c l e s  may be e x p la in e d  
by one g e n e r a l i s e d  movement i n  a h ig h e r  d im ension ,  but  though, 
to  a s c i e n t i s t ,  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of redu c in g  a l l  movements to 
one g e n e r a l i s e d  movement i s  a t t r a c t i v e  by re a so n  of i t s  g r e a t e r  
s i m p l i c i t y  -  and i t  i s  e v i d e n t l y  a much s im p le r  co n c ep t io n  - 
y e t  t h a t  does not  h e lp  the  m e ta p h y s ic ia n ,  because he i s  s t i l l  
c o n f ro n te d  w i th  movement, and the need of f i n d i n g  an e x p la n ­
a t i o n  f o r  i t .  I n  o th e r  words,  g r a n te d  movement^as a p h y s i c a l  
f a c t ,  i t  may be p o s s i b l e  to  g e t  a s im p le r  p h y s i c a l  e x p la n a t io n  
i n  terms of H in to n 's  e x t r a  d im ens ion .  But t h i s  cannot be h e ld  
to  e x p l a i n  the - ^ b s s i b i l i t y  of movement i t s e l f ,  s in ce  o ^  
movement has always tp  be p o s t u l a t e d .  And w i th  movement o u t ­
s t a n d in g  and u n e x p la in e d ,  we have not  e l im in a t e d
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1
t im e .  We cannot  e x p l a i n  ' t ime* by the escapades  of  d e r i v a t i v e  
' t i m e s '  t h a t  a re  r e a l l y  space ;  f o r  a t  each s tag e  of the  r e ­
g r e s s i o n  ' t i m e '  i t s e l f  e lu d e s  u s .  Dunne adm its  and emphasizes 
t h i s ,  but the  t ru e  c o n c lu s io n  to  draw from i t  i s  n e i t h e r  t h a t  
time ' i s '  the r e g r e s s ,  nor t h a t  i t  i s  the  l a s t  term  in  the 
r e g r e s s  (between which c o n c lu s io n s  he w av e rs ) ,  bu t  t h a t  the one 
t h in g  which we do no t  g e t  by the r e g r e s s  i s  t im e , which e lu d e s  
us a t  every  s t e p .  The r e g r e s s ,  th e n ,  i s  n o t  i n  any way| ex ­
p l a n a t o r y  of t im e :  f o r  the e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t  which embarking 
on an i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s  t e a c h e s  us i s ,  t h a t  a t  whatever  term 
we s t o p ,  we are s t i l l  c o n f ro n te d  w i th  t im e ,  in  i t s  p r i s t i n e  
u n e x p la in e d  s p le n d o u r .  For to  say t h a t  a c e r t a i n  method of 
a n a l y s i s  of tem pora l  f a c t s  (a  v i c i o u s  one, i n  my o p in io n ) ,  
l e a d s  to  an i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s  d o e s n ' t  mean t h a t  time is_ t h a t
r e g r e s s .  Dunne never  saw t h i s .
The l a s t  p a r t  of t h i s  c h a p te r  w i l l  be taken  up w i th  
some remarks on p r e d i c t i o n  and the s t a t u s  of the f u t u r e  -
bo th  v e ry  im p o r ta n t  q u e s t i o n s .  For i t  s ta n d s  to  re a so n  t h a t
i f  genuine p r e d i c t i o n  o c c u r s ,  we shou ld  have to  moderate the
the
f u l l  b l a s t  of any Bergsonian  argument a g a i n s t / s p a t i a l i s i n g  
of t im e ,  through con ce iv in g  of the  f u t u r e  i n  a  way ana logous
1. Reasons were g iv en  above f o r  r e j e c t i n g  t h i s  c o n c ep t io n  oi 
movement and t im e .  But, on Dunne’ s own p r i n c i p l e s ,  i t  
f o l lo w s  t h a t ,  to  p u t  i t  c r u d e ly ,  though a l l  movements 
ex c ep t  one a re  e l i m i n a t e d ,  t h i s  one remains u n ex p la in ed  
and i n e x p l i c a b l e .
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to  the p a s t .  But t h a t  would not  a f f e c t  the  o th e r  c r i t i c i s m s  
t h a t  have been made. I f  t h e re  i s  p r e d i c t i o n ,  t h a t  d i s p o s e s  of  
Broad, but i t  does no t  n e c e s s a r i l y  j u s t i f y  Dunne, f o r  as he 
h im se l l  r i g h t l y  p o i n t s  o u t ,  h i s  m e ta p h y s ic a l  t h e o ry ,  and h i s  
dream -evidence a re  l o g i c a l l y  independen t  of each o t h e r ,  though 
h i s  p o s i t i o n  i s ,  n a t u r a l l y ,  s t r e n g th e n e d  by hav ing  two s e p a r ­
a t e  l i n e s  of argument to go upon. I t  w i l l  be conven ien t  to 
fo l lo w  Dunne' s p r a c t i c e ,  and t r e a t  of the two to p i c s  s e p a r a t e ­
l y ,  but before  doing t h i s ,  i t  i s  a d v i s a b le  to  make one p o i n t  
c l e a r .  That i s ,  t h a t  i n  so f a r  as Dunne means by ' p r e d i c t i o n '  
a more or l e s s  p rob ab le  f o r e c a s t ,  he e scap es  the  c h i e f  c r i t ­
ic ism s  t h a t  can be d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  the n o t io n  of p r e d i c t i o n ,  
s in c e  nobody would doubt t h a t  we can make more or l e s s  p ro b ­
ab le  s t a te m e n ts  about the f u t u r e . On the o th e r  hand, i f  t h i s  
i s  a l l  t h a t  he means, h i s  work l o s e s  i n  im por tance ,  and th e re  
i s  no need to  c o n s t r u c t  a m e ta p h y s ic a l  t h e o ry  p o s t u l a t i n g  the 
eq u a l  s t a t u s  of p a s t  and f u t u r e  to  e x p l a i n  s t a t e m e n ts  t h a t  
a re  m ere ly  p r o b a b l e . I t  seems t h a t  he re  a g a in  Dunne hedges 
between two v iews: the one, p o s t u l a t i n g  c e r t a i n  p r e d i c t i o n s ,  
of the  h i g h e s t  i n t e r e s t  and importance i f  i t  can be sub­
s t a n t i a t e d :  the o t h e r ,  more t r i v i a l ,  but  a l s o  l e s s  p a r a d o x ic a l  
to  h o ld .  In  what f o l l o w s ,  I  s h a l l  t r e a t  on ly  of the i i r s t ^  
view, as long as i t  be remembered t h a t  th e r e  a re  pa ssag e s
s u p p o r t in g  the second.
1 .  "Experiment w i th  Time", p . 198.
2 .  Op.c i t .  p p . 219, 223, 230.
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F i r s t l y ,  w i th  r e g a rd  to  the dream r e s u l t s  g iven  
in  "An Experiment w i th  Time", th ey  form a remarkable  c o l l e c ­
t i o n  not l i g h t l y  to  be s e t  a s i d e .  Granted  t h a t  i t  i s  not 
sci '=*ntific  ev id e n c e ,  i t  i s  no t  e a sy  to see how such cou ld  be 
c o l l e c t e d  on t h i s  p o i n t .  And Dunne nowhere can be accused  of 
s t r e t c h i n g  a p o i n t  i n  h i s  own fa v o u r :  i f  a n y th in g ,  he u nd er­
e s t i m a t e s  h i s  c a se s  f o r  p r e c o g n i t i o n . That i s ,  on h i s  own 
p r i n c i p l e s ,  i f  p r e c o g n i t i o n  i s  re g a rd e d  as  e q u a l l y  p o s s i b l e  
w i th  r e t r o s p e c t i o n .  But t h a t  i s  j u s t  what seems to  me ques­
t i o n a b l e .  I must admit to  a p r e ju d ic e  a g a i n s t  p r e c o g n i t i o n ,  
and to  a wish to  a t t r i b u t e  a d ream -event to  a n y th in g  but 
p r e c o g n i t i o n .  I  hope t h a t  t h i s  i s  no t  a p igheadedness  which 
f l i e s  in  the face  of f a c t s . I  p r e f e r  to t h in k  t h a t  the f a c t s  
can be i n t e r p r e t e d  d i f f e r e n t l y  a c c o rd in g  to  whether  we s t a r t  
i n  f a v o u r  o f ,  or a g a i n s t ,  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of p r e d i c t i o n .  This 
im p l ie s  a m e ta p h y s ic a l  p o s i t i o n ,  which w i l l  be defended  in  
a n o th e r  c h a p te r :  assuming f o r  the  p r e s e n t  t h a t  i t  i s  d e f e n s ­
i b l e ,  the  p l e a s a n t  c o n j u r e r ' s  t a s k  of  e x p la in in g  Dunne away
w i l l  occupy the nex t  few p a g e s .
In  what f o l lo w s ,  I  s h a l l  no t  a t te m p t  to  d i s p u te  the
ev idence  t h a t  Dunne adduces ,  but to  see whether  ' p r e - c o g n i t i v e ' 
dreams cannot b ea r  any o th e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
In  the  f i r s t  p l a c e , t h e re  i s  the p o s s i b i l i t y  of  
m i s t a k e s .  B es ides  the obvious m is ta k es  of i d e n t i f y i n g  a 
m ere ly  g e n e ra l  dream w i th  a p a r t i c u l a r  e v e n t ,  and of a t t r i b u t -
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in g  a dream of a p a s t  ev en t  to  a f u t u r e  ev en t  -  m is ta k es
which on ly  i n s i s t e n c e  upon c o r r o b o r a t iv e  der ta i lcean  a v e r t  -
t h e re  a re  o t h e r s ,  more d i f f i c u l t  to  p i n  down and t h e r e f o r e
more i n s i d i o u s .  We a l l  have a s t r a n g e  f e e l i n g  a t  t im es  as i f
we had remembered som ething,  o r  had seen  i t  b e f o r e . Dunne
su g g e s t s  t / ia t  our vague s t i r r i n g s  of memory and our f e e l i n g s
o f  ' d é j à  v u '  a r e  t o  be a t t r i b u t e d  t o  p r e c o g n i t i o n .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,
a l t e r n a t i v e  e x p la n a t io n s  can be g iv e n .  The s i m i l a r i t y ,  which
g iv e s  us the f e e l i n g  of f a m i l i a r i t y ,  may be i n  the though t
c o n te n t  (o r  g e n e r a l  co n tex t )  on the two o c c a s io n s ,  not  i n  any
s p e c i a l  ' be long ing  t o g e t h e r n e s s ' of them. Lloyd Morgan g iv e s
1
an e x c e l l e n t  example of t h i s :  the  two o cc as io n s  are  r e a d i l y
seen  to  be s i m i l a r  and cou ld  e a s i l y  be c l a s s i f i e d  t o g e t h e r  as 
" two o cc as io n s  when I  was w alk ing  w i th  X", "two o ccas io n s  when 
I  t a l k e d  about  Y", "two o cc as io n s  when I  was i n  the ne ig h b o u r­
hood of Z", e t c . I t  i s  no wonder t h a t  one shou ld  re v iv e  the 
o t h e r :  but t h a t  i s  v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  from say in g  e i t h e r  t h a t  the 
l a t t e r  i s  on ly  a memory of the  form er or  t h a t  the  form er i s  a 
p r e c o g n i t i o n  of the  l a t t e r .  To ru s h  headlong  i n t o  e i t h e r  of 
th e se  two s t a t e m e n ts  i s  in  e f f e c t  to  deny t h a t  e x p e r ie n c e s  
can be ro u gh ly  c l a s s i f i e d  under  g ro u p s .  Again, i t  i s  common 
knowledge t h a t  w h ile  some of our a s s o c i a t i o n s  are  f a i r l y  easy  
to  t r a c e ,  o th e r s  are  p e c u l i a r  to  o u r s e l v e s ,  and g ive a b i a s
1. "Emargent E v o l u t i o n " , p . 125.
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to  our though ts  which i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  a x p l a i n  on " r a t i o n a l "  
g ro un ds .  R e c e n t ly ,  l  was t r y i n g  to  remember the  p h ra s in g  of 
W ordsw orth 's  ode;
"Though n o th in g  can b r in g  back the hour 
Of sp len do u r  in  the g r a s s  . . . "
At t h a t  p o i n t  the word " i n s u f f e r a b l e "  f l a s h e d  i n t o  my mind,
and r e f u s e d  to  d e p a r t .  I t  l i n k e d  i t s e l f  i n s i s t e n t l y  w i th
"sp len do u r"  - a quee r  c o n ju n c t io n ,  c e r t a i n l y ,  and one t h a t
had n o th in g  to  do w i th  Wordsworth. I  remembered in  the end
De Q u in cey 's  p h ra se  in  the  "Opium E a te r "  - " f r e t t e d  w i th
1
i n s u f f e r a b l e  s p le n d o u r" ,  and was s a t i s f i e d .  This example i s  
in te n d e d  to  show the t a n g e n t i a l  behav iou r  of our th o u g h ts ,  and 
t h a t  a s s o c i a t i o n s  can remind on grounds which a r e ,  o b j e c t i v e l y ,  
i n s u f f i c i e n t . The v e ry  i r r a t i o n a l i t y  of some of th ese  d a r t s  
of though t  makes us f e e l  t h a t  t h e re  i s  a m iss ing  co n n e c t io n  
somewhere, and we a re  tempted to  overdo i t  by h a rk in g  back to 
the  whole p re v io u s  i n c i d e n t ,  i n s t e a d  o f  to  the one a s p e c t  of 
i t  which i s  r e l e v a n t .
S econdly ,  th e re  i s  always a preponderance  of the  
p a s t  in  a m ix tu re  of f a m i l i a r  t h i n g s ,  though we are  l i a b l e  to  
o ver loo k  t h e i r  f a m i l i a r i t y ,  and a t t e n d  to  t h e i r  new g ro u p in g .  
Most people  have an id e a  what a p lace  - Oxford, f o r  i n s t a n c e  
' l o o k s  l i k e '  - a g e n e r i c  image of c o l l e g e s  and lawns and c 
c h u rc h e s .  We have a l l  seen  churches  and lawns, and pho tographs^
1. An i n t e r e s t i n g  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t h a t  i s  nojb De Q u incey 's  
p h r a s e ,  which i s  " . . .  i n t o  i n s u f f e r a b l e  sp lendour  t h a t  •
f r e t t e d  my h e a r t . "
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of well-known 'v i e w s '  of Cambridge, and perhaps  have r e a d  
"The S c h o la r  Gypsy". I t  i s  on ly  the g roup ing  which i s  unknown, 
bu t  we a re  l i a b l e  to  f o r g e t  how much was a l r e a d y  f a m i l i a r ,  i f  
our g e n e r i c  image shou ld  be an y th in g  l i k e  the r e a l  t h i n g .  Or 
a g a in ,  b len d in g  my r e s u l t  i n  a whole which answers f a i r l y  
w e l l  to  an a l t e r e d  o b j e c t :  thus  a man may leave  h i s  b i r t h p l a c e  
a t  the age of  seven ,  and never  r e t u r n  to i t  u n t i l  he i s  s i x t y .  
In  the i n t e r v a l  h i s  memories become i n c r e a s i n g l y  vague: he 
a t t r i b u t e s  to  i t  a h ideo u s  r e d  b r i c k  market  h a l l  ( t h a t  he has 
seen  e lsew here)  i n s t e a d  of the o ld  o n e , and w ider  r o a d s ,  l a rg e  
shops ,  ' s u p e r '  cinemas, a new bank in  the  c e n t r e  of the  town, 
and u g ly  su b u rb s .  As much the same th in g  i s  happening ev e ry ­
where,  he may v e ry  w e l l  be r i g h t  i n  h i s  s o - c a l l e d  'm e m o r ie s ' ,  
and coming back, may ' r e c o g n i s e ' the bank and m a rk e th a l l  t h a t  
had on ly  been b u i l t  f i v e  y e a r s ,  and l a t e r ,  when he l e a r n s  
t h i s ,  a t t r i b u t e  h i s  'know ledge ' to  p r e d i c t i o n  or second s i g h t .
But p r e d i c t i o n  i s  no t  mere ' s e e in g  A, and A comes 
t r u e . '  Though where we a re  to  draw the l i n e  in  a l l  these  ex­
amples between a m o r e - o r - l e s s  r i g h t  g e n e ra l  agreem ent,  which 
i s  o th e rw ise  e x p l a i n a b l e ,  and the p a r t i c u l a r  g ra sp  of d e t a i l  
which p r e d i c t i o n s  c la im ,  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  say .  The d i s t i n c t i o n  
i s  a m a t t e r  of p l a u s i b i l i t y ,  and cannot be made a b s o l u t e .  I f  
A i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  u n l ik e  a n y th in g  we might r e a s o n a b ly  e x p e c t ,  
i f  i t  cannot be t r a c e d  to a n y th in g  e l s e , i f  the number of 
a l t e r n a t i v e s  of equ a l  a n te c e d e n t  p r o b a b i l i t y  to  A i s  g r e a t .
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the p r e d i c t i o n  i s  a d m i t te d ,  but as  t h i s  i s  a p ra g m a t ic ,  not 
a l o g i c a l  t e s t ,  i t  i s  always open f o r  an opponent to h o ld  t h a t  
the  ' p r e d i c t i o n '  was not  g e n u i n e . F o r ,  l a s t l y ,  i t  i s  ve ry  
d i f f i c u l t  to  e v a lu a te  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  of a dream, and p ro p o r ­
t i o n a t e l y  ea sy  to  m is take  co inc id en ce  or g e n e ra l  co r re sp o n d ­
ence f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  p r e d i c t i o n .  Thus a man may dream t h a t  
he i s  i n  a r a i lw a y  c a r r i a g e  w i th  a number of m a r k e t - p e o p le .
He may r a r e l y  t r a v e l  by r a i l ,  and he d i s l i k e s  crowds: con­
s e q u e n t ly  t h i s  i s  a r a r e  e v e n t .  But the  number of a l t e r n a t i v e  
modes of t r a v e l  i s  a f t e r  a l l  l i m i t e d :  i f  h i s  c a r  b reaks  down - 
and t h i s  may j u s t  as w e l l  happen on market  day as on any o th e r  
day - and he i s  too o ld  to  c y c le ,  and too l a z y  to  walk , and 
h i s  b u s in e s s  i s  e s s e n t i a l ,  the t r a i n  i s  the  on ly  a l t e r n a t i v e . 
We a re  a p t  to  a s s e s s  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  i n a c c u r a t e l y .
The unconsc ious  i s  v e ry  much to  the  fo re  nowadays, 
and g r a n te d  the b a s i c  p r i n c i p l e s  of  modern d o c t r i n e s  of  the 
u n co n sc io u s ,  some ' p r e d i c t i o n s '  can be e x p la in e d  away. We may
g
be u n c o n s c io u s ly  i n f lu e n c e d  to choose our subséquent a c t i o n s  
in  accordance  w i th  a dream. I  dream t h a t  I  am a t  X where I 
v e ry  r a r e l y  go, and on ly  remember t h i s  dream when, a day or  
so l a t e r ,  I  am a t  X. The memory has  been l a t e n t ,  and has  i n ­
f l u e n c e d  my choice  of an e x p e d i t i o n .  In  such c a s e s ,  a re  we to  
say t h a t  the a c t i o n  was because of  the dream or v ice  v e r sa ?  
Again ,  t h e re  are  a c c r e d i t e d  cases  of unconsc ious  p e r c e p t i o n .
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I  see S, and ' f o r g g f  t h a t  I  have seen  i t .  A c h i l d  who once 
saw Oxford when he was v e ry  ÿoung, may have a v i v i d  and d e t a i l e d  
dream of one s t r e e t  a n ig h t  or two be fo re  he i s  go ing  to  Oxford, 
as  he t h i n k s ,  f o r  the  f i r s t  t i m e . Or S may be such as to  make 
T p ro b ab le  -  and 1, u n c o n sc io u s ly  p e r c e i v i n g  S and i n f e r r i n g  
from i t  to  T, may dream t h a t  T happens ,  and be g e n u in e ly  un­
ab le  to  r e a l i s e  why; 1 dreamt of  T. I n  cases  of sudden i l l n e s s ,
A, a p p a r e n t l y  in  the  b e s t  of h e a l t h ,  may dream befo rehand  
t h a t  he i s  s e r i o u s l y  i l l .  I t  i s  no t  f a r - f e t c h e d  to  say  t h a t  
such ca se s  may be due to  unconsc ious  knowledge a l l  the  time 
t h a t  he i s  no t  as w e l l  as  he seems, and no t  to  p r e d i c t i o n .  
F i n a l l y ,  the  d i s t i n c t i o n  between the a p p a re n t  and l a t e n t  con­
t e n t  o f  dreams makes i t  v e ry  d i f f i c u l t  to  say  o ffhan d  to  what 
the  dream ' r e f e r s * .
T h i r d ly ,  whenever we t h i n k ,  p la n  or  remember, i t  
may be s a i d  l o o s e l y  t h a t  our minds wander th rough  time i n  an 
ana logous  f a s h i o n :  p la n n in g  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  i s  im p o r tan t  i n  con­
n e c t i o n  w i th  p r e d i c t i o n .  We do n o t ,  r i g h t l y ,  f i n d  any p a r  
t i c u l a r  m ystery  in  the  f u l f i l m e n t  of our p l a n s ,  and many 
dreams are  of the p la n n in g  ty p e .  W i s h - f u l f i lm e n ts  and f a n ­
t a s i e s  a re  a t  l e a s t  p o t e n t i a l  p l a n s .  Again, the  p e r s i s t e n c e  
of  an id e a  as  w el l  as  i t s  o b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  counts  in  
e v a l u a t i n g  the  worth  of a ' p r e d i c t i o n ' .  I t  i s  no t  p rob ab le  
t h a t  a l o n g - l o s t  unc le  w i l l  bequeath  to  me a m i l l i o n  pounds:
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bu t  i l  t h a t  c h im e r ic a l  f a n t a s y  were o f t e n  i n  my mind, i t  
would not  be very  s t r a n g e  i f  I  dreamt of i t  s h o r t l y  b e fo re  
the unexpec ted  happened.  We m u s t , th e n ,  i n t e r p r e t  ’unexpec ted ­
n e s s '  i n  two sen se s  be fo re  we a s s e s s  the  p r o b a b i l i t y  of oc- 
cu r ren ce S j  and as  ws11 as  the o b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  we must 
remember the s u b j e c t i v e  a t t i t u d e  of  mind. This second f a c t o r  
i s  o f t e n  f o r g o t t e n .
F o u r t h l y ,  the f o r e s i g h t  may be p u r e ly  i n t e l l e c t u a l ,  
as  i n  the case of g e n e r a l  p r o p h e c i e s .  Economic c r i s e s  fo l lo w  
w ars :  a cyc le  of good h a r v e s t s  cannot l a s t  f o r  e v e r ,  and 
seven l e a n  k ine  fo l lo w  the f a t  ones:  g iv en  the n a tu re  of 
ITapoleon’ s a c t i v i t i e s  in  Hurope, i t  was not  d i f f i c u l t  to f o r e ­
see t h a t  h i s  r u l e  would no t  be a s t a b l e  one: a r a i lw a y  t im e­
t a b l e  f o r e c a s t s  w i th  f a i r  accu racy  the movements of t r a i n s :  
by i n d u c t io n  from p a s t  low p r e s s u r e  systems a f a l l  i n  the  
barom ete r  i s  b e l i e v e d  to  h e r a l d  bad w e a th e r .  But such i n t e l ­
l e c t u a l  f o r e s i g h t s  must be c l e a r l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from p r e d i c ­
t i o n s  p r o p e r .  S w if t  has p ro v id ed  us w i th  a n e a t  l i t t l e  d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  between the ’ c a u s e ’ of a man’ s d e a th  and the ’p r e -  
d i c t e r ’ of i t .  How f a r  would I s a a c  B i c k e r s t a f f  have been 
re g a rd e d  as h a s t e n i n g  the end of Mr. P a r t r i d g e , if>  a f t e r  
the  p r e d i c t i o n  t h a t  Mr. P a r t r i d g e  would d ie  on c e r t a i n
day, Mr. P a r t r i d g e  had tak en  the h i n t ?
E x p la in in g  away one unknown f a c u l t y  in  terms of 
a n o th e r  unknown f a c u l t y  i s  a h i g h l y  u n d e s i r a b le  p ro c e d u re .
1 .  " B i c k e r s t a f f  P a p e r s . ”
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S t i l l ,  i f ,  as  seems p ro b a b le ,  we have f i n a l l y  to  admit the 
e x i s t e n c e  of v/hat we now c a l l  ’ supernorm al f a c u l t i e s ’ , i t  
may be a d v i s a b le  to  remember t h a t  some of the phenomena of 
t e l e p a t h y  and p sy ch ic  r e s e a r c h  cou ld  accoun t  f o r  some p u z z l in g  
examples of ’p r e c p g n i t i o n ’ , w i th o u t  the  need of p o s t u l a t i n g  
p r e c o g n i t i o n  as w e l l .  A'^cfreams of an ev en t  which, a c t u a l l y ,  
happened some time be fo re  h i s  dream, but which he i s  p o s i t i v e  
he d id  no t  know a b o u t .  S h o r t l y  a f t e r  he dreams i t ,  he h e a r s  
of i t ,  a s  he a v e r s ,  f o r  the f i r s t  t im e .  In  such c a s e s ,  the 
f a c t  t h a t  the even t  had happened b e fo re  the dream makes un­
n e c e s s a ry  the p o s t u l a t i o n  of p r e c o g n i t i o n  i f  t e l e p a t h y  i s  ad­
m i t t e d .  And, of the two, the l a t t e r  seems to  me much the l e s s  
i n c r e d i b l e .
L a s t l y ,  i f  a l l  o th e r  e x p la n a t io n s  f a i l ,  t h e re  i s  
always c o in c id e n c e .
I t  i s  i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  th e se  d iv e r s e  e x p la n a t io n s  
shou ld  i l l  bea r  comparison w i th  Mr. Dunne’ s s i n g l e  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  
and h i s  d i s c r e e t  and sc ru p u lo u s  method of u s in g  i t .  Granted  
an epu a l  a n te c e d e n t  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  th e re  can be no douot which 
e x p l a n a t i o n s  shou ld  be a c c e p te d .  But i t  seems to  me t h a t  the 
n o t io n  of p r e d i c t i o n  r a i s e s  so many d i f f i c u l t i e s  t h a t  i t  i s  
no t  w orth  h av in g ,  and t h a t  in  the long run  the  more cumbrous 
e x p la n a t io n s  above w i l l  prove s im p le r .  These d i f f i c u l t i e s  can 
on ly  be s t a t e d  h e r e ;  th ey  seem to  me to  be f i n a l .  F i r s t ,  of
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c o u r se ,  t h e re  i s  the d i f f i c u l t y  of i n t e r f e r e n c e , as Dunne 
r e c o g n i s e s .  A p r e d i c t i o n  p r e d i c t s  what w i l l  happen; i f  th en  
i t  d o esn ’ t  happen, how can the p r e d i c t i o n  be a genuine one?
But b es ide  t h i s  e v id e n t  d i f f i c u l t y ,  th e re  a re  two o t h e r s ,  l e s s  
ea sy  to  s e e ,  b u t ,  I  t h i n k ,  no l e s s  fun d a m e n ta l .  What e x a c t l y  
do we mean when we say  t h a t  we dream of  a f u t u r e  ev e n t?  What 
i s  the r e l a t i o n  between dream and ev en t  such t h a t  the word 
’ o f ’ can r i g h t l y  be used? T h i r d ly ,  a s t r i c t e r  n o t io n  of cause 
i s  r e q u i r e d :  and my fundam enta l  o b j e c t i o n  to p r e d i c t i o n  i s  
n o t  t h a t  some p r e d i c t i o n s  don’ t  come t r u e ,  but t h a t  p r e d i c ­
t i o n  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  inco m p a t ib le  w i th  c a u s a l i t y .
The r e s t  of t h i s  c h a p te r  w i l l  be concerned w i th  
Dunne’ s m e ta p h y s ic a l  b a s i s  f o r  h i s  b e l i e f  i n  p r e c o g n i t i o n ,  
and w i th  h i s  view of the g e n e ra l  s t a t u s  of the f u t u r e .  The 
f i r s t  d i f f i c u l t y  mentioned above, t h a t  of i n t e r v e n t i o n  to 
a l t e r ,  can b e s t  be d e a l t  w i th  in  t h i s  co n n e c t io n :  the o th e r  
two must be pos tponed  to a n o th e r  c h a p te r ,  s in ce  Dunne never
a t t e m p ts  to  d ea l  w i th  them.
The d i s t i n c t i o n  between p a s t  and f u t u r e  i s  one 
which e x i s t s  on ly  f o r  t i m ^ :  f o r  time 2, a l l  e v e n ts  a re  
e q u a l l y  ’p r e s e n t '  . - " 'Ivary T i m e - t r a v e l l i n g  f i e l d  of p r e s e n t ­
a t i o n  i s  c o n ta in e d  w i t h i n  a f i e l d  one dimension l a r g e r ,  
t r a v e l l i n g  i n  a n o th e r  dimension of t im e ,  the  l a r g e r  f i e l d  
co v e r in g  e v e n ts  which a re  ' p a s t '  and ' f u t u r e ’ , as w e l l  as 
' p r e s e n t ' ,  to  the  s m a l le r  f i e l d . "  The s o le  d i s t i n c t i o n  3 ^
^ "Experiment w i th  Time” p . 187. See a l s o  the co r re spo n d ing
passages  i n  ’’S e r i a l  U n iv e r se ” » a l r e a d y  r e f e r r e d  t o .
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between p a s t  and f u t u r e ,  th en ,  i s  the  e m p i r i c a l  one t h a t
o b se rv e r  1, as a m a t t e r  of f a c t ,  c o n f in e s  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  to  a
s i n g l e  p o in t  in  time 1, and t r a v e l s  s low ly  up i ÿ . Dunne must,
of c o u r se ,  on th ese  p r i n c i p l e s  r e j e c t  Bergson’ s view of a
lundarnental  ’becoming’ . He s a y s ,  ”Tn u n n e c e s sa ry  a d d i t i o n ,  we
have i t  t h a t  these  ex tended  o b j e c t s  must be conceived  as be ing
p e r p e t u a l l y  added to  by a p ro c e s s  of c r e a t i o n .  This i s  a v e ry
s t r a n g e  p r o p o s i t i o n ,  and one f o r  which we have no ev idence  
1
w h a t s o e v e r . ” But I doubt whether i t  p o s s ib l e  to g e t  r i d  
of becoming: i t  i s  i n e s c a p a b le ,  and Dunne h im s e l f  has to  admit 
t h a t  AB ’moves a l o n g ’ in  time 1. I t  seems to me more unnecessary
% y 2-
than  B ergson’ s view to  assume : -  ( i j  a t  the  moment Y, the 
whole c o n te n t s  of X-Z are  o b j e c t i v e l y  ’ t h e r e ’ . (2) the move­
ment of AB, which in v o lv e s  the ’ becoming’ to  which Dunne 
o b j e c t s ,  and a l s o  an e x t r a  d im ension .  Dunne cannot c r i t i c i s e  
Bergson on the sco re  of economy: and to  say t h a t  AB ’moves 
a l o n g ’ ’ i n ’ ’ time 1 ’ - which has a l r e a d y  been c r i t i c i s e d  - i s  
c e r t a i n l y  no l e s s  dubious than  i s  the n o t io n  oi ’becoming •
To say t h a t  t h e re  i s  not  a p a r t i c l e  of ev idence  f o r  ’becoming’ 
i s  tan tam ount  to say in g  t h a t  th e re  i s  not a p a r t i c l e  of 
evidence  f o r  the movement of AB in  time 1. But p ro b a b ly  what
1. ”Exp3 r im en t  w ith  Time” , p . 152. See a l s o  p . 153-6 .
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Dunne meant i s  t h a t  th e re  i s  no ev idence  f o r  ' becoming' as
u l t i m a t e  and i r r e d u c i b l e ,  in  which he may be r i g h t  - though
I t  1 3  d o u b t fu l  whether  h i s  own r e g r e s s i v e  system ev e r  succeeds  
i n  e l i m i n a t i n g  or e x p la in in g  becoming*
But the main c r i t i c i s m  I wish to  make i s  not  a g a i n s t
h i s  r e j e c t i o n  of ’ becoming’ : i t  i s  t h a t  Dunne i s  ru n n ing  w i th
the hare  and h u n t in g  w i th  the hounds in  h i s  view of the f u t u r e .
He a s s e r t s  a view t h a t  i s  i a r  removed from, and in co m p a t ib le
w i th ,  the commonsense one, y e t  he r e v e r t s  to  t h i s  on o c c a s io n s .
He i s  t r y i n g  to  have i t  bo th  ways: i n  a v e ry  r e a l  sense  - no t
m ere ly  a ’ f i r s t - t e r m  t im e ’ s e n s e ,  due to our l i m i t a t i o n s  - A
must happen b e fo re  B, or e l s e ,  a t  A we cou ld  neve r  modify the
course  of e v e n t s ,  so t h a t  the p r e d i c t e d  B does no t  o c c u r .  I
s u g g e s t  t h a t  the tem poral  language Dunne uses  in  t h i s  co n n e c t io n
i s  s i g n i f i c a n t : -  ”He may never  e n c o u n te r  the  c e r e b r a l  even t
r e p r e s e n t e d  by bb” - the even t  p e r c e iv e d  in  the  dream - and may,
i n s t e a d ,  when f i e l d  2 i s  a t  G”H” , e n c o u n te r  a t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  
1
e v e n t ,  c . ” How i s  t h i s  "when" to  be i n t e r p r e t e d ?  A ls o : -  " I t  i s  
to  be n o t i c e d  t h a t  th e se  b reaks  in  the  v e r t i c a l  a re  to  be r e ­
g a rd ed ,  no t  as f i x e d  su b s t ra tu m  f e a t u r e s  which e x i s t  b e fo re  ( i n  
a b s o lu te  Time) o b s e rv e r  1 re ach es  0, bu t  a s  changes i n  t h a t
su b s t ra tu m  which occur a t  the  i n s t a n t  when ( i n  a b s o lu te  Time)
2
t h i s  o b s e rv e r  r e a c h e s  t h a t  p o i n t . "  What i s  " a b s o lu te  t im e " but
1 .  "Experiment w i th  Time", p . 219. I t a l i c s  mine.
2 .  I b i d .  p . 221.
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a c o n fe s s io n  t h a t  some e v e n ts  must occur b e fo re  o t h e r s ,  i n  a 
sense t h a t  i s  no t  m ere ly  due to  our l i m i t a t i o n s ?
I t  ma,y be s a i d  t h a t  Dunne n eve r  den ied  the  be f o r e -
a n d - a f t e r  r e l a t i o n  - a l l  he den ied  was the o b j e c t i v i t y  of 
p a s t ,  p r e s e n t ,  and f u t u r e . But, i n  the f i r s t  p l a c e ,  the fo rm er
g a in s  i t s  e s s e n t i a l  meaning from the l a t t e r ;  and in  the  second
1
p l a c e ,  i f  a l l  e v e n t s ,  a s ^ u n n e  i n s i s t s ,  a re  e q u a l ly  ’p r e s e n t ’ , 
i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  see why the b e f o r e - a f t e r  r e l a t i o n  shou ld  
go from A-B, r a t h e r  than  from B-A. On Dunne’ s p r i n c i p l e s  i t  
would seem to  be i n d i f f e r e n t  which we c h o o s e .
But though denying t h a t  ’e v e n t s ’ are  r e a l l y  i n  the 
f u t u r e ,  he r e v e r t s  to  the more u s u a l  b e l i e f  whenever i t  i s  
c o n v e n ie n t .  An example w i l l  make my c r i t i c i s m  c l e a r e r .  In
M
c h e s s ,  I  may p la n  an a t t a c k .  Halfway th ro u g h ,  a t  M, I r e a l i s e  
t h a t  i f  I con t inue  as  I had in te n d e d ,  I  s h a l l  i n e v i t a b l y  be 
mated a t  H. But i f  I  change to  de fen ce ,  t h e r e  i s  a chance 
t h a t  a t  0 I  may e sc ap e ,  and t h i s  in  f a c t  h a p p e n s . But t h a t  I 
can modify my proposed  p l a n s ,  and re a c h  0 i n s t e a d  of H, does 
not  mean t h a t  bo th  cannot be ’ r e a l l y ’ f u t u r e  to  me a t  M - on 
the c o n t r a r y ,  the whole p o in t  of the  s i t u a t i o n  i s  t h a t  M 
occur  be fo re  e i t h e r  ¥  or 0 - o th e rw is e ,  t h e r e  would be no 
o b j e c t  i n  my i n t e r f e r i n g  a t  M.
1. ’’S e r i a l  U n iv e r s e ” , p . 82.
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I  su g g es t  t h a t  on the one hand, Dunne con ce ives  of 
p a s t ,  p r e s e n t ,  and f u t u r e  sp read  o u t ,  and a l l  e q u a l l y  a c c e s s ­
i b l e :  and t h a t  on the o t h e r ,  he r e v e r t s  to  the common concep- 
t i o n  of M being b e fo re  ¥ .  I n  o th e r  words,  ’f i r s t - t e r m  t im e ’ 
p e r s i s t s  th ro u g h o u t .  T h is ,  i t  w i l l  be remembered, was a p o i n t  
l e f t  undec ided  in  an e a r l i e r  c r i t i c i s m :  t h a t  i t  shou ld  no t  do 
so was then  h i s  on ly  loophole  a g a i n s t  a charge of f a l l a c i o u s  
r e a s o n in g .  I t  i s  w i th  r e g a r d  to  the  f u t u r e  t h a t  the w ors t  con­
sequences of a t o o - s p a t i a l i s e d  con cep t io n  of time a re  r e v e a l e d .  
Dunne’ s view of  the f u t u r e  as be ing  both ’ t h e r e ’ and ’ a l t e r ­
a b l e ’ (which i s  a t a c i t  adm iss ion  t h a t  i t  i s  ’ l a t e r  t h a n ’ what 
we do in  the p r e s e n t )  i s ,  to  pu t  i t  b l u n t l y ,  f a r  too good to 
be t r u e . /
To sum up, the main d e f e c t s  of Dunne ’^  th eo ry  of time 
are  those  r e s u l t i n g  from s p a t i a l i s a t i o n  and a to o -read y  identi-*^ 
f i c a t i o n  of time in  i t s  passage  w ith  time as p a ssed .  This I s a d ^  
to  the f a l l a c i o u s  view of time being  taken  by the ’movementT 
of t im e ,  and the id e a  t h a t  the  'now' has a v e l o c i t y .  I t  a lso 
r e s u l t s  in  the  u n s a t i s f a o t o r i n e s s  of a r e g r e s s  which e x p la in s  
n o th in g ,  and in  the  th o ro u g h ly  u n d e s i r a b le  co n cep t io n  of the 
f u t u r e .  L e s s e r  c r i t i c i s m s ,  such as t h a t  of f a i l u r e  to  work o u t  
i n  d e t a i l  the n o t io n  of an o b s e rv e r ,  only  emphasize the
fundam enta l  d e f e c t .
B ut ,  a t  the  end of a c h a p te r  g iv en  c h i e f l y  to
d e s t r u c t i v e  c r i t i c i s m ,  i t  must be emphasized t h a t  t h i s  i s  so
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b ecau se ,  among the  v e ry  many advan tages  and obvious im portance  
of  Mr, Dunne’ s work$ d e f e c t s  which a re  l e s s  s t r i k i n g  b u t ,  I  
t h i n k ,  none the  l e s s  r a d i c a l ,  a re  a p t  to  be o v e r lo o k e d .
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CHAPTjîR IX. PRiijDICTIOH.
The power to  p r e d i c t  f u t u r e  e v e n ts  has been c la im ed
by many, by p ro p h e t  and c h a r l a t a n ,  by m ys t ic  and h y s t e r i c ,
from Joseph  to  the p r e s e n t  day . Yet i t  i s  not a im h iv e r s a l
f a c u l t y ,  and those  who l a c k  i t  ( o r ,  pace Mr. Dunne, have
n eve r  n o t i c e d  i t )  a re  a p t  to  be in c r e d u lo u s  when c o n f ro n te d
w i th  a l l e g e d  i n s t a n c e s  of p r e c o g n i t i o n . Perhaps  i t  i s  t h i s
l a c k  of agreement about the p o s s i b i l i t y  of p r e c o g n i t i o n  as
w e l l  as  the g e n e ra l  i n t e r e s t  i t  a ro u se s  ^  f o r  who i s  th e r e  who
has neve r  wished to  know, befo re  d e c id in g  on a course  of  a c t i o n ,
f o r
what the outcome of i t  w i l l  be? -  which acco u n ts  -àî. the  a v o id ­
ance of i t  by p h i l o s o p h e r s .  V/hat everyone dabb les  i n ,  i s  n o t  
l i k e l y  to  be the s u b j e c t  of a s c h o l a r l y  monograph. Yet i t  i s  
an im p o r ta n t  t o p i c ,  and one which i t  i s  n e c e s s a ry  to  g e t  c l e a r  
abou t  befo re  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  view of time can be r e ach ed .  To 
Mr. Dunne i s  due the c r e d i t  f o r  the  g e n e r a l , i l  b e l a t e d ,  re
c o g n i t i o n  of t h i s .
I f  I  say t h a t  a dream or a p r o p h e t i c  v i s i o n  or a 
sudden fo re b o d in g  was a genuine example of p r e c o g n i t i o n ,  what 
do I mean by t h i s ?  In  the  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  I  do no t  merely  mean 
t h a t  I ' s e e '  3 ,  and t h a t  a t  a l a t e r  da te  3 ' happan s ' .  At 
p r e s e n t ,  I  have a g ro te sq u e  m enta l  image of A (a  Londoner) 
s i t t i n g  b l i s s f u l l y  in  the ' c h a i r '  on Cader Berwyn i n  h i s  f u l l  
C i ty  r e g a l i a .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  though u n l i k e l y ,  t h a t  t h i s  w i l l
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happen: but I  have no i n t e n s e ,  i n n e r  c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  i t  w i l l .
On the  c o n t r a r y ,  the more I t h in k  of i t ,  the more c h im e r ic a l  
t h i s  p l e a s i n g  s i g h t  seems. But genuine p r e c o g n i t i o n  i s ,  a s  i t  
were ,  anchored :  i t  does no t  f l o a t  th rough the mind as a p l e a s ­
a n t  o r  t e r r i f y i n g  f a n t a s y ,  bu t  i s  i n s i s t e n t  t h a t  i t  i s  to  be 
r e l a t e d  to  a c t u a l i t y .  I f  p r e c o g n i t i o n  i s  not d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
from the mere th in k in g  of something"which comes t r u e ,  ev e ry  
i d l e  surmise  w i l l  be d i g n i f i e d  with  the  name of p r e c o g n i t i o n ,  
and the whole th in g  w i l l  be no more than  a g u e s s in g  game. lîx- 
p ro s s e d  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  p r e c o g n i t i o n  i s  not  vague dreaming, but  
i s  l i t e r a l l y ,  p r e - c o g n i t i o n :  t h a t  i s ,  th e re  i s  a c e r t a i n t y  
abou t  i t ,  and the p r e c o g n i t i o n  p recedes  the ev en t  which i s  
p r e c o g n i s e d .  I t  would seem from t h i s  l a t t e r  s t a te m e n t  t h a t  the 
p r e c o g n i t i o n  must be something o th e r  than  the  ev en t  p re co g ­
n i s e d .  I n  t h a t  c a se ,  what i s  meant by say ing  t h a t  on January  1 s t  
I  dreamt ^  a f u t u r e  ev en t?  What i s  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
the p r e d i c t i o n  and the even t  which j u s t i f i e s  me in  say ing  t h a t  
t h e ^ p r e d i c t i o n  i s  a p r e d i c t i o n  " o f ” the ev en t?  How i s  t h i s  
" o f ” to  be an a ly sed ?  The q u i c k e s t  way would be to  say t h a t  the  
ev e n t  which i s  f o r e t o l d  in  the p r e d i c t i o n  i s  the same even t  
which ’h ap p e n s ’ . But i n  t h a t  c a se ,  how a re  we to  e x p la in  away 
the  t im e - l a p s e ?  My dream t h a t  I  am re a d in g  "P ickw ick” i s  
i t s e l f  an ev en t  (HJl) : and by h y p o th e s i s  i t  has  a p la c e  i n
307
the t i r a e - s e r i e s  d i f f e r e n t  from my a c t u a l  r e a d in g  of the book 
(ij2) • Jn  the ana logous  case of memory, however, nobody argues  
from ( the  a c t u a l  read in g )  and 33 ( the  memory)’ s be ing  d i f ­
f e r e n t  e v e n ts  to  the i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of  memory. While i t  i s  
g r a n te d  t h a t  the a n a l y s i s  oi ”o f ” i n  the  p h ra s e ,  " the memory 
of 3 2 ” , i s  more d i f f i c u l t  than  the  p l a i n  man might suppose,  
i t  does n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a d i f f i c u l t y  l i k e  the  a n a l y s i s  of ”o f ” 
i n  the p h r a s e , " the  p r e d i c t i o n  of 3 2 . ” In  o th e r  words, i t  i s  
no t  the d i f f e r e n c e  of the two e v e n ts  31 and 32 t h a t  c o n s t i t u t e s  
the  e s p e c i a l  d i f f i c u l t y ,  s in ce  t h i s  does not  a r i s e  in  connec­
t i o n  w i th  the d i f f e r e n t  e v e n ts  32 and 33 :  i t  i s  t h e i r  o r d e r .
The c r u c i a l  q u e s t io n  a t  the  b a s i s  of p r e d i c t i o n  i s :  Can I have 
p r e c o g n i t i o n  of something u n le s s  t h a t  "som eth ing” i s  a l r e a d y ,  
in  some s e n s e , g iven? I f  the answer to t h i s  q u e s t io n  i s  "No", 
the a l l e g e d  p r e c o g n i t i o n  i s  no p r e c o g n i t i o n ,  but p e r c e p t i o n ,  
u n le s s  a meaning can be a t t a c h e d  to the " in  some sense a l r e a d y  
g iven"  so t h a t  the prima f a c i e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i s  removed. I f  
the answer to  the q u e s t i o n  i s  "Yes", the s u p p o r t e r s  of p r e ­
c o g n i t i o n  have to  e x p la in  what o th e r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between the 
p r e c o g n i t i o n  and what i s  p re c o g n is e d  i s  p o s s i b l e  # The onus 
p roband i  i s  on them - and in  the absence of such p ro o f  s c e p t i c s  
a re  a t  l i b e r t y  to  ho ld  t h a t  they  a re  not  d e a l in g  w i th  genuine 
p r e c o g n i t i o n s , but w i th  mere " s e e in g  A, and A comes t r u e " .
But befo re  the q u e s t io n  çan be p r o p e r ly  asked ,  i t
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w i l l  be a d v i s a b le  to  g e t  c l e a r e r  what i s  meant and what i s  
no t  meant by p r e d i c t i o n .  A f e r t i l e  source  of c o n fu s io n ,  a l ­
read y  m entioned ,  must f i r s t  be removed, by d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  
between e v e n t s ,  and the c o n te n t s  of  e v e n t s .  This does not  im­
p ly  t h a t  such a d i s t i n c t i o n  can be made a b s o l u t e ,  f o r  t h a t  
would be a g r e a t  e r r o r .  By the " c o n te n t  of an ev en t"  I mean, 
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  my r e a d in g  of a book. But my re a d in g  of a book
i s  always d a ta b le  ; i t  happens a t  a  c e r t a i n  t im e i  and however
1
many t im es i t  happens ,  i t  i s  a d i f f e r e n t  ev en t  each t i m e . 
B r i e f l y ,  the c o n te n t  of an even t  I s  what happens:  the even t  
i t s e l f  i s  what happens when i t  happens .  There i s  an e s s e n t i a l  
r e f e r e n c e  in  the n o t io n  of an even t  both  to  c o n te n t  and to 
d a t e :  and the e v e n t ,  more fundam enta l  than  e i t h e r ,  m ed ia tes  
between unda ted  c o n te n t  and empty t i m e . The danger of a b s t r a c t ­
ing  time from ev e n ts  i s  w e l l  known: the o p p o s i te  danger of ab­
s t r a c t i n g  c o n te n t  from e v e n ts  i s  l e s s  r e a l i s e d ,  but may be no 
2
l e s s  s e r i o u s .  Unless  we are  to a l lo w  s t r a n g e  amorphous "Uni­
v e r s e s  of D isco u rse "  w here in  u nda ted  c o n te n t s  f l o a t ,  we must 
r e c o g n is e  t h a t  th e re  cannot be a "what happens" w i th o u t  a
1. I am ta k in g  "happening" as  u l t im a t e  and i n d e f i n a b l e .
2 .  Science  p roceeds  by a b s t r a c t i n g  from p a r t i c u l a r s  of time 
(and p lace )  and by ig n o r in g  d a ta b le  c h a r a c t e r s .  This a lone  
i s  not  v i c i o u s ,  as long as i t  i s  not thought  t h a t  t h i s  ab­
s t r a c t i o n  i s  an y th in g  more than  a m e th o d o lo g icaM ev ice  •
When t h i s  f u r t h e r  s t e p  i s  t ak en ,  t r o u b le  b e g i n s . Some of 
the p e r p l e x i t i e s  and c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  t h a t  oese t  modern 
s c i e n t i s t s  may be due to t h i s  e r r o r .
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when a t  which i t  happens .  The tem poral  r e f e r e n c e  in  the verb  
" to  happen" i s  e s s e n t i a l .  However, as  long as  i t  be remembered 
t h a t  c o n te n t  cannot u l t i m a t e l y  be a b s t r a c t e d  from e v e n t s ,  the 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between them i s  a u s e f u l  one, and makes i t  e a s i e r  
to  avo id  s u p e r f i c i a l  arguments bo th  f o r  and a g a i n s t  p r e c o g n i ­
t i o n .
My hav ing  of a p r e c o g n i t i v e  dream of X going to 
China i s  i t s e l f  an e v e n t ,  31. But what I  p ra c o g n ise  i s  no t
^Y^nt 32 which l a t e r  happens when X does go to  China, but 
the c o n te n t  o f  t h a t  e v e n t ,  X’ s going to  China, which I w i l l  
c a l l  C f o r  s h o r t .  Thus what I  p re co g n ise  i s  no t  32, but C. In  
o th e r  words, the c o n te n t  of 31 and 32 i s  to  a c e r t a i n  e x t e n t  
i d e n t i c a l .  This may seem a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  in  te rm s ,  f o r  e i t h e r  
two th in g s  a re  i d e n t i c a l  or th ey  are  n o t .  I t  remains to  be 
seen  whether t h i s  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i s  a r e a l  one - f o r  m y se l f ,  I 
doubt w hether  p r e c o g n i t i o n  can be d isp o sed  of so e a s i l y .  The 
s u p p o r t e r  of p r e c o g n i t i o n  i s  bound to  h o ld  t h a t  th e re  i s  more 
th an  a mere g e n e ra l  s i m i l a r i t y  between the  c o n te n t  of the 
dream and the c o n te n t  of the ’ r e a l ’ e v e n t ,  f o r  the dream, he 
says ( i n  the s t i l l  un an a ly sed  p h r a s e ) ,  i s  a dream ’ o f ’ the 
e v e n t .  On the o th e r  hand, th e re  i s  a d i f f e r e n c e ,  and the d i f ­
f e re n c e  i s  j u s t  t h a t  vague, e l u s i v e ,  but  n e v e r t h e l e s s  im p o r t ­
a n t  one between dreams and ’ r e a l  l i f e ’ . 3 v i d a n t l y ,  however, 
the d i f f e r e n c e  t h a t  i s  a l l e g e d  to c o n t r a d i c t  the i d e n t i t y
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of the tvm c o n te n t s  i s  no t  in  the c o n te n t s  a t  a l l .  Whether C 
happens in  a dream or in  r e a l i t y  does no t  a l t e r  C. The "con­
t r a d i c t i o n "  i s  based upon an e lem en ta ry  m is u n d e r s ta n d in g .
The problem of p r e c o g n i t i o n ,  however, as  we have 
seen in  the  case of memory i s  not how two ev e n ts  can have the 
same c o n te n t  ; and i t  i s  not  so much even how the c o n te n t  can 
be seen ,  though t  o f ,  or  dreamt be fo re  i t  a c t u a l l y  happens .  For 
i f  t h a t  were so eve ry  i d l e  remark, ev e ry  chance fan cy  which 
’ came t r u e ’ would be in  the same c a s e .  Nobody f i n d s  any s p e c i a l  
d i f f i c u l t y  i n  a man’ s say in g ,  "When X comes over nex t  time I 
want him to  see the g a rd en " ,  and nobody f e e l s  the need of  ex­
p l a i n i n g  how he came to  say i t  before  X’ s v i s i t ,  when i n  due 
course  X d id  see the g a rd en .  The p o i n t  i s  no t  m erely  t h a t  he 
i s  a p u rp os iv e  ag en t  and can p la n  what he and X s h a l l  do - i t  
would be u s e l e s s  to  e x p la in  away a l l  r e f e r e n c e  to  the f u t u r e  
i n  terms of w i l l ,  f r e e  or  o the rw ise  - the essence  of the  ex­
ample i s  i n  the "when X comes", i f  X in  f a c t  does come. Argu­
ments a g a i n s t  p r e c o g n i t i o n ,  th e n ,  which con f ine  them selves  to 
denying the p o s s i b i l i t y  of C’ s being  though t  o f ,  or dreamt o f ,  
b e fo re  i t  a c t u a l l y  happens prove too ÿuch, 1 or th ey  can app ly  
e q u a l ly  to  q u i t e  harm less  a n t i c i p a t i o n s  and p l a n n in g s .  I  am 
not s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  we know a l l  t h a t  i t  means when we make 
p la n s  in v o lv in g  the f u t u r e ,  but I  do su gg es t  t h a t ,  v/hatever 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s  in vo lv ed  even in  p la n n in g ,  a d d i t i o n a l  and
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g ra v e r  d i f f i c u l t i e s  a re  in v o lv ed  in  p r e d i c t i o n .  In o th e r  
words, the e a r l i e r  s t a te m e n t  t h a t  the problem of  p r e c o g n i t i o n  
was not in  the d i f f e r e n c e  of the e v e n ts  31 and 32 ,  but in  
t h e i r  o r d e r , needs m o d i f i c a t i o n .  Not on ly  in  t h e i r  o rd e r  but 
in  t h a t  e x t r a  c o r r o b o r a t i o n  and c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  b inds  31 and 
32 t o g e t h e r  i s  the essence  of the problem of p r e d i c t i o n  to  be 
fo un d .  This l a s t  s t a te m e n t  i s  vague .  I f  I  wished to  uphold  
p r e c o g n i t i o n ,  I shou ld  have to a m p l i fy  i t :  as i t  i s ,  the 
leg ac y  i s  an i n t e r e s t i n g  one.
I t  may be o b je c te d  t h a t  the problem i s  an u n r e a l  one, 
and t h a t  th e re  i s  no such e x t r a  c o r r o b o r a t i o n  and c e r t a i n t y  
in  p r e d i c t i o n s  as a g a i n s t  mere t h i n k i n g - t h a t - c o m e s - t r u e .
Mr. Dunne seems to  ho ld  t h a t ,  s in ce  p r e c o g n i t i o n  i s  a normal 
f a c u l t y ,  we cannot t e l l ,  from the mere t h in k in g  over our
dreams a t  b r e a k f a s t ,  which of them w i l l  be v e r i f i e d  and which 
1
w i l l  n o t .  He t a k e s ,  as  a s u f f i c i e n t  c r i t e r i o n  of p r e d i c t i o n ,  
the mere v e r i f i c a t i o n  a t  a l a t e r  d a t e ,  and d i s t i n g u i s h e s  p r e ­
d i c t i o n  from co inc id en ce  on ly  by the i m p r o b a b i l i t y  of the 
occurrence*  I t  may be g r a n te d  t h a t  the com for tao le  use of  the 
word ’ c o in c i d e n c e ’ i s  o f t e n  a s h e l t e r  1 or ig n o ra n c e ,  when a 
l i t t l e  t r o u b le  would have d i s c o v e re d  a c a u s a l  co n n e c t io n ,  and 
a l s o  t h a t  we do, in  f a c t ,  g ive more credence to  a l l e g e d  
v e r i f i e d  p r e d i c t i o n s  in  p r o p o r t i o n  to  t h e i r  a p r i o r i
1 . From my own e x p e r i e n c e ,  I  have f e l t  no more ^ o n v ic t io n  a t  
the  time about dreams which were l a t e r  v e r i f i e d  th an  aoout 
those  which were n o t .  That seems to  me to  p o in t  to  co­
in c id en ce  r a t h e r  th an  to p r e c o g n i t i o n .
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i m p r o b a b i l i t y ,  and c o r r e c t n e s s  i n  d e t a i l s .  N e v e r th e l e s s ,  the 
f a l l a c y  of  "po s t  hoc ergo  p r o p t e r  hoc" l u rk s  to  t r a p  the un- 
wary. We are  a l l ,  below a more or l e s s  s u p e r f i c i a l  co v e r in g  of 
r e a s o n ,  s u p e r s t i t i o u s .  We b e l i e v e  t h a t  our lu ck  i s  o u t ,  or i n .  
There i s  a t i d e  in  the a f f a i r s  of men" - and th a t  what i s  
bad ly  begun w i l l  end b a d l y , We h a te  to  h ea r  o th e r s  p rophesy  
evil- ,  even in  j e s t ,  and i f  a n y th in g  shou ld  happen, we blame 
them f o r  i t .  Of c o u r se ,  t h i s  p rocedure  i s  on ly  h a l f - c o n s c i o u s ,  
and i f  our " r a t i o n a l "  s e lv e s  h ea rd  of i t ,  th ey  would soon 
squash i t  as nonsense .  But i t  i s  t h i s  unconsc ious  p roneness  to 
i r r a t i o n a l  b e l i e f  t h a t  makes i t  so d a n g e ro u s . I c h o s e ,a s  a 
p l e a s i n g  f igm en t  of  the im a g in a t io n ,  the s p e c ta c l e  of A s i t t i n g  
on the top  of  Cader Berwyn, and when I chose i t ,  I  s a i d  t h a t  
even i f  i t  ev e r  came t r u e ,  i t  would not be a p r e d i c t i o n  on my 
p a r t .  Supposing ,  however, the improbable happened: would I no t  
be i n c l i n e d  to  look  back on my chance fancy  w i th  u n e a s in e s s ,  
and wonder w h e th e r ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  some dim "prem on it ion"  had not  
gu ided  my th o u g h ts  to  take t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  cou rse?  I might j u s t  
as w e l l ,  I  might say ,  have though t  of B i n s t e a d  of A, and of 
Cader Bronwen*s bogs i n s t e a d  of the c rag  perched  h ig h  over the 
l a k e ;  the  way i s  ea sy  to  wondering I shou ld  have though t
as  I  d i d .  An i r r a t i o n a l  f e e l i n g ,  p e rh a p s :  but i t  cannot be 
d en ied  t h a t  we have a tendency ,  look ing  back, to  see more than
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c o in c id e n c e .  I t  i s  one th in g  to say ,  I f  G d id  no t  happen, t h a t  
would not  make of  my fa n cy  a p r e c o g n i t i o n :  i t  i s  q u i t e  a n o th e r  
to  say ,  G has happened, bu t  my p re v io u s  p i c t u r e  of i t  was not  
a p r e c o g n i t i o n . But i t  i s  ’ a n o t h e r ’ , not f o r  any l o g i c a l  r e a s o n ,  
bu t  because oi our p s y c h o lo g ic a l  p r e d i l e c t i o n s . Yet we do not  
even c a r r y  our i l l o g i c a l i t y  to  i t s  l o g i c a l  c o n c lu s io n s ,  and 
in  the case of the  f u l f i l m e n t  of a remark l i k e  " I  hope we 
have c a r r o t s  f o r  d in n e r " ,  we have s u f f i c i e n t  sense to  see no­
th in g  m y s te r io u s .  A l l  t h i s  i s  v e ry  obv ious :  but the p o i n t  t h a t  
I am t r y i n g  to  make i s  t h a t  t h e re  i s  no l o g i c a l  d i f f e r é n c e  
between the  " c a r r o t - f u l f i l m e n t "  and the " c r a g - f u l f i l m e n t " , 
bu t  on ly  a d i f f e r e n c e  of p r o b a b i l i t y .  Hence, i f  p r e c o g n i t i o n  
i s  not to  be on the same ( l o g i c a l )  l e v e l  as  guesswork and i d l e  
fa n c y ,  i t  must be c e r t a i n .
Now where i s  t h i s  c e r t a i n t y  to  come in?  E m p h a t ic a l ly ,  
not  a f t e r  the ev en t  o n ly :  f o r  we have seen  how s u g g e s t i b l e  
we are  in  f i n d i n g  ca u sa l  co n n ec t io n s  a f t e r  the f u l f i l m e n t  of 
a " p r e d i c t i o n . "  Yet i t  would seam h a r s h  to  l i m i t  c e r t a i n t y  
to  c e r t a i n t y  be fo re  the  f u l f i l m e n t :  some of Mr# Dunne’ s 
b e s t  examples ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  do not  seem to  have been 
a t t e n d e d  w i th  c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  th ey  would be f u l f i l l e d .  I t  
would be a m is take  to  weight  the s c a l e s  a g a i n s t  p r e d i c t i o n  
to  s t a r t  w i th ;  bu t  we must p r o t e c t  o u r s e lv e s  a g a i n s t  p o s t ­
f u l f i l m e n t  s u g g e s t i o n .  3van so ,  p r e m ô n i t i o n s , however c e r t a i n ,
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are  no t  always f u l f i l l e d .  We do no t  h ea r  of the p r o p o r t i o n  o f  
u n f u l f i l l e d  to  f u l f i l l e d  p r e d i c t i o n s :  I s u s p e c t  t h a t  i t  i s  
l a r g e .  S u b je c t iv e  c e r t a i n t y ,  th e n ,  i s  not  a good enough 
c r i t e r i o n  of p r e c o g n i t i o n .  We are  thus  fo r c e d  back to  the 
s t a r t i n g  p o i n t ,  s h o r t  c u t s  hav ing  f a i l e d :  the on ly  c r i t e r i o n  
of genuine p r e c o g n i t i o n s  i s  in  a p e c u l i a r  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between 
the p r e c o g n i t i o n  and the even t  ’ o f ’ which i t  i s  a p r e c o g n i t i o n .  
F a i l i n g  the  d i s c o v e ry  and the  a n a l y s i s  of t h i s ,  we have no 
re a s o n  to  b e l i e v e  t h a t  p r e d i c t i o n s ,  as d i s t i n c t  from g u e ss ­
work, o cc u r .
I t  might seem a t  f i r s t  s i g h t  p l a u s i b l e  t h a t  the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p  i s  a c a u s a l  one. The coming ev en t  " c a s t s  i t s  
shadow b e fo re"  ( i n  the ph rase  which i s  so f a m i l i a r  t h a t  we 
never  s to p  to  examine i f  the ana logy  i s  a good o n e ) , and causes  
me to  have an i n t i m a t i o n  of i t ,  s i m i l a r  in  k ind  to  t h a t  p a r ­
t i c u l a r  type of i n t i m a t i o n  (o f  a p a s t  even t)  which I c a l l  mem­
o ry .  In  terms of the ana log y ,  in  memory I look a t  a shadow, and
2
know what the o b je c t  was t h a t  c a s t  i t  - w hether  i t  was a t r e e ,
1. Once, be fo re  a jo u rn e y ,  I  ’ f e l t ’ t h a t  something would happen 
to  the t r a i n .  I  had never  had the  f e e l i n g  befo re  or s i n c e ,  
and the absence of any p ro p e r  r e a s o n ,  i f  an y th in g  i n c r e a s e d  
the s u g g e s t i o n .  I  had s u f f i c i e n t  sense not to  postpone the 
jo u rn e y ,  and no th in g  happened. The ’p r e m o n i t io n ’ , though 
s t r o n g ,  was (pe rh ap s  c o n v e n ie n t ly )  vague - f o r  i f  t h e re  had 
been a mishap, however s l i g h t ,  I f e a r  t h a t  I  would have 
been c r e d u lo u s .
2 . In  the te rm in o lo gy  I have been u s in g ,  the c o n t e n t .
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or a house ,  or a man. This  i s  no t  a t  a l l  a bad ana logy  f o r  
memory (as  long as  i t  i s  not p r e s s e d  too f a r ) . But when ap& 
p l i e d  to. p r e c o g n i t i o n  i t  i s  s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y . For the t r e e  
i s  bo th  l o g i c a l l y  and temporally prior to i t s  shadow, and to  
imagine t h a t  a t r e e ,  as y e t  n o n - e x i s t e n t , can c a s t  a shadow 
i s  an a b s u r d i t y .  I t  may be objected t h a t  t h i s  l a s t  sen ten ce  
i s  so p h ra se d  t h a t  i t  begs the question. The p o i n t  a t  i s s u e  
i s  j u s t  whether  the  f u t u r e  i s  "n o th in g  a t  a l l " ,  or n o t ,  and 
to  a d o p t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  Broad’ s view would p re jud g e  the ques­
t i o n  a t  once .  At t h i s  stage i t  would be j u s t  as v a l i d  to h o ld ,  
w i th  Dunne, t h a t  t h e re  i s  no o n t o l o g i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between 
p a s t ,  p r e s e n t ,  and f u t u r e :  i n  which case the ph rase  "as y e t  
n o n - e x i s t e n t "  i s  h i g h l y  m is le a d in g ,  and tends  to  throw s u s ­
p i c i o n  on a perfectly r e p u ta b le  a n a lo g y .  N e v e r th e l e s s ,  I  do 
no t  t h in k  t h a t  the  o b j e c t i o n  i s  v a l i d ,  l o r  the c o n t r a d i c t i o n  
s ta n d s  even i f  i t  i s  p h ra se d  in  terms of b e fo re  and a f t e r ,  
and not in  terms of p r e s e n t  and f u t u r e .
I would su g g es t  that the a t te m p t  to  r e l a t e  p r e ­
c o g n i t i o n s  to  e v e n ts  by means of c a u s a l i t y  - whether ex­
p r e s s e d  by sh a d o w -a n a lo g ie s , or not  - i s  based  upon a 
fundam enta l  c o n fu s io n .  The sponsors  of t h i s  a re  trying to  
have i t  bo th  ways: they  i n s i s t  on th e  temporal  p r i o r i t y  ol 
the p r e c o g n i t i o n ,  and yet p r e te n d  to e x p l a i n  i t  by a r e l a t i o n  
which*hoIds only  between e a r l i e r  and l a t e r .  The q u e s t io n
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does no t  m ere ly  concern  a few s t r a y  dreams or  v i s i o n s  - had 
i t  been t h a t  on ly ,  nobody would o b j e c t  much -  but in v o lv e s  the 
whole v a l i d i t y  oi the  c a u s a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p *  Those who have h e ld  
t h i s  view have r a r e l y  seen  the  su b v e rs iv e  consequences i t  en­
t a i l s .  ( I  do not  mean to  su g g es t  t h a t  the n o t io n  of c a u s a l i t y
i s  so f i r m l y  e n t re n c h e d  t h a t  i t  i s  beyond s u s p i c i o n ,  or  t h a t  
i t  i s  com ple te ly  u n d e rs to o d  by u s ,  but I  do su g g es t  t h a t  i t  i s  
no t  to  be l i g h t l y  over throw n, i f  any o th e r  e x p l a n a t i o n ,  no t  
in v o lv in g  the d e n i a l  of the u n i d i r e c t i o n a l i t y  of c a u s a l i t y ,  i s  
f e a s i b l e . )  The e a s i e s t  way, p e rh ap s ,  to u n d e r s ta n d  the  s i t u ­
a t i o n ,  i s  to  c o n s id e r  the  q u e s t i o n :  I f  th e  r e l a t i o n  i s  one of 
c a u s a l i t y ,  which i s  the  cause and which the  e f f e c t ?  Does the 
dream cause the e v e n t ,  or  v ice  v e r sa ?
I t  i s  no t  im po ss ib le  to  imagine a case in  which the
the dream might be a t  l e a s t  a  p a r t - c a u s e  of the e v e n t .  Suppose, 
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  a man dreamt t h a t  he v i s i t e d  a c e r t a i n  
sm all  town to  which he d id  no t  o f t e n  go. S h o r t l y  a f t e r w a r d s ,  
a f r i e n d  w i th  a new ca r  t h a t  he was anx ious  to  t r y  out c a l l e d  . 
u n e x p e c te d ly ,  and o f f e r e d  to  take him o u t ,  g iv in g  him the  
choice  of d i r e c t i o n .  The mere f a c t  t h a t  the name of the town 
was f r e s h  in  h i s  memory, even i f  u n c o n s c io u s ly , might l e a d  
him to  choose i t .  There i s  no p a r t i c u l a r  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  such 
a c a u s a l  c o n n e c t io n .  But,  ve ry  e v i d e n t l y ,  th e re  i s  no p r e ­
c o g n i t i o n  in  any p ro p e r  sense of the word. On the o th e r  hand,
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i f  the ev en t  causes  the  dream, we can on ly  a sk ,  "How?" For 
such c a u s a t io n  would he of  a fu n d a m e n ta l ly  d i f f e r e n t  k in d  
from what i s  u s u a l l y  c a l l e d  c a u s a t io n :  so d i f f e r e n t ,  in deed ,  
t h a t  i t  would he dangerous to  c a l l  bo th  n o t io n s  by the same 
name, because of the r i s k  of c o n fu s io n .  I su g g es t  t h a t  the  
masquerade of t h i s  second n o t io n  under the  name of the f i r s t  
s e rv e s  no purpose excep t  to obscure  our minds to  i t s  change­
l i n g  o r i g i n ,  and to  make us b e l i e v e  t h a t  we u n d e r s ta n d  i t ,  
when in  f a c t  we do n o t .
There i s ,  however, one way in  which an e x p la n a t io n  
of f u l f i l l e d  p r e d i c t i o n s  might be g iven  in  c a u sa l  te rm s .
Suppose t h a t  I had reaéon  to  th in k  i t  p o s s i b l e ,  though no t  to 
be c e r t a i n ,  t h a t  G would happen, and t h a t  my reaso n s  were sound. 
I f  c e r t a i n  e v e n ts  a t  t l  caused  G to  happen a t  t 3 ,  i s  i t  not  
a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  they  caused D (a  dream of G) in  the i n t e r ­
ven ing  time - a t ,  say ,  t2?  Thus n e i t h e r  G nor D i s  a cause of 
the o t h e r ,  bu t  th e y  a re  l i n k e d  by c a u s a t io n ,  f o r  bo th  are  
e f f e c t s  of a p r i o r  ev en t  or e v e n t s .  Such an e x p l a n a t io n ,  though 
p o s s i b l e  and even p l a u s i b l e  to  accoun t  f o r  the undoubted "be­
lo ng ing  to g e th e r n e s s "  of p r e d i c t i o n  and r e a l  even t  (o th e rw ise  
ve ry  h a rd  to e x p la in )  i s  c e r t a i n l y  opposed to  p r e c o g n i t i o n .
For i t  in v o lv e s  t h a t  t h e re  i s  no s p e c i a l  r e le v a n c e  to  the 
f u l f i l m e n t  in  the ’p r e d i c t i o n ’ , o th e r  than  as  a c o l l a t e r a l  
e f f e c t  of the same c a u s e s , and i t  p o s t u l a t e s  n o th in g  more 
th an  "tW normal u n i d i r e c t i o n a l  c a u s a t i o n .  I t  may be o b je c te d
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t h a t  the s i m i l a r i t y  of D and G may be due to co in c idence  - 
but t h a t  o b j e c t i o n  i s  not l i k e l y  to  be made by a s u p p o r t e r  of 
p r e c o g n i t i o n ,  nor would i t  h e lp  him i f  i t  were,  s in ce  co­
in c id e n c e  i s  h i s  own w o rs t  enemy. C au sa t io n ,  then ,  cannot be 
the r e l a t i o n  inv o lv ed  in  p r e d i c t i o n .
A second s u g g e s t io n  o f f e r s  i d e n t i t y  as the s o l u t i o n .  
Now i t  i s  ag reed  t h a t  D ( the  dream) and 3 ( the even t  which i s  
i t s  f u l f i l m e n t )  have the same c o n te n t  - t h i s  i s ,  ind eed ,  one 
premise on which the n o t io n  of p r e d i c t i o n  was based ,  s in ce  
o th e rw ise  th e re  would be e n d le s s  arguments as to  whether  D 
r e f e r r e d  to  3 or to  some o th e r  s i m i l a r  e v e n t .  But a lone  t h i s  i s  
no t  s u f f i c i e n t  - we have to  e x p la in  hov/ such i d e n t i t y  i s  p o s s ­
i b l e .  To go too f a r  in  t h i s ,  and to  deny the p o s s i b i l i t y  of the 
same c o n te n t  a t  d i f f e r e n t  t im es ,  would be to  endanger memory 
and p la n n in g ,  and to  c r e a t e  u n n ec essa ry  d i f f i c u l t i e s . The main 
p o i n t  which d i s t i n g u i s h e s  the c a r r y i n g  out  of a p la n  and the 
f u l f i l m e n t  of a p r e d i c t i o n  i s  t h a t  i n  the form er (though the 
p s y c h o lo g ic a l  emphasis i s  a d m i t te d ly  on the f u t u r e )  the l o g i c a l  
emphasis i s  on the  p a s t ,  while  i n  the l a t t e r  i t  i s  on the f u t u r e .  
I d e n t i t y  i s  not i t s e l f  a tem poral  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  Hence when i t  
i s  a p p l i e d  to th in g s  i n  t i m e , I w i l l  n f t  say i t  l o s e s  p a r t  of 
i t s  f o r c e ,  but r a t h e r  t h a t  i t  i s  marked by the queer l o p s i d e d ­
ness  of t i m e . I d e n t i t y  i s  pe r f e c t l y  sym m etr ica l ;  time i s  n o t .
I t  would, of co u rse ,  be an a b s u r d i t y  to su g g es t  t h a t  i d e n t i t i e s
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become not q u i t e  i d e n t i c a l ,  and t h i s  i s  not what i s  meant:
an examp3:9 may make the meaning c l e a r e r .  Two ev e n ts  (such t h a t
th ey  would be commonly spoken of as ' t h e  same th in g  happening
a g a i n ' )  a re  no t  i d e n t i c a l ,  f o r  th ey  have d i f f e r e n t  tem poral
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  such as d a t e . The two c o n t e n t s ,  c o n s id e r e d  i n
a b s t r a c t i o n  from t im e ,  a re  i d e n t i c a l :  bu t  the two e v e n ts  as a
whole (as  e v e n ts  i n  t im e ) ,  a re  s u b j e c t  to  t im e .  Hence, to  c a r r y
over i n t o  our d e a l in g s  w i th  e v e n ts  n o t io n s  of i d e n t i t y  t h a t
ap p ly  on ly  in  a b s t r a c t i o n  from da te  i s  a m is ta k e :  and i t  i s
no t  a b su rd  to  t a l k  of " d i f f e r e n c e  of em phas is" between two
1
e v e n ts  which have i d e n t i c a l  c o n t e n t s .  In  a p e r f e c t l y  conce ived  
p l a n ,  the p la n  and the e x e c u t io n  have the same c o n te n t ,  but 
though the p l a n n e r  emphasizes what he hopes w i l l  happen, the 
l o g i c a l  emphasis i s  on the p l a n ,  which has both l o g i c a l  and 
tem pora l  p r i o r i t y  over the  e x e c u t io n .  I  have been a t  some p a in s  
to show t h a t  sameness of c o n te n t  i s  not  in com pa t ib le  w i th  such 
em phasis :  i t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  c o n s i s t e n t ,  t h e r e f o r e , to  h o ld  bo th  
i d e n t i t y  of c o n te n t  between p la n  and r e s u l t ,  and t h a t  the 
emphasis th rou g ho u t  i s  from p la n  to  r e s u l t .  The same th in g  
ho ld s  a l s o  in  the case of memory. In  p r e d i c t i o n ,  though th e re  
may be i d e n t i t y  of c o n te n t ,  the emphasis i s  always from l a t e r
1. T h ^ " d i f fe r e n c e  of emphasis" i s  n o t ,  of c o u rse ,  the work 
o f ' ^ i d e n t i t y ,  but  of time ( i f  the  h y p o s t a t i s i n g  language 
be p e r m i t t e d  f o r  a moment). I d e n t i t y  i s  ’ a l l  t h a t  i t  eve r  
was’ , and the  i r r e g u l a r i t i e s  a re  not  s in s  of om iss ion  on 
i t s  p a r t ,  bu t  of commission by t i m e .
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to  e a r l i e r :  the p r e d i c t i o n  i s  c o n s id e re d  as hav ing  no im p o r t ­
ance in d e p e n d e n t ly  of the even t  which i s  i t s  f u l f i l m e n t . l o g i c ­
a l l y ,  the  l a t e r  i s  c o n s id e r e d  as c o n d i t i o n in g  the e a r l i e r ,  
which i s  a r e t u r n  to  the f i r s t  s u g g e s t io n ,  t h a t  has a l r e a d y  
been d i s c u s s e d :  the n o t io n  of  i d e n t i t y  has no p a r t i c u l a r  
r e l e v a n c e ,  ex cep t  to  bamboozle us i n t o  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  no d i f ­
f e r e n c e  in  the  s t a t u s  of p r e d i c t i o n  and f u l f i l m e n t  i s  r e q u i r e d .  
But t h i s  i s  the  a b s t r a c t ,  m a th em at ica l  view of i d e n t i t y .  I t  
i s  on ly  as a  r e s u l t  of co n fu s io n  t h a t  we can ap p ly  to  tem poral  
e v e n ts  n o t io n s  of  i d e n t i t y  which a re  a p p r o p r i a t e  on ly  in  ab ­
s t r a c t i o n  from t i m e . The p o s t u l a t i o n  of i d e n t i t y ,  t h e n ,  l e a v e s  
e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t s  u n e x p la in e d ,  and cannot r a t i o n a l i s e  p r e d i c t i o n
There remain as  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  only  c o in c id e n c e ,  
m i r a c l e s ,  and a new r e l a t i o n ,  no t  r e d u c ib le  to  e i t h e r  i d e n t i t y  
or  c a u s a l i t y ,  but re sem bling  them in  c e r t a i n  r e s p e c t s  : and 
th e se  need not  be d i s c u s s e d  a t  l e n g t h .  Coincidence i s  of 
course  anathema to  the b e l i e v e r  in  p r e c o g n i t i o n ;  nor would 
'm i ra c le *  s a t i s f y  him, e s p e c i a l l y  i f ,  l i k e  Dunne, he b e l i e v e d  
p r e c o g n i t i o n  to  be common and n o rm a l . As r e g a rd s  the  new r e ­
l a t i o n ,  u n t i l  we a re  g iv e n  p o s i t i v e  grounds f o r  r e c o g n i s in g  
i t ,  t h e re  can be no harm in  heed ing  Occam's maxim.
By i t s  f a i l u r e ,  th en ,  to  g ive  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  ex­
p l a n a t i o n  of the  r e l a t i o n  s u b s i s t i n g  between p r e d i c t i o n  and 
f u l f i l m e n t  such t h a t  the form er can r i g h t l y  be c a l l e d  a 




Yet a c c u r a t e  f o r e c a s t i n g s  have been known. How i s  
t h i s  to  be r e n d e re d  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  the c o n c lu s io n s  t h a t  have 
j u s t  been r e a c h e d ?  In  the  f i r s t  p l a c e ,  t h e r e  a re  p l a n n in g s  - 
b u t  I  have t r i e d  to  show t h a t  th e se  a r é  q u i t e  d i s t i n c t  from 
p r e d i c t i o n s  p r o p e r .  S econ d ly ,  t h e r e  i s  guesswork  - bu t  t h a t  
a l s o  i s  n o t  p r e d i c t i o n .  T h i r d l y ,  and most im p o r t a n t ,  t h e r e  a re  
the  s o - c a l l e d  p r e d i c t i o n s  of  s c i e n c e .  I t  i s  w i th  them t h a t  
t h i s  s e c t i o n  w i l l  be c h i e f l y  c o n c e rn ed .
Only t h i s  morning th e r e  was an acco u n t  i n  the  news­
p ap e r  of  an e c l i p s e  of  the  moon which w i l l  take  p la c e  oh' 
J a n u a ry  8 th ,  (1 9 3 6 ) .  B eg inn ing  a t  4 .28  p .m . the  e c l i p s e  w i l l  
be t o t a l  f o r  23 m in u te s ,  and p a r t i a l  f o r  3hours 23 m in u te s ,  
and f o r  a  p e r i o d  of 5-ï  h o u rs  the  moon w i l l  be i n  the  penumbra. 
The moon when e c l i p s e d  w i l l  be c o p p e r - c o lo u re d ,  and l a s t l y ,  
we a re  p rom ised  t h a t  the e c l i p s e  w i l l  be v i s i b l e  from a l l  over  
the  B r i t i s h  I s l e s  and France  - the  o n ly  c o n d i t i o n  b e ing  t h a t  
the  sky must be c l e a r  I There a re  he re  no l e s s  th a n  f i v e  
p o s i t i v e  - no t  vague - s t a t e m e n t s .  Three concern  the  d u r a t i o n  
of  the  e v e n t ,  and the  time of  commencement : one m en t ions
1. I  use ’p r e d i c t i o n ’ and ’p r e c o g n i t i o n ’ i n d i f f e r e n t l y . To 
d i s t i n g u i s h  between them i s  u s e f u l ,  s in c e  the  fo rm er  
term  i s  e n t r e n c h e d  in  s c i e n c e ,  and t h e r e  c e r t a i n l y  a r ^  
p r e d i c t i o n s  as  s c ie n c e  u se s  the  word; bu t  i n  the  long  
ru n ,  the  f a m i l i a r  sense  b e t r a y s  u s ,  and we a s s e r t  ’p r e ­
d i c t i o n ’ in  t h a t  sense  a l s o .  I t  seems to  me t h a t  to  say 
s c i e n t i f i c  ’p r e d i c t i o n s ’ a re  n o t  r e a l  p r e d i c t i o n s  i s  the  
l e s s e r  e v i l .
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th^ p l a c e s  a t  which i t  w i l l  o ccu r ,  and one d e s c r i b e s  what i t  
w i l l  loo k  l i k e .  A p r e d i c t i o n  t h a t  was not  f i r m l y  b e l i e v e d  
would n e v e r  be made in  such p r e c i s e  t e rm s .  This  example shows 
s c i e n t i f i c  p r e d i c t i o n  a t  i t s  most c o n f id e n t  l e v e l .  I t  i s  p e r ­
haps b e t t e r  to  s t a r t  w i th  a s im p le r  one .  Many of  the  s t a t e ­
ments i n  s c ie n c e  a re  c a u s a l  ones ,  and i t  i s  no t  too much to  
say  t h a t  the  f i r s t  g r e a t  s t e p  in  s c i e n t i f i c  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  i s  
ta k e n  when a number of o c c u r r e n c e s ,  h i t h e r t o  r e g a rd e d  as 
f o r t u i t o u s l y  co n n e c ted ,  a re  e x h i b i t e d  as  c a u s a l l y  co n n e c te d .  
What e x a c t l y  t h i s  in v o lv e s  i s  by no means c l e a r ,  bu t  a t  l e a s t  
i t  i n v o lv e s  t h a t  l i k e  cau ses  a re  fo l lo w e d  by l i k e  e v e n t s .  
"A rsen ic  cau ses  d ea th "  means ^  l e a s t  "A ll  men who have 
swallowed x  g r a i n s  of a r s e n i c ,  g r a n t e d  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  
( s t a t e  of  h e a l t h ,  e t c . ,  and absence  of c o u n t e r a c t i n g  c ircum ­
s t a n c e s ) ,  have d i e d " ,  and " I f  A, i n  s i m i l a r  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,
1
swallows X g r a i n s  of  a r s e n i c ,  ^  w i l l  d i e ." This l a t t e r  
s t a t e m e n t  i s  a p r e d i c t i o n  abou t  what w i l l  happen .  I t  i s  d e r iv e d  
from the g e n e r a l  c a u s a l  p r i n c i p l e  "same c a u se ,  same e f f e c t "  - 
bu t  what i s  meant by the  "same cau se"?  I t  was s a i d ,  i n  the
1. As I  am no t  s p e c i a l l y  concerned  w i t h  c a u s a t i o n ,  I  do no t  
go i n t o  the  q u e s t i o n  of  the  v a l i d i t y  cl  i n d u c t i o n ,  l i e i t h e r  
do I a t t e m p t  to  a m p l i fy  the  " c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s ta n c e s " ,  as  
long  as  i t  i s  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  th ey  a re  no t  l e f t  as vague as  
t h a t ,  b u t  a re  s t a t e d ,  as f a r  as  th e y  a re  known. In  t h e o r y ,  
th e y  can be e x h a u s t i v e l y  t a b u l a t e d :  w he the r  t h i s  i s  so ,  i s  
a n o th e r  q u e s t i o n .
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f i r s t  s e c t i o n  of  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  t h a t  two e v e n ts  a r e  n e v e r  ' t h e  
same’ , and t h a t  what i s  meant i s  m ere ly  t h a t  t h e i r  c o n t e n t s  
a re  the  same. The ' s a m e n e s s '  o f  ca u se s  i s  a sameness of  con­
t e n t ,  and to  t h a t  e x t e n t  c a u s a t i o n  a b s t r a c t s  from e v e n t s ;  y e t ,  
because  c o n te n t  by i t s e l f  i s  n o th in g  u n l e s s  i t  i s  the  c o n t e n t  
ol an 8V 3nt , t h i s  a b s t r a c t i o n  can n ev e r  become c o m p le te .  This 
double c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of p a r t i a l  a b s t r a c t i o n  from, and y e t  
e s s e n t i a l  r e f e r e n c e  t o ,  e v e n t s  i s  fundam en ta l  to  C a u s a l i t y .  
Hence what c a u s a l i t y  p r e d i c t s  i s  no t  a f u t u r e  e v e n t ,  bu t  t h a t  
a t  some f u t u r e  d a te  t h e r e  w i l l  be an a c t u a l i s a t i o n  of  a g iv en  
c o n t e n t .  This  d i s t i n c t i o n  may seem t r i f l i n g ,  bu t  i t  shows how 
the  p r e d i c t i o n s  of c a u s a t i o n  can be made c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  the 
commonsense d i f f e r e n c e  between the p r e s e n t  and the f u t u r e . I t  
may be h e l p f u l  to  s t a t e  the  p o s i t i o n  s im p ly  a t  f i r s t ,  and 
l a t e r  r e sh a p e  i t .  I f  my p r e d i c t i o n s  a r e  so e x h a u s t iv e  t h a t  
th e y  in c lu d e  ' t h e  event^ as  w e l l  a s  i t s  c o n t e n t ,  then  t h i s  
e v e n t  i s  i n  a l l  s t r i c t n e s s  a p r e s e n t  e v e n t ,  and the  d i s t i n c ­
t i o n  between p r e s e n t  and f u t u r e  has  v a n i s h e d .  This  I  b e l i e v e  
to  be i m p o s s i b l e .  F o r ,  however a c c u r a t e  our p r e d i c t i o n s  may 
be, th e r e  i s  a lways some t h i n g  t h a t  i s  l a c k i n g  abou t  them 
a t i n y  c o r n e r  m i s s in g ,  so to  speak ,  t h a t  i s  on ly  added wheii 
the  ev e n t  a c t u a l l y  h a p p e n s . I t  would, however, be a m is tak e  
to  take  the a n a lo g y  of a j i g s a w  to  which the  l a s t  p ie c e  i s  
added too  s e r i o u s l y ,  f o r  t h a t  would s u g g e s t ,  e r r o n e o u s ly ,
324
t h a t  ’ con ten t»  a b s t r a c t e d  from e v e n ts  i s  a s  m a t e r i a l  a s  the  
whole J ig saw  minus t h a t  one p i e f e l  Used w i th  d i s c r e t i o n ,  
though ,  the a n a lo g y  need n o t ' b e  h a r m f u l .  E x p re s se d  i n  s l i g h t l y  
more t e c h n i c a l  lan g u ag e ,  the  p o s i t i o n  I  am a d v o c a t in g  i s  t h a t  
the  ’h a p p e n in g ’ of  e v e n t s  i s  u l t i m a t e ,  i n d e f i n a b l e ,  and un­
p r e d i c t a b l e ,  though ’ t h a t  3 w i l l  h ap p en ’ can i n  some c a s e s  be 
r e n d e re d  v e ry  h i g h l y  p r o b a b l e .  This  i s  m ere ly  a r e s t a t e m e n t  
of  a v e r y  f a m i l i a r  p o s i t i o n .  On the  one hand, ’ don’ t  count  
your  ch ick e n s  b e fo re  th ey  a re  h a t c h e d ’ , and ’ t h e r e ’ s many a 
s l i p  ’ t w ix t  cup and l i p * ,  a r e  the  p l a i n  man’ s way of e x p r e s s ­
in g ,  i n  a c o n s i d e r a b l y  l e s s  roundabout  manner th an  the  p h i l o ­
s o p h e r ,  the  i n s e c u r i t y  and u n c e r t a i n t y  of  the f u t u r e .  On the  
o t h e r  hand ,  i t  would be f o o l i s h  to  deny the  * c o n n e c t e d n e s s ’ 
of h a p p e n in g s ,  and t h a t  c e r t a i n  happen ings  te n d  to  be fo l lo w e d  
or  accompanied by c e r t a i n  o t h e r s ,  so t h a t  from one we a re  l e d  
to  e x p e c t ,  n o t  a l t o g e t h e r  i r r a t i o n a l l y , o t h e r s .  To deny t h a t  
e v e n ts  a re  p r e d i c t a b l e  w i th  c e r t a i n t y  i s  n o t  uo deny a l l  con­
n e c t e d n e s s .  A v e ry  s im ple  example can be ta k e n  to  show t h a t  
the  two a s p e c t s  a re  c o n s i s t e n t .  A c h i l d  k n i t s  a s c a r f ,  which 
she g iv e s  as  a b i r t h d a y  p r e s e n t  to  h e r  b r o t h e r .  I t  i s  s u f ­
f i c i e n t l y  obv ious  t h a t  the  s c a r f  co u ld  no t  have been g iv en  
on the  b i r t h d a y  had no t  i t s  appearance  been p ro v id e d  f o r  by 
som eth ing  t h a t  took  p la c e  b e fo re  the b i r t h d a y  -  the  a c t  of  
k n i t t i n g  the  s c a r f .  U n less  the  s c a r f  had been k n i t t e d ,  i t
1 .  Th is  i s ,  of c o u r s e ,  a minimum s t a t e m e n t .
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c o u ld  n o t  be g iv e n  as  a p r e s e n t ,  and i n  k n i t t i n g  i t ,  the  
c h i l d  was making i t  i n c r e a s i n g l y  p ro b a b le  t h a t  i t  would be 
g i v e n .  But a t  no time p r e v io u s  to  the a c t u a l  happen ing  og the 
e v e n t  * c h i l d  g i v i n g  s c a r f  to  b r o t h e r ’ cou ld  anyone be su re  
i t  would happen .  U n t i l  i t  was i i n i s h e d ,  t h e r e  was always the 
p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  i t  would neve r  be done i n  t im e ,  t h a t  the  
wool m ight be im p o s s ib le  to  match , t h a t  she would be i l l ,  and 
so on. Dvan when f i n i s h e d  i t  might be l o s t ,  or  mauled by the 
k i t t e n ,  or  a c c i d e n t a l l y  unwound, or the b r o t h e r  might d i e ,  or  
d i s a p p e a r ,  o r  q u a r r e l  w i th  h i s  f a m i l y .
The p r e s e n t  makes the  f u t u r e  : does i t  a l s o  en su re  
i t ?  That i s  the  c r u c i a l  q u e s t i o n .  A b e t t e r  mode of e x p r e s s io n  
would be ,  p e r h a p s ,  t h a t  e v e n ts  a r e  a d m i t t e d l y  to  a c e r t a i n  
e x t e n t  (w he ther  w h o l ly ,  i s  a n o t h e r  m a t t e r )  d e te rm in ed  by e a r l i e r  
e v e n t s ,  and t h a t  we u n q u e s t i o n a b l y  b e l i e v e  t h a t  e v e n t s ,  which 
as  y e t  a re  f u t u r e ,  w i l l  when th e y  happen a l s o  be c o h e re n t  w i th  
t h e i r  p r e d e c e s s o r s . The second  h a l f  o f  the  q u e s t i o n  th en  be­
com es:-  1)0 p r e s e n t  e v e n ts  en su re  f u t u r e  ones? l i  the  n o t io n  of 
c a u s a l i t y  i s  ta k e n  a t  a l l  s e r i o u s l y ,  i t  i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  i n  one 
sense  the  answer i s  "Yes": I  want to  show t h a t  i n  a n o t h e r ,  no
l e s s  l e g i t i m a t e  s e n s e ,  t h e  answer i s  "Uo".
In  the  s c a r f  example,  i t  w i l l  soon be o b j e c t e d  t h a t
i f  the  p r e s e n t  i s  n o t  g iv e n  - t h a t  i s ,  i i  the  ex p e c te d  C i s  
n ev e r  a c t u a l i s e d  -  i t  i s  no t  because t h e r e  i s  r e a l  d i s c o n t i n -  
u i t y  between p r e s e n t  and f u t u r e ,  bu t  because between ( the
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e v e n t  of  f i n i s h i n g  the  s c a r f ,  which makes i t s  p r e s e n t a t i o n  
h i g n l y  p ro b a b le )  and ( tha e v e n t  of  g i v i n g  the  b r o t h e r  a
sgjpething e l s e  has  o c c u r r e d ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  the  a c c i d e n t  
a l  b u rn in g  of  the  s c a r f . Looking back on the  sequence of 
e v e n t s ,  the  d e t e r i n i n i s t  co u ld  e x h i b i t  them as  b e lo n g in g  to  
n e a t  c a u s a l  s e r i e s :  and he would f i n d  no d i s c o n t i n u i t y  o f  any 
k i n d .  But t h i s  i s  no t  an o b j e c t i o n  to  the  view he re  p u t  f o r ­
ward ,  and the whole argument can be g r a n te d ,  q u i t e  c o n s i s t e n t ­
l y .  I t  may be f u r t h e r  u rg e d ,  however, t h a t  w i th  complete  de­
te rm in ism  i t  i s  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e ,  a t  the  time of 3^,  to  
see t h a t  3 g ( th a  b u rn in g  of the  s c a r f )  i s  ’ going to  h ap p e n ’ . 
But t h i s  i s  e x a c t l y  on a l l  f o u r s  w i th  s a y in g  t h a t  the  g iv in g  
of  th e  s c a r f  ’w i l l  h ap p en ’ : and by t h a t  I  do no t  m ere ly  mean 
t h a t  f u r t h e r  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  such asc removing the  s c a r f  from
d an g e r ,  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  bu t  t h a t  no p r e d i c t i o n  i s  c e r t a i n  u n t i l
2
i t  i s  a c t u a l i s e d .  I f  you p r e f e r  to  add, "because som eth ing  
m ight happen to  s to p  i t " ,  you may -  bu t  you w i l l  l a y  y o u r s e l f  
open to  r e f u t a t i o n  by the  advoca te  of  eomplete  d e te rm in ism ,  
b e s i d e s  m is s in g  what seems to  me the  more e s s e n t i a l  p o i n t ,  o f
1. I t  m ight be d i f f i c u l t ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  to  show the book 
was chosen a t  one shop r a t h e r  th a n  a n o t h e r ,  and the  de- 
t e r m i n i s t  u s u a l l y  c o n t e n t s  h im s e l f  w i th  sayj.ng, " I ^  
knew a l l  the  c i r c u m s ta n c e s ,  we co u ld  e x h i b i t  e v e r y t h in g  
as  d e te rm in e d " ,  w i th o u t  c la im in g  t h a t  he doe^ know a l l  
the  c i r c u m s ta n c e s
2 .  Compare "Space ,  Time, and D e i t y " ,  i i ,  327 -8 .
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the  f u n d a m e n ta l i t y  of the happen ing  of  e v e n t s .  ( In  a d d i t i o n ,  
i t  i s  no lo n g e r  n e c e s s a r y  to  deba te  the q u e s t i o n  of  complete  
o r  p a r t i a l  d e te rm in ism ,  s in c e  i n  any case t h e r e  i s  no de- 
termir^gj]^ e x c e p t  i n  a b s t r a c t i o n  from the tem p ora l  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c s  of e v e n t s . )  The p r e s e n t  may be e n s u re d  by the  p a s t :  
p e r h a p s ,  i f  t h i s  h e ld  good on many o c c a s io n s ,  we sh o u ld ,  by 
i n d u c t i o n ,  t h i n k  i t  p ro b a b le  t h a t  what i s  now f u t u r e ,  when i t
becomes p r e s e t ,  w i l l  l i k e w is e  be e n s u re d  by i t s  p a s t ,  our 
1
p r e s e n t .  But t h e r e  can be no p re su m p t io n  from t h a t  to  the  
d i f f e r e n t  s t a t e m e n t : -  "While i t  i s  s t i l l  f u t u r e ,  i t  i s  en ­
s u re d  by the  p r e s e n t " ,  w i th o u t  com m itt ing  the  f a l l a c y ,  r i g h t l y  
ce n su re d  by Bergson, of c o n fu s in g  time p a s s i n g  w i th  time 
p a s s e d .  The p r e s e n t  may be,  as  th e  de t e r m i n i s t s  a s s e r t ,  the  
making of the  f u t u r e :  i t  i s  never  the f u t u r e  as  made.
C a u s a l i t y ,  howeyer, i s  based  on i n d u c t i o n ,  and the 
l o g i c a l  v a l i d i t y  of t h i s  p ro c e s s  i s  v e ry  o f t e n  impugned. (The 
same t h i n g  i s  t r u e  of s t a t i s t i c a l  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , to  which 
the  remarks above a l s o  a p p ly . )  I t  may be s a i d  t h a t  the  u n c e r ­
t a i n t y  of i t s  p r e d i c t i o n s  i s  to  be e x p l a i n e d  i n  terms of  t h i s  
i m p e r f e c t  l o g i c a l  p r o c e s s  r a t h e r  th a n  in  terms of  i t s
1 .  "B nsur3d" i s  u s e d ,  i n t e n t i o n a l l y , n o n -c o m m it^ l ly . In  
p a s s i n g ,  i t  may be remarked t h a t  the  c o n ju n c t io n  ol 
’ t h i n k  i t  p r o b a b l e ’ and ’w i l l ’ i s  p e rh aps  i n t e r e s t i n g .
See the  remarks made on p r e d i c t i o n  by L a i r d  i n  C h a p . I I I  
o f  h i s  "S tudy  i n  R e a l i s m " .
328
r e f e r e n c e  to  e v e n t s .  The s i m p le s t  and most r e l e v a n t  way to  
d i s c o v e r  w he the r  t h i s  i s  so i s  no t  to  embark on a d i s c u s s i o n  
o j  i n d u c t i o n ,  bu t  to  r e i e r  to  p r e d i c t i o n s  i n  which the i n f e r ­
ences  a re  l o g i c a l l y  u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e . examples of th e s e  a re  
t r a i n s  ol m a th e m a t ic a l  r e a s o n i n g ,  s imple no l e s s  th an  complex 
o n es .  Given t h a t  the  s i d e s  AB and AC of a t r i a n g l e  a re  e § u a l ,
^^ ows t h a t  the  a n g le s  ABC and ACB a re  a l s o  e q u a l ,  and
1
t h i s  can be s t r i c t l y  d e m o n s t r a te d .  What i s  meant by ’ fo l lo w s ^ ?  
I t  i s  above a l l  im p o r ta n t  to  see t h a t  t h i s  i s  a  l o g i c a l ,  no t  
a t e m p o r a l , ’ f o l l o w s ’ , and t h a t  the  n o t i o n  i s  t h a t  o f  e n t a i l -  
ment,  n o t  of s e q u e n c e .  T rue ,  s in c e  we are c r e a t u r e s  of  t im e ,  
the  d e m o n s t r a t io n  i s  worked out  in  time by the  schoo lboy  (and 
so becomes s u b j e c t  to  "The thousand  n a t u r a l  shocks That f l e s h  
i s  h e i r  t o " ’. ) ,  bu t  the  r e a s o n in g  i t s e l f  i s  c o m p le te ly  l o g i c a l . 
S t r i c t l y ,  i t  i s  nonsense to  say  t h a t  the end of the  demon­
s t r a t i o n  i s  ’ f u t u r e ’ to  the  b e g in n in g ,  and i t  on ly  g a in s  a 
meaning i n  r e f e r e n c e  to  the  boy whose working th ro u g h  i t  
’ t a k e s  t i m e ’ . I n  o t h e r  w ords ,  u n l i k e  c a u s a l i t y ,  t h e r e  i s  no 
e s s e n t i a l  r e f e r e n c e  to  e v e n t s  i n  the  i n f e r e n c e s  th e m s e lv e s ,
and th e r e  i s  no u n c e r t a i n t y .
M ath em at ica l  and l o g i c a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  t h e n ,  have no 
p a s t ,  p r e s e n t ,  and f u t u r e ,  and c o n s e q u e n t ly ,  t h e r e  i s  no 
’ p r e d i c t i o n ’ i n  the l i t e r a l  meaning of the  word. But,  i t  w i l l  
be s a i d ,  th e y  have a l o g i c a l  o rd e r  of p re c e d e n c e :  cannot we
1. G ran ted  c e r t a i n  p o s t u l a t e s ,  which do no t  a f f e c t  the  
argument h e r e .
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say  t h a t  one s ta g e  i n  the  argument i s  ’ b e f o r e ' a n o th e r  s t a g e ?  
In  a s e n s e ,  yes  -  but t h a t  i s  i n  i t s  e x p o s i t i o n  by u s .  The 
e a s i e s t  way to  see t h a t  geom etry  - and s t i l l  more, a l g e b r a  - 
i s  no t  a  m a t t e r  o f  l i n e a r  i n f e r e n c e  i s  no t  to  t h i n k  o f  ' s t e p s '  
i n  the  ' p r o c e s s '  (b o th  q u e s t i o n - b e g g i n g  term s) but to  c o n s id e r  
d a t a  and c o n c lu s i o n .  S ince  geom etry  i s  man-made, which b r i n g s  
i n  o t h e r ,  p r o p e r l y  n o n -m a th e m a t i c a l , f a c t o r s ,  we may l e a r n  
more th an  we knew a t  the  b e g in n in g .  That i s  n o t  the  p o i n t . The 
p o i n t  i s ,  t h a t  the  a n g le s  ABC and ACB have been e q u a l  ’ a l l  the 
t i m e ’ , as w e l l  as the l i n e s  AB and AC. They have undergone no 
change d u r in g  the  p ro c e s s  which i s  our p e r c e p t i o n  of t h e i r  
e q u a l i t y .  I f  we must use tem p o ra l  language to  e x p re s s  non­
tem po ra l  n o t i o n s ,  r a t h e r  th a n  say  t h a t  the  e q u a l i t y  of s i d e s  
"comes b e f o re "  the  e q u a l i t y  of a n g l e s ,  l e t  us  say  t h a t  b o th  
a re  con tem poraneous .  That d i s p o s e s  of  the o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  any r e a l  l o g i c a l  p r e c e d e n c e .  There i s  no p recedence  i n  l o g i c  
i f  t h e r e  i s  ’more i n ’ the  c o n c lu s io n  th a n  in  the p r e m is e s ,  i t  
i s  no t  c o m p le te ly  l o g i c a l ,  f o r ,  as R u s s e l l  p u t s  i t ,  l o g i c  and 
m athem at ics  a r e  t a u t o l o g i e s .  A b e t t e r  way ol e x p r e s s in g  the  
p o i n t  th a n  by s a y in g  t h a t  the  e q u a l i t y  of AB and AC and the  
e q u a l i t y  of ABC and ACB a re  contem poraneous ,  i s  to  say  t h a t  
th e y  h o ld  good t o g e t h e r .  This  i s  e v i d e n t  i n  the  example g iv o n ;  
i t  i s  n o t  so e v i d e n t  i n  more c o m p l ic a te d  exam ples ,  ( such  as 
t h a t [ - ! g  +  3% t  -f-^aa5--iq5jT l(-0 +  S’ %-fâj e q u a l s  i f h .  ) 
the  ' i n t e r v e n i n g ' ' s t a g e s '  have been worked o u t .  But ' e v i d e n c e '
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i s  n o t  a m a t t e r  of  l o g i c  but of  p sy c h o lo g y .
How comes the  q u e s t i o n  of the  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  a l l  
t h i s ,  and of the  r e s u l t  i n  ev e ry d ay  l i f e  of  the  a p p l i c a t i o n  to  
i t  of s e t s  of i n f e r e n c e s  t h a t  a re  co m p le te ly  l o g i c a l  and, 
h en ce ,  c e r t a i n .
A t r a i n  l e a v e s  M f o r  0, 225 m i le s  d i s t a n t . U n t i l  i t
r e a c h e s  H, 195 m i le s  from M, i t  t r a v e l s  a t  60 r a . p .h . ,  bu t
a f t e r w a r d s  i t  slows down to  40 m .p .h .  I t  s to p s  a t  H, and two
s t a t i o n s  b e fo re  i t ,  f o r  t e n  m inu te s  a t  e a ch ;  a f t e r  l e a v i n g  ÎJ
i t  s t o p s  f i v e  more t im es  f o r  f i v e  m inu te s  e a c h .  How long  does
i t  t ak e  the t r a i n  to  go from M to  0? -  As f a r  a s  the  f i g u r e s
a re  co n ce rn ed ,  the  answer i s ,  so to  speak ,  c o n ta in e d  i n  them-
Jhs e l v e s ,  and a l l  we have to  do, i t  seems, i s  to  c a l l  the  4 r c T  
’h o u r s ’ , and th e r e  we have a c e r t a i n  p r e d i c t i o n .  But no t  so 
f a s t .  I s  i t  e q u a l l y  c e r t a i n  t h a t  the  f i g u r e s  ap p ly  to  the  
a c t u a l  ru n n in g  t im es  of the  t r a i n ?  U nless  t h a t  can be e s t a b l i s h ­
ed we have no r i g h t  to  c la im  t h a t  the  p r e d i c t i o n  i s  c e r t a i n .  
T rue ,  i t  would be a genuine  p r e d i c t i o n ,  i f  j u s t i f i e d ,  which the  
mere cy p h e r in g  of + . . . . )  to  4 ]£  n ev e r  would b e .  But
ife j u s t i f i e d ?  I  s u g g e s t  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t ,  and t h a t  once the 
r e s u l t s  of m a them at ics  a re  a p p l i e d  to  e v e n ts  i n  t im e ,  th e y  a re  
i n  the  same p o s i t i o n  as  c a u s a l  o r  s t a t i s t i c a l  p r e d i c t i o n s ,  and 
l i a b l e  to  be u p s e t .  I f  i t  be s a i d ,  ’’The t r a i n  was seVen m in u te s  
l a t e  to d a y ,  I  a d m i t .  But th r e e  m inu te s  were l o s t  because of a 
s i g n a l  check ,  we had to  w a i t  s i x  m inu tes  a t  11 f o r  the  t r a i n
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from the w e s t ,  which was d e la y e d  by fo g ,  and made up time by 
o n ly  s t a y i n g  f o u r  m inu tes  a t  B- and Q i n s t e a d  of  f i v e " ,  the 
answer i s  the  same as to  the  c o r re s p o n d in g  o b j e c t i o n  of  the  
complete de t e r m in i  s t . "Tou cannot  t e l l  what w i l l  happen u n t i l  
i t  h ap p e n s ."
The u n c e r t a i n t y  i s  n o t , however, i n  the  c a l c u l a t i o n s  
th e m s e lv e s ,  bu t  i n  the e x a c tn e s s  of  t h e i r  a p p l i c a t i o n  to  e v e n t s .  
I t  may be o b j e c t e d  t h a t  the c o n t i n u a l  im p l ie d  d i s t i n c t i o n  be­
tween m athem atics  as i t  i s  and our use of i t  i s  u n w a r ra n te d :  
the most e f f e c t i v e  r e p l y  to  t h i s  i s  to  a sk  what th e n  i s  meant 
when we say  t h a t  somebody’ s c a l c u l a t i o n  i s  ’w rong’ ’.
There a r e ,  t h e n ,  two d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  e lem en ts  i n ­
v o lv ed  when we say  of a t r a i n  t r a v e l l i n g  a t  60 m .p .h .  t h a t  i t  
w i l l  take  two ho u rs  to  go 120 m i l e s .  The f i r s t  i s  m a th e m a t ic a l  
and c e r t a i n :  the  second i s  the a p p l i c a t i o n  of the m a th e m a t ic a l  
r e s u l t s  to  the  c o n c re te  p o s i t i o n ,  and i t  i s  t h i s  l a s t  which 
’ i n f e c t s ’ ( i n  B r a d l e y ’ s p h ra se )  the r e s u l t a n t  p r e d i c t i o n  w i th
i t s  own u n c e r t a i n t y .
I t  i s  now p o s s i b l e  to  d e a l  w i th  the  case  of the  
e c l i p s e .  The e a r t h  i s  a body w hich  moves, w i th  v e ry  l i t t l e  
a b e r r a t i o n ,  i n  an o r b i t  whose e q u a t io n  i s  known. S i m i l a r l y  
v/i th  the  moon and su n .  The o t h e r  knov/n f a c t s  a re  t h e i r  
v e l o c i t i e s  r e l a t i v e  to  each  o t h e r .  G ran ted  t h i s  i n i o r m a t io n ,  
and g iv en  an i n i t i a l  p o s i t i o n  of the b od ies  (such as t h a t  
g a in e d  by t e l e s c o p i c  o b s e r v a t io n  of t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  r e l a t i v e l y
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to  the  f i x e d  s t a r s  on, say ,  F e b ru a ry  1 5 th ,  1831 a t  2 p . m . ) ,  i t  
i s  p o s s i b l e  to  c a l c u l a t e  ( l )  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n s  a t  any 
g iv e n  t i m e , (2) the  t im es  when th e y  w i l l  a p p e a r  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  
r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n ,  such as  sun ,  e a r t h ,  and moon in  a s t r a i g h t  
l i n e .  The second  of th e s e  i s  in v o lv e d  i n  the p r e s e n t  c a s e .  The 
s i x  t im es  g iv en  i n  the  acco u n t  (of the moon’ s e n t e r i n g  and 
l e a v i n g  the  penumbra, of the b e g in n in g  and end of t o t a l  and 
p a r t i a l  e c l i p s e ) , and the in f o r m a t io n  r e g a r d i n g  what p a r t  of 
the  e a r t h ’ s s u r f a c e  w i l l  be tu r n e d  towards the  moon ( t h a t  i s ,  
where th e  a r e a  of v i s i b i l i t y  i s )  a re  a l l  c a l c u l a b l e ,  and o n ly  
the ap pearance  i s  d e s c r i b e d  from i n d u c t i o n .  The assu m p t io n s  
upon which the  c a l c u l a t i o n s  a re  based  a r e ,  f i r s t ,  t h a t  the 
e q u a t io n s  t h a t  g iv e  the  p a th  of the bod ies  a r e  c o r r e c t ,  and 
t h a t  th e y  w i l l  n o t  v a ry  over  th e  i n t e r v a l  f o r  which the c a l c u l ­
a t i o n s  a r e  made. This  i s  an assu m p tio n  t h a t  i s  no t  m a t h e m a t i c a l , 
b u t  concerned  w i th  the a p p l i c a b i l i t y  of  m a th em a t ic s ;  i t  would 
n o t  be s e I f - d e s t r u c t i v e  to  doubt i t ,  and so t h e r e  i s  an e lem ent  
of u n c e r t a i n t y .  S econd ly ,  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  the  v a r i a b l e s  of  
the  c a l c u l a t i o n  a re  a p p l i c a b l e  to  e x p e r i e n c e ,  and i n  p a r t i c u l a r  
t h a t  the  ’ t ’ of p h y s i c s  can be i n t e r p r e t e d  w i th o u t  comment as
’ t i m e • ’
• v _ . ,
1. Compare J u l e s  V ern e ’ s s t o r y  of th e  de tachm ent of p a r t  ol 
the  e a r t h ,  and i t s  p r o j e c t i o n  th ro u g h  s p a c e .  The mathe­
m a t i c i a n  on the  f rag m en t  a s c e r t a i n e d  t h a t  i t s  p a t h  was 
e l l i p t i c ,  and p r e d i c t e d  i t s  r e t u r n  to  the  e a r t h .
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E s s e n t i a l l y ,  the p ro c ed u re  ta k e n  i s  one of  a b s t r a c t*  
in g  from e v e n t s ,  m a n ip u la t in g  m a th e m a t ic a l  e x p r e s s i o n s  ( i n  
w hich ,  remember, t h e r e  i s  no p a s t  and no f u t u r e  and ’p r e d i c t ­
a b i l i t y ’ , i n  any p ro p e r  sense  of the word, v a n i s h e s )  u n t i l  a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y  one a p p e a r s ,  and f i n a l l y  r e i n t e r p r e t i n g  i n  terms 
of  e v e n t s .  And w i th  t h i s  r e i n t e r p r e t i n g ,  the  c o n t in g e n c y ,  
which i s ,  e s s e n t i a l l y ,  the  e x p r e s s i o n  of the d i f f e r e n c e  be­
tween an e v e n t  as  t a l k e d  a b o u t ,  e x p e c te d ,  hoped f o r ,  w i l l e d ,  
and the  e v e n t  as  h a p p e n in g , r e a p p e a r s .  U nless  you a re  p r e ­
p a re d  to  adm it  the co n t in g e n c y  of  the f u t u r e  i n  t h i s  p r e c i s e  
sense  - t h a t  i t  i s  fu n d a m e n ta l ly  d i f f e r e n t  from the  p r e s e n t  
i n  t h a t  i t  has no t  happened - you w i l l  f i n d  i t  exjbremely d i f ­
f i c u l t  to  e x p l a i n  what you mean by sa y in g  t h a t  the e v e n t  you 
p r e d i c t  i s  f u t u r e ,  s in c e  t h e r e  w i l l  be ,  to  a l l  i n t e n t s  and 
p u r p o s e s ,  no d i f f e r e n c e  between the  e v e n t  as  you p r e d i c t  i t  
now and as  i t  happens in  the  f u t u r e . P r e d i c t i o n s  approx im ate  
to  c e r t a i n t y :  but when th ey  re a c h  i t  th e y  cease  to  be p r e d i c ­
t i o n s ,  bu t  a re  the  r e a l i s a t i o n .
I t  rem ains  now to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between the  v a r io u s
c o n t e x t s  i n  which the  word ’p r e d i c t i o n ’ has  been u sed -
; I n  the  f i r s t  p l a c e , , a s  has  a l r e a d y  been s a i d ,  mere 
g u e s s in g  must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from p r e d i c t i o n  p r o p e r .
1 .  "The n o t io n  of p e r f e c t  p r e d i c t i o n  i s  s e l f - c o n y a d i  c t o r y . . .
"M onis t" ,  1927, p . 526.)
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S eco nd ly ,  i t  i s  j u s t  as  im p o r ta n t  t h a t  we sh o u ld  not  f a l l  
i n t o  the o p p o s i t e  e r r o r  of c o n fu s in g  what I  p ropose  to  c a l l  
^ . i n t e l l e c t u a l  f o r e s i g h t "  w i th  p r e d i c t i o n .  L a s t l y ,  the  r e l a t i o n  
between p r e d i c t i o n  and c e r t a i n t y  must be d i s c u s s e d .
There i s  a type of  f o r e s i g h t  which i t  would be a 
m is ta k e  to  c a l l  p r e d i c t i o n  - u n l e s s  ’p r e d i c t i o n ’ were be ing  
u sed  in  a wide s e n s e .  Two men, A and B, a re  p l a y i n g  c h e s s .  At 
any moment, A p e r c e i v e s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  co m bin a t io ns  of  moves a re  
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e .  By one of t h e s e ,  he cou ld  mate B i n  
th r e e  moves -  bu t  on ly  i f  B met him ha lfw ay  by making f a n t a s t i c  
a l l y  bad moves. He does not  s e r i o u s l y  c o n s id e r  i t  as  a p o s s i ­
b i l i t y ,  and i t  would be v e ry  u n n a t u r a l  to  say  t h a t  h i s  p u r e l y  
i n t e l l e c t u a l  f o r e s i g h t  of t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  e n d - s i t u a t i o n  was a 
p r e d i c t i o n .  Hot m e re ly ,  i t  sh o u ld  be n o te d ,  because of i t s  
i m p r o b a b i l i t y , bu t  because the  mere s e e in g  of  s i t u a t i o n  H as 
d e d u c ib le  from s i t u a t i o n  K ( i n  acco rdance  w i th  the  r u l e s  
d e te r m in in g  the  game of chess)  i s  i n  i t s  e ssen ce  l o g i c a l  and 
h a s ,  as  i t  s t a n d s ,  no r e f e r e n c e  to  the  f u t u r e .  Suppose now 
t h a t  s i t u a t i o n  S ( a n o th e r  m a t ing  p o s i t i o n )  i s  a l s o  d e d u c ib le  
from K, and has  the  advan tage  t h a t  i t  does not  p o s t u l a t e  s e l f -  
im m ola t ion  on B 's  p a r t ,  A may dec ide  to  t r y  to  b r in g  i t  a b o u t .  
He i s  th e n  r e g a r d i n g  S ,  no t  m ere ly  c o n t e m p l a t i v e l y ,  bu t  a s  a 
g o a l ,  and to  i t s  r e a l i s a t i o n  he sefis h i m s e l f .
P r e d i c t i o n ,  t h e n ,  i s  d i s t i n c t  b o th  from g u e s s in g  and  
from p u r e l y  i n t e l l e c t u a l  c o n te m p la t io n :  from the lo rm e r .
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because i t  ô la im s c e r t a i n t y ,  from the l a t t e r ,  because i t  
e s s e n t i a l l y  r e f e r s  to  f u t u r e  a c t u a l i s a t i o n s  and no t  m ere ly  to  
l o g i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  I t  may be s a i d  t h a t  many p r e d i c t i o n s  
do n o t  c la im  c e r t a i n t y .  Th is  i s ,  of c o u r s e ,  to  some e x t e n t  a 
m a t t e r  o f  words:  bu t  i t  i s  a d v i s a b l *  to  keep to  the  s t r i c t e r  
u s e .  A d m i t te d ly ,  i n  o r d i n a r y  lan g u ag e ,  ' p r e d i c t i o n '  i s  u sed  
b o th  f o r  more or l e s s  p ro b a b le  f o r e c a s t s ,  and f o r  c la im s  o f  
c e r t a i n t y ,  bu t  t h i s  p r a c t i c e  i s  no t  to  be recommended. And, of 
the two a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  the  l a t t e r  i s  th e  i n t e r e s t i n g  one, f o r  
the  fo rm er  r a i s e s  no s p e c i a l  p h i l o s o p h ic  p ro b lem s .  G ran ted ,  
t h e n ,  t h a t  p r e d i c t i o n s ,  s t r i c t l y  s o - c a l l e d ,  a re  c e r t a i n ,  can 
t h e r e  be any p r e d i c t i o n s ?  I  t h i n k  t h a t  the  answer i s  Ho, and 
the  r e a s o n  i s  t h a t  p r e d i c t i o n  a t t e m p t s  to  r e c o n c i l e  two i n ­
com p a t ib le  n o t i o n s ,  the  n o t i o n  of  c e r t a i n t y ,  and the  n o t io n  
of  h appen ings  i n  t i m e . A^^ast i l l u s t r a t i o n  from c h e s s .  Mate i s  
i n e v i t a b l e  i n  t h r e e  moves, tho se  which B makes be ing  f o r c e d  
each  t im e .  I s  i t  no t  c e r t a i n  t h a t  B w i l l  be mated? The m at ing  
p o s i t i o n  can be deduced from the  p o s i t i o n  of th e  p i e c e s  on the  
b o a rd ,  and the  p rob lem  becomes a k in  to  one of m a them at ic s :  
t h e r e  i s  no lo o p h o le  anyw here . Beginning  and end a re  compacted 
t o g e t h e r .  But i n  the a c t u a l  p l a y i n g  o u t  of the  end th e y  a re
1 . There i s  a w id e s p re a d  view t h a t  the  f u t u r e  i s  the  t o t a l  o f  
a l l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  one of  which i s  to  be a c t u a l i s e d .  T h i i
which imputes  p rem a tu re  c o n c lu s io n s  on t h i s  fundam^n a 
q u e s t i o n  of the  s t a t u s  of  the  f u t u r e .
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s p re a d  ou t  i n  t im e :  they  become e v e n t s ,  s e p a r a t e d  "by a f i n i t e  
d u r a t i o n .  And i n  t h a t  f i n i t e  d u r a t i o n  the  un ex p e c ted  might 
happen - A m ight  lo s e  h i s  head ,  o r  a v e ry  u rg e n t  v i s i t o r  m igh t  
a r r i v e ,  or. a c a r e l e s s  movement might u p s e t  the  t a b l e ,  o r  some­
body might have a h e a r t  a t t a c k  -  and the  m at ing  of  B by A would 
n o t  o c c u r .  However u n l i k e l y ,  i s  no t  the  p o i n t :  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e . 
An e lem en t  of  u n c e r t a i n t y  has  e n t e r e d  i n  w i th  th e  s p r e a d in g  
o u t  of b eg in n in g  and end i n  t im e .  L o g i c a l l y ,  the  end i s  g iv e n  
i n  the  b e g in n in g ,  bu t  t h i s  i s  n ev e r  so i n  t i m e , u n l e s s  the  
’h a p p e n in g ’ of e v e n t s  i s  deg raded  to  n o t h i n g n e s s .  The c e r t a i n t y  
of  l o g i c a l  and m a th e m a t ic a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  canno t  s u rv iv e  t h e i r  
a p p l i c a t i o n  to  e v e n t s ,  and p r e d i c t i o n  must be r e j e c t e d  as  im­
p o s s i b l e  .
I t  canno t  but be e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h i s  c h a p te r  can have 
no cogency to  one who r e j e c t s  the  a s su m p t io n s  and u n s u p p o r te d  
a s s e r t i o n s  on which i t  i s  b a s e d .  Where fundam en ta l  m e ta p h y s ic a l  
d i f f e r e n c e s  a re  r e a c h e d ,  no f u r t h e r  argument i s  p o s s i b l e .  Cer­
t a i n  a s s e r t i o n s ,  however, need to  be f u r t h e r  a m p l i f i e d ,  and so 
the  f o l l o w in g  c h a p t e r s  w i l l  be tak en  up w i th  an a t t e m p t  to  
a n a ly s e  what i s  meant by the  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  and the  ’ becoming’
o f  t i m e .
337
CHAPTER XJRRii;V3RSIBILITY.
Tha conscious devisers of paradoxes can f ind  l i t t l e  
tha t  i s  more amusing to them than the denial of the i r r e v e r s ­
i b i l i t y  of time; so strongly is  i t  im p l ic i t ly  affirmed by 
common sense. Time i s  ' the  s u b t (^  th ie f  of youth' , and i t s
. . .  'moving f inger  w rites ,  and having w ri t .
Moves on: nor a l l  you P ie ty  nor Wit 
Shall lure i t  back to cancel ha lf  a l ine 
Ror a l l  your tea rs  wash out a word of i t . '
In more homely language, the p la in  man subscribes unhesita t-  
ingly to the view of time as an ev e r - rô l l in g  stream bearing 
i t s  sons always in one d i rec t io n .
Nevertheless, in  sp ite  of, or because of, the easy 
obviousness of the i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  of time in experience, i t s  
denial,  a t  l e a s t  a s 'an  in te re s t in g  hypothesis, has had a 
ce r ta in  a t t r a c t io n  to many. Thus in physics we hear of speeds 
g rea te r  than l ig h t  as leading to a reversa l  in the order of 
events: the notion of e te rn i ty  owes par t  of i t s  a t t rac t iv en ess  
to the escape i t  o ffers  from the f lux  of time: and the success 
of the p la in  man in repair ing  a blunder, so tha t  i t  i s  as i f ,  
to commonsense a t  l e a s t ,  i t  had never been, makes i t  seem 
tha t  some actions can be reversed, and tha t  "what's done can 
not be undone" i s  f a l s e . All these tendencies have had re ­
percussions in philosophy, and have given r ise  to recognis- 
ably d i s t in c t  methods of denying the i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  of time.
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F i r s t ,  th o se  who emphasize the  n o t i o n  of  e t e r n i t y .  
They a r e  co n c e rn ed ,  n o t  so much to  deny t h a t  t ime i s  i r r e v e r s ­
i b l e  - i n d e e d ,  t h e y  o f t e n  emphasize t h i s  i m p e r f e c t l y  l o g i c a l  
c h a r a c t e r  i n  o r d e r  to  throw douo ts  upon the  c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  
tha  n o t i o n  of  t ime - a s  to  h o ld  t h a t  e t e r n i t y  i s  the  t r u e  
r e a l i t y ,  and t h a t  t i m e , even i f  i t  i s  n o t  u n r e a l ,  i s  a t  b e s t  
d e f e c t i v e  i n  th e  view of  r e a l i t y  t h a t  i t  g i v e s .  Hence i r r e v e r s ­
i b i l i t y ,  which i s  a t em p o ra l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ,  i s  s l i g h t e d ;  
though i t  i s  n o t  d e n ie d  to  a p p ly  to  t im e ,  i t  i s  d e n ie d  to  
have any u l t i m a t e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  i n  a  w o r ld  where on ly  the  
e t e r n a l  i s  t r u l y  r e a l .  But s i n c e  we have n o t  a t  p&esent to  
d ec id e  w h e th e r  time i s  ’u n r e a l ’ , b u t  a r e  concerned  on ly  w i th  
the  q u e s t i o n  w he th e r  the  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  commonly a t t r i b u t e d  
to  time i s  r i g h t l y  so a t t r i b u t e d  (a  q u e s t i o n  which i d e a l i s t s  
r a r e l y  r a i s e ) , i t s  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  can be d e f e r r e d .
P h y s i c i s t s  th em se lv es  a r e  n o t  as  a  r u l e  co ncerned  
to  make d e f i n i t e  pronouncem ents  r e g a r d i n g  th e  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  
o f  t i m e . T h e i r  s t a t e m e n t s  a re  u s u a l l y  i n  the  form of  an " i f  
t h e n " ,  w i th o u t  i n q u i r i n g  too  c l o s e l y  w h e th e r  th e  h y p o t h e s i s  
does i n  f a c t  h o l d .  I t  i s  one t h in g  to  s a y  t h a t  i f  a  man a t ­
t a i n e d  a v e l o c i t y  g r e a t e r  th a n  t h a t  o f  l i g h t ,  he would see 
e v e n t s  i n  r e v e r s e  o r d e r ;  i t  i s  q u i t e  a n o th e r  to  a s s e r t  t h a t  
such  r e v e r s i b i l i t y  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  and to  do them j u s t i c e ,  
p h y s i c i s t s  have u s u a l l y  a v o id e d  t h i s  f u r t h e r  s t a t e m e n t .
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Unwary p h i l o s o p h i s i n g  from th e  r e s u l t s  o f  p h y s i c s  *s to  be 
blamed f o r  the  w o rs t  e x c e s s e s  i n  t h i s  d i r e c t i o n .  What p h y s i c s  
p ro v e s  i s  n o t  t h a t  th e  o r d e r  o f  e v e n ts  i s  r e v e r s i b l e ,  bu t  
t h a t  under  c e r t a i n  c i r c u m s ta n c e s  i t  would be ,  f o r  a  g iv en  ob- 
s e r v e r .  But I t  a f f o r d s  n o t  th e  s l i g h t e s t  hope t h a t  th e s e  c i r ­
cum stances  a r e  r e a l i s e d ,  and i n  so f a r  as  p h y s i c s  i s  d e f i n i t e  
on t h i s  p o i n t ,  t h e r e  would seem to  be a p re su m p t io n  a g a i n s t  
t h e i r  r e a l i s a t i o n ,  a s  b e ing  c o n t r a r y  to  i t s  p r im ary  assu m p t io n s  
regg ,rd ing  l i g h t .  Th is  p o i n t  w i l l  be r e t u r n e d  to  a f t e r  th e  
’p a r a d o x ’ has  been summarised.
F iv e  e v e n t s ,  A ,B,C,D,3 ’happen* on the  e a r t h  a t  
r e g u l a r  i n t e r v a l s  o f  ane  m in u te .  Im m ed ia te ly  C o c c u r s ,  a 
t r a v e l l e r  X l e a v e s  the  e a r t h  a t  a  h ig h  speed  which i s  y e t  l e s s  
th a n  t h a t  o f  l i g h t .  He s e e s  D, n o t  a t  the  end of a  m in u te ,  
b u t  a f t e r  a  ( v e ry  s l i g h t l y )  lo n g e r  i n t e r v a l ;  a f t e r  double 
t h a t  i n t e r v a l ,  he s e e s  3 .  Compared w i th  the g raph  t h a t  Y 
( s t a t i o n a r y  on the  e a r t h )  makes, X’s i s  d i f f e r e n t ,  though 
s i m i l a r ,  w i t h  the  i n t e r v a l  between C and D, and D and 3 1+m 
m in u te s  (where m depends on X’ s speed) i n s t e a d  of  1 m in u te .
The second case  i s  where X’ s speed  i s  th e  speed  of  l i g h t ;  
c o n s e q u e n t ly  h^ s e e s  C a l l  th e  t im e .  The t h i r d  case i s  where 
X’ s sp eed  i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  l i g h t :  l e a v i n g  the  e a r t h  as  C happens  
he q u i c k l y  o u t s t r i p s  the  r a y s  of  l i g h t  from C, and where he i s  
C h as  ’ no t  y e t  h ap p e n ed ’ . I f  he i s  t r a v e l l i n g  f a s t  enough, he
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may see  B, and th e n ,  o u t s t r i p p i n g  t h a t ,  see A. The f o u r  
g ra p h s  of  X and Y can q u i c k l y  be compared.
4  Ç G D ^  Y 's  g r a p h .
^ g r a p h s .  Casa I .
4  9 S C " " Case I I .
?  S " " Case I I I .
( I n  each  c a s e ,  X s t a r t s  h i s  jo u r n e y  a t  th e  time when C happens.);
As i t  s t a n d s ,  i t  i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  a l l  t h a t  i s  p ro v e d  
i s  t h a t  X would see  A, B, and C happen i n  r e v e r s e  o r d e r ;  i t  
does n o t  prove a n y th in g  ab o u t  the  r e v e r s e d  happen ing  o f  A, B, 
and C. On the  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  i s  ta k e n  as  a  p rem ise  t h a t  A, B, and 
C do happen i n  t h a t  o r d e r ,  s in c e  o n ly  i f  th e y  do can X’ s ex ­
p e r i e n c e  o f  t ,  Bj and A be ac c o u n te d  f o r . The d i s t i n c t i o n  
between what X s e e s ,  and what r e a l l y  i s ,  i s ,  however, v e ry
f a r  from b e in g  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  d i s m i s s a l  of  the  p rob lem . I t  i s
e a s y  to  say ,  "X, from th e  time he l e a v e s  th e  e a r t h ,  s ee s  
e v e n t s  i n  r e v e r s e  o r d e r ,  bu t  t h e y  do no t  r e a l l y  happen i n  t h a t  
Glider": i t  i s  l e s s  e a s y  to  e x p l a i n  what c o n s t i t u t e s  m otion 
and r e s t .  U l t i m a t e l y ,  we have no knowledge of  the  o r d e r  o f  
e v e n t s  e x c e p t  th ro u g h  s e e in g  t h a t  th e y  o ccu r  in  t h a t  o r d e r :  
and any argument which c a s t s  doub ts  on t h i s  must go too  i a r .
I n  such an extreme case  i t  seems q u i t e  c e r t a i n  to  us  t h a t  X 
i s  wrong: n e v e r t h e l e s s  any a t t e m p t  to  tamper w i th  h i s  b e l i e f s
l e a d s  t o  d i s a s t r o u s  r e s u l t s .
A l l  the  same, t h e r e  i s  r e d r e s s .  For we have no
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r e a s o n  to  b e l i e v e  i n  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  X, n o r ,  f u r t h e r ,  i n  
h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y .  Fo r  p h y s i c s ,  w h i le  i t  t a k e s  l i g h t  s i g n a l s  as  
the  means o f  d e te r m in in g  q u e s t i o n s  o f  s i m u l t a n e i t y  and o r d e r ,
IS ip s o  f a c t o  r u l i n g  ou t  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e r e  b e in g  speeds  
g r e a t e r  th a n  l i g h t .  The p a rad o x  i s  i n  d i r e c t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  to  
r o l a t i v i t y  p h y s i c s  i n  t h a t  i t  i n v o lv e s  th e  a d d i t i o n  and sub­
t r a c t i o n  o f  l i g h t  a s  an o r d i n a r y  v e l o c i t y ,  as  w e l l  as  a  speed  
g r e a t e r  th a n  t h a t  o f  l i g h t . In  o t h e r  words,  the  p a rad o x ,  though  
s u g g e s te d  by p h y s i c s ,  r e s t s  upon a s su m p t io n s  which p h y s i c s  
r e j e c t s .
T h i r d l y ,  though l i g h t  s i g n a l s  a re  u se d  as  c r i t e r i a  
i n  p h y s i c s  f o r  d e te rm in in g  the  o rd e r  of  e v e n t s ,  i t  does n o t  
f o l l o w  t h a t  the  b e h a v io u r  o f  l i g h t  has  any e x t r a - p h y s i c a l  
r e le v a n c e  to  t h a t  o r d e r .  The movements o f  an o b s e rv e r  i n  space 
a f f e c t  h i s  p e r c e p t i o n  of  e v e n t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  i f  he fo l lo w s  an 
a g r e e d  c o n v e n t io n  r e g a r d i n g  the  t r a n s m i s s i o n  of s i g n a l s ,  bu t  
th e y  do no t  a f f e c t  the  happen ing  of  the  e v e n t s .  The p o i n t  i s
1. I n  c a s e s  I  and I I .  Even i f  i t  i s  a t t e m p te d  to  escape  t h i s  
o b j e c t i o n ,  by s a y in g  t h a t  m i n  Case I  i s  0 ,  i n  Case I I  i t  
s t i l l  r e m a in s .  The p l a u s i b i l i t y  o f  th e  ’ s t e l l a r  t r a v e l l e r  
r e v e r s i b i l i t y  l i e s  i n  the  e x t e n s i o n  o f  the  ana lo gy  from 
Case I and Case I I  to  Case I I I .  But,  as  E dd in g to n  showed,
the  t r a v e l l e r  would "neve r  know what a  c lo s e  ra ce
making of i t " ,  and f o r  him the  v e l o c i t y  of  l i g h t  would be
what i t  a lways had b ee n .  The doubt th u s  c a s t  upon Cases I
and I I  makes Case I I I  even l e s s  p l a u s i b l e .
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p u t  v e ry  c l e a r l y  by I ^ r i t a i n  w i th  r e f e r e n c e  to  s i m u l t a n e i t y .
We must n o t ,  he s a y s ,  confuse  " s i m u l t a n e i t y  i t s e l f  and the  
s e n s i b l e  s t a n d a r d  by which we a re  aware o f  i t .  We cannot  ap­
p r e c i a t e  s i m u l t a n e i t y  a t  a  g r e a t  d i s t a n c e  w i th o u t  i n t r o d u c i n g
- ^ 4
c e r t a i n  c o n v e n t i o n s . . .  But s i m u l t a n e i t y  i t s e l f  i s  t o t a l l y  i n ­
dependen t  of  t h e s e  c o n v e n t i o n s . "  What h o ld s  o f  s i m u l t a n e i t y  
h o ld s  a l s o  o f  tem p o ra l  o r d e r  i n  g e n e r a l ,  and to  p rove  t h a t  
the  o r d e r  of  e v e n ts  i s  r e v e r s i b l e  we must do more th a n  prove 
t h a t ,  g r a n t e d  c e r t a i n  c o n v e n t io n s ,  the  o r d e r  o f  e v e n ts  a p p e a r s  
from a g r e a t  d i s t a n c e  the  r e v e r s e  o f  the  r e a l  o r d e r .  Th is  i s ,  
i n  e s s e n c e ,  the  f i r s t  o b j e c t i o n  to  th e  ’p a r a d o x ’ , r e s t a t e d  to  
a v o id  th e  c r i t i c i s m s  to  which i t  was open .  I f  the  word ’ r e a l ’ 
i s  o b j e c t e d  t o ,  i t  can be r e p l a c e d  i n  the  p h ra se  by " the  o r d e r  
i n  which e v e n t s  h appen" ,  beyond which no f u r t h e r  d e f i n i t i o n  i s  
p o s s i b l e . To p u t  the  p o i n t  i n  a n o th e r  way, o b s e rv e r s  may f a i l  
to  ag ree  a s  to  w he th e r  A and B a r e  o r  a r e  n o t  s im u l ta n e o u s :  
in d e e d ,  i n  s p e c i a l  c a s e s  i t  may be im p o s s ib le  to  d e te rm ine  
t h i s  by p h y s i c a l  means, n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  o b j e c t i v e l y ,  i t  must 
be t r u e  e i t h e r  t h a t  th e y  a re  s im u l ta n e o u s  o r  t h a t  one d id  i n  
f a c t  happen b e fo re  the  o t h e r ,  and i t  i s  t h i s  "happening" which 
i s  a b s o l u t e  and fu nd am en ta l  - and which i s  e n t i r e l y  u n a f f e c t e d
1 .  E s s a y  on "Tha M ath em at ica l  A t t e n u a t i o n  of Tl^^e" i n  the
volume e n t i t l e d  ( i n  the  E n g l i s h  t r a n s l a t i o n )  "The Freedom 
of  th e  I n t e l l e c t " ,  p . 92 .  See a l s o  h i s  c r i t i c i s m s  on the  
w e l l  known a v i a t o r  example,  i n  an a r t i c l e  i n  the  Revue 
U n i v e r s e l l e "  ( A p r i l  1924) .
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by any J i y p o t h e t i c a l  s t e l l a r  t r a v e l l e r ,  w h e the r  a c c r e d i t e d ,  o r  
an im p o s to r  as  t h i s  one i s .
The t h i r d  method o f  approach, to  the  d e n i a l  o f  the  
i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  o f  time i s  the  most fu n d a m e n ta l ,  even though 
i t  i s  the  way of  the  d e s p i s e d  p l a i n  man. He s a y s ,  i n  e f f e c t ; -  
You say  t h a t  n o th in g  t h a t  i s  done aan be und on e . That seems 
to  me a h a r d  s a y in g ,  and an u n t ru e  o n e • My w ife  can u n r a v e l  
h e r  k n i t t i n g  i f  she makes a m is ta k e  i n  i t .  My c h i l d r e n  q u a r r e l ,  
b u t  make i t  up ,  and a l l  i s  a s  b e f o r e . I ,  a s  a Communist, once 
p l a c e d  a time-bomb i n  the  C i ty  Museum, bu t  on h e a r i n g  X (a  
p o l i t i c i a n )  b r o a d c a s t ,  I  was moved w i t h  h o r r o r  and r e p e n t a n c e ,  
and h a s t i l y  removed i t  b e fo re  i t  e x p lo d e d .  S u re ly  th e s e  and 
o t h e r  a c t s  of  undoing  a r e  f a m i l i a r  enough? Y et ,  a c c o rd in g  to  
you, the  p a s t  i s  i r r e p a r a b l e . "  The p l a i n  man t a k e s  up the  
p o s i t i o n  t h a t  the  consequences  of  an a c t  can be wiped ou t  so 
t h a t  i t  i s  a s  i f  i t  had neve r  been - i n  o t h e r  words ,  t h a t  r e ­
v e r s i o n  to  the  i n i t i a l  s t a t e  i s  p o s s i b l e .  Whether t h i s  i s  so i s  
the  c r u c i a l  q u e s t i o n  to  d e te rm in e :  f o r  i r r e p a r a b i l i t y  in v o lv e s  
i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y ,  and even i f  the  c o n t r a r y  does n o t  h o ld  w i th  
c e r t a i n t y ,  the  d e n i a l  o f  i r r e p a r a b i l i t y  a t  the  v e ry  l e a s t  
weakens the  c la im  of i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y .
I t  i s  u n f o r t u n a t e ,  i f  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g ,  t h a t  the  p l a i n  
man i s  n o t  a  v e ry  c o n s i s t e n t  gu ide  i n  t h i s  m a t t e r .  Common sense  
a f f i r m s ,  u n h e s i t a t i n g l y ,  t h a t  the  e f f e c t s  of  a  s p i d e r ' s  crawl 
over  a room In  th e  Tower on J a n u a ry  1 s t  1600 have long  s in c e
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Ceased to  be f e l t ,  and t h a t  n o th in g  i n  the  w orld  now would be 
d i f f e r e n t  i f  the  s p i d e r  had n ev e r  c raw led  a t  a l l  t h a t  day* On 
the  o t h e r  hand,  i t  a l s o  h o ld s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  e v e n t s ,  sm a l l  i n  
t h e m s e lv e s ,  l i k e  C a e s a r ’ s c r o s s i n g  the  R ubicon,  have a p ro fo u n d  
e f f e c t  on the  cou rse  o f  h i s t o r y ,  and t h a t  even tod ay  our l i v e s  
would have been d i f f e r e n t  had  th e y  n o t  o c c u r r e d .  Once th e  two 
d i f f e r e n t  views have been t a k e n ,  the  way i s  ea sy  to  showing 
t h a t  b o th  examples a re  i n  much the  same p o s i t i o n .  A f t e r  a l l ,  
a  s p i d e r ’ s c raw l  -  though a t  a d i f f e r e n t  t ime and p la c e  -  was 
once r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  im p o r ta n t  h i s t o r i c a l  e v e n t s ,  and i n  the  
h e a t  d e a th  of  th e  u n i v e r s e ,  C a e s a r ’ s c o n q u e s ts  w i l l  no lo n g e r  
m a t t e r .  Once we adm it  t h a t ,  we a r e  bound to  ag ree  t h a t  t h e r e  
i s  no l o g i c a l  h a l t i n g p l a c e  between two extreme c o n c e p t io n s .
One i s ,  t h a t  w h a tev e r  we do -  our  most im p o r ta n t  d e c i s i o n s  
e q u a l l y  w i th  the  m ech a n ic a l  avo idance  of  an o b s t a c l e  -  makes 
no r e a l  d i f f e r e n c e  : i t  w i l l  a l l  be the  same a hundred  th o u sa n d  
y e a r s  h e n c e . The o t h e r  says  t h a t  e v e r y t h in g  m a t t e r s ,  and t h a t ,  
however t r i f l i n g  the  o c c u r r e n c e ,  the  w or ld  n ev e r  i s  as  i f  i t  
had  n o t  b e e n .  I f  I  had  n o t  a v o id e d  th e  o b s t a c l e ,  b u t ,  i n  f a l l ­
i n g ,  had  c u t  my l e g  on a r u s t y  i r o n ,  d eve loped  b l o o d - p o i s o n in g ,  
and d i e d ,  the  w o r ld  i n  a  hundred  th o usand  y e a r s  would have 
been d i f f e r e n t  i n  no t  h a v in g  my d e sc e n d a n ts  to  g lad den  i t .
And so on .
Both  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a re  u n p a l a t a b l e  and savour  o f  
m o rb id n e s s ,  and t h e r e  i s  som eth ing  to  say  f o r  the  p l a i n  man’ s
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re jec t io n  of both, in  th e i r  extreme form. But they are so 
horr ib ly  log ica l ;  once we quit  the sh e l te r  of one, we are 
driven on without a h a l t  u n t i l  we reach the other, and i f  we 
rebel a t  'Nor a l l  thy tea rs  wash out a word of i t ' ,  we must 
espouse 'Tout passe, tout casse, tout l a s s e ' .  Is  th is  r e a l ly  
8 0 , though? Would i t  not be possible to hold th a t ,  though 
nothing can ever a l t e r  the fa c t  ( i f  i t  i s  a fac t)  th a t  a 
spider did perambulate a room in the Tower on January 1st,  
1600, nevertheless a l l  e f fe c ts  have long since died away? Or, 
on the other hand, th a t ,  though much i s  t ra n s i to ry  in i t s  
e f fe c t s ,  some la s t in g  differences may abide?
Take the former case f i r s t .  There i s  something 
about the "irrevocable pas t" ,  in i t s  extreme view, th a t  seems 
to me to savour of an old fam il ia r  confusion regarding the 
t ru th  of propositions about the p a s t .  I t  was said e a r l i e r  
tha t  "The Battle of Hastings was 1066 is  always true" i s  
l ia b le  to lead to confusions: and not the le a s t  of these i s  
th a t  which causes us to imagine th a t  when we say "That i t  
has happened is  true" we are saying anything in p a r t ic u la r  
about the p resen t .  Certainly , i f  there had been no Battle of 
Hastings, we could not now t ru ly  say, "The Battle of Hastings- 
was in 1066", and to tha t  extent the past ' a f f e c t s '  the 
present - i f  we wish to put i t  in  that misleading way. But 
i t  does not follow from th a t ,  tha t  i t  a f fec ts  i t  in any 
other way. Not a l l  our tea rs  and regre ts  can a l t e r  the fac t
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tha t  the Battle of Hastings was in 1066 - tha t  goes without 
saying. I t  i s ,  however, an^ unfortunate way of expression, 
fo r  i t  sounds as i f  we can never reach a s ta te  of equilibrium 
in which a l l  e f fec ts  of tha t  b a t t le  w il l  have died away. In 
the case of the Battle  of Hastings, of course, i t  i s  pe r fec t ly  
easy to claim tha t  the whole course of English h is to ry  has 
been, and s t i l l  i s ,  influenced by i t ;  so perhaps the spider 
example is  the b e t t e r .  We can never a l t e r  the fac t  of the 
sp id e r 's  crawl: but there is  no log ica l  compulsion to pass to 
the d i f fe ren t  statement tha t  the world today i s  d i f fe ren t  
from what i t  would have been had the spider not crawled.
A pendulum, se t  in motion by an outside agent, 
swings in ever-decreasing arcs ,  and f in a l ly  comes to r e s t .  Wk 
Where the i n i t i a l  impulse is  g rea t ,  i t  w i l l  swing fo r  a longer 
time than i t  would for  a s l ig h t  impulse, and s im ilar ly ,  some 
events have more important repercussions than o th e rs . I t  i s  
not contradic tory  - on the contrary, i t  i s  the p la ines t  
commonsense - to say both "The s l ig h t  impulse I gave has now 
ceased" ^ id  "At 2.15 on January 10th, 1936,1 touched the 
pendulum." For the l a t t e r  statement to be true i t  i s  not 
necessary to deny the former, and where th is  has been done, 
i t  i s  only as the r e s u l t  of confusion. Agreed, tha t  i t  
be true that the e f fec ts  of A never re a l ly  die out, as the 
determinists  a s se r t ,  yet i t  must be c lear ly  seen tha t  th is
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i s  a f urther  p os it ion ,  and one which i t  i s  not lo g ica l ly  
necessary to hold.
The second case i s  le ss  important fo r  our purpose.
I t  seems to me that  to say, "Because the e f fec ts  of A and B 
and G have died out in  time, everything f in a l ly  dies out", i s  
no stronger than any other induction from ’some' to ' a l l ' .  I t  
i s  anj remains an i l leg i t im a te  extension from the point of view 
of log ic .  This does not mean that  i t  may not he highly probable 
on i t s  own merits :  but tha t  i t s  claim to I n f a l l i b i l i t y  i s  bogus.
I t  should be evident by now that  there are two fund­
amentally d i s t in c t  senses in which the word ’r e p a ra b i l i ty ’ i s
Calleç/used. The f i r s t  may be u&e é  r ep a rab i l i ty  of things, and has no 
p a r t ic u la r  relevance to time, eggoept in  so fa r  as everything 
i s  'in* time. I f  I drop a book, I can pick i t  up again: i f  I 
lose i t ,  I can go to the Lost Property Office and recover i t .
But not everything is  reparable in th is  way - dolls  break, 
clothes wear out, and e l e c t r i c  bulbs fu s e . I t  is  in te re s t in g  
to note the mixture of r e p a ra b i l i ty  and i r r e p a ra b i l i ty  in an 
ordinary conversation - "Don* t  cry, dar l ing .  1*11 buy you a 
new one" - "No, please don 't  apologise  ^ I t  r e a l ly  doesn 't  
matter, fo r  i t  can ea s i ly  be replaced" - and so on. Although 
there is  an i rreparab le  element - the cup, once broken, cannot 
be repaired  - the t o t a l  s i tu a t io n  is  taken as reparab le , 
when replacement i s  easy. As usual, the p la in  man has a
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p r a c t ic a l ,  not a log ica l ,  c r i te r io n  of what is  reparable and 
what is  i r reparab le ,  and the child ,  who begins by being s t r i c t ,  
ly  lo g ica l ,  soon conforms to conventional behaviour, and finds 
comfort in  another d o l l .  Moreover, commonsense a l t e r s  i t s  
views on re p a ra b i l i ty  with the passage of time - a clumsy 
breaking of a treasured possession seems unforgivable a t  the 
time, but a f t e r  a year i t  matters l e s s .  In th is  connection 
comes the phrase, "time the healer" - but i t  should be c lear ly  
seen tha t  i t  i s  not time that is  e i th e r  reparable or i r r e p a r ­
able in such cases. What is  rea l ly  meant is  tha t  the e f fec ts  
are ge tt ing  le s s ,  the swings of the pendulum shorte r .  Time
enters  in because the pendulum swing * takes time *, not, as the
1
phrase suggests, as i t s e l f  an agency making for  equilibrium. 
Lastly ,  i t  should be remembered tha t  ' reparab il i ty*  is  here 
used in a general sense to include both annih ila t ion  of gain 
as well as overcoming of lo s s .  The vandals whose wareT destroy 
p ic tu re -g a l le r ie s  and cathedrals and who threaten  to make 
3urop9 rever t  to i t s  primitive savagery equally with seekers 
of lo s t  property show th a t  * reparabili ty* can be e i th e r  p o s i t ­
ive or negative•
The so-called  i r r e p a r a b i l i ty  of time is  quite d is ­
t i n c t  from a l l  t h i s .  I drop my book, and immediately pick i t
1. I t  i s  b e s id e  th e  p o i n t  to  b r in g  i n  h e re  q u e s t i o n s  of  en­
t r o p y .  3ven  i f  time cann o t  be d e f in e d  i n  p h y s i c a l  te rm s 
w i th o u t  r e f e r e n c e  to  e n t r o p y ,  we a re  n o t  h e re  co ncerned  
w i t h  p h y s i c s .
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up. Yet I dM drop i t ,  and nothing can a l t e r  th i s ;  what can 
he a l te re d  i s  the posit ion  of my book on the f loor . \ h e  notion 
of reparation  app lies ,  not to time, but to the content of time. 
Something can be done about "My book is  on the f lo o r" ,  but 
nothing can be done about "At 2.15 on January 11th, 1936, my 
book f e l l  on the floor" - i t  ju s t  i ^ .  And i t  i s  tremendously 
important to r e a l is e  tha t  the ’ i s '  in  the l a s t  sentence i s  a 
timeless ' i s ' .  True, i t  can be in te rp re ted  in a temporal 
manner; I can, fo r  instance, t ru th fu l ly  say the next day tha t  
i t  had f a l le n .  But i f  we confine ourselves to th is  i n te rp r e t ­
a t ion ,  we sh a l l  have a very stunted view of the problem, and 
be l ik e ly  to f a l l  into one of the f a l l a c ie s  mentioned e a r l i e r .
Secondly, fo r  the second statement to be true i t  i s  
not necessary tha t  the book should be on the f loo r  a t  the 
time when I make the statement. The t ru th  of a statement about 
the past i s  independent of any re p a ra b i l i ty  in the things 
concerned: consequently, so f a r  as logic goes, i t  i s  co ns is t ­
ent with a s ta te  of a f f a i r s  (a t  the time of the statement) in 
which a l l  trace of the past event has disappeared. (This i s ,  
of course, a restatement of the e a r l i e r  pos it ion :  in terms of 
the analogy then used, ' t h a t  there was an impulse' is
1. Weber takes the example of a phys ic is t  who, in an experi­
ment with a pendulum, loses count - "So fa r  as the ex­
periment is  concerned, he may ' r e p e a t '  time by se t t ing  the 
pendulum swinging again, but he has ' l o s t '  some time which 
he can never repeat."  ("Monist", 1927, p . 530.)
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compatible with any length of swing now or with none a t  a l l . )  
But, i t  may be said, i f  th i s  i s  so, how can I ^  that I am 
speaking the t ru th?  The book re a l ly  did drop, but now i t  i s  
back in i t s  place; how am I to convince somebody coming in  
now that i t  did drop? This i s  quite evidently a separate 
question; and whether we hold tha t  "what re a l ly  happened" i s  
discoverable in p r inc ip le  ( tha t  i s ,  th a t  traces  are l e f t ,  and 
th a t  things are not reparable - determinism) or whether we 
hold tha t  perfec t  reparation  i s  possible in things, does not 
a f fe c t  what did, in f a c t ,  happen. What i s  meant by the i r ­
r e p a ra b i l i ty  of time is  merely and simply that  what happened, 
did happen.
But th is  simple view, i t  may be said, is  open to 
the grave objection tha t  i t  depends on an o v e r-g lo r i f ica t io n  
of da te . I f  a l l  that  is  meant by i r r e p a r a b i l i ty  as applied to 
time, the c r i t i c  urges, i s  th is  emphasis on the date a t  which 
an event happens, the i r r e p a r a b i l i ty  may be granted s t ra ig h t  
away, but i t  is  worth very l i t t l e ,  fo r  i t  i s  admitted tha t  a l l  
tha t  i t  comes to is  the tautologous asser t ion  tha t  X happened
when i t  did happen.
There is  some t ru th  in th i s ,  but the l a s t  word has
not been said upon the sub jec t.  I t  does not seem to me merely 
a tautology, but the statement of a very important pr inc ip le  * 
to say tha t  i f  the 'happening' of an event is  taken as ultim­
a te ,  two consequences follow - f i r s t ^ t h a t  there is  temporal
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i r r e p a r a b i l i t y  in the sense given above, and secondly tha t  
propositions about tha t  event are log ica l ly  independent of the 
time a t  which they are made ( th is  i s  often known as the “time­
lessness of t r u t h s " ) . I belive tha t  th is  view is  fundamental 
and that i t  is  presupposed whether we deny or a sse r t  what I 
have ca l led ,  not very c lea r ly ,  the re p a ra b i l i ty  of th in g s . An 
example to make th is  c lea re r ;  When Housman says,
"Today the Roman and h is  trouble 
Are ashes under Uricon",
he is  re fe r r in g  to the transience of human a c t i v i t i e s ,  u n t i l
i t  i s  as i f  they had never been. The determinist ,  complete or
p a r t i a l ,  steps forward and objects tha t  some e f fec ts  of Roman
occupation s t i l l  remain, and that the o b l i te ra t io n  is  not ye t ,
perhaps never w i l l  be, complete. But both a like assume tha t
once the Romans were there ,  and also tha t  th is  fac t  ( th a t  they
were once there) does not a l t e r  with the passage of time. I
do not know whether a spider crawled round a room in the
Tower on January 1s t ,  1600, and I do not expect ever to know.
But i t  e i th e r  did or did not happen tha t  a spider so crawled;
whatever the case was, one of these a l te rn a t iv es  happened,
and tha t  is  the ultimate f a c t ,  beyond which no more can be
s a id .^ I t  i s  often held tha t  each happening is  a ' f a c t ’ which
1. Of course, as h is to r ian s  are not omniscient, more evidence 
may come to l ig h t ;  and h is to r ian s  of successive ePo^hs 
might say; " I t  is  true tha t  a spider crawled", and I t  i s  
true tha t  a spider did not crawl." But th a t  does not a f fec t  
what happened (whatever i t  was); only our knowledge of 
what happened.
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i s  ^timelessly t ru e '  - another way of expressing i t  i s  tha t  
once a thing has taken i t s  place in the t im e-series ,  the 
passage of time can make no difference to i t .
But what about the r e p a ra b i l i ty  of events? So f a r ,  
i t  has been said tha t  the content of an event may or may not 
be reparable (the determinists  and th e i r  opponents are s t i l l  
engaged in controversy about th is)  - and that  date i s  not r e ­
parable . Had th is  alone been s tressed , the c r i t ic ism  of hypo- 
s t a t i s a t io n  would have been ju s t i f i e d ,  fo r  'd a te '  by i t s e l f  i s  
an undesirable s u b s ta n t ia l i s a t io n .  But, with the best w il l  in  
the world, I found i t  impossible to commit th^s fa l lacy  (with 
the in ten t ion ,  of course, of t re a t in g  ' content'  and 'd a te '  
separa te ly ,  and then inquiring what holds for th e i r  union in 
even ts) .  Hence the l a s t  few pages, while dealing professedly 
with ' d a t e ' ,  have, through the fa i lu re  of complète abs trac t ion ,  
app lica tion  also to events. Events, as regards th e i r  content, 
may be reparable: as regards th e i r  date, they cannot be • and 
the event as a whole, since i t  i s  ' in fec ted '  by i t s  date, i s  
i r repa rab le ,  in the s t r i c t  sense tha t  i t  has happened a t a 
ce r ta in  time. True, th is  sense may be p e r fec t ly  t r i v i a l :  i t  
sounds unnecessarily pedantic to say tha t  when I drop a book 
on the f lo o r ,  the event i s  i r reparab le  because i t  ha^ happen­
ed. Nevertheless, i t  seems to me the only log ica l  pos it ion  
to take up, in spite  of the su p e rf ic ia l  consistency of those
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who hold e i th e r  tha t  nothing matters or tha t  everything m atte rs .  
But i t  goes without saying that  th is  usage of irreparable  i s  
not the common one, and tha t  i t  i s  a minimum usage - when we 
have sa id  tha t  an event is  irreparable  in th is  sense we have 
said very l i t t l e .
All th is  i s  supposed to have cleared the way f o r , 
and led up to ,  a discussion of the i r r e v e r s ib i l i t y  of t ime.
Yet i t  cannot but be evident tha t  much of the l a t t e r  par t  
depends on ce r ta in  postu la tes  about time, and th is  may seem to 
be a begging of the question. "Tilvents, as regards th e i r  con­
te n t ,  may be reparable - a£ regards th e i r  d a te , they cannot be." 
Why not? unless we are already covertly introducing the notion 
of i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y .  But the fa l la cy ,  i f  i t  be a fa l lacy ,  cannot 
be avoided: the notions of i r r e p a r a b i l i t y  and i r r e v e r s ib i l i t y  
are e s s e n t ia l ly  connected. Much of what follows w il l  be unsup­
ported asse r t ion  - unsupported, because i t  seems to me basic - 
and any disagreement w i l l  therefore be u l t im a te .
R ev e rs ib i l i ty  is  a notion with which we are a l l  
fam il ia r  - yet i t  is  one for which i t  is  very d i f f i c u l t  to 
f ind  a d e f in i t io n  that  does not e i th e r  mislead or beg the 
question. Perhaps the most harmless form - i f  not the most en­
lightening - i s  t h i s : -  "A se r ies  A,B,C,D,3 is  revers ib le  i f  
i t s  terms may in d i f fe re n t ly  be taken in the order A,B,C,D,3 
or in  the order 3,D,C,B,A. I t  is  i r rev e rs ib le  i f  th is  cannot
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be done." This d e f in i t io n  says nothing about the nature of the 
terms - they may be the properties  of a c i rc le  or a row of 
cabbages numbered from l e f t  to r ig h t  or r ig h t  to l e f t ,  or 
events in  time.
Secondly, i t  should be noted tha t  asymmetry i s  not the 
same as i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y ,  for  though the l a t t e r  involves the 
former, the former does not necessar i ly  involve the l a t t e r .  I f  
A i s  g rea ter  than B, B is  not g rea ter  than A - the re la t io ns  of 
•grea ter  than' and ' l e s s  than' are not symmetrical. But i t  does 
not follow, and i t  i s  not in fact^he case, tha t  i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  
i s  Involved, fo r  I t  Is in d if fe ren t  whether we say, i s  grea ter  
than B' or 'B is  less  than A' . 3 i th a r  method of statement i s  
equally co rrec t .
Thirdly, i t  i s  nonsense to ta lk  of the r e v e r s ib i l i ty  
or i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  of single th ings. An event is  ne ither  revers­
ib le  nor i r rev e rs ib le  - i t  i s  only of an order tha t  r e v e r s ib i l i t y  
can be predicàtè-d.
Lastly ,  i f  not nonsensical, i t  i s  a t  l e a s t  e l l i p t i c  
to ta lk  of ' time' as being i r r e v e r s ib l e . The view which hypo- 
s t a t i s e s  'Time' into a big blank absolute, a singùlar subject of 
pious genera l isa t ions ,  thereby makes i t  impossible for i t s e l f  to 
ascribe any meaning to the statement tha t  time i s  revers ib le  or 
i r r e v e r s ib le .  (Unfortunately, since "nothing's impossible to 
fa i th "  th is  attempt has often been made I ) I t  is  only i f  time i s  
modestly conceived as the order of a ser ies  of events, not as a
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hypostatised absolute, tha t  the question whether i t  is  re- 
versib le  or no can be asked.
21o say that  the order of events is  i r rev e rs ib le  
means tha t  a se r ies  of events cannot in d i f fe re n t ly  be taken 
in  the order or in the order 13 ,D,C,B,A. This i s
easy enough, but i t  is  much harder to explain why the order 
i s  not in d i f fe re n t ,  without presupposing temporal character­
i s t i c s .
I am inclined to think tha t  i t  i s  more fundamental 
to explain i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  in terms of the happening of events 
than to explain the happening of events in terms of i r r e v e r s ­
i b i l i t y .  For in  the l a t t e r  case we are s t i l l  faced with the 
question why the order i s  i r r e v e r s ib le ,  and to answer th is  
by "because they happen in tha t  order" i s  to re turn  to the 
s t a r t in g -p o in t . Granted tha t  we must s t a r t  from what i s  u ltim­
ate and indefinable , we must yet beware of choosing the wrong 
s ta r t in g -p o in t .
I f  we say that  A and B are two events, and tha t  B
follows A, what is  involved by th is?  F i r s t ly ,  i t  is  quite
evident that i f  B follov/s A, A doesn 't  follow B. Yet, i t  may
be objected, supposing B's and A's were arranged a l te rn a te ly ,
l ike  black and white beads on a s t r in g ,  i t  would be quite 
true to say both tha t  black follows white and that white 
follows black. That, however, is  not the po in t .  We are not
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saying th a t  a whits bead cannot follow a black one: what we 
are saying i s  tha t  white bead (c a l l  i t  Matthew) tha t  pre­
cedes Mark, a black bead, cannot also follow i t .  This i s  the 
p la ines t  commonsense, and the s t r i c t e s t  logic :  a s im ilar  bead 
to Matthew may follow Mark, but the same Matthew cannot both 
precede and follow Mark.
So f a r ,  however, we have only got asymmetry, not 
i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y .  Counting from l e f t  to r ig h t ,  we may say, 
"Matthew precedes Mark", and because the r e la t io n  of preced­
ence is  asymmetrical, we cannot, ^  long as we count in the 
same ordey  ^ say tha t  Mark precedes Matthew. But we can reverse 
the order of counting, and go from r igh t  to l e f t  equally well.  
In th is  case we can say "Mark precedes Matthew", and we can 
not say tha t  Matthew precedes Mark. I t  is  in d if fe ren t  wljich 
order we deCide to use. The question i s ,  whether th is  bead- 
analogy i s  properly applicable to events in time. Certainly, 
i f  we look upon events as ’ strung out' in  a hypostatised time, 
we have no reason for  doubting i t .  But i t  would seem, a t l e a s t  
a t  f i r s t  s ig h t ,  tha t  i$ i s  a l together  misleading to think of
1. I t  may become conventional to use one ra ther  than the other 
All 3nglish reading depends on the agreement tha t  the 
l e t t e r  nearer the l e f t  is  'b e fo re ' ,  the l e t t e r  nearer the 
r ig h t  ' a f t e r ' .  I t  i s  remarkable, when one comes to think 
of i t ,  how ea s i ly  we "understand" the spell ing  rule - 
"I before 3 ,  except a f te r  C"l The Chinaman reading 3nglish  
would get th is  wrong.
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events as objectively  ' t h e r e ' ,  and of our passing from one to 
another as akin to the process of counting beads. After a l l ,
W9 are ourselves ' i n '  time, and i t  is  only by an e f fo r t  of 
thought of doubtful v a l id i ty  tha t  we can put ourselves 'o u t­
s ide '  time, and announce triumphantly tha t  ' ob jec t ive ly '  the 
beads can be counted in e i th e r  d i rec t io n .  (Exact significance 
of the words in inverted commas unknown^) But th is  seems to me 
to beg the question. I f ,  per impossibile, we could put our­
selves ' outside ' time, we probably should f ind  things very 
d i f fe ren t  in tha t  specious Utopia, but tha t  i s  not the po in t .  
The question a t  issue is  whether,as things a r e , events can be 
counted in e i th e r  d irec t ion .  I f  so, and the bead analogy i s  a 
permissible one, the time-order w il l  be asymmetrical, but i t  
w i l l  not be i r r e v e r s ib l e . There i s  nothing in the bead analogy 
to give i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y .  Is  there ,  then, any meaning, and i f  
so, what meaning, in saying tha t  the order of events i s  i r ­
revers ib le?
I t  i s ,  f i r s t ,  necessary to d is t ingu ish  between two 
d if fe ren t  senses in which ' i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y '  i s  used. F i r s t ,  
there is  ' i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y ' proper, used only of an order which 
cannot be reversed. Secondly, the word i s  often also used for 
what would b e t te r  be ca lled  'unreversed ' ,  of an order which i s  
not, in  f a c t ,  reversed. A one-way s t r e e t  i s  an example of un- 
re versed order, since a l l  cars do, in  f a c t ,  proceed in one 
d irec t ion  only. But i t  i s  not impossible tha t  a car should go
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the other way, and so the order i s  not. i r r e v e r s ib l e . I r r e v e r s ­
i b i l i t y  involves unreversedness, but not vice versa.
I f  A and B are two events, and B follows A, A does 
not follow B. Nobody would dispute t h i s .  But i t  i s  a d if fe ren t  
pos it ion ,  and one which is  not lo g ica l ly  involved by the former 
to say that A can ' t  follow B. We must d is t ingu ish  between the 
i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  of law and the unreversedness of f a c t .  Why 
' c a n ' t '  A follow B? Because, i t  may be answered, of something 
in the nature of A and B. This, however, has nothing to do 
with temporal order as such. I am not concerned to deny th a t ,  
in causa l i ty  fo r  instance, there may be something more than 
mere temporal p r io r i ty  which marks A out as the cause of B, 
some causal bond (of various degrees of stringency, according 
to d i f fe ren t  w riters)  between th e i r  natures .  But I am concerned 
to deny that  th is  i s  temporal. On the contrary, i t  i s  opposed 
to time, and is  the re s u l t  of abs trac t ion  from the temporal 
element, fo r  the word ' cannot' has no place in  time.
The only temporal par t  i s  A and then B - and the 
whole point of time is  in tha t  "and then", which is  not fu r th e r  
analysable, for  the happening of events is  u l t im a te .
I am inclined to think that the question of i r re v e rs -  
i b i l i t y  is  in  a sense almost i r re lev an t  to time, and that  what 
we mean by the u n id irec t io n a l i ty  of time is  not a matter of
1. I apologise fo r  the uncouth expression!
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'musts’ and 'cannots '  but ju s t  a matter of f a c t .  I t  
ju s t  happens so.
This i s  not, of course, équivalent to asse r t ing  that  
time is  revers ib le ,  which seems to me nonsense, and misleading 
nonsense a t th a t .  I t  may or may not be the case tha t  contents 
could conceivably have been ac tua lised  in a d if fe ren t  order, 
and th a t  B might have preceded A - tha t  is  a question tha t  con­
cerns causa l i ty .  But they have not, in f a c t ,  happened thus, 
and A did precede B - and that  i s  a l l  tha t  matters for  time.
Put d i f f e re n t ly ,  the order in which contents are ac tua lised  
may or may not be revers ib le :  but time-order i s ,  s t r i c t l y ,  
ne i ther  revers ib le  nor i r r e v e r s ib le ,  though the l a t t e r  mode of 
statement is  less  harmful than the former.
I t  may be objected tha t  the posit ion  re s ts  on an un­
desirable abs trac t ion  of time from content and of both from 
events. Undoubtedly, th is  abs trac t ion  is  undesirable i f  carridd  
too f a r ,  but up to a point i t  i s  both legitimate and useful ,  
and I cannot see tha t  i t  i s  carrying i t  too fa r  to say that  
something which can be predicated of the order in which contents 
are ac tua l ised  ( r e v e r s ib i l i t y  or i r r e v e r s ib i l i ty )  cannot be 
predicated of time-order. On the contrary, i t  is  the opposite 
view, tha t  time-order, which is  a mere cumulative 'and th en ' ,  
can be ca l led  ' i r r e v e r s i b l e ' or ' revers ib l e ' , which is  the rea l  
hyposta t isa t ion  of time. Only with the aid  of th is  d is t in c t io n
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are we enabled to take the very simple, and, I think, correct
view t h a t  the  ‘h a p p e n in g ’ o f  e v e n ts  i s  u l t i m a t e ,  and t r a n s c e n d s
any ta lk  of r e v e r s ib i l i t y .  As fa r  as time-order i s  concerned,
i t  seems to  me unmeaning to  a sk  i f  i t  c o u ld  be ’ r e v e r s e d ’ .
_.  ^  ^ loose
T im e-o rde r  is* I r r e v e r s i b l e '  on ly  i n  the /[sense  o f  u n r e v e r s e d n e s s ,  
t h a t  i t  has  happened so ,  and not  o th e r w is e ;  bu t  i f  we say  of  
e v e n t s  t h a t  t h e i r  o r d e r  i s  i r r e v e r s i b l e ,  we are  r e f e r r i n g  n o t  
o n ly  to  p u r e l y  tem p o ra l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  bu t  a l s o  to  c o n t e n t .
I t  i s  only where the notion of content en ters ,  tha t  r e v e r s ib i l ­
i t y  or i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  can be properly predicated .
Those who affirm r e v e r s ib i l i t y  do so usually with 
th e i r  eyes fixed on content, and they adduce cases of ' rep a r ­
a b i l i t y  of th ings '  in th e i r  favour. On the other hand, many 
opponents of r e v e r s ib i l i t y  have said how ridiculous i t  would 
be i f  things were reversed, and how ludicrous i t  would be to 
see the cow jumping backwards over the moon. But both, oppon­
ents and defenders a l ik e ,  seem to me to emphasize the wrong 
thing. I am not here concerned to go into d e ta i l  about whether 
s c ie n t i f i c  'laws' can go backward, which in essence is  what 
these people are arguing about, because whatever the r e s u l t ,  
time has not in any sense been made t o ’go backward'. . I t  is  
conceivable tha t  A might succeed B, but that is  a difference 
in the order in which the contents are actualised  in events: 
i t  has no bearing whatever on time as such. Whether i t  i s  A 
and then B' or 'B and then|A' is  i r re levan t  to time, for a l l
361
tha t  time i s ,  is  the 'and then' of the happening of events.
I t  may he objected that we can only know (for in ­
stance) causal re la t io ns  as in time; how than have we any 
r igh t  to say tha t  the i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y  is  in these (with th e i r  
ta lk  of the 'n a tu res '  of A and B) and not in time? The answer 
i s ,  tha t  we can never prove our pos it ion ,  and that nobody can 
be forced to agree on th is  matter, fo r  disagreement i f  there 
be any i s  u l t im a te . But i t  i s  a strong point in favour of th is  
view that with a simple d is t in c t io n  (one which is  constantly 
made in other contexts, and which need not be carried  to the 
point when i t  becomes vicious) much verbal complexity and 
d i f f i c u l ty  can be cleared away. The problem of i r r e v e r s ib i l i t y  
i s  in great pa r t  a pseudo one : and i t s  genuine d i f f i c u l t i e s  
are great enough without adding to them.
Can, then, the order of events be reversed? This 
question can be taken in  three senses, two of which are not 
fundamental.
F i r s t l y ,  comes the excessive preoccupation with the
temporal order of events to the exclusion of content. Can
events, in so fa r  as they are temporal, be reversed? This
question has no meaning, on the suppositions I have been making
1. That i s ,  unless we are prepared to in te rp re t  temporal order 
in terms of i r r e v e r s ib i l i t y ,  instead  of vice versa. This 
seems to me a much clumsier way, as ' happening' is  moie 
fundamental. This is  a dogmatic statement for which no 
proof can be given or required, but I believe i t  to be 
j u s t i f i e d .
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Secondly, there is  the opposite extreme of emphasiz- 
^ing content and neglecting date. This e rror  seems to me on a l l  
fours with tha t  of saying that  the bead Matthew can both pre­
cede and follow Mark, when what is  meant is  tha t  another white 
bead, q u a l i ta t iv e ly  exactly l ike Matthew, follows Mark. I t  i s  
to confuse q u a l i ta t iv e  s im i la r i ty  with numerical id e n t i ty .  
Those who lay too much s t re s s  on the p o s s ib i l i ty  of "repar­
a b i l i t y  of things" and who f a i l  to see tha t  i t  i s  t o t a l ly  i r ­
relevant to the question of i r r e v e r s i b i l i t y ,  seem to me to 
commit th is  f a l la c y .  When a l l  f r i l l s  have been removed, any 
doctrine of "cycles of events" u lt im ately  depends on th is  
notion.What th is  comes to is  tha t  the 'same' event can recur 
over and over again. This is  rubbish. The same content may or 
may not recur - tha t  is  a d i f fe ren t  question - but each time 
i t  happens, i t  has a d if fe ren t  date, and is a d if fe ren t  event. 
This is  im plic i t  in the very word ' r e c u r ' .  I t  may be objected 
that  when the two events are exactly the same in every par­
t i c u la r  except date, i t  is  mere^pedantry to i n s i s t  on call ing  
them ' tw o ',  and that they are ' r e a l l y '  id e n t ic a l .  This i s  to 
a ce r ta in  extent a matter of language. I do not deny tha t  
th is  difference of date is  in many cases supremely unimport­
ant,  and tha t  for  p ra c t ic a l  purposes, we often re fe r  to them 
as one thing, and not as two. This subs t i tu t io n  of ’thing ' 
fo r  'even t '  is  not a s l ip  of the pen, and i t  seems to me
1. See also on this point, Lotze, "Metaphysics", p . 315 f f .
3 6 3
very important* Evon i f  i t  i ^  only a matter of language, i t  
might as well be c lear language and consis tent language. I f  
we are going to use the word 'even t '  as having an e ssen t ia l  
reference to date, there must be no hedging over i t  - e spec ia l­
ly  as such hedging is  to ta l ly  unnecessary, while we possess 
the word ' th in g '  for  the other notion. Secondly, i t  i s  quite 
d i f fe ren t  to ta lk  of cycles of things and to ta lk  of cycles of 
events, and we cannot pass from one to the other.  Even i f  the 
same content does recur, tha t  proves nothing about the repar­
a b i l i t y  of time - and what is  more, the denial of the l a t t e r  
does not rule out of court the p o s s ib i l i ty  of the re p a ra b i l i ty  
of th ings. (This point has been even more overlooked than 
the o ther.)
A br ie f  example to clear  the matter up. Suppose, 
( a f te r  the fashion of Herbert Spencer), tha t  from an i n i t i a l
" O '
point A, the course of events could he regarded as a steady 
evolution u n t i l  a culminating point of complexity was reached 
a t  C, and that  then the opposite process of devolving began, 
u n t i l  the primitive sim plicity  of A was again reached, a f t e r  
which the whole process began again, exactly the same points 
(B,C,D) being reached as before» I t  is  not nonsense to say 
tha t  i t  is  a r e p e t i t io n  of the same process in time, and 
tha t  the event of passing B the f i r s t  time is  a d if fe ren t
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event from that of passing B the nth time. I t  is  not nonsense; 
and at i s  the only log ica l  pos it ion  to take, since any a l t e r n ­
a t iv e ,  however i t  defend i t s e l f  by counter-attacks of 'ped­
an try '  and 'merely verbal consis tency ',  commits the fa l la cy  
exposed above. However t r i v i a l  the difference between the two
events, and however d i f f i c u l t  i t  be for me to avoid a t  l e a s t
1 #  
the appearance of hypostatis ing  time, we must admit tha t  there
is  a d ifference, or ruin any hope of a t ta in in g  a sa t i s fa c to ry  
theory of time, on a wretched muddling hedging about ' i d e n t i c a l ' 
and 'exac t ly  s im ilar '  .
Thirdly, can events, sanely conceived, as having both 
content and date, occur in reverse order? I t  is  evident tha t  
there are two questions h e re , and the whole of th is  chapter 
has been an attempt to show tha t ,  though they cannot, without 
f a l l a c i e s ,  be t rea ted  in complete i so la t io n ,  yet they are 
log ica l ly  separable, and that to see th is  is  to avoid some 
of the worst confusions tha t  have made the problem of i r r e v e r s ­
i b i l i t y  a byeword. The whole purpose of the d is t in c t io ns  made 
in th is  chapter i s  not to divide the ind iv is ib le  - to chop up 
'even ts '  into slii?es neatly  labe lled  'Bate ' and ' Content' l ike 
sandwiches a t  a party  - but to attempt to get clear what 
properly belongs to what, in the b e l ie f  tha t  only so can we
1. And cer ta in ly  the argument could not be worse chosen for  
the p la u s ib i l i ty  of my view. I think that  the supposition 
is  a thoroughly bad one. Compare Bergson's remarks,
"Creative Evolution", p . 385.
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gat c lear  on the more fundamental notion of 'event*.
The f i r s t  question i s  the one on which n ine-tenths of 
the ink shed over " i r r e v e r s ib i l i ty "  has been lavished. Granted 
the notion ol causa li ty ,  can the normal sequence of cause and 
e f fe c t  be reversed? "3varything unfolds in a ce r ta in  d irec tion ,  
and i f ,  by chance, we saw something produced in the opposite 
d irec tion  we should be immediately struck by i t  as by something 
contrary to the course of n a tu re . We need not, as a matter of 
f a c t ,  have here recourse to imaginations such as those of Wells; 
we can see th is  reversed world. To do th is  we have only to 
provide ourselves with a cinematography to in se r t  within i t  a 
re e l  of p ictures  representing moving phenomena - such as the 
jumping or the f a l l in g  of a horse, a drop of water dripping 
into a pond, the descent of a mass of stones or of sand - and 
to turn the crank tn the opposite d irec t io n .  I t  is  impossible 
to describe the strangeness of the impression which comes from 
the aspect of these p ic tu re s .  I t  is  not sorcery; but is  some­
thing more or less  like i t :  i t  i s  a world manifestly absurd, 
which presents no analogy with the one we know." Meyerson's 
remarks can be pa ra l le led  from any of a dozen w r i te rs ,  without 
any d i f f i c u l ty ,  and there is  no need to enlarge on the point,  
as i t  i s  immediately evident.
1. M e y e rson, " Iden ti ty  and R e a l i t y " , p .217. See a lso ,  Breton, 
a r t i c l e  on r e v e r s ib i l i t y  in "Les Mondes (Dec. 1875),
Fechner, "Vier Paradoxa"; and Karl Pearson, "Grammar of
Science", p . 394.
366
One l a s t  warning may, i t  is  hoped, reinforce the 
e f fec t  of previous r e i t e r a t io n s .  In dealing with causal re ­
la t io n s ,  there is  need fo r  the g rea tes t  care; fo r  causa li ty ,  
as well as abs trac t ing  from, has e s sen t ia l  reference to, par­
t i c u la r  events in time, and i t  would be useless to imagine 
tha t  the question of the 'befo re '  and ' a f t e r '  of cause and 
e f fe c t  (to mention only one temporal element) could be excluded 
a l tog e the r .  Ne ver th e le s s , with the exception of the regu la r i ty  
view of causation, i t  i s  generally thought tha t  there is  'more 
in '  causality  than mere temporal sequence, and though that  
'more' i s  ex trao rd inar i ly  d i f f i c u l t  to render e x p l ic i t ,  i t  i s  
usually  such as to j u s t i f y  ( in  however slack a use is  not the 
p o in t ) , some reference to ' l a w ' . I t  is  the appearance of the 
notion of ' law' that I wish to discuss here , and in so fa r  as 
i t  i s  possible to separate off the purely temporal element and 
examine the other without p a r t ic u la r  reference to time, th is  
w il l  be done. The warning is  against believing tha t  th is
separation can be f in a l .
When a s c ie n t i s t  says, "Acids turn litmus paper red",
he is  a sse r t ing  a general co rre la t ion  between two d if fe ren t  
kinds of th ings. These 'k inds '  are the re su l t  of h is  se lec ­
tion  of ce r ta in  aspects in which he is  in te res ted  from s i t u ­
ations th a t  may be d i f fe re n t :  thus what he c a l l s  'a c id s '  
d i f f e r  in many ways, and agree only in the one property
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which he, thinking i t  important, c a l ls  'a c id i ty * .  The a sse r ­
t ion of 'law' ( in  however vague a sense th is  is  in terpreted^) 
implies abs trac t ion ,  more or less  a rb i t r a ry ,  from p a r t ic u la r s  
of date, place, secondary q u a l i t i e s ,  and so on. To a ce r ta in  
ex ten t,  then, a l l  causa li ty  involves rep a rab i l i ty  of things, 
since i t  pos tu la tes  that the 'same' cause can occur over and 
over again. ( 'Same', of course, i s  used re la t iv e ly ,  even so 
fa r  as content is  concerned, fo r ,  as Whitehead showed in his  
P rinc ip le  of Convergence to Simplicity with Diminution of Ex- 
tan t ,  i t  is  only by taking smaller and smaller p ieces, and 
t re a t in g  them as iso la ted  systems, tha t  we can get exact qual­
i t a t iv e  s im i la r i ty . )  The dipping of litmus paper in carbolic 
acid by A a t  time t^ i s  compatible with the dipping of litmus 
paper in sulphuric acid by B at time tg* What causality  a s se r ts  
is  not so much the exact r e p e t i t io n  of a whole s i tu a t io n ,  as 
the re p e t i t io n  of ce r ta in  generalised elements - and content, 
no less  than date, i s  abs trac ted  from. Nobody would deny re ­
p a ra b i l i ty  of things in th is  schematised form, though there 
might be more doubt as to whether an exact rep l ica  of a given 
complex Bcëneewould ever occur. But there is  no need to reopen 
the question of rep a rab i l i ty  of things: the conclusions form­
er ly  reached should be reca l led ,  th a t ,  th eo re t ica l ly ,  xsqa
minimum that can be said is  su f f ic ie n t  fo r  my purpose.
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re p a ra b i l i ty  of things is  possible , but tha t  the p robab il i ty  
of exact r ep e t i t io n s  varies  from high, in simple cases l ike  - 
dropping a book, to low, in complex s i tu a t io n s .  But th is  alone 
does not give r e v e r s ib i l i t y .  All tha t  r e p a ra b i l i ty  a s se r ts  i s  
that a content ca^ recur: but r e v e r s ib i l i t y  involves the
A K R A M A Z Y  
fu r th e r  posit ion  that  the intervening stages between the
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i n i t i a l  and f in a l  positions (A and L) can be re traced  in 
reverse order. Here again i t  is  a matter of p l a u s ib i l i t y .  In 
the case of simple movements, fo r  instance, i t  seems easy to 
'go backwards' ,  and retrace one's s teps,  l ike the famous 
Duke of York and his ten thousand men, whereas complicated 
s i tu a t io n s  are ipuch more d i f f i c u l t .
But is  th is  so? Motion in mechanics is  rev e rs ib le ,  
but is  i t  in even the simplest s i tu a t ion s  in practice?  I 
move forward two paces, and back again immediately - but 
energy has been used in the process, and the energy used is. 
more than the work done in moving me forward and back again, 
fo r  heat has been generated which is  lo s t  beyond r e c a l l .  I t  
i s  wrong to murmur that entropy and time are bound up to ­
gether, and that here, where we are attempting to ignore 
temporal ch a ra c te r is t ic s ,  entropy should also be overlooked: 
for  tha t  would be to beg the question. I do not here intend
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to go into the physical question, which has been exce l len t ly  
discussed by Meyerson - but i t  seems to me s ig n if ican t  tha t  
physics should attempt to re la te  to each other two sources of 
departure from the ideals  of ra t io n a l  mechanics tha t  a r e , a t  
le a s t  a t  f i r s t  s igh t ,  very d i f fe ren t  from each other, loss of 
heat and time-order. Secondly, as well as the phenomena of loss ,  
there are also those of gain. As was pointed out in a former 
chapter, there is  some empirical evidence for  the view tha t  
novelties  do occur, and i t  i s  simpler in the long run to admit 
them than to indulge in the endless and unsa tis fac to ry  task of 
attempting to explain them away in terms of postu la ted  elements. 
Thirdly, as the laws of chance make i t  extremely improbable 
tha t  a complex s i tu a t io n  should ever recur in a l l  i t s  d e ta i l s ,  
i t  is  only in very simple cases tha t  recurrence need be con­
sidered as a p ra c t ic a l  p o s s ib i l i ty .
I t  would seem, then, tha t  even as regards content, 
there is  not a great deal of evidence in favour of reparab i l ­
i t y ,  except in very simple s i tu a t io n s ,  and there i s  s t i l l  less
in favour of r e v e r s ib i l i t y .
As applied to time-order, the notion ol r e v e rs ib i l -
i t y  is  unmeaning, and i t s  use depends upon a bad blunder,
which would lead to an in f in i te  regress .  I f  we think of time
!)
p l i c a t i o n  dans l e s  S c i e n c e s . "
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as moving, i t  is  a very easy step to the view that i t s  course 
is  ' l a i d  out' as i t  were behind i t ,  and then to the view tha t  
th is  course can be re traced  like movements in space. As Dunne 
quite co rrec t ly  pointed out, such a movement would i t s e l f  
' take t im e ',  and thus the f i r s t  step of his regress i s  taken. 
But the movement of time is  so d i f fe ren t  from ordinary move­
ment that i t  is  a misnomer to c a l l  i t  movement: where I d if fe r  
from Dunne is  not in the consequences to which such a view 
would lead, but in thinking i t ,  not a se lf -ev iden t  s ta r t in g -  
point,  but a f a l la c y .  The u n id i rec t io n a l i ty  of time i s  
fundamental, and i s  not to. be analysed away in terms of 
notions of i r r e v e r s ib i l i t y  which themselves derive from i t .
Events, then, must mediate between the bare 'happen­
ing' of time which transcends r e v e r s ib i l i ty ,  and the p oss i­
b i l i t y  of r e v e r s ib i l i t y  which genera lisa t ion  of content a f ­
fords .  Yet even i f  tha t  l a t t e r  p o s s ib i l i ty  were more than a 
p o s s ib i l i ty ,  the order of events could n^ver be r e v e r s ib le .
In so fa r  as events have an e s sen t ia l  reference to time, to 
that  degree they are infected  by the p e c u l ia r i t i e s  of time.
The sum of odd and even is  always odd, and s im ilar ly  the 
clash of ( theo re t ica l ly )  reversib le  and unreversed ser ies  
must always re su l t  in the v ic tory  of the l a t t e r .  In th is  
is  the true Triumph of Time.
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CHAPTER X I . BECOMING.
I t  i s  u n f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  what i s  p ro b a b ly  the  most 
c e l e b r a t e d  d e f i n i t i o n  of time sh o u ld  a l s o  be one of  the  w o r s t .  
A r i s t o t l e ' s  name has  g iv e n  countenance  to  i t ,  and i t  r e a p p e a r s  
w i th  maddening i t e r a t i o n  f 6 r  c e n t u r i e s ,  i n  such u n l i k e l y  p l a c e s  
as  t h e o l o g i c a l  t r e a t i s e s ,  and works on l i t e r a r y  c r i t i c i s m ,  as  
w e l l  a s  in  a l l  h i s t o r i e s  of  p h i lo s o p h y .  The u n s a t i s f a c t o r i n e s s  
of  th e  d e f i n i t i o n  of  time in  terms of  m otion  i s  no t  i n  any­
t h i n g  t h a t  can be d e f i n i t e l y  c o n t r o v e r t e d ,  but i n  i t s  o n e s id e d ­
n e s s ,  and in  the  s t u n t e d  view of time to  which i t  g iv e s  r i s e .
No one would deny t h a t  we cann o t  d i s t i n g u i s h  the  
p a ssag e  of time w i th o u t  c o u n t in g  movements, bu t  t h a t  a lone  
does no t  mean t h a t  time i t s e l f  i s  n o th in g  but "movement i n  so 
f a r  as  i t  ad m its  o f  e n u m e r a t io n " . A r i s t o t l e  h im s e l f  saw t h a t  
the  b e f o r e - a n d - a f t e r  r e l a t i o n  ( t h e  B s e r i e s )  i s  n o t  s p e c i f i c ­
a l l y  te m p o ra l ,  bu t  t h a t ,  on the  o t h e r  hand ,  u n l e s s  we a p p re ­
hend a b e fo re  and a f t e r  r e l a t i o n  ( a n d t h i s  i n v o lv e s  movement) 
we canno t  app rehend  the  passag e  of  t im e .  But A r i s t o t l e  wrongly  
o m i t t e d  ' p a s s a g e ' ,  and t h i s  meant t h a t  the  c o n d i t i o n s  of  our 
a p p re h e n s io n  of  d u r a t i o n  were c o n s id e r e d  by him to  be the  v e ry  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  the  n a tu r e  of  t i m e . To say t h a t  " t ime i s  
a  k in d  of  number" i s ,  from one p o i n t  of view, t r u e ,  but i t  i s  
c u r i o u s l y  i n s u f f i c i e n t .  I f  i t  were n o th in g  more, i t  would no t
1 . "M e ta p h y s ic s" ,  IV, \ X • For  P l o t i n u s '  c r i t i c i s m s  of  A r i s ­
t o t l e ' s  and s i m i l a r  t h e o r i e s ,  see "Enneads" ( t r a n s .
G u t h r i e , p p . 986 f f . ) .  •
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be what we mean by ' t i m e ' ,  f o r  t h e r e  i s  n o th in g  in  t h i s  v iew to  
ac c o u n t  f o r  the  asymmetry which i s  the  most im p o r ta n t  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c  o f  t im e ,  and t h i s  i s  the  main d e f e c t  i n  A r i s t o t l e ' s  v iew .
I t  sesms to  me t h a t  of the  two n o t i o n s ,  time and movement, the
fo rm er  i s  much the  more fu n d a m e n ta l .  3van i f  ( i g n o r i n g  'becom­
i n g '  f o r  the  p r e s e n t )  we a t t e m p t  to  a n a ly s e  time i n  te rm s  o f  
m o t io n ,  we can o n ly  p ro c e e d  w i th  the  h e lp  of the  n o t io n  o f
change,  and ^  d i s c o u n t i n g  the  s p a t i a l  a s p e c t  of movement.
Th is  i s  much more c o m p l ic a te d  th a n  the  o p p o s i t e  p r o c e s s  o f  
a n a l y s i n g  m otion  in  te rm s o f  change or t im e ,  and s p a c e ,  and
1
d e s c r i b i n g  i t ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  as  "change g e n e r a t e d  i n  s p a c e . "
B u t ,  s e c o n d ly ,  t h e r e  i s  a  h e a v i e r  coun t  a g a i n s t  th e  d e f i n i t i o n  
o f  t ime i n  te rm s  of movement. 3ven i f  we a g r e e d  to  p e r fo rm  the  
c o m p l ic a te d  p r o c e s s  of  a n a ly s i n g  d u r a t i o n  by m otion ,  the  f u r t h e r  
d i f f i c u l t y  rem ains  of  th e  'becom ing '  o f  t im e .  This  canno t  be 
a n a ly s e d  a s  m o t ion ,  e x c e p t  i n  a  s p e c i a l i s e d  and ( I  th in k )  a 
th o ro u g h ly  bad s e n s e . For  such 'movement' ( o f  the  ' n o w ' , of  
the  ' p r e s e n t '  ' i n t o '  ' t h e  f u t u r e ' )  i s  no t  m otion  th ro u g h  sp ace ,  
which i s  the  o n ly  m otion  we can u n d e r s t a n d  u n l e s s  we_ a l -  
r e a d y  p r e s u p p o s in g  time and becom ing; and e v e r y th in g  i s  a s  i n ­
e x p l i c a b l e  a s  © v e r re fo r  the  e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  onJiy v e r b a l . Wha^ 
i s  i t  th rou gh  which becoming, i f  i t  i s  a n a ly s e d  as  m otion ,
' becomes '?  The q u e s t i o n  i s  u n an sw e rab le ,  f o r  i t  i s  n o n s e n s i c a l ,
1 .  The o p p o s i t e  view i s  t a k e n  by ¥ .K .  C l i f f o r d ,  (L e c tu r e s  and 
A s s a y s " , I . ,  p . 2 6 2 ) .
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and r a s t s  upon a v i c i o u s  c o n c e p t io n  o f  t ime and change - a 
c o n c e p t io n  which l e a d s  s t r a i g h t  to  an i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s • 
ÎT e v e r th e le s s ,  s in c e  th e  ’ hecoming» of  time as u l t i m a t e  and 
i r r e d u c i b l e  i s  f a r  from being u n i v e r s a l l y  a c c e p t e d ,  and i s  
in d e e d  what i s  i n  q u e s t i o n  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  i t  would be a m is ­
take  to  r e l y  too  much upon t h i s  argument a t  the  p r e s e n t  s t a g e .  
I t  i s  i n c lu d e d  h e re  as  an added r e a s o n ,  to  some p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  
f o r  r e j e c t i n g  any d e f i n i t i o n  of  time i n  term s of m o t ion :  f o r  
the  o t h e r s ,  t h a t  i t  i s  cumbrous and c o m p l ic a te d ,  sh o u ld  be 
s u f f i c i e n t .
What, t h e n ,  of change? Can time be c o m p l e t e l y  ana­
l y s e d  in  terms of change? and can we deny, as Me T ag g a r t  does ,  
t h a t  t h e r e  c o u ld  be time in  a c h a n g e le s s  u n i v e r s e ?  I t  i s  c e r ­
t a i n l y  p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  i n c o n c e iv a b le ,  a s  has  been p o i n t e d  ou t  
over and over  a g a in ,  t h a t  t h e r e  sh o u ld  be c o n s c io u s n e s s  o f  
t ime w i th o u t  change,  f o r  we can on ly  apprehend  d u r a t i o n  a g a i n s t  
a background of change* Y et ,  i t  may be s a i d ,  i t  i s  a l l  the  
same l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h e r e  sh o u ld  be t im e ,  even though 
we co u ld  n ev e r  be co n sc io u s  of  i t .  I t  i s  no t  im p o ss ib le  t h a t  
the  u n iv e r s e  whould be a s t a t i c ,  c h a n g e le s s  w h o le , l i k e  a 
c h i l d ' s  ru b b e r  b a l l  l y i n g  l o s t  and f o r g o t t e n ,  and t h a t  t ime 
sh o u ld  n e v e r t h e l e s s  'g o  o n ' ,  as  i t  does w h i le  the  b a l l  l i e s
u n to u ch ed ,  unchang ing ,  among the  n e t t l e s .
This  i s  a th o ro u g h ly  u n d e s i r a b l e  v iew, and depends 
on a sh o ck in g  h y p o s t a t i s a t i o n  of  t ime i n t o  a t h i n g  i n  i t s e l f ,
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a p a r t  from the  u n iv e r s e  of e v e n t s .  Time i s  n o t  an a b s t r a c t  
metronome p la c e d  sn ug ly  o u t s id e  the  u n i v e r s e ,  and m easu r ing  
mundane e v e n ts  by i t s  t i c k i n g ; i t  i s  no t  som eth ing  t h a t  i s  
l o g i c a l l y  in d ep en d e n t  of  the  u n i v e r s e :  i f  i t  w ere ,  the  u n i v e r s e  
would n o t  be ' a l l  t h a t  i s ' ,  and so would n o t  be th e  u n i v e r s e .
We a re  back a t  the  dub ious  e q u i v o c a t i o n s  of  K a n t ' s  F i r s t  
Antinom y.
The s u p p o s i t i o n ,  t h e n ,  i s  f a l s e :  i f  n o th in g  changed, 
n o t  o n ly  would t h e r e  be no c o n s c io u s n e s s  o f  t im e ,  t h e r e  would 
he no t im e .  Change in v o lv e s  t im e ,  but  e q u a l l y ,  time in v o lv e s  
change:  the  two a re  c o i m p l i c a n t .  Are th e y ,  t h e n ,  e q u i v a l e n t ?  
U l t i m a t e l y ,  p e r h a p s ,  yes  : bu t  we f i n d  i t  u s e f u l  to  use the  two 
words to  show t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  a s p e c t s  a r e  be in g  s t r e s s e d . ' Change' 
i s  u sed  when we want to  emphasize th e  c o n t e n t ,  the  ' w h a t ' :
' Time' i s  u sed  when we a r e  d e a l in g  w i t h  the  medium, the  ' i n  
which ' of  change .  I  use the  word 'medium' q u i t e  d e l i b e r a t e l y  
though aware of  th e  d an ge rs  to  which i t s  misuse i s  open: l i k e  
the  e t h e r ,  time i s  l i a b l e  to  have s u b s t a n t i a l  q u a l i t i e s  a t ­
t r i b u t e d  to  i t ,  and to  become, i n  M a r i t a i n ' s  p l e a s a n t  p h r a s e , 
a  p la c e  where we p u t  a l l  our b l a c k e s t  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  o u t  to  
p a s t u r e  I N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  seems to  me v i t a l  to  take  a v e ry  
s im ple  view of  time as t h a t  i n  which e v e n t s  happen,  r i s k i n g  the  
p o s s i b l e  misuse of ' i n  which*,  r a t h e r  th a n  b l u r r i n g  i t s  u s e ­
f u l n e s s  by a t o o - f a c i l e  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  w i th  c h a n g e . Time and
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change, th e n ,  though u l t i m a t e l y  i n s e p a r a b l e ,  emphasize d i f f e r ­
e n t  a s p e c t s .  I s  i t  s e n s i b l e  to  a sk  which a s p e c t  i s  the  more 
fu n d a m e n ta l ,  and i f ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  time can be a n a ly s e d  o t h e r  
th an  m e th o d o l o g ic a l l y ,  i n  term s of  change? I  doubt i t .
Th is  i s  where the  im portance  o f  the  q u e s t i o n  of  
' b e c o m in g ' ,  w i th  which the  r e s t  o f  t h i s  c h a p te r  w i l l  be con­
c e rn e d ,  e n t e r s  i n .  I f  we were to  a s s e r t  a fu ndam en ta l  and i r ­
r e d u c i b l e  becoming, we sh o u ld  commit o u r s e l v e s  to  the  view 
t h a t  q u a l i t a t i v e  change (what Broad c a l l s  'c h a n g e s  i n  t i m e ' )  
i s  i n s u f f i c i e n t  a s  a  c o r r e l a t e  to  what we mean by ' t i m e ' ,  and 
t h a t  a fu n d a m e n ta l ly  d i f f e r e n t  type o f  change i s  a l s o  r e q u i r e d .
'Becoming' i s  commonly u sed  i n  two s e n s e s ,  which, 
though co n n e c te d ,  a re  no t  the  same. B es ides  i t s  normal use i n  
ev e ry d ay  l i f e ,  i t  i s  a l s o  u sed  by Bergson and Broad in  a  semi- 
t e c h n i c a l  s e n s e .  When Broad, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  a s s e r t s  t h a t  the  
f u t u r e  " i s  n o th in g  a t  a l l " ,  t h e r e  i s  a sense  i n  which t h i s  i s  
so o b v io u s ly  t r u e  as  t o  seem t r i M a l .  Quite  e v i d e n t l y ,  p a r t  
o f  what we mean by an e v e n t ' s  be in g  f u t u r e  ( i s )  t h a t  i t  does 
n o t  e x i s t  now. Nobody d e n ie s  the  n o n - e x i s t e n c e  of  the  f u t u r e  
i n  t h i s  s e n s e :  what many have d e n ie d  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  any more
to  i t  th a n  t h a t .
On the  o th e r  hand,  we m ight i n t e r p r e t  the  s t a t e m e n t
" th e  f u t u r e  i s  n o th in g  a t  a l l " ,  i n  a n o th e r  way, and t h i s  i s
1 .  A d e f i n i t i o n ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  l i k e  "The f u t u r e  i s  r e a l i t y
which i s  no t  made and i s  no t  y e t  be ing  made" ( 0  g e t s  no­
w here .  (F a w c e t t ,  "Divine Im agin ing"  p . l 5 0 ) .
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the i n t e r e s t i n g  one .  In  the  l e s s  e x c i t i n g  sense  above, the  p a s t ,  
e q u a l l y  .^ ith  the  f u t u r e ,  ( i s )  "n o th in g "  -  f o r  i t  f o l lo w s  from 
the  d e f i n i t i o n  of  p a s t  and f u t u r e  t h a t  th ey  a re  d i s t i n c t  from 
the p r e s e n t  - bu t  i n  t h i s  new se n s e ,  p a s t  and f u t u r e  a re  no t  
a d m i t t e d  to  be on the same p l a n e .
In  a l l  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  i t  i s  e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  h a rd  
to  keep c l e a r  i n  our minds what i s  mere t a u t o l o g y ,  what i s  
due to  our s u b j e c t i v e  l i m i t a t i o n s ,  and what i s  g e n u in e ly  im­
p o r t a n t ,  and y e t  i t  i s  v i t a l  t h a t  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n c e s  sh ou ld  be 
k e p t  i n  mind. Arguments from ' s u b j e c t i v e  l i m i t a t i o n s ' ,  f o r  
example,  cu t  b o th  ways: we have no r e a s o n  to  suppose t h a t  the  
w or ld  r e a l l y  i s  what we i n e v i t a b l y  b e l i e v e  i t  to  be ,  o r  t h a t  
t h e r e  ' m us t '  be an o n t o l o g i c a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between p a s t  and 
f u t u r e  because  we have knowledge of th e  one i n  a way i n  which 
we have no t  knowledge of  the  o t h e r ;  b u t ,  on the  o t h e r  hand, 
i t  i s  i n t e l l e c t u a l  s u i c i d e  to  beg in  d o u b t in g  our on ly  means 
o f  knowledge. G ran ted  t h a t  m e tap h y s ic s  may be v i t i a t e d  by the  
e g o c e n t r i c  p re d ic a m e n t :  I  y e t  f a i l  to  see t h a t  t h e r e  i s  any 
sense  w h a tso ev e r  i n  dreaming of  M etaphys ics  a s  an i d e a l  Thing- 
i n - i t s e l f .  Hence, in  the  absence  of  ev idence  to the  c o n t r a r y , 
t h a t  our c o g n i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s  to  p a s t  and f u t u r e  a re  d i f f e r e n t  
i s  prim a f a c i e  ev idence  to  the  d i s t i n c t i o n ' s  between them be­
ing  a genuine one .  And t h a t  our c o g n i t i v e  r e l a t i o n s  a re  
d i f f e r e n t , v e ry  few, i f  any ,  have e v e r  a t t e m p te d  to  deny.
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Becoming, i n  the  i n t e r e s t i n g  s e n s e ,  i s  co n c e iv ed  o f  
as  an a lo go u s  to  g ro w th .  Of cou rse  t h i s  i s  a  bad s t a t e m e n t ,  f o r  
s t r i c t l y ,  growth i s  an example of  becoming, and to  r e v e r s e  t h e  
two i s  to  p u t  the  c a r t  b e fo re  th e  h o r s e .  But t h a t  J u s t  i l l u s ­
t r a t e s  the  d i f f i c u l t y  which we a re  i n :  th e  c o n c e p t io n s  w i th  
which we a re  d e a l i n g  a r e ,  i t  i s  c la im ed ,  so fundam en ta l  t h a t  
any a n a lo g y  i s  bound to  be c i r c u l a r .  A l l  the  same, som eth ing  
has  to  be done, and c i r c u l a r i t y  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  v i c i o u s :  
the  u p h o ld e r s  of  such a view a re  bound to  s t a r t  somewhere, and 
g rowth  has  the  advan tage  t h a t  i t  i s  im m ed ia te ly  f a m i l i a r  to  
a l l ,  even though ,  on more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  l e v e l s ,  a s  p h y s i c i s t s  
and b i o l o g i s t s ,  we ig n o re  i t  o r  e x p l a i n  i t  away i n  te rm s o f  a  
p o s t u l a t e d  c o n s e r v a t i o n  t h e o r y .  On Monday, a  sh oo t  o f  g re e n  i s  
v i s i b l e  above the  s o i l .  On Tuesday, i t  i s  an i n c h  above the  
g round ,  on Wednesday, two i n c h e s .  (We a re  supposing  i t  to  be 
o f  th e  mushroom f a m i l y l )  We say of  t h i s  sh o o t  t h a t  i t  has  
grown. Now th e r e  i s  no need to  go a g a in  h e re  i n t o  the  ques­
t i o n ,  p a r t i a l l y  d i s c u s s e d  i n  an e a r l i e r  c h a p t e r ,  how f a r  i t ^  
i s  p l a u s i b l e  to  suppose t h a t  what we c a l l  i t s  * development* 
i s  i m p l i c i t  i n  i t s  p a s t  s t a t e ,  and n o t  a  r e a l  * development* 
i n  any p ro p e r  sense  of  th e  word: i n s t e a d  I  s h a l l  make t h r e e  
b r i e f  re m a rk s .  F i r s t l y ,  our b e l i e f  i n  g row ^  i s  o r i g i n a l ,  and 
the  a t t e m p t  to  reduce  e v e r y th in g  to  a sum i n  s im ple  a d d i t i o n  
and s u b t r a c t i o n  i s  a  l a t e r  dev ice  t h a t  ma^ have no more thaui
1. Not always r e a l i s i n g  what t h a t  i m p l i e s .
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m e th o d o lo g ic a l  u t i l i t y . I t  i s  th e  p ro d u c t  of  too  much l e a r n i n g .  
S eco nd ly ,  a l th o u g h  f o r  s i m p l i c i t y  the  example c o n s id e r s  on ly  
the  growth ol one g re en  sho o t  as  measured i n  sp a c e ,  growth  i s
n o t  c o n f in e d  to  mere e l o n g a t i o n  of  the  a l r e a d y  g iv e n ,  l i k e  th e
1
A m e r ic a n 's  chewing gum. I n  t im e ,  a f lo w e r  w i l l  come. Growth i s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  co n nec ted  w i th  n o v e l t y .  T h i r d l y ,  even i f  the  p r e ­
s e n t  s t a t e  i s  i m p l i c i t  i n  the  p a s t ,  t h a t  p roves  n o th in g  a t  a l l  
abou t  a f u t u r e  s t a t e ,  u n l e s s  we p re jud g e  the  v e ry  q u e s t i o n  a t  
i s s u e ,  which i s  the  l e g i t i m a c y  o f  the  i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  o f  ( p a s s ­
i n g '  w i t h  ' p a s s e d ' .
On the  o t h e r  hand ,  however, i t  must no t  be f o r g o t t e n  
t h a t  the  a n a lo g y  h a l t s  and f a i l s  i n  some r e s p e c t s .  I t  i s  
e v i d e n t  t h a t  i f  we took  i t  s e r i o u s l y ,  we sh o u ld  be committed 
to  h o ld in g  t h a t  p a s t  and p r e s e n t  have the  same f o o t i n g ,  i n  
o p p o s i t i o n  to  the  f u t u r e ,  j u s t  as  Monday's in c h  of  g re en  i s  
a s  much ' t h e r e '  a s  what i s  ' now' be ing  added ,  i n  c o n t r a d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  to  what i s  ' n o t  y e t '  t h e r e . I f  u p h o ld e r s  of 'becom­
i n g '  a re  bound to  take  t h i s  s u b s t a n t i a l i s e d  view o f  the  p a s t ,  
i t  w i l l  be a s e r i o u s  o b j e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  th e  p l a u s i b i l i t y  of 
' b e c o m in g ' . N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e r e  i s  a s e n s e ,  e a s i e r  p e rh a p s  to  
see th an  to  e x p r e s s ,  in  which i t  i s  j u s t i f i a b l e  to  t a l k  of
1 .  Th is  h a rm les s  p h ra se  seems to  me v e ry  s i g n i f i c a n t .
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3
the p a s t  as ' t h e r e '  i n  a way i n  which the  f u t u r e  i s  n o t  ' t h e r e l  
I  use the  vague e x p r e s s i o n  ' t h e r e '  to  a v o id  ' e x i s t i n g ' ,  or  
' p r e s e n t ' ,  o r  ' i s ' ,  a l l  of which invoke id e a s  of  grammar which 
a re  i r r e l e v a n t  to  the q u e s t i o n ,  hut  which , i f  u sed ,  would l e a d  
to  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of  t e n s e ,  and confuse  th e  i s s u e . I t  i s  v i t a l  
to  see t h a t  we a re  no t  concerned  now w i th  the  mere ' t a u t o l o g o u à  
use of  t e n s e  e x p r e s s i o n s ;  were t h a t  the  c a s e ,  i t  would be s e l f ­
c o n t r a d i c t o r y  to  t a l k  of  p a s t  e v e n ts  as  e x i s t i n g  in  some s e n s e ,
j u s t  as  i t  would be p e r f e c t l y  t r i v i a l  to  a s s e r t  'b e c o m in g . '
rut
P u t  b r i e f l y ,  the  p o i n t  i s  t h a t  the  sense  in  which the  p a s t
" e x i s t s "  i s  i n  no way r e d u c i b l e  to  any s t a t e m e n t  about  what a t
p r e s e n t  ^ s . ( T h e  d e n i a l  of  t h i s  l e a d s  to  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of
the  O n to lo g ic a l  Argument.)  I t  may be a s s e r t e d ,  o r  d e n ie d ,  t h a t
t h i s  sense  i s  w orth  b o t h e r i n g  a b o u t .  I f  i t  be d e n ie d ,  c a d i t
q u a e s t i o .  I f  i t  be a s s e r t e d ,  as I  t h i n k  i t  may v e ry  w e l l  be,
th en  h a l f  of what the s u p p o r t e r s  of  'becom ing '  m a in t a in  has
been g r a n t e d .  As f o r  the  o t h e r  h a l f ,  t h a t  the  f u t u r e  ' i s '  no t  
2
i n  the  sense  i n  which the p a s t  ' i s ' , the  arguments i n  i t s
1 .  "F u tu re  and p a s t  a l i k e  a re  n o t ,  but the  manner of t h e i r  n o t -  
be ing  i s  no t  the  same." (L o tz e ,  "M e ta p h y s ic s" ,  p . 3 2 5 ) .  Inge
( "P h i lo so p h y  of  P l o t i n u s " )  r e l a t e s  the  d i f f e r e n c e  to  d i f f e r ­
e n t  a t t i t u d e s  of  w i l l  to  p a s t  and f u t u r e .
2 .  The p o i n t  i s  so im p o r ta n t  and so o f t e n  co n fu sed  t h a t  r e i t e r ­
a t i o n  may be f o r g i v e n .  The ' i s '  i s  no t  the  o r d i n a r y  tem pora l  
' i s '  o f  p r e s e n t  t im e :  and to  say  t h a t  the f u t u r e  ' i s '  no t
in  t h i s  e a s y  sense  i s ,  so f a r  from be ing  an argument f o r  
a s s e r t i n g  ' becoming' in  any im p o r ta n t  s e n s e ,  t o t a l l y  
i r r e l e v a n t  to  i t .
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f a v o u r  a r e ,  from the v e ry  n a tu re  o f  th e  c a s e ,  p r o b a b i l i t y  
ones o n ly .  F i r s t l y , t h e r e  i s  the  commonsense b e l i e f  i n  the  
d i f f e r e n c e  between p a s t  and f u t u r e , and in  the  absence  of p r o o f  
to  the c o n t r a r y ,  i t  o f f e r s  a p re su m p t io n  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  such a 
d i f f e r e n c e . S econ d ly ,  u n l e s s  you a l lo w  becoming, t h e r e  a p p e a r s  
to  be v e ry  l i t t l e  p o i n t  in  i n s i s t i n g  upon the  u n re v e r s e d n e s s  
o f  t im e .  I s  s u c c e s s io n  a lon e  enough to  c o n s t i t u t e  t im e? In  
o t h e r  w ords ,  i s  the  A s e r i e s ,  w i t h  i t s  asymmetry and c u r io u s  
u n i d i r e c t i o n a l i t y ,  m ere ly  th e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  of our own busy 
b r a i n s ,  and i s ,  ' o b j e c t i v e l y '  (w ha tever  t h a t  may mean I ) the B 
s e r i e s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  t im e?  T h a t ,  of  c o u r s e ,  r a i s e s  the  d i f ­
f i c u l t  and p o s s i b l y  m e an in g le s s  problem  as  to  w he the r  th e r e  
would s t i l l  be time i n  a m in d le s s  u n i v e r s e ,  and the  ( a t  the 
l e a s t )  u n p r o f i t a b l e  s p e c u l a t i o n  as  to  how and why such ’ t im e '  
would d i f f e r  from what we poor  e g o c e n t r i c  m o r t a l s  c a l l  t ime I 
You a re  committed to  t h i s  u n l e s s  you adm it  ' b e c o m i n g ' . T h i rd ­
l y ,  ' i r r a t i o n a l '  as  such  becoming i s ,  t h e r e  i s  much i n  the 
w or ld  t h a t  i s  i r r a t i o n a l .  The p o s t u l a t i o n  of  s e l f - c o n t a i n e d  
m ech an ica l  sy s tem s ,  of  machines of  p e r f e c t  e f f i c i e n c y ,  where ,  
so to  speak ,  an e x a c t  b a lan c e  s h e e t  can be drawn up t h a t  
checks e x a c t l y ,  i s  a  h a rm le s s  l i t t l e  game which h u r t s  nobody, 
and which can give much a e s t h e t i c  p l e a s u r e .  But,  a p a r t  from 
our a e s t h e t i c  and e t h i c a l  f e e l i n g s ,  which, a s  R u s s e l l  has  
a s s u r e d  u s ,  a re  q u i t e  i r r e l e v a n t ,  t h e r e  i s  no p a r t i c u l a r
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r e a s o n  why we sh o u ld  e x p e c t  the  u n i v e r s e  to  conform to  our 
i d e a l  of the  P e r f e c t  Balance S h e e t .  I t  seems to  me t h a t  r a t h e r  
.t^han adm it  unknown x ' s  by the  back door a t  the  l a s t  m inute  to 
make our a c c o u n ts  t a l l y ,  we sh o u ld  do w e l l  to  adm it  them a t  
the b e g in n in g .  I f  t h e r e  i s  i r r a t i o n a l i t y ,  i t  may as  w e l l  be 
a d m i t t e d  f i r s t  a s  l a s t :  f o r  p h i lo s o p h y  i s  n o t  s c i e n c e ,  and 
though th e r e  i s  some j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  the  s c i e n t i s t  who un­
sw e rv in g ly  seeks  f o r  the i d e a l  o f  a c o m p le te ly  ' r a t i o n a l '  
e x p l a n a t i o n ,  t h e r e  i s  none f o r  the  m e t a p h y s i c i a n . F o u r t h l y ,  
when a l l  i s  s a i d  and done, we do use the  n o t io n  of becoming, 
and f e e l  t h a t  we know what we mean by i t  ( u n t i l  we become 
o f e r - c r i t i c a l  and s o p h i s t i c a t e d ) . I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  see why 
th e r e  sh o u ld  be so r e a d y  an ac c e p ta n c e  o f ,  and f a m i l i a r i t y
w i t h ,  an e n t i r e l y  ungrounded n o t i o n ,  on the  p a r t  of  th e  p l a i n  
2
man.
A d m i t t in g ,  th e n ,  an i r r e d u c i b l e  ' b e c o m in g ' , what 
i s  the  r e s u l t  on the  s t a t u s  of  the  f u t u r e ?  F i r s t l y ,  such a 
view r e s u l t s , i n  an e s s e n t i a l  asymmetry between p a s t  and 
f u t u r e  : t h e r e  i s  a c o n t i n u a l  i n s t a b i l i t y  i n  the  t i m e - s e r i e s  i n  
the  d i r e c t i o n  of  the  f u t u r e . This  i n s t a b i l i t y  A lexander
1 .  As I ,  when a c h i l d ,  ' b a la n c e d '  my a c co u n ts  by "L o s t ,  ? i d " ,  
o r  "U naccountab ly  g a in e d ,  5d ."  There i s  some candour in  
the  'u n a c c o u n t a b l y '  t h a t  i s  a b s e n t  from too  many p h i l o s o -
2 .  As^Lotze p u t  i t ,  we must e i t h e r  adm it  ^ c o m i n g ,
the  becoming of  an u n r e a l  appearance  of Becoming I ( Meta­
p h y s ic s "  p . 10 5 ) .  The law of  I d e n t i t y ,  he i n s i s t s ,  on ly  says  
t h a t  a t h i n g  i s  what i t  i s ,  n o t  t h a t  i t  must a lways rem ain
so
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c o n c e iv e s  of  a s  a n i s u s  towards d e i t y :  Bergson t h i n k s  of  i t  
as  a c o n t i n u a l  p r o c e s s  of  c r e a t i o n ,  e v e r  e v o lv in g  new fo rm s .
But t h i s  i n s t a b i l i t y , as  w e l l  as  u rg in g  onwards to  e v e r  new 
and h i g h e r  fo rm s ,  i s  a l s o  d e s t r u c t i v e ,  a s  i s  w i t n e s s e d  by the 
common view t h a t  l i n k s  time w i t h  a t r a n s i e n c e  t h a t  i s  too  o f t e n  
p i t i f u l  -  "A l l  f l e s h  i s  g r a s s ,  and the  g o o d l in e s s  t h e r e o f  i s  
as  th e  f lo w e r  of  the f i e l d .  The g r a s s  w i t h e r e t h ,  the  f lo w e r  
f a d e t h  There i s  n o th in g  i n  e i t h e r  o f  th e s e  views t h a t
i s  i n  c o n f l i c t  w i th  commonsense: on the  c o n t r a r y ,  the  p l a i n  
man would r e a d i l y  ag ree  bo th  t h a t  time p a s s e s ,  and t h a t  ' i n  
t im e '  ( i n  t h a t  v e r y  s i g n i f i c a n t  l i t t l e  p h ra se  t h a t  was n o t i c e d  
e a r l i e r )  new t h i n g s  a re  c r e a t e d .  The i n s t a b i l i t y  of  t i m e , and 
the  e s s e n t i a l  d i f f e r e n c e  between the  s t a t u s  of  p a s t  and f u t u r e ,  
cannot  r i g h t l y  be i g n o r e d .  S eco nd ly ,  i t  makes more p l a u s i b l e ,  
though  i t  does n o t , t l  t h i n k ,  a b s o l u t e l y  n e c e s s i t a t e ,  a  view - 
such  as  B r o a d ' s ,  who h o ld s  t h a t  the f u t u r e  i s  ' n o th in g  a t  a l l '
-  i n  a  sense  which i s  v e ry  f a r  from be in g  t r i v i a l .  P ro o f  o f  
t h i s  p o s i t i o n ,  from the n a t u r e  of the  c a s e ,  i s  im p o s s ib le ,  
and when a l l  the  ev idence  f o r  and a g a i n s t  has  been summarised, 
i t  must be j u s t  a c c e p te d  o r  r e j e c t e d ,  f o r  an u l t i m a t e  d i s ­
agreem ent w i l l  have been r e a c h e d .
The f i r s t  o b j e c t i o n  t h a t  n a t u r a l l y  comes to  mind
when t o l d  t h a t  the  f u t u r e  i s  ' n o th in g  a t  a l l ’ , i s : -  "How, th e n .
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i s  i t  t h a t  we can and do make judgments abou t  the  f u t u r e ? "  As 
Broad c l e a r l y  saw, i t  i s  no answer to  t h i s  to  deny t h a t  our 
judgm ents  may be c e r t a i n  on es ,  and to  say  t h a t  p r e d i c t i o n  i s  
im p o ss ib le  -  "Our q u e s t i o n  i s  no t  w h e th e r  we can have c e r t a i n  
knowledge abou t  the  f u t u r e , but i s  the  p r i o r  q u e s t i o n ;  IVhat are  
we r e a l l y  t a l k i n g  abou t  when we p r o f e s s  to  make judgm ents  abou t  
the  f u t u r e , and what do we mean by the  t r u t h  or  f a l s i t y  of  
such judgm ents?"
Broad d e a l s  w i th  t h i s  v e ry  im p o r ta n t  q u e s t i o n  a t  
l e n g t h ,  and s u c c e s s f u l l y  on the  whole • B r i e f l y ,  h i s  argument 
i s ,  t h a t  s t a t e m e n t s  may have meaning even  though the  o b j e c t  
' a b o u t '  which th ey  are  made does no t  e x i s t .  We can g ive  meaning 
to  the s t a t e m e n t  "Puck has  t u r n e d  the  m i lk " ,  even though Puck 
does no t  e x i s t  and has  n ev e r  e x i s t e d .  S i m i l a r l y ,  Broad a rg u e s ,  
we can a t t a c h  meaning to  the  s t a t e m e n t  " I t  may r a i n  tomorrow", 
w i th o u t  h av in g  to  a t t r i b u t e  to  tomorrow some obscure  k in d  of  
' e x i s t e n c e '  a t  the  time when I  make the  ju d g m e n t . Second ly ,
Broad d i s t i n g u i s h e s  between what a judgment i s  a b o u t , and the 
f a c t  to  which the  judgment r e f e r s . The d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  c h a r a c t e r ­
i s t i c  of  judgm ents  ' a b o u t '  the  f u t u r e  (and  t h a t  which d i s t i n -  
g u i s h e s  them from judgm ents  ’ a b o u t ’ im ag ina ry  e n t i t i e s ,  which
A
do r e f e r  to  a  f a c t ,  even i f  i t  i s  a  n e g a t iv e  one ) ,  i s  t h a t
1 .  ’’S c i e n t i f i c  T hought" ,  p . 70 .
2 .  T h is  d o c t r i n e  of  n e g a t iv e  f a c t s  i s  no t  u n i v e r s a l l y  a c c e p te d .  
But i t  i s  p ro b a b le  t h a t  by a r e s t a t e m e n t  ol what i s ,  a f t e r  
a l l ,  n o t  v i t a l  to  h i s  main p o s i t i o n .  Broad co u ld  av o id  c r i t ­
i c i s m  on t h i s  s c o r e .  The same a p p l i e s  to  some r a t h e r  queer  
language a t  the  top  of  p . 72, w i th  a dubious  use of ’ r e a l  .
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t h e r s  i s  no f a c t  to  which th ey  r e f e r  a t  the  time when th e y  
a re  made."They are  t h e r e f o r e  a t  t h a t  time n e i t h e r  t r u e  nor 
f a l s e .  They w i l l  become t r u e  o r  f a l s e  when t h e r e  i s  a f a c t  f o r  
them to  r e f e r  t o :  and a f t e r  t h i s  th e y  w i l l  rem ain  t r u e  o r  f a l s e ,  
as  th e  case may be,  f o r  ev e r  and e v e r .  . . .  ' J u d g m e n ts '  which 
p r o f e s s  to  be abo u t  the  f u t u r e  a r e  no t  genuine  judgm ents  when 
t h e y  a re  made, bu t  m ere ly  e n jo y  a c o u r t e s y  t i t l e  by a n t i c i p a ­
t i o n ,  l i k e  the e l d e s t  sons of  the  h ig h e r  n o b i l i t y  d u r in g  th e  
l i f e t i m e  of  t h e i r  f a t h e r s . "  I t  sh o u ld  be n o t i e e d  t h a t  the  tempo^ 
.a l  language in  t h i s  p assag e  i s  n o t ,  a s  i t  might seem a t  f i r s t  
s i g h t ,  a d e f e c t ,  s in c e  B ro a d 's  whole p o i n t  i s  t h a t  the  r e f e r ­
ence to  the  f u t u r e  i s  u l t i m a t e  and i r r e d u c i b l e .  So f a r ,  ex­
c e p t  f o r  minor d u b i e t i e s  of s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  do no t  a f f e c t  the  
main argum ent ,  he has  made ou t  a good case f o r  h i m s e l f . But xhau 
when he goes on to  a n a ly s e  " I t  has  r a i n e d " ,  " I t  i s  r a i n i n g  now", 
and " I t  w i l l  r a i n " ,  w i t h  a view to  showing t h a t  the  t e n s e -  
r e f e r e n c e  in  the  l a t t e r  i s  i r r e d u c i b l e ,  I  cannot  t h i n k  t h a t  he 
has  p ro v ed  h i s  p o i n t ,  f o r  r e a s o n s  which were e x p la in e d  i n  an 
e a r l i e r  c h a p t e r .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  would be f o o l i s h  to  a t t a c h  
too  much im portance  to  t h i s .  A d m i t te d ly ,  i t  would be a u s e f u l  
s h o r t  c u t  f o r  Broad i f  he c o u ld  show t h a t  even our fo rm u la ­
t i o n s  canno t  w h o l ly  e l i m i n a t e  a r e f e r e n c e  to  the  f u t u r e .  But 
even i f  t h a t  i s  n o t  so ,  h i s  e s s e n t i a l  view i s  v e ry  f a r  from
1. Op.c i t .  p . 73 .  See a l s o  M cTaggart’ s c r i t i c i s m s  of Broad 
("N a tu re  of E x i s t e n c e "  s e c .  334 e t  s e q .J  •
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b e in g  d i s p ro v e d ,  s i n c e ,  as  he h im s e l f  p o in t e d  out  e a r l i e r ,  
v e r b a l  j u g g l i n g  i s  e a s y .  "Much of  th e  t r o u b l e  about  Time and 
Change comes from our o b s t i n a t e  a t t e m p ts  to  reduce  such ju d g e ­
ments to  the c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  form. Any judgment can be v e r b a l l y  
reduced  to  t h i s  form . We can reduce "S i s "  to  "S i s  e x i s t e n t " .  
But the  r e d u c t io n  i s  p u r e ly  v e r b a l ,  and those  who take  i t  
s e r i o u s l y  la n d  i n  the  s lo u gh s  of the  O n to lo g ic a l  Argument. 
S i m i l a r l y ,  "S i s  f u t u r e "  i s  v e r b a l l y  a judgment t h a t  a s c r i b e s
a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  to  an e v e n t  S .  But,  i f  we a re  r i g h t ,  t h i s
1
must be a m i s t a k e . "  B ro a d 's  view seems to  me im p o ss ib le  to  
prove by such a s h o r t  c u t  as  t h i s  would be,  f o r ,  as  was sug­
g e s t e d  i n  the e a r l i e r  c h a p t e r ,  i t  i s  d o u b t f u l  w hether  i t  i s  
e v e r  p o s s i b l e  to  prove a m e ta p h y s ic a l  t h e o ry  of time by the 
use of s t r i c t  l o g i c a l  t e n s e l e s s  language - bu t  t h a t  i s  no
argument a g a i n s t  i t .
A more im p o r ta n t  q u e s t i o n  i s  how, on h i s  t h e o r y ,  we
can a s s e r t  g l i b l y  t h a t  my s t a t e m e n t  " I t  w i l l  r a i n  tomorrow" 
w i l l  be conf irm ed  or  r e f u t e d  by what happens tomorrow. I t  
would seem t h a t  t h i s  i s  i t s e l f  a p r o p o s i t i o n  about  the  f u t u r e ,  
and t h a t  t h e r e  i s  danger of an i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s .  B ro a d 's  
answer to  t h i s  i s  s a t i s f a c t o r y ; -  "With any judgment we can 
t e l l  what k in d  of f a c t  w i l l  v e r i f y  or  r e f u t e  i t ,  as soon as 
we know what the judgment i s  abou t  and what k in d  of  a s s e r t i o n  
i t  makes. But no amount of  i n s p e c t i o n  of a judgment i t s e l f
1 .  Op.c i t .  p . 6 8 - 9 .
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w i l l  show us p a r t i c u l a r  f a c t  which makes i t  t r u e  i f  i t  i s  
t r u e  and f a l s e  i f  i t  i s  f a l s e .  There i s  t h e r e f o r e  no i n c o n s i s t ­
ency between the  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  we can know a t  once what k in d  
of  f a ^  would v e r i f y  a judgment abou t  the  f u t u r e ,  and the s t a t e ­
ment t h a t  such judgments  do no t  r e f e r  to  any f a c t  when made."
This  Q x p o s i t io n  oi Broad can s u i t a b l y  be ended w i th  
the  ad v an tag es  which he b e l i e v e s  he g a in s  by h i s  t h e o r y .  F i r s t ­
l y ,  he c la im s t h a t  the d i f f e r e n c e s  of our c o g n i t iv e  a t t i t u d e s  
to  p a s t  and f u t u r e ,  o th e rw ise  v e ry  h a rd  to  e x p l a i n ,  a re  accoun ted  
f o r  on h i s  p r i n c i p l e s .  " I t  i s  commonly h e ld  t h a t  t h e r e  can be 
no c e r t a i n  knowledge abou t  the  f u t u r e ,  bu t  t h a t  a l l  judgments 
which p r o f e s s  to  be abou t  i t  c o n s i s t  of  more or l e s s  p ro b a b le  
c o n j e c t u r e s  made by ana logy  w i th  the  p a s t .  Now we do no t  always 
r e c o g n i s e  how odd our c e r t a i n t y  about  t h i s  i s  on the  assum ption  
t h a t  the f u t u r e  r e a l l y  i s  som ething  t h a t  has " f u tu r e  e x i s t e n c e "  
a s  th e  p a s t  r e a l l y  i s  something t h a t  has " p a s t  e x i s t e n c e . "
I f  the f u t u r e  e x i s t ,  and be j u s t  t h a t  p a r t  of the  e x i s t e n t  
which succeeds  the  p r e s e n t ,  i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  see why a p r e s e n t  
a c t  of c o g n i t i o n  might no t  know an ev e n t  which i s  l a t e r  th an  
i t s e l f ,  j u s t  a s  i t  can know some e v e n ts  which a re  e a r l i e r  th an  
i t s e l f . "  I t  would, of c o u r se ,  be a m is take  to  suppose t h a t  
t h i s  i s  an argument f o r  h i s  view, ex c e p t  v e ry  i n d i r e c t l y .
S econd ly ,  Broad c la im s  t h a t  he can^void  the  v i c i o u s  
i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s  c r i t i c i s e d  by M cTaggart : -  " I s  t h e r e  a n y th in g  
l O p . c i t .  p . 74. 2 .  I b i d .  p . 78.
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c o n t r a d i c t o r y  i n  the f a c t  t h a t  Queen A nn e 's  d e a th  has been 
p r e s e n t  and i s  now p a s t ?  There v e ry  w e l l  might be i f  we had to  
take  the  change of  an e v e n t  in  r e s p e c t  to  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
of  p r e s e n t n e s s  and p a s t n e s s  a s  ana logous  to  the  change of  a 
s i g n a l  lamp i n  r e s p e c t  to  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of  r e d  and g r e e n .  
But we have seen  t h a t  t h a t  cannot  be done, and t h a t  the  second 
k ind  of change depends on the f i r s t .  . . .  What happens when 
Lord B o lingbroke  swears i s  no t  t h a t  something which was f a l s e  
o f  A nne 's  d e a th  becomes t r u e  o f  i t ,  bu t  t h a t  something becomes
t r u e  of  A nne 's  d e a th  which was b e fo re  n e i t h e r  t r u e  nor f a l s e  
1
of i t . "  I t  seems to  me t h a t  Broad has j u s t i f i e d  h i s  c la im  to  
have dem olished  the  need f o r  a r e g r e s s ,  and t h a t  t h e r e  i s  much 
to  be s a i d ,  bo th  m e ta p h y s i c a l l y  and from the  s t a n d p o i n t  of  
common s e n s e ,  f o r  the  view t h a t  the  f u t u r e  i s  n o th in g  a t  a l l .  
The r e s t  of  the  c h a p te r  w i l l  be tak en  up w i th  a d i s c u s s i o n  of  
two p o i n t s .  The f i r s t  i s  the  a n a l y s i s  of  p r o p o s i t i o n s  t h a t  
would commonly be s a i d  to  be ' a b o u t '  the  f u t u r e . The second 
i s  -  % a t  a re  we going to  do abou t  o t h e r  t h e o r i e s  of the
f u t u r e ?
A p r o p o s i t i o n  such as " U i th a r  he w i l l  come or  he 
w i l l  no t  come" need no t  d e t a i n  us lo n g .  I t  i s  e v id e n t  t h a t  
t h i s  i s  a  p u re ly  l o g i c a l  d i s j u n c t i o n ,  and we do n o t  need to  
have knowledge of the  f u t u r e  in  any sense  w ha tever  to  a t t a c h
2 ! I n  view o f^B road’ s e x c e l l e n t  t r e a tm e n t  of  t h i s  t o p i c ,  the  
remarks h e re  a re  to  be r e g a rd e d  on ly  as  supp lem en ta ry
h i s .
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meaning to  t h i s .
" E i t h e r  he w i l l  come, o r  he w i l l  w r i t e  to  e x p l a i n . "  
T h is ,  a g a in ,  i t  may be s a i d  i s  no t  a p r o p o s i t i o n  about  the  
f u t u r e ,  but a l o g i c a l  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  the  a s s e r t i o n  of  whose 
a c t u a l i s a t i o n  b r in g s  i n  the  r e f e r e n c e  to  the  f u t u r e .  I t  i s  im­
p l i c i t l y  assumed t h a t  the  d i s j u n c t i o n  i s  e x h a u s t i v e ,  and i f  
t h i s  i s  so ,  the  p r o p o s i t i o n c c a n ,  i t  i s  c la im ed ,  be e x h i b i t e d  
i n  a co m p le te ly  l o g i c a l  form . Suppose, however, t h a t  n e i t h e r  
a l t e r n a t i v e  was r e a l i s e d ,  the  a l t e r n a t i v e s  cou ld  no t  have been 
e x h a u s t i v e ,  and t h i s  was because our knowledge a t  the  time 
when we made the s t a t e m e n t  was i n c o m p l e t e . I f  I  say ,  "He w i l l  
come e i t h e r  on the  t r a i n  or  on the  b u s" ,  and I  am r i g h t ,  i n  
t h a t  he does come on one, t h a t  does no t  mean t h a t  I  ’knew' the 
f u t u r e . What i t  does mean i s  t h a t  my judgment has app rox im ated  
to  an e x h a u s t iv e  l o g i c a l  d i s j u n c t i o n ,  in  which the  r e f e r e n c e  
to  the  f u t u r e  i s  a t  a minimum, t h a t  i s ,  z e r o .  I f  I  am wrong, 
and he m isses  bo th  t r a i n  and bus,  and has  to  t e l e g r a p h ,  the  
d i s j u n c t i o n  was e v i d e n t l y  n o t  an e x h a u s t iv e  one.
But i t  sho u ld  be e v i d e n t  by now, t h a t  i f  the  a n a l y s i s  
s to p s  h e r e ,  i t  i s  ve ry  f a r  from being  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  I t  i s  p e r ­
f e c t l y  c o r r e c t  t h a t  i n  so f a r  as  I  can reduce p r o p o s i t i o n s  
' a b o u t '  the  f u t u r e  to  a l o g i c a l  form, I  am to  t h a t  e x t e n t
1. Compare the  examples g iv en  by McTaggart i n  h i s  c r i t i c i s m  of 
Broad ("N atu re  of E x i s t e n c e "  i i ,  p . 2 3 - 6 ) .  McTaggart i s  m is ­
ta k e n  i n  supposing  #hat  l o g i c a l  d i s j u n c t i o n s  r e f e r r i n g  to  
the  f u t u r e  can be adduced as an argument a g a i n s t  Broad.
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e l i m i n a t i n g  the f u t u r e .  But t h a t  i s  on ly  h a l f  the  s t o r y ,  and a 
m is le a d in g  h a l f  a t  t h a t ,  s in c e  i t  l e a d s  us to  a t t a c h  emphasis  
to  the  wrong en d .  The o t h e r  h a l f  i s ,  t h a t  such a r e d u c t io n  can
neve r  1^ co m p le ted , though i t  may approx im ate  v e ry  c l o s e l y  to  
-“^kie l o g i c a l  i d e a l .  I t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  c o r r e c t  to  say t h a t  ^  the 
d i s j u n c t i o n  i s  e x h a u s t i v e ,  " H i th e r  he w i l l  come or he w i l l  
w r i t e  to  e x p la in "  becomes a l o g i c a l  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  but th e n  the  
whole q u e s t i o n  i s  g iv e n  away by the  a p p a r e n t l y  in n o c e n t  remark 
ab ou t  " the  a s s e r t i o n  of whose a c t u a l i s a t i o n  b r in g s  i n  the  
r e f e r e n c e  to  the  f u t u r e " • Above and beyond the  l o g i c a l  a l t e r n ­
a t i v e  t h e r e  always remains o u t s t a n d in g  the  q u e s t io n  o f  a c t u a l ­
i s a t i o n . This  seems to  me much more im p o r ta n t  tha lz  B ro a d 's  
a t t e m p t  (even  i f  i t  had been s u c c e s s f u l )  to  show t h a t  a v e r b a l  
r e f e r e n c e  to  the  f u t u r e  must always rem ain  o u t s t a n d i n g .  Again,  
the  a t t e m p t  to  say t h a t  in com ple te  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a re  to  be 
a t t r i b u t e d  to  our in ad eq u a te  knowledge i s  a r e t u r n  to  the  o ld  
view t h a t  d i f f e r é n c e s  between p a s t  and f u t u r e  a re  m ere ly  cog­
n i t i v e .  I t  sh o u ld  be emphasized, t h a t  i t  i s  q u i t e  p o s s i b l e  to  
h o ld  t h i s  view; what I am o b j e c t i n g  to  i s  no t  t h i s  view as  
such ,  bu t  the  type of a n a l y s i s  o f  p r o p o s i t i o n s  ’ a b o u t ’ the
f u t u r e  which c o v e r t l y  begs th e  q u e s t i o n .
In  so f a r ,  t h e n ,  as  t h e r e  i s  a  genu ine  r e f e r e n c e
to  the  f u t u r e  in  p r o p o s i t i o n s  such as  "He w i l l  come on the
t r a i n  or  on the b u s" ,  i t  i s  no t  m ere ly  a q u e s t i o n  of  the
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a l t e r n a t i v e s  be ing  no t  e x h a u s t iv e  i n  f a c t , bu t  i t  i s  i n  p r i n - 
c i £ l e  im p o ss ib le  t h a t  th ey  cou l^d  be l o g i c a l l y  t a b u l a t e  
c o m p le te ly  s e t  o u t .
I t  i s  e s s e n t i a l  t h a t  we sh ou ld  be c l e a r  on the  
d i f f e r e n c e  between ’knowing t h a t  X i s  r e d ’ (o r  ’ t h a t  3 w i l l  
happen’ ) and between knowing what i s  meant by the  s t a t e m e n t  
t h a t  X i s  r e d ,  o r  t h a t  3 w i l l  happen .  P a r t  o f  the  v a lu e  o f  
B road’ s e x p o s i t i o n  i s  t h a t  he i s  d e f i n i t e  on t h i s  p o i n t .  The 
fo rm er  i s  a  q u e s t i o n  of  p r e d i c t i o n ;  the l a t t e r ,  as  Broad 
p o i n t s  o u t ,  i s  th e  p r i o r  one of u n d e r s t a n d in g  what i t  i s  t h a t  
a  p r o p o s i t i o n  a s s e r t s . I t  i s  no t  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  and i t  i s  
o n ly  by ig n o r in g  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  t h a t  i t  cou ld  be th o u gh t  to 
be one, t h a t  we can say b o th  t h a t  we know what i s  meant by 
"3 w i l l  happen" ,  and t h a t  we do n o t  know t h a t  3 w i l l  happen .  
3 x p re s s e d  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  the  d e n i a l  o f  the  p r o p o s i t i o n  "3 w i l l  
happen" i s  i t s e l f  an i m p l i c i t  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  we know what i s  
meant by the p r o p o s i t i o n  which we a re  d en y in g .  As Broad p u t  i t ,  
"There i s  no i n c o n s i s t e n c y  between th e  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  we can 
know a t  once what k in d  of  f a c t  would v e r i f y  a judgment abou t  
the  f u t u r e ,  and the s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  such judgments do not  r e f e r
- mmgimgmms
the  f u t u r e .
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to  any f a c t  when made." A l l  t h i s  may seem e le m e n ta ry  l o g i c ,  
hu t  i t  i s  f a t a l l y  e a sy  to  g e t  con fused ,  and to  produce sh a l lo w  
and ungrounded arguments i n  consequence bo th  f o r  and a g a i n s t  
' b e c o m in g ' .
How, th e n ,  are  we to  a n a ly s e  "X w i l l  d i e " ?  I t  i s  i r ­
r e l e v a n t ,  even i f  t r u e ,  to  say  t h a t  t h i s  s t a t e m e n t ,  though 
p r o b a b le ,  i s  no t  c e r t a i n ,  s in c e  i t  r e s t s  on the  v a l i d i t y  of  
i n d u c t i o n  . . .  and so f o r t h .  The t r o u b l e  i s ,  t h a t  t h i s  i r r e l e v ­
ance i s  n o t  always seen  a t  once ,  s in c e  ' w i l l '  i s  ambiguous, im­
p l y i n g  bo th  the  mere r e f e r e n c e  to  the f u t u r e  and an a s s e r t i o n  
t h a t  a t  some f u t u r e  d a t e ,  the  e v e n t ' w i l l ' c e r t a i n l y  happen .
But even i f  we deny t h a t  "X w i l l  i s  c e r t a i n ,  what we are
denying  i s  the  a s s e r t i v e  c o n n o ta t io n  of ' w i l l ' , no t  t h a t  i t  
e s s e n t i a l l y  c o n ta in s  a r e f e r e n c e  to  t e n s e .  In  h i s  a n a l y s i s  o f  
how i t  i s  t h a t  we can a t t a c h  meaning to  s t a t e m e n t s  t h a t  r e f e r  
to  the  f u t u r e ,  when the  f u t u r e  i s  n o th in g  a t  a l l .  Broad i s  
v e ry  sound, and th e r e  i s  no need to  go i n to  i t  f u r t h e r  h e r e .  
G ran ted  the  i n i t i a l  a c t  o f  f a i t h  - and Broad n ev e r  convinces  
me t h a t  i t  i s  a n y th in g  o th e r  th a n  an a c t  of f a i t h ,  though 
none the  worse on t h a t  a c c o u n t ,  s in c e  we have g o t  to  beg in
somewhere -  he has  r e n d e re d  the s ta te m e n t  of h i s  th e o ry  v e ry
2
p l a u s i b l e .
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The second to p ic  to  be d i s c u s s e d  was what o t h e r  v ie  
of the  f u t u r e  a re  h e l d ,  what t h e i r  degree of p l a u s i b i l i t y  i s ,  
and how f a r  i t  would be p o s s i b l e  to  make them  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  
the  view t h a t  becoming i s  fu n d a m e n ta l .
There i s ,  f i r s t ,  the f a m i l i a r  view, s t i l l  f l o u r i s h i n g ,  
l i k e  the g re en  bay t r e e ,  t h a t  a l l  e v e n ts  from ' p a s t ' to  ' f u t u r e '  
e x i s t  i n  a  f i x e d  o rd e r  which i s  t i m e l e s s ,  and t h a t  a l l  we mean 
by ' t i m e '  i s  g iv en  by the m otion of  a s i n g l e  p o i n t  a long  thaJh
f i x e d  row of e v e n t s .  'B ecom ing ' ,  th e n ,  which i s  the  movement of
the  'n o w ' ,  i s  fundam enta l  to  time'; bu t  n e i t h e r  i t  nor time a re  
of  any r e a l  im p o r ta n c e .  On the one hand, we have i d e a l i s t s  such 
as  B rad ley  and McTaggart a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  such a view of time i s  
obscure  and c o n t r a d i c t o r y , and t h a t  the  t r u e  R e a l i t y  i s  to  be 
found in  a s t a t i c ,  c h a n g e le s s  rea lm  where time has  been t r a n s ­
cended .  On the  o t h e r ,  Dunne u rges  t h a t  i f  we g ra sp  the  n e t t l e  
of  i n f i n i t e  r e g r e s s e s  b o l d l y ,  we can th e re b y  e x p l a i n  the  mys­
t e r i e s  of  the  Cosmos. Both views - though t h i s  i s  no t  so ob­
v io u s  i n  the case of  Dunne - r e s t  u l t i m a t e l y  upon a b e l i t t l a ­
ment and d e n ia l  of t im e ,  and a d i s m i s s a l  of a l l  genuine tem- 
p o r a l  problems as  be ing  'mere a p p e a r a n c e s ' ,  even i f ,  as  i n  the 
case of B rad ley ,  t h e r e  i s  hedging  to  the  e x t e n t  of a d m i t t i n g  
th e s e  to  be r e a l l y  ap p ea ran ces  1 Such a view of the  f u t u r e ,  as  
be in g  i n  some sense  ' r e a l l y  t h e r e '  a l l  the  t im e ,  seems to  me 
a v e ry  u n f o r t u n a t e  one, and one can sym path ise  w i th  those  
i d e a l i s t s  who found t h a t  i t  l a d  s t r a i g h t  to  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s .
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The o b j e c t i o n s  a g a i n s t  i t  a re  f o u r f o l d .  I t  i s  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  
t o ,  or a t  the  v e ry  l e a s t ,  i n  no way su p p o r te d  by, e x p e r i e n c e :
I t  i s  based  on a h y p o s t a t i s a t i o n  of ' p a s t ' , ' f u t u r e ' , and the  
'n o w ' :  i t  l e a d s  to  e n d l e s s  a n t in o m ie s :  i t  i s  th ro ug h  and through 
s p a t i a l i s e d .  B es ides  t h i s ,  i t  i s  to  me an added o b j e c t i o n  t h a t ,  
i n  em phas iz ing  d u r a t i o n ,  i t  no t  on ly  i g n o r e s ,  bu t  d e n ie s  'Be­
coming' to  be fu n d a m e n ta l .  I t  sho u ld  have been sc rap p ed  long  ago
But we have no t  to choose between the two ex trem es  of 
t h i s  view and B r o a d ' s .  There i s  a t h i r d  view, m e d ia t in g  between 
t h e s e ,  which has much to  recommend i t .  I n  B o sa n q u e t ' s  w o rd s : -  
" In  go ing  on, time no t  m ere ly  e x p r e s s e s ,  bu t  i s ,  the  movement 
of  the  r e a l ,  t h a t  i s  to  say ,  of the u n i v e r s e .  I t  may be con­
c e iv e d ,  in d e e d ,  no t  as a m a th em at ica l  a b s t r a c t i o n ,  bu t  as  a 
c o n c re te  s u p e r - i n t e l l e c t u a l  e x p e r i e n c e ,  a  c r e a t i v e  g row th .  
D iv e rg e n c e , n o v e l t y ,  f r e e  o r i g i n a t i v e n e s s , and a c e r t a i n  
degree of  i n d e t e r m i n a t i o n  a r e  the  p r i n c i p a l  laws of  t h i n g s .
And t h i s  i s  the  v e ry  source of our freedom and i n s p i r a t i o n .
The open g a t e s  of the f u t u r e  make th e  i n t e r e s t  and ex c i te m e n t  
of  l i f e .  . . .  There i s  n o th in g  f i x e d .  "Tout e s t  donné" i s  th s  
p r i n c i p l e  most a b h o r r e d .  Our d e s t i n y  and t h a t  oi the  u n iv e r s e  
i s  r é a l l y  and e f f e c t i v e l y  i n  our own hands ,  w i th  no r e s e r v ­
a t i o n  e x c e p t  t h a t  the  u n iv e r s e  has  many o th e r  members b e s id e s  
u s .  Time, in  the  sense  of d u r a t i o n ,  i s  a t  the  v e ry  h e a r t  of 
t h i n g s . "  This  t h i r d  view, e x e m p l i f i e d  by Bergson, d i f f e r s  bu t
1. "Value and D e s t in y  of  the  I n d i v i d u a l " ,  p p . 292-3 .
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s l i g h t l y  from t h a t  of Broad. But t h e r e  a re  p a s s a g e s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
i n  "C re a t iv e  E v o l u t io n " ,  where Bergson abandons the  view of  a 
pure becoming and t a l k s  as  i f  the  é l a n  v i t a l  ' c h o s e ' one of  
s e v e r a l  a l t e r n a t i v e s  open to  i t .  As has  a l r e a d y  been s a i d ,  i f  
t h i s  language i s  more th an  m e t a p h o r i c a l ,  Bergson l a y s  h im s e l f  
open to  the c r i t i c i s m s  t h a t  he had h im s e l f  p u t  fo rw ard  i n  
"Time and F ree  w i l l "  a g a i n s t  a t o o - s p a t i a l i s e d  c o n c e p t io n  of 
c h o ic e ,  which s u l l i e s  the  s p le n d o u r  of  pure d u ré e .  N e v e r th e l e s s ,  
I  t h i n k  t h a t  sy m p a th e t ic  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  t h i s  k in d  of  view 
(n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  of  B e rg so n 's  own s t a t e m e n t s )  might y i e l d  a 
meaning which i s  no t  on ly  p o s s i b l e ,  but  h i g h l y  p l a u s i b l e .
Many peop le  boggle a t  B ro a d 's  view because i t  goes too 
f a r . They would ag ree  w i th  him no t  m ere ly  t h a t  the  f u t u r e  ' i s  
n o th in g  a t  a l l '  i n  the  t a u to lo g o u s  s e n s e ,  bu t  t h a t  i n  the  more 
im p o r ta n t  sense  t h a t  'becom ing '  r e a l l y  i s  fundam enta l  the  f u t u r e  
i s  n o n - e x i s t e n t : n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  a t  r i s k  of s e l f - c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  
th ey  cannot  w ho l ly  agree  w i th  him. On the  o th e r  hand, the Jàs 
dubious  method of c o n c e iv in g  of s e v e r a l  (pa thw ays '  open to the  
é la n  v i t a l  i s  even more d i s a g r e e a b l e ,  and w i th  r e a s o n .
I s  i t  p o s s i b l e  to  modify the  pathway view i n t o  some­
th in g  l e s s  b l a t a n t ,  and c o n s i s t e n t l y  to  h o ld  t h i s  m o d i l i e d  
view t o g e t h e r  w i th  the view t h a t  ' becoming' i s  fundam enta l?
I  b e l i e v e  t h a t  i t  i s .
I t  i s  a t t r a c t i v e  to  t h in k  of the  f u t u r e  as the
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r©alm of  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  -  and no t  the  l e a s t  p a r t  of i t s  a t t r a c ­
t i o n  l i e s  i n  i t s  r e a d i n e s s  to  admit  a lm os t  any i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  
F i r s t ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e r e  i s  th e  v e ry  c o n c re te  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of  
th e se  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a s  'p a th w a y s ’ , b ranch ing  and i n t e r s e c t i n g  
and a l t o g e t h e r  behav ing  i n  a d e l i g h t f u l l y  g e o m e t r i c a l  way. The 
t o o - e n t h u s i a s t i c  a c cep tan ce  of  t h i s  view, and the  prompt r e ­
c a p i t u l a t i o n  by i t s  opponents  of the  o b j e c t i o n s  to  which i t  i s  
v e ry  e v i d e n t l y  open, have combined to  b r in g  i n t o  d i s r e p u t e  the 
n o t i o n  of  a re a lm  of  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .  This  i s  u n f o r t u n a t e ,  f o r  
i t  i s  open to  a q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  which e s c a p e s  
the  c r i t i c i s m s  b rough t  a g a i n s t  a to o - n a iv e  'p a th w a y s '  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n .
Of c o u r s e ,  the  p h ra se  fa  rea lm  of  p o s s i b i l i t i e s '  i s  
i t s e l f  v e ry  u n f o r t u n a t e ,  a s  l e a d in g  to  n o t io n s  of  the  ' u n i ­
v e r s e  of d i s c o u r s e ' type - a  s u b s t a n t i a l i s e d  home of  h y p o th e se s  
and m ig h t -h a v e -b e e n s .  We might s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  the  much-abused 
word ' r e a lm '  t h a t  o f  ' t o t a l b u t  t h a t  i s  open to  the  o p p o s i t e  
danger  t h a t  i t  may l e a d  us to  suppose t h a t  a l l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
a r e  of the  same t y p e , and t h a t  t h e i r  ' sum' i s  something ' ob­
j e c t i v e  ' -  which i s  n o n sen se .  I t  sh o u ld  be c l e a r l y  r e a l i s e d  
t h a t  what i s  meant by ' t o t a l '  o r  ' r e a l m '  -  w hichever  word we 
s e l e c t  a s  l e a s t  m is le a d in g  - i s  no t  a  m a th em at ica l  sum, nor  
a u n iv e r s e  of  d i s c o u r s e ,  bu t  i s  m ere ly  a sh o r th a n d  e x p r e s s i o n
1. "The r e a l  f u t u r e  i s  the  p o s s i b l e  as  d i s t i n c t  from the  a c t ­
u a l . "  (Macmurray i n  Symposium 6n Time and Change - A r i s ­
t o t e l i a n  Supplement V I I I ,  p . 160) .
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f o r  a c o n c e p t io n  which i s  p e r f e c t l y  l e g i t i m a t e ,  though a p t  to  
be misused*
S econd ly ,  t h e r e  a re  many usages  of  ' p o s s i b l e '  and 
co n fu s io n  i s  e a s y .  T h e i r  d i s e n ta n g le m e n t  w i l l  be a t t e m p te d  in  
the n e x t  c h a p te r :  h e re  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  say  t h a t  ' p o s s i b l e ' 
i s  be ing  used  i n  the  v e ry  wide sense  i n  which a n y th in g  i s  c a l l ­
ed  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  i s  n e i t h e r  l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s a ry  nor  l o g i c a l l y  
i m p o s s i b l e • T h is  l o g i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y  must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
from the  s u b j e c t i v e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  and ig no ran ce  which l e a d s  us 
to  s ay ,  " I t  may p o s s i b l y  be s o " ,  where " I  d o n ' t  know" i s  im­
p l i e d .  I t  i s  no t  the  p la c e  he re  to  d i s c u s s  the  view which has  
been h e ld  ( n o t a b ly  by Spinoza)  t h a t  a l l  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  m ere ly  
our ig n o ra n c e ,  and i t  w i l l  be assumed f o r  the p r e s e n t  t h a t  
th e y  a re  d i s t i n c t .
TTt w i l l  r a i n  today  th r e e  w eeks" .  " I t  w i l l  n o t  r a i n  
today  th r e e  w eeks" .  T oge ther  th e se  p r o p o s i t i o n s  e x h a u s t  the  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  and I can a s s e r t  w i th  c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  oneof 
them w i l l  come t r u e . I n  l i k e  manner I  can make an i n f i n i t e  
number of s t a t e m e n t s  about  to day  th r e e  weeks, a r ra n g e d  i n  
p a i r s  such t h a t  one of each  p a i r  c o n t r a d i c t s  the o t h e r ,
wear e i t h e r  b la c k  or  brown", and so on. In  p r a c t i c e , we 
a m a t t e r  o f  p r i n c i p l e ,  i s  a n o th e r  q u e s t i o n .
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as  f o r  i n s t a n c e :  "London Bridge w i l l  f a l l  down," "London B ridge  
w i l l  n o t  f a l l  down":"There w i l l  he more than  f i v e  c ro c u s e s  o u t  
i n  the p a r \ k " ,  "There w i l l  no t  he more t h a n  f i v e  c ro c u s e s  ou t  
i n  the  p a r k " ;  " I t  w i l l  he co ld  i n  London", " I t  w i l l  no t  he co ld  
i n  London", and so on. Given i n f i n i t e  p a t i e n c e ,  i t  would he 
p o s s i b l e  i n  th e o ry  to  compile a  l i s t  such t h a t  n o th in g ,  how­
e v e r  t r i v i a l ,  which happened on the  chosen day i n  London 
sh ou ld  he o m i t t e d  from the  l i s t .  And hy e x te n d in g  the  l i s t ,  
ev e ry  e v e n t  anywhere, a t  any t im e ,  co u ld  be in c l u d e d .  We neve r  
dream, of  c o u r s e ,  o f  making such a complete l i s t :  but we o f t e n  
do thinfc i n  an ana logous  f a s h i o n  about  c e r t a i n  e v e n ts  in  which 
we a re  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n t e r e s t e d .  The boy who v e ry  much hopes 
t h a t  he w i l l  be g iv e n  w h i te  mice on h i s  b i r t h d a y  t h in k s  the  
n ig h t  b e f o r e ,  " S h a l l  I  o r  s h a l l  I  no t  he the  p o s s e s s o r  of w h i te  
mice tomorrow n ig h t? "  A man i n  danger on a s in k in g  sh ip  wonders 
i f  he w i l l  ev e r  see h i s  home a g a i n .  I t  i s ,  th e n ,  no t  p a r t i c u l ­
a r l y  s t r a n g e  t h a t  i t  sh o u ld  have been though t  p o s s i b l e  to  ex ­
ten d  t h i s  c o n c e p t io n  of the f u t u r e  as a s to re h o u s e  of a l t e r n ­
a t i v e s ,  and i t  i s  a  p e r f e c t l y  l o g i c a l  e x t e n s i o n .  I f  i t  i s  p e r ­
m i s s ib l e  to  t h i n k  of the f u t u r e  as  h o ld in g  i n  i t s  la p  e x c i t i n g  
a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  such as l i f e  o r  d e a th ,  h a p p in e s s  o r  m ise ry ,  
fame o r  p enury ,  i t  i s  e q u a l l y  p e r m i s s i b l e  to  t h i n k  of the  
f u t u r e  as an i n f i n i t e l y  long  l i s t  o f  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  n o t  a l l  of 
them e x c i t i n g .  The q u e s t io n  i s .  I s  such a view a d m is s ib le ?
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To which I  t h i n k  the  answer i s ,  "Yes, w i t h i n  l i m i t s ."  And 
th e s e  l i m i t s  a re  the  l i m i t s  of  h y p o s t a t i s a t i o n :  as soon as we 
beg in  to  t a l k  about  ' t h e  f u t u r e ’ as  p o s s e s s i n g  ' a  l a p ’ we a re  
g e t t i n g  d a n g e ro u s ly  n e a r  the  b o r d e r l i n e .
The p l a i n  man t u r n s  up h i s  nose a t  the  complete l i s t .
I t  i s ,  a s  he r i g h t l y  rem arks ,  t r i v i a l :  who c a re s  w hethe r  t h e r e
i s ,  o r  i s  n o t ,  a p o r t i o n  of a d a y -o ld  "D a i ly  î / îa il” c o n ta in in g
a b a n a n a -s k in  i n  a was te  pape r -b a s k e  t  a t  Marble Arch today  th r e e
weeks? What i s  more, we cannot even t e l l  from the l i s t  whether
t h i s  supremely u n i n t e r e s t i n g  e v e n t  does o cc u r :  i t  i s  j u s t  p u t
down as  a p o s s i b i l i t y ,  a lo n g  w i th  i t s  c o n t r a d i c t o r y . And t h a t ,
I  t h i n k ,  i s  the  whole p o i n t .  The l i s t  ^  t r i v i a l ;  i t  g e t s  us
no f u r t h e r :  i t  i s  j u s t  the b a ld  s t a t e m e n t  of d i s j u n c t i o n s . I f
i t  does go f u t h e r  than  t h i s ,  i t  i s  f a l l a c i o u s ^ a s  c la im in g  a
power t o  p r e d i c t  which we have seen  to  be i m p o s s i b l e . A l l  t h a t
the l i s t  can t e l l  us  i s  the t r i t e  and undoubted  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t
e i t h e r  such and such a c o n te n t  (and he re  fo l lo w s  a l i s t  of
’ c o n t e n t s ’ , most of them u n i n t e r e s t i n g )  w i l l  be a c t u a l i s e d ,
1
or t h a t  i t  w i l l  n o t .  I t  g iv e s  no h i n t  w ha tsoever  as  to  which 
c o n te n t s  w i l l  be a c t u a l i s e d  and which w i l l  n o t ;  the  q u e s t i o n  
of  a c t u a l i s a t i o n  i s  a t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  png,« To g e t  r i d  of
1 .  McTaggart seems to  h o ld  ("Wature of  E x i s t e n c e "  V o l . I I , p p .  
23-5) t h a t  t h i s  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  B ro ad 's  v iew . I cannot 
a g r e e .  He r i g h t l y  s a y s : " i t  seems to  me P ^ i te c e r t a i n  t h a t  
" I t  w i l l  r a i n  tomorrow" i s  e i t h e r  t r u e  or  f a l s e  » 
does not  f o l lo w  from t h a t ,  as he im ag in es ,  t h a t  j ,ngland 
w i l l  W a  r e p u b l i c  i n  1920" was f a l s e  i n  1919^
399
the  r a t h e r  clumsy symbolism of the l a s t  few p ag es :  the  l i s t  
of  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  i s  p u r e ly  and s t r i c t l y  l o g i c a l ,  and i t  a f f o r d s  
no c lue  a t  a l l  to  what w i l l ,  i n  f a c t ,  happen .  We have l e a r n t  
n o th in g  more about  ’ becoming’ w i th  a l l  our e f f o r t s :  wrapped up 
i n  a s t a t i c  l o g i c ,  a l l  our adduc ing  of  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  has  go t  
us no f u r t h e r .
T h is ,  t h e n ,  i s  a p u r e l y  l o g i c a l  co n c e p t io n  of  f u t u r e  
e v e n t s  and i t  i s  c o n c e rn ed , no t  w i th  f u t u r i t y  as  such ,  but w i th  
Ab® a b s t r a c t  r e l a t i o n s  of  e q u i v a l e n c e , and c o n t r a d i c t i o n , i n  so 
f a r  as th e y  a r e  e x e m p l i f i e d  i n  the  c o n te n t  o f  th e s e  e v e n t s . I t  
i s  v i t a l l y  im p o r ta n t  to  r e a l i s e  t h a t  the  sense i n  which we say ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e  - "There i s  a p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  . . . "  has  em phat ic ­
a l l y  no t  a n y th in g  to do w i th  e x i s t e n c e .  "There i_s a p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t "  must no t  be i n t e r p r e t e d  t e m p o r a l ly .  I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  a 
b a n a n a -sk in  wrapped in  a newspaper wi&l a c t u a l l y  be d e p o s i t e d  
a t  Marble Arch i n  t h r e e  weeks’ time : i t  i s  a l s o  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  
t h e r e  w i l l  be no such d e p o s i t i o n .  But we are  no t  to conce ive  of 
th e se  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  as  hav ing  a k in d  of  b o d i l e s s  e x i s t e n c e ,  
o r  a s  w a i t i n g  to  come and be a c t u a l i s e d  -  where a c t u a l i s a t i o n  
i s  tho u g h t  of m ere ly  as  adding a k in d  of s o c i a l  c a ch e t  to  the 
p ro c e e d in g s ,  comparable to  W.3. G i l b e r t ’ s rhyme of th e  two men 
c a s t  away on a d e s e r t  i s l a n d  who found them selves  unab le  to 
e n t e r  i n t o  c o n v e r s a t i o n  u n t i l  th ey  had been p r o p e r l y  in t r o d u c e d :  
That i s  the  nemesis t h a t  a w a i ts  a l l  those  t h a t  t r a f f i c  i n
1. C e r t a i n l y ,  they  e x i s t  as th ou g h ts  i n  my mind, but  t h a t  i s  a 
t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  m a t t e r .
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p o s s i b i l i t i e s  - the danger of h y p o s t a t i s i n g  th e se  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
i n t o  something feaving e x i s t e n c e ,  though not  an a c t u a l  e x i s t e n c e .  
3v@n L e ib n iz  h im s e l f  had not w ho l ly  e scap ed  t h i s  c r i t i c i s m .
I t  i s  e x t re m e ly  u n f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  o r d in a r y  language 
sh o u ld  have emphasized t h i s  ten d en cy .  Whatever our m e ta p h y s ic a l  
v iew s ,  i n  unguarded moments (o r  moments of  commonsense, which 
ev e r  you p r e f e r ) , we r e v e r t  to  the  language and b e l i e f s  o f  
eve ryday  l i f e .  This  i s  in  many ways a b l e s s i n g ,  bu t  i t  cannot
be d en ied  t h a t  i t  has  i t s  d a n g e r s , i n  the  v/ay of  u n c r i t i c a l
ac c e p ta n c e  of dubious  s t a t e m e n t s ,  which q u ic k ly  f i n d  t h e i r  way 
i n t o  our m e ta p h y s ic s .  Whenever we say ,  as we do u n t h i n k i n g l y ,
"I  wonder i f  I  s h a l l  have a l e t t e r  tom orrow", " I  w ish  v/e had
known what the end of t h i s  would be" ,  "Do you t h i n k  th e r e  w i l l
be war?" we are  s im ply  a s k in g  f o r  t r o u b l e .  This  method of form­
u l a t i o n  i s  h i g h l y  m is le a d in g ,  f o r  i à '  l e a d s  us to th in k  of  the  
p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of  the  f u t u r e ,  no t  m ere ly  in  the  a b s t r a c t  l o g i c a l  
way which i s  the  on ly  l e g i t i m a t e  one, bu t  as be ing  i n  some way 
c o n c re te  and ’p o s i t i v e ’ . The s t e p  i s  a s h o r t  one from c o n s i d e r ­
in g  the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  ’hav ing  a l e t t e r  tomorrow’ and ’no t  hav in g  
a l e t t e r  tomorrow’ , to  u s in g  ’p o s i t i v e ’ language which im p l i e s  
t h a t  we can a t t a c h  a c o n c re te  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  now to  tomorrow’ s 
receipt of a l e t t e r .  That the i m p l i c a t i o n  i s  only  h a l f - r e a l i s e d  
makes i t  a l l  the more dan ge ro us .  S i m i l a r l y ,  "Do you th in k  t h e r e  
w i l l  be war?" can be i n t e r p r e t e d  in  one of two ways. The f i r s t .
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and d u l l e r ,  one i s  t h a t  we a re  c o n s i d e r in g  the a l t e r n a t i v e s  
’w ar’ and ’ n o t - w a r ’ w i th  r e f e r e n c e  to  some u n s p e c i f i e d  f u t u r e  
d a t e .  This  i s  p e r f e c t l y  l e g i t i m a t e .  But i t  can a l s o  be i n t e r ­
p r e t e d  p o s i t i v e l y ,  so t h a t  the  answer ’Y es’ would be tak en  to 
mean t h a t  war i s  w a i t i n g ,  so to  speak ,  round the c o rn e r  - I f  
we a re  now a t  B, war i s  w a i t i n g  a t  C.
^ 1
This  i s  a s p a t i a l i s e d  c o n c e p t io n  of  t im e ,  and i s  i l l e g i t i m a t e .  
A gain ,  B ru tus  m igh t ,  lo o k in g  back over  p a s t  e v e n ts  on the  
n ig h t  be fo re  P h i l i p p i ,  say  to  h i m s e l f ,  " I  w ish  t h a t  I had no t  
murdered C aesa r :  I  d id  not  a n t i c i p a t e  t h i s  end" ,  but as  soon as 
he u se s  the  e x p r e s s i o n  "what the  end would b e ", i t  sounds as  
i f  the  end was i n  some way p re d e te rm in e d ,  and cou ld  p r i n ­
c i p l e  have been known. I t  i s  v i t a l  to  r e a l i s e  t h a t  t h i s
’p o s i t i v e ’ language must not  be tak en  as i t  s t a n d s ,  but t h a t
2
a l l  we can l o g i c a l l y  say  of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of the  f u t u r e  
i s  the  mere bare s t a t e m e n t  o f  d i s j u n c t i o n s . B a i l i n g  t h i s ,  t h e r e  
w i l l  be c o n s t a n t  co n fu s io n  between tem pora l  and non- tem pora l  
s t a t e m e n t s .
Yet,  i t  may be o b j e c t e d ,  i f  I  say ,  " I  wonder i f  t h e r e  
w i l l  be a l e t t e r  from X tomorrow", I  can j u s t i f y  any tem pora l
1. I t  does no t  a l t e r  m a t t e r s  i f  C i s  a s s ig n e d  no d e te rm in a te  
p l a c e ,  bu t  i s  v ague ly  s a i d  to  be m ere ly  ’ ah ead ’ : the 
f a l l a c y  rém ains  the same.
2 .  "The p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t h a t  the  f u t u r e  h o ld s  i n  s t o r e " ,  i s  a 
f a v o u r i t e  and s h o ck in g ly  bad e x p r e s s i o n ,  which i l l u s t r a t e s  
as w e l l  as a n y th in g  the  k in d  of  view I  am c r i t i c i s i n g .  Of 
course  ’h o l d s ’ i s  t i m e l e s s .
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i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t h a t  the  c o n ju n c t io n  of  ' w i l l  ' and ' tom orrow ' 
s u g g e s t s ,  f o r  a f t e r  a l l  i t  i s  e i t h e r  t r u e  or  no t  t r u e  t h a t  a 
l e t t e r  from X now l i e s  i n  a m ai lbag  on i t s  way to  me. But t h a t  
i s  to  g ive  the  whole case away. C e r t a i n l y  i t  i s  t r u e  t h a t  t h e r e  
e i t h e r  i s  o r  i s  no t  such a l e t t e r  f o r  me « t h i s  has  never  been 
d e n ie d .  N e i th e r  i s  i t  d en ied  t h a t  we can now g ive  a meaning to  
such a s t a te m e n t  a s ,  "There w i l l  be a l e t t e r  f o r  me tomorrow." 
What i s  d en ied  i s  t h a t  we can now a s s e r t  the  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  i n  
any o th e r  th an  a l o g i c a l  and a b s t r a c t  s e n s e ,  o f  something t h a t  
has no t  y e t  happened .  P o s s i b i l i t y  and a c t u a l i t y  a re  d i s t i n c t ;  
i f  we w ish  to  look  upon the  f u t u r e  as  a sum of p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  
we can do so ,  as  long  as we do no t  make t h i s  a s t e p p i n g - s t o n e  
to  the  d i f f e r e n t  and d e f i n i t e l y  wrong view t h a t  th e s e  p o s s i ­
b i l i t i e s  have now some m y th ic a l  e x i s t e n c e  of t h e i r  own.
I t  may be s a i d  t h a t  such a c o n c e p t io n  of  f u t u r e  
e v e n t s  i s  p e r f e c t l y  t r i v i a l  and w o r t h l e s s ,  and t h a t  i |  t h i s  i s  
a l l  t h a t  our long  s e a rc h  has  r e s u l t e d  i n ,  we might as  w el l  f a l l  
back upon B road’ s view and say  t h a t  the  f u t u r e  i s  n o th in g  a t  a l l .  
But i t  seems to  me t h a t  t h i s  c o n c e p t io n  a l lo w s  f o r  a v e ry  im­
p o r t a n t  p o i n t  which o th e rw ise  i s  ve ry  d i f f i c u l t  to  e x p l a i n  -  and 
t h a t  i s ,  t h a t  the  f u t u r e  i s  not  m ere ly  a c o n s t a n t  e x t ra n e o u s  
’ t a c k in g  on’ bu t  ’ grows out  o f ’ the p r e s e n t .  Whether or  not  a 
complete  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  scheme can, u l t i m a t e l y ,  be a c c e p te d ,  i s
1 .  Compare the  f i r s t  d ia lo g u e  in  André M a u ro is ’ "C ap ta in s  and 
K in g s ."
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a moot p o i n t  -  but a t  l e a s t  i t  i s  no t  o b v io u s ly  s i l l y  to  t a l k  of 
c a u s a l  c o n n e c t io n s ,  and r e g u l a r  s e q u e n c e s .  Kobody r e a l l y  doub ts  
t h a t  diamonds cu t  g l a s s ,  t h a t  n ig h t  fo l lo w s  day, t h a t  w a te r  
b o i l s  a t  100 C. iSvants a r e  connec ted  i n  e x p e r i e n c e ,  and i t  
would be a poor  view of time which made t h e i r  c o n s t a n t  connec­
t i o n  a m i r a c l e .  K a n t ’ s i n s i g h t  was g r e a t  when he saw t h a t  the 
t i m e - s e r i e s  no t  on ly  a l lo w s  f o r ,  bu t  r e q u i r e s , the  c o n n e c t iv ­
i t y  of  e v e n t s .
To say t h a t  the  f u t u r e  i s  n o th in g  a t  a l l ,  i s  t r u e ,  
i n  a sense  t h a t  i s  n o t  m ere ly  t a u t o l o g i c a l :  but  i t s  o v e r ­
emphasis  may b l i n d  us to  the  im portance  of  con nec tedn ess  and 
c o n t i n u i t y  between p a s t ,  p r e s e n t ,  and f u t u r e .  B ru tu s ,  lo o k in g  
back ,  can d i s c o v e r  a c o n n e c t io n  between h i s  p r e s e n t  s t a t e  and 
h i s  p a s t  d e c i s i o n  to  s u p p o r t  C a s s iu s :  he can see how one ev en t  
l e d  up to  a n o t h e r ,  and how each d e c i s i o n  i n  t u r n  ex c lu d ed  a 
number of a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  and made i t  more p ro v a b le  t h a t  the 
e v e n t ,  which i s  now a c t u a l l y  hap pen in g ,  sh ou ld  o c c u r .  Bven on 
a minimum giew, which r e f u s e s  to  p o s t u l a t e  de te rm in ism ,  we a re  
bound to  adm it  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  some c o n n e c t io n  between p a s t  and 
p r e s e n t ,  and t h a t  i t  i s  no t  e n t i r e l y  i r r e l e v a n t  to  ad d u ce , as 
a t  l e a s t  a  p a r t i a l  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  what i s  happening  now, 
e v e n ts  t h a t  have o c c u r re d  a t  some p a s t  d a t e • We can and do
1 .  Though f a r d e ,  i n  an i n t e r e s t i n g  p a s s a g e ,  s a y s :  "L’ê t r e  n ' e s t  
pas  le  c o n n a î t r e ,  e t  i l  e s t  peu p h i lo s o p h iq u e  de v o i r  dans 
l e  p a s sé  l a  source  de l ' ê t r e  p a rce  que l e  s o u v e n i r  e s t  l a  
source  de l a  c o n n a i s s a n c e . "  ("Revue de Métaphysique e t  de 
M ora le" ,  1001, p . 12 5 ) .  But t h i s  view i s  r a r e l y  h e l d .
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a t t a c h  a meaning to  the  s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  B ru tu s '  d e c i s i o n  to  
h e a r  what the  c o n s p i r a t o r s  had to  say  was the  f i r s t  s t e p  on a 
ro a d  t h a t  l e d  to  P h i l i p p i . On a r o a d . Looking back over p a s t  
e v e n t s ,  we s p a t i a l i s e  them i n  a way which i s  i l l e g i t i m a t e  f o r  
f u t u r e  e v e n t s . But, though the  an a log y  cannot  be e x a c t ,  we can 
y e t  use i t  to  a c e r t a i n  e x t e n t .  F o r , though the  p r e s e n t  i s  
neve r  th e  f u t u r e  as  made, n e v e r the  l e s s  i t  i s  the  making of the  
f u t u r e  > and must no t  be re g a rd e d  as t o t a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t  to  i t .
I n  the p r e s e n t  a lone  we a c t ,  bu t  our a c t i o n s  r e s t r i c t  and a l t e r  
the  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  of  the  f u t u r e . I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  X w i l l  
become Prime M i n i s t e r ,  b u t  i f ,  a t  t h i s  moment, he i s  s h o t  dead 
by an a s s a s s i n ,  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  can never  be a c t u a l i s e d .  Our 
a c t i o n s  a re  p u rp o s iv e  and d i r e c t e d  towards an end which i s  
o f t e n  o th e r  th a n  immediate s a t i s f a c t i o n :  we work when we would 
r a t h e r  be l a z y ,  because by doing so ,  we b e l i e v e  t h a t  we a re  
making i t  more p ro b a b le  t h a t  an e v e n t  which we c o n s id e r  d e s i r ­
ab le  w i l l  o c c u r .  No sane view of time can n e g l e c t  the  im p o r t ­
ance of p l a n n in g .
I t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  c o n s i s t e n t  to  h o ld  a l l  t h i s  c o n j o i n t -
l y  w i th  the  view t h a t  the  f u t u r e  i s  n o th in g  a t  a l l :  in d e e d ,  i t  
i s  on ly  on the l a t t e r  assum ption  t h a t  we can g iv e  any e f f e c t ­
ive  meaning to  any t a l k  abou t  ' p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' .  (When Dunne, 
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  u se s  the n o t io n  of  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  he i s  m ere ly
of  Broad, p r e v io u s l y  r e f e r r e d  t o .
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b e in g  i n c o n s i s t a n t  : dn h i s  view he has no r i g h t  to  use i t . )  
But a g a in  i t  must be r e p e a t e d  t h a t  th e se  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a r e  
p u r e ly  l o g i c a l ,  and t h a t  to  admit them i s  i n  no way to  deny 
t h ^  u l t i m a t e  and fundam enta l  n a tu r e  of becoming, bu t  r a t h e r  
to  emphasize i t .  The p r e s e n t  i s  the  making of  the  f u t u r e ,  bu t  
i t  i s  neve r  the  f u t u r e  as  made: t h e r e  i s  always an u l t i m a t e  
res iduum  which i s  u n p r e d i c t a b l e ,  and which we c a l l ,  v e ry  
s im p ly ,  the ’h a p p e n in g ’ of  an e v e n t .
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CHAPTER X II . CONTINGENCY.
Tha whole q u e s t i o n  of  co n t in g en cy  i s  e x t re m e ly  com­
p l i c a t e d ,  b u t  i t  i s  made u n n e c e s s a r i l y  so by the  v a ry in g  mean­
in g s  which a re  a t t a c h e d  to  con t in g en cy  and r e l a t e d  c o n c e p t io n s ,  
such as ’p o s s i b i l i t y ’ and ’n e c e s s i t y ’ . In  the  l a s t  c h a p te r  a 
rough e x p l a n a t i o n  of how ’p o s s i b i l i t y ’ was be ing  u sed  was g iv e n :  
i t  i s  now time to  a n a ly se  i n  g r e a t e r  d e t a i l  the d i f f e r e n t  con­
c e p t io n s  involvedi#: and to  i n d i c a t e  i n  what sen se s  the  v a r io u s
1
words w i l l  be u sed  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r .
F i r s t l y ,  th e r e  i s  the s t r i c t  sense  i n  which ’ im­
p o s s i b l e ’ i s  u sed  to  mean l o g i c a l  i m p o s s i b i l i t y :  i t  a p p l i e s  
on ly  to  something which i s  s e I f - c o n t r a d i c t o r y .  The l o g i c a l l y  
n e c e s s a r y  i s  t h a t  whose c o n t r a d i c t o r y  i s  im p o s s ib le :  the  l o g i c ­
a l l y  p o s s i b l e  i s  t h a t  which i s  n e i t h e r  n e c e s s a ry  nor i m p o s s ib l e .
I f  t h a t  were a l l  th e r e  was to  i t ,  t h e r e  would be 
l i t t l e  d i f f i c u l t y ,  bu t  t h e r e  a re  l o o s e r  meanings i n  common 
u sa g e ,  which make f o r  am b ig u i ty  and c o n f u s io n .  L o g ic a l  imposs­
i b i l i t y  and n e c e s s i t y  must be c l e a r l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from what 
i s  im p o ss ib le  or  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  a l l  p r a c t i c a l  p u r p o s e s . When a 
man s a y s ,  " I t  i s  im p o ss ib le  t h a t  a  t h i n g  sh ou ld  bo th  be P and 
n o t - P " , he i s  u s in g  ' i m p o s s i b l e ’ i n  a  d i f f e r e n t  sense  from h i s  
n e igh bo u r  who s a y s : -  " I t  i s  im p o ss ib le  f o r  a  man a t  Baker S t r e e t
1 .  Much of th e  m a t e r i a l  c o n ta in e d  i n  t h i s  c h a p te r  has been
ta k e n  from my R e i t l i n g e r  Tssay  (1933) ,  now in  th e  U n i v e r s i t y  
of London L i b r a r y .  For a  f u l l e r  t r e a tm e n t  of co n t in g e n c y ,  
and from a somewhat d i f f e r e n t  s t a n d p o i n t ,  r e f e r e n c e  may 
be made to  t h i s .
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now to  c a tc h  a Southbound t r a i n  t h a t  l e a v e s  W aterloo  in  two 
m in u te s '  t im e ."  The i m p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  of  the  l a t t e r  i s  e x t r a -  
l o g i c a l  and c o u ld  n o t  be p e r c e iv e d  w i th o u t  a knowledge of the 
r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n s  of  the  two s t a t i o n s :  i t  i s  no t  l o g i c a l l y  im­
p o s s i b l e  t h a t  W ate r loo  might have been on ly  a hundred  y a r d s  
from Baker S t r e e t ,  and then to  go from one to  the  o t h e r  i n  two 
m inu te s  would have been p r a c t i c a b l e . As i t  i s ,  i t  i s  p r a c t i c a l ­
l y  im p o ss ib le  to  do t h i s ,  bu t  i t  i s  not l o g i c a l l y  im p o s s ib le ,  
s in c e  i t  i s  no t  ex c lu d ed  by l o g i c .  I  s h a l l  c a l l  t h a t  ' i m p r a c t i c  
a b l e '  o r  ' p r a c t i c a l l y  i m p o s s ib l e ' which i s  no t  shown to  be im­
p o s s i b l e  by l o g i c ,  but which i s  so v e ry  im probable  t h a t  ini f a c t  
i t  can always be n e g l e c t e d .  S i m i l a r l y  w i th  p r a c t i c a l  n e c e s s i t y  
as  opposed to  l o g i c a l  n e c e s s i t y .
This k in d  of  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  and n e c e s s i t y  i s  r e l a t i v e ,  
and i n c lu d e s  the  l o o s e r  usage of th e  p l a i n  man ( " I t  i s  n e c e s s ­
a r y  f o r  a man to  be over tvrenty-one to  have a v o t e " ) ,a s  w e l l  
as the  more c a u t io u s  use of  the  s c i e n t i s t :  bu t  the  p o i n t  i s ,  
t h a t  however p ro b a b le  a w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  i n d u c t i o n  may be ,  i t  
must be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from t h i n g s  t h a t  are l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s a ry ,  
and hence a b s o l u t e .  Thus i t  i s  p r a c t i c a l l y  and not  l o g i c a l l y  
n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  w a te r  b o i l s  a t  lOO'C. ,  t h a t  a l l  crows a re  b l a c k ,  
and so on. I n  s imple examples l i k e  t h i s ,  i t  i s  ea sy  to  see the 
d i s t i n c t i o n :  but the  r e a l l y  ha rm fu l  am bigu i ty  o ccu rs  when 
peop le  t a l k  of w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d  e m p i r i c a l  r u l e s  as  i f  th e y
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th o u g h t  t h a t  th ey  were l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s a r y .  That i s  f a l s e .  
Logic has  n o th in g  to  say  on the  s u b j e c t  o f  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n c r e t e  
f a c t s ,  nor on the g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s  based upon them, f o r  i t  i s  
e n t i r e l y  concerned  w i th  a b s t r a c t  r e l a t i o n s .  There a re  v e ry  few 
t h i n g s  which a re  l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s a ry  or  im p o ss ib le  i n  them­
s e l v e s ,  bu t  th e re  are  many more which a re  a l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s ­
a ry  r e s u l t ,  g iv en  c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s .  Thus the  p rem ises  of a 
v a l i d  s y l lo g i s m ,  or  n o n - s y l l o g i s t i c  d ed u c t iv e  argument,  a re  
q u i t e  c o r r e c t l y  s a i d  to  r e n d e r  the  c o n c lu s io n  l o g i c a l l y  nec­
e s s a r y .  But the  main p o i n t  i s  t h a t  the c o n c lu s io n  a lone  i s  no t  
n e c e s s a r y :  i t  i s  on ly  n e c e s s a ry  as fo l lo w in g  from i t s  p r e m i s e s , 
O bvious ly  i f  the p rem ises  a re  d u b iou s ,  the  c o n c lu s io n  w i l l  be 
e q u a l l y  so :  and we must have e x t r a - l o g i c a l  knowledge abou t  the 
t r u t h  of the p re m is e s ,  b e fo re  we can a s s e r t  the c o n c lu s io n  
a l o n e . To say ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t  X i s  l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s a ry ,  i s  
n o t  the  same as to  say " I f  A,B,C . . .  then  X i s  l o g i c a l l y  n ec ­
e s s a r y " .  X may be a l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s a ry  r e s u l t  of A,B,C, but 
u n t i l  we a re  s a t i s f i e d  t h a t  A,B,C a re  them se lv es  l o g i c a l l y  
n e c e s s a r y  (which , by the way, might in v o lv e  an i n f i n i t e  r e ­
g re s s )  , we canno t  a s s e r t  X a lone  to  be l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s a r y .  
L o g i c a l l y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  even i f  we assume X to  be e n t a i l e d  by 
A,B,C . . . ,  X i s  p o s s i b l e  bu t  i t  i s  no t  n e c e s s a r y .  This must 
be em phasized ,  f o r ,  u n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  e n t a i Iment forms a v e ry  
co n v e n ie n t  s t e p p in g - s to n e  between p r a c t i c a l  n e c e s s i t y  and
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l o g i c a l  n e c e s s i t y :  so t h a t  those  who would draw th e  l i n e  a t  
c o n fu s in g  the  two l a t t e r  d i r e c t l y  have no o b j e c t i o n  to  e q u a t ­
in g  what i s  p r a c t i c a l l y  n e c e s s a ry  w i th  what i s  l o g i c a l l y
n e c e s s i t a t e d  by i t s  a n t e c e d e n t s ,  and t h a t  w i th  what i s  l o g i c -  
a l l y  n e c e s s a r y .
I t  has been c la im ed  t h a t  what we have c a l l e d  ’p r a c ­
t i c a l  n e c e s s i t y ’ , a t  l e a s t  i n  i t s  s t r i c t e r  u sages  by s c i e n t ­
i s t s ,  can be reduced  to  the l o g i c a l  r e l a t i o n  of e n t a i Im e n t .
In  o th e r  words,  the  c o n te n t  of  e v e n ts  i s  l o g i c a l l y  (n o t  s im ply  
p r a c t i c a l l y ) n e c e s s i t a t e d  by the  a n t e c e d e n t s .  Those who h o ld  
t h i s  view say  t h a t  i t  i s  no t  s im ply  our e x p e r ie n c e  t h a t  a l l  
crows a r e  b l a c k ,  but t h a t  the b la c k n e s s  of  crows cou ld  be 
deduced from the  whole s t a t e  of the  u n i v e r s e ,  i f  we had s u f ­
f i c i e n t  know ledge• This  i s  a t e n a b le  view, and i s  i m p l i c i t  i n  
a l l  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  schemes, bu t  h e re  i t  i s  b e t t e r  to  co n t in u e  
to  d i s t i n g u i s h  between p r a c t i c a l  c e r t a i n t y  and the r e l a t i o n  
of  e n t a i Iment than  to  beg the  q u e s t io n  by assuming t h a t  the 
fo rm er can be red u ced  to  the  l a t t e r *  S t i l l  l e s s  i s  i t  d e s i r ­
ab le  to  assume t h a t  e v e n ts  them se lves  a re  l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s ­
i t a t e d  by t h e i r  a n t e c e d e n t s ,  f o r  r e a s o n s  g iven  e a r l i e r .
So f a r  we have d i s t i n g u i s h e d  between l o g i c a l  and 
p r a c t i c a l  i m p o s s i b i l i t y :  l o g i c a l  and p r a c t i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y :  
l o g i c a l  n e c e s s i t y ,  e n t a i Im e n t , and p r a c t i c a l  n e c e s s i t y .  In  
the case  of i m p o s s i b i l i t y  and n e c e s s i t y ,  the  s u b s t i t u t i o n
409
of the  l o g i c a l  f o r  the  p r a c t i c a l  k ind  narrows t h e i r  a p p l i c ­
a b i l i t y ,  bu t  i t  i s  the o p p o s i te  w i th  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  f o r  many 
t h in g s  which .commonsense would say  a re  im p o ss ib le  or n e c e s s a r y  
a re  not so on a s t r i c t e r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  bu t  on ly  v e ry  p ro b a b le  
o r  im prob ab le ,  and hence ,  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e .  A l though ,  f o r  
i n s t a n c e ,  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a c o i n ' s  t u r n i n g  up heads  i n  a 
hundred  s u c c e s s iv e  throws (1 ; glOO) i s  so s l i g h t  a s  to  be 
n e g l i g i b l e ,  y e t  i t  i s  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e .  Thus l o g i c a l  p o s s ­
i b i l i t y  i s  v e ry  much vfider th an  p r a c t i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y .
A t h i r d  use of " p o s s i b i l i t y "  must now be d i s t i n g u i s h ­
e d .  We o f t e n  say  " I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  . . . "  when what we mean 
i s  t h a t  we do n o t  know. Such a use i s  s u b j e c t i v e  o n ly ,  and i s  
the  r e s u l t  of i n s u f f i c i e n t  knowledge. For example,  we s a y : -  
" I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  X w i l l  come on the  2 p .m . t r a i n  tod ay ,  
o r  w a i t  t i l l  6 p .m ." :  bu t  i f  we had known t h a t  X 's  p a r t n e r  had 
been sudden ly  ta k e n  i l l  the  n i g h t  b e f o r e ,  we sh ou ld  r e a l i s e  
t h a t  X would be v e ry  busy t h a t  day , and t h a t  i t  would be p r a c ­
t i c a l l y  im p o ss ib le  f o r  him to  leave  on the  e a r l i e r  t r a i n .  This 
i s  a v e ry  common use or  ' p o s s i b i l i t y ' ; and i t  i s  o f t e n  h e ld  
t h a t  a l l  p o s s i b i l i t y  re d u ces  to  t h i s  - t h a t  what we c a l l  p o s s ­
i b i l i t y  i s  m ere ly  s u b j e c t i v e  and to  our incom ple te  know­
le d g e .  S p inoza ,  f o r  example, h e l d  t h i s  v iew: u s in g  the  terms 
i n  the s t r i c t  l o g i c a l  s e n s e ,  he says  : -  " I  c a l l  a  t h in g  imposs­
i b l e  when i t s  e x i s t e n c e  would imply a c o n t r a d i c t i o n :  n e c e s s a ry ,  
when i t s  n o n -e x is te n c e  would imply a c o n t r a d i c t i o n :  p o s s i b l e .
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when n e i t h e r  I t s  e x i s t e n c e  nor i t s  n o n -e x i s t e n c e  imply a 
c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  but  when the n e c e s s i t y  or I m p o s s i b i l i t y  of i t s  
ns,turs  depend on causes  unknown to  u s , w h i le  we f  e ig n  
Ü  e x i s t s ." He d id  not  d e f in e  the  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  as  
t h a t  which n e i t h e r  n e c e s s a ry  nor im p o ss ib le  ( s in c e  he be­
l i e v e d  t h a t  th e re  was n o th in g  c o r re sp o n d in g  to  t h i s ) , bu t  as 
t h a t  which i s  n o t  known to  be n e c e s s a ry  or  im p o s s ib l e .
A second view looks  to  d e te rm in ism  to  a b o l i s h  p o s s ­
i b i l i t y  i n  any o th e r  th an  a s u b j e c t i v e  s e n s e ;  bu t  t h i s  i s  ob­
v i o u s l y  no t  the  case w i th  p a r t i a l  d e te rm in ism :  i f  on ly  p h y s i c s  
i s  d e te rm in e d ,  i t  i s  no t  m ere ly  ’ s u b j e c t i v e ’ and due to  ’ f i n i t e  
l i m i t a t i o n s ’ , when one man X t a l k s  of the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of a
c e r t a i n  a c t i o n  on the  p a r t  o f  a n o th e r  man Y. But even in  the
2
case of complete d e te rm in ism ,  some l o g i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  r e ­
main i n t a c t .  Take, f o r  example, the  s t a t e m e n t : -  " I t  i s  p o s s ­
i b l e  f o r  X to  walk twenty  m i le s  tom orrow". I f  the  sp eaker  d id  
n o t  know t h a t  X had s p r a in e d  h i s  ank le  r e c e n t l y ,  the  p o s s i b i l ­
i t y  cou ld  be shown to  have e x i s t e d  on ly  i n  h i s  mind: bu t  I 
do no t  see how i t  can ev e r  be a rgu ed  t h a t  the l o g i c a l
1 .  "Be Intellectus Ernendatione" , ("Selections", e d .  Wild, 
p.19.) (Italics mine .)
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p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  m s re ly  s u b j e c t i v e  i n  " I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  f o r  a 
man to  walk tw enty  m i le s  a  day" ,  because i t  i s  q u i t e  a d i f f e r ­
e n t  k in d  of  s t a t e m e n t  from the  fo rm e r .  What i s  more, the  op­
p o n en ts  of  p o s s i b i l i t y  canno t  have i t  bo th  ways: th e y  can 
s t i g m a t i s e  i t  as be in g  i n  one sense  s u b j e c t i v e ,  o r  i n  a n o t h e r ,  
as  deny ing  d e te rm in ism ,  bu t  n o t  as  bo th  a t  once .  Thus i f  I  
s a y ,  " I t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  t h i s  co in  may come doBin heads  o r  
t a i l s :  I  do n o t  know", I  am n o t  a s s e r t i n g  (1) t h a t  the  r e s u l t  
w i l l  be i n d e t e r m i n a t e ,  (2) a n y th in g  e i t h e r  f o r  o r  a g a i n s t  the  
c o n t e n t i o n  t h a t  the  f a l l  o f  the  penny was d e te rm in ed  by 
p h y s i c a l  l a w s .
A l l  t h i s  i s  no t  to  be ta k e n  as  im ply ing  t h a t  S p in o za  
was wrong i n  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  ' l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e '  i s  m ere ly  a 
c o u r t e s y  t i t l e  in v e n te d  by our i g n o r a n c e .  But,  u n t i l  p r o o f  to  
the  c o n t r a r y  i s  p rod uced ,  we have a t  l e a s t  p r im a f a c i e  gpôünds 
f o r e r e j e c t i n g  h i s  v iew, and f o r  a d m i t t i n g ,  as the  minimum 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  of  the  p o s s i b l e .  I n  what f o l ­
lows,  I  s h a l l  be m a in ly  concerned  w i th  l o g i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  
and i t  w i l l  be assumed h e n c e f o r t h  t h a t  t h i s  n o t i o n  i s  n o t  a
m ere ly  s u b j e c t i v e  o n e .
What i s  the  r e l a t i o n  between the  p o s s i b l e  and th e
a c t u a l ?  between th e  bare  coherence  which i s  a l l  t h a t  l o g i c  
r e q u i r e s  f o r  ' p o s s i b i l i t y ' ,  and e x i s t e n c e  i n  t im e?  and how 
does co n t in g e n c y  e n t e r  i n t o  th e  world?  I t  i s  i n  th e  work of  
L e ib n iz  t h a t  th e se  q u e s t i o n s  are most f u l l y  d i s c u s s e d ,  and
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i t  a lways seems p a r a d o x i c a l  to  me, t h a t  w h i le  L e i b n i z ’ ex ­
p l i c i t  t r e a tm e n t  of  time i s  no t  v e ry  e x c i t i n g ,  and co u ld  be 
e a s i l y  p a r a l l e l e d  among many p h i l o s o p h e r s  w i th o u t  h i s  g e n i u s ,  
i m p l i c i t  i n  h i s  work a re  s u g g e s t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  of  the  h i g h e s t  
im portance  - and a l l  t h i s  w i th o u t  m en t io n in g  the  word ' t i m e '  « 
B r i e f l y ,  L e i b n i z '  p o s i t i o n  i s  as  f o l l o w s .  N ec essa ry  
p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  a s  e x e m p l i f i e d  i n  l o g i c  and m a th em at ic s ,  a r e  
p u r e l y  fo rm a l  and a b s t r a c t ,  and b ea r  no e s s e n t i a l  r e f e r e n c e  
to  any a c t u a l  s t a t e  o f  a f f a i r s .  There i s  some o t h e r  e lem en t  
i n  any p r o p o s i t i o n  which has  an e x i s t e n t i a l  im p o r t ,  and t h i s  
e lem en t  can n ev e r  be re d u ced  to  pure l o g i c .  Thus no e x i s t e n t ­
i a l  p r o p o s i t i o n  ( e x c e p t  one d e a l i n g  w i th  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  God, 
which i s  i t s e l f  l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s a ry )  can be j u s t i f i e d  i n  i t s  
e n t i r e t y  by l o g i c  -  t h e r e  must a lways remain an i r r e d u c i b l e  
e l e m e n t .  Hence what we c a l l  f a c t s  a re  c o n t i n g e n t ,  f o r  th e y  
canno t  be deduced by r e a s o n  a lo n e  -  "T ru th s  of r e a s o n in g  a re  
n e c e s s a r y ,  and t h e i r  o p p o s i t e  i s  im p o s s ib l e :  t r u t h s  of  f a c t  
a r e  c o n t i n g e n t ,  and t h e i r  o p p o s i t e  i s  p o s s i b l e " .  For a l l  
t r u e  s t a t e m e n t s ,  t h e r e  must be a s u f f i c i e n t  r e a s o n  why th e y  
a re  so ,  and no t  o t h e r w i s e .  N ecessa ry  t r u t h s ,  i f  n o t  im m edia te­
ly  s e l f - e v i d e n t ,  have a  s u f f i c i e n t  r e a s o n  which can be d i s ­
cove red  by a n a l y s i s  to  be n e c e s s a r y :  and c o n t i n g e n t  t r u t h s  
have t h e i r  u l t i m a t e  ground i n  th e  n a tu r e  of  God. Thus when 
L e ib n iz  s a i d  t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  t r u t h  was c o n t i n g e n t ,  he d id
1 .  "Monadology", s e c .  3 5 .
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n o t  mean t h a t  th e r e  was no re a so n  f o r  i t ,  but t h a t  i t  depended 
on a n o th e r  p r i n c i p l e  b e s id e s  the p u r e ly  l o g i c a l  one.  This p r i n ­
c i p l e  i s  God 's  choice  of the  b e s t ,  l e t  us imagine a c o l l e c t i o n  
o f  p r o p o s i t i o n s  ( a l l  ol the  s u b j e c t - p r e d i c a t e  form, f o r  L e ib n iz
th o ug h t  t h a t  a l l  p r o p o s i t i o n s  ex p re s se d  the  in h e ren ce  of  a
k
q u a l i t y  in  a s u b j e c t  ) •  Some we can see a re  l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s a r y ,  
and o t h e r s  a re  im p o s s ib le ,  but the  g r e a t  m a jo r i t y  of them we 
sh ou ld  s im ply  l a b e l  ’ t r u e ’ , or  ’ f a l s e ’ • Yet s in ce  th e r e  i s  no t  
( t o  commonsense a t  l e a s t )  a n y th in g  i n h e r e n t l y  im p o ss ib le  i n  the 
i d e a  of a cow’ s be ing  a r a t i o n a l  an im al ,  most of us would admit 
t h a t  i t  i s  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  ( though in co m p a t ib le  w i th  t h i s  
w orld  as i t  i s )  f o r  i t  to  be so .  Hence, the  l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  
i n c lu d e s  bo th  th in g s  t h a t  a re  a c tu a l  and t h e i r  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s ,  
and as f a r  as l o g i c  goes ,  t h e re  i s  n o th in g  to  choose between 
the  p r o p o s i t i o n s :  "Camels have humps", and "Camels have n o t  
humps". But one of them, though p o s s i b l e  i n  i t s e l f ,  i s  no t  
com pat ib le  (o r  compossib le)  w i th  what happens to  be the  a c t u a l  
w o r ld .  This a c t u a l  w orld  i s  made up of a number of m u tu a l ly  
compossible  e le m e n ts :  but th e r e  are o th e r  p o s s i b l e  w o r ld s ,  a l l  
i n t e r n a l l y  com poss ib le ,  and the  choice  between them cannot  be 
d e te rm ined  by l o g i c a l  p r i n c i p l e s  a lo n e ,  so why shou ld  t h i s  
w orld  and no t  the  o t h e r s ,  be a c t u a l ?  The re a so n  i s  t h a t  God 
has  chosen i t  i n s t e a d  o f  the  o t h e r  p o s s i b l e  w orlds  because i t  
i s  b e t t e r  th an  th ey  a r e ,  and God n e c e s s a r i l y  bu t  f r e e l y  chooses
1. But the  va lue  of h i s  views i s  no t  l i m i t e d  to  t h i s  a r t i f i c i a l  
scheme.
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the  b e s t .  This  i s  the  r e a l  meaning o f  t h a t  much m isu n d e rs to o d  
p h r a s e ,  " the  b e s t  o f  a l l  p o s s i b l e  w orlds"  -  i t  does no t  mean 
t h a t  e v e r y th i n g  in  the  w orld  i s  b e t t e r  th a n  any u n r e a l i s e d  
p o s s i b i l i t y ,  but t h a t  J^ken  as a w h o le , the  a c t u a l  world  i s ,  
l i t e r a l l y ,  the  b e s t  among the p o s s i b l e  w o r ld s .  I f  the  world  
were no t  b e t t e r  than  any o t h e r ,  i t  cou ld  not  have come i n t o  
e x i s t e n c e ,  f o r  "When two th in g s  t h a t  cannot bo th  happen are  
e q u a l l y  good; and n e i t h e r  in  them selves  nor in  t h e i r  combin­
a t i o n  w i th  o t h e r  things^ü has the  one any a.dvantage over the
1
o t h e r ,  God w i l l  produce n e i t h e r  of them."
A l l  t h i s  can be summed up under th r e e  h ead s :  f i r s t l y ,  
e v e r y th in g  i s  c o n t in g e n t  which i s  no t  e n t a i l e d  or  c o n fu te d  by 
l o g i c ,  and so a l l  a c t u a l  e x i s t e n c e ,  ex cep t  God’ s ,  i s  c o n t i n ­
g e n t .  Second ly ,  the l o g i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  i n c lu d e s  the f a l s e  as 
w e l l  as  the  t r u e ;  and t h i r d l y ,  which of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
sh o u ld  be a c t u a l i s e d ,  i s  d e te rm ined  by an e x t r a - l o g i c a l ,  but 
n e c e s s a r y ,  p r i n c i p l e ,  God’ s choice  of the b e s t . L e i b n i z ’ 
d e t a i l e d  working out of h i s  m e taphys ics  i s  open to  s e v e r a l  
o b j e c t i o n s ,  of v a ry in g  im p o r tan ce .  I t  i s  s a i d  t h a t  t h i s  w orld  
i s  v e ry  f a r  from being i d e a l ,  t h a t  he l a l l a c i o u s l y  h y p o s t a t -  
i s e d  ’p o s s i b i l i t i e s ’ and conceived  God as choosing  t h i s  w orld  
from a l l  the  o th e r  p o s s i b l e  w orlds  much as  a c h i l d  chooses  the 
b i g g e s t  and b r i g h t e s t  b a l lo o n  from a dozen i n  a shop-window, 
t h a t  h i s  view of the  l o g i c a l  s t r u c t u r e  of p r o p o s i t i o n s  was
1. Quoted R u s s e l l ,  "Ph i losophy  of L e i b n i z " , p .210 .
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d e f e c t i v e ,  t h a t  he g o t  i n t o  d i f f i c u l t i e s  w i th  d i s c r e t e  monads,,  
which cou ld  no t  p o s s i b l y  communicate w i th  each o t h e r ,  and so on.
Of th e se  the c r i t i c i s m  of  h y p o s t a t i s a t i o n  i s  most 
im p o r ta n t  i n  the  p r e s e n t  c o n n e c t io n .  L e ib n iz  canno t  wholly  
escape t h i s  c r i t i c i s m ;  and, as  was s a i d  in  the  l a s t  c h a p te r ,  
to  r e g a r d  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  as s u b s t a n t i a l  i s  to  g ive  away the 
case e n t i r e l y  and to  make u s e l e s s  the d i s t i n c t i o n  between p o s s ­
i b l e  and a c t u a l .  But because L e ib n iz  f a i l e d  to  keep to  the  
s t r a i g h t  and narrow p a th  does no t  mean t h a t  such a view i s  
i n e v i t a b l y  doomed to  f a i l u r e  - on the  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  seems to  me 
t h a t  as  long as we are c a r e f u l  to  remember t h a t  the p o s s i b i l ­
i t i e s  a re  !J)urely l o g i c a l ,  and t h a t  i n  a s s e r t i n g  "S i s  p o s s i b l e "  
we a re  no t  a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  S i s ,  i n  f a c t ,  l i k e  l y  to  happen, 
the  d i s t i n c t i o n  i s  of  the h i g h e s t  im p o r tan ce .  I t  i s  v i t a l ,  
however, to  r e a l i s e  t h a t  i f  we use the  n o t io n  o f ’e x i s t e n c e ’ i n  
c o n n e c t io n  w i th  th e se  l o g i c a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  ijb no t  a 
tem pora l  e x i s t e n c e . The sense  i n  which p o s s i b i l i t i e s  ’ e x i s t ’ 
i s  so u n l ik e  o r d in a r y  e x i s t e n c e  i n  t im e ,  t h a t  the  word i s  
b e t t e r  avo ided  a l t o g e t h e r  as o f f e r i n g  too  g r e a t  a t e m p ta t io n  
to  c o n f u s io n .  ' S u b s i s t s '  i s  a lm ost  as  bad .  On the  whole i t  
seems s im p le r  to  keep to  the t e r b  ' t o  b e ' ,  as long as i t  i s  
remembered t h a t  i t  i s  be ing  used  t im e l e s s l y .  When we say "S 
i s  p o s s i b l e " ,  our s t a t e m e n t  i s  i n  no way ana logous  to  "X i s  
r e d " ,  bu t  i s  r a t h e r  the  a s s e r t i o n  "S - p o s s i b l e " .  'Whatever h i s
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o c c a s io n a l  t r a n s g r e s s i o n s ,  L e i b n i z '  view of p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  
e s s e n t i a l l y  no t  a h y p o s t a t i s a t i o n  - on the c o n t r a r y ,  h i s  d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  i s  one which,  ta k e n  s e r i o u s l y ,  would b a n ish  hypo- 
é t a t i s a t i o n  f o r  e v e r .
Before go ing  any f u r t h e r ,  i t  i s  a d v i s a b l e  to g e t  
c l e a r  on what L e ib n iz  meant and what he d id  not  mean by con­
t in g e n c y .  The word ’ c o n t in g e n c y ’ has been used  in  th r e e  t o t a l ­
l y  d i l f e r e n t  s e n s e s ,  and i t  i s  im p o r ta n t ,  i n  i n t e r p r e t i n g  
L e ib n iz ,  no t  to  read  i n t o  him a meaning which he never  i n t e n d e d .  
F i r s t ,  t h e r e  i s  L e i b n i z ’ u s e ,  which i s  a p u r e ly  l o g i c a l  o n e .
For  him^, as  we havé seen ,  e v e ry th in g  t h a t  was not l o g i c a l l y  
n e c e s s a ry  was c o n t i n g e n t ,  and s in c e  n e c e s s i t y  was a b s t r a c t ,  a l l  
p a r t i c u l a r  e x i s t e n t s  were c o n t i n g e n t .  But t h i s  adm iss ion  of 
co n t in g en cy  i n t o  the u n iv e r s e  i s  not  in co m p a t ib le  w i th  determ­
in ism ,  and L e ib n iz  could  c o n s i s t e n t l y  have been a de t e r m i n i s t . 
His co n t in g en cy  i s  l o g i c a l l y  i r r e l e v a n t  to  d e te rm in ism .
Second ly ,  th e r e  i s  the  commonsense v iew. The p l a i n  
man would ag ree  w i th  L e ib n iz  t h a t  i t  i s  c o n t in g e n t  in  the 
morning w hethe r  i t  r a i n s  in  the  a f t e r n o o n  -  because he d o e s n ' t  
know - bu t  he would no t  say  i n  the  a f t e rn o o n  t h a t  the r a i n  i n  
the  morning was c o n t i n g e n t ,  because i t  was a ' f a c t ' .  To common 
sense  f a c t s  a re  f a c t s ,  and no t  c o n t in g e n t ,  bu t  to  L e ib n iz  i t  
was j t t s t  because a th in g  was a f a c t  . that i t  was c o n t i n g e n t .  
Commonsense, i n  i t s  d i s t i n c t i o n  between the  p o s s i b l e  and the  
a c t u a l ,  would say  t h a t  i t  i s  the  form er which i s  c o n t i n g e n t ;
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L e ib n iz  would say  the l a t t e r .  Obviously  t h e r e  i s  a r a d i c a l  
d i f f e r e n c e  between the  two c o n c e p t io n s ,  j n  t h i s  second s e n s e ,  
we c a l l  t h in g s  c o n t in g e n t  when we mean t h a t  we do not  know 
what w i l l  happen, and i t  i s  a p u r e ly  subje.^ 'ctive v iew.
The t h i r d  sense  of co n t in g en cy  i s  the most e x c i t i n g  
one, and i s  the one which i s  u s u a l l y  in v o lv ed  when s c i e n t i s t s  
and p h i lo s o p h e r s  d i s c u s s  whether  th e re  i s  "a c o n t in g e n t  e l e ­
ment i n  th é  u n i v e r s e " .  (As i s  u s u a l  w i th  cosmic q u e s t i o n s ,  i t  
i s  e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y  d i f f i c u l t  and not always p r o f i t a b l e  I ) No­
body has e v e r  doubted  t h a t  c e r t a i n  t h in g s  are c o n t in g e n t  f o r  
us - but th e r e  have been manÿyrho have doubted t h a t ,  o b j e c t i v e ­
l y ,  th e r e  a re  e v e n ts  which are  c o n t i n g e n t ,  and t h a t  t h e r e  i s ,  
no t  m ere ly  an u n c a l c u l a t e d ,  bu t  an i n c a l c u l a b l e  e lem ent  in  
the u n i v e r s e .  I t  i s  in  t h i s  t h i r d  sense  t h a t  co n t ing en cy  i s  
the d e n i a l  o f  de te rm in ism .
Of th e s e  th re e  s e n s e s ,  i t  i s  the  f i r s t  w i th  which 
we a re  m ain ly  concerned ,  and which i s  to  be u n d e rs to o d  u n l e s s
the c o n t r a r y  i s  s t a t e d .
C on t ingen t  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  th e n ,  a re  those  which i n ­
volve r e f e r e n c e  to  p a r t s  of t im e .  This  i s  im p l ied  in  the  
s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  i t  i s  the  a c t u a l ,  and no t  the  p o s s i b l e ,  which 
i s  c o n t i n g e n t .  That was as f a r  as L e ib n iz  g o t ,  and he never  
worked out in  d e t a i l  the ex t re m e ly  i n t e r e s t i n g  i m p l i c a t i o n s
1 . S p inoza ,  of c o u r s e ,  would have s a i d  t h a t  a l l  con t in g en cy  
was of t h i s  k in d .  (Compare " S th i c s  I ,  33, s c h . l . J
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o f  t h i s  viaw w i th  r e g a r d  to  t im e .  The r e s t  o f  t h i s  c h a p te r  
w i l l  be tak en  up w i th  an a t te m p t  f u r t h e r  to  ex ten d  t h i s  view 
ol co n t in g en cy  and p o s s i b i l i t y ,  and to  see how i t  concerns  
the problem of t i m e .
F i r s t l y ,  t h i s  view  in v o lv e s  a sharp  c leavage  between 
the l o g i c a l  and the n o n - l o g i c a l .  Logic s u f f i c e s  on ly  to  g ive  
the com poss ib les  (by weeding out  what i s  b l a t a n t l y  s e l f - c o n ­
t r a d i c t o r y  th rou gh  the Law of N o n - C o n t r a d ic t i o n ) , and i t  i n  no
way d e te rm in es  what i s  to  become a c t u a l .  Thus, from among a
1
c o l l e c t i o n  of p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a few can be r e j e c t e d  out  of hand: 
bu t  the g r e a t  m a j o r i t y  rem ain ,  and th e re  i s  no way of d i s t i n ­
g u i s h in g  between them ^  l o g ic  a l o n e . C onsequen t ly ,  we c a l l  
to  our a i d  a f a c t u a l  c r i t e r i o n :  we say t h a t  some of th ese
p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  though l e g i t i m a t e  f o r  a l l  t h a t  l o g i c  can t e l l
2
u s ,  do no t  f a c t  co r re sp o n d  to  a n y th in g  i n  a c t u a l i t y .  We 
say b r i e f l y  and w i th  an a s su ra n ce  t h a t  i s  a lm ost  p a t h e t i c ,  
t h a t  th e y  are  ’f a l s e ’ , and t h a t  o th e r s  a re  ’ t r u e ’ . This i s  
not the  p la c e  to  go i n t o  the  c o n t ro v e r s y  as  to  whether  o r  no t  
’ t r u t h ’ i s  r e l a t i v e ^  as a d m i t t i n g  of degrees^ and t h a t  we rnwrely 
c a l l  something ’ t r u e ’ when i t  i s  more t r u e  than  f a l s e  ( i n  the
a re  ’ t r u e ’ or ’f a l s e ’ in  f a c t .
2 .  Or t h a t  they  are  no t  c o h e re n t  w i th  the r e s t  o f  the  w o r ld .
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words of  B r a d l e y ' s  e p ig ra m :-  "3very  t r u t h  i s  so t ru e  t h a t  
any t r u t h  must he f a l s e " ) .
N e v e r th e l e s s ,  t h e re  i s  a sense  i n  which i t  i s  c o r ­
r e c t  to  say t h a t  t ru e  and f a l s e  a re  on ly  r e l a t i v e  d i s t i n c t i o n s ,  
and t h a t  the  d e c i s i o n  and con f idence  w i th  which we use th e se  
terms (e x cep t  i n  c o m p ara t iv e ly  r a r e  b o r d e r l in e  ca ses )  may m is ­
l e a d  us i n t o  b e l i e v i n g  them a b s o l u t e .  I  do no t  mean to  say 
t h a t  t h i s  i s  the  on ly  s e n se ,  nor t h a t  i t  i s  the  most im p o r ta n t  
one: the p o i n t  t h a t  I  am t r y i n g  to  make i s  t h a t  the  d i s t i n c -  
t i o n  between t ru e  and f a l s e  i s  n o t  w ho l ly  to be e x p la in e d  in  
terms of l o g i c .  And t h i s  i s  no t  on ly  because lo g i c  l e a v e s  i n ­
d e te rm in a te  which of s e v e r a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a re  " t r u e "  and 
which " f a l s e " :  but a l s o  because a p o s s i b i l i t y  which i s  a c t u a l ­
i s e d  a t  one time ( a s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  t h i s  s ig n a l - la m p  
shou ld  be green) may not be a c t u a l i s e d  a t  a n o t h e r .  Were the
d i s t i n c t i o n  a p u r e ly  l o g i c a l  one i t  cou ld  never be s a i d  ( i n
1
p o p u la r  language ) t h a t  what i s  t ru e  a t  one time i s  f a l s e  a t  
a n o th e r  t i m e . This  l a t t e r  p o i n t  must be emphasized because 
the a t t e m p t  has sometimes been made to  show t h a t  lo g ic  does 
no t  l eav e  in d e te rm in a te  what p o s s i b i l i t i e s  a re  a c t u a l i s e d ,  
and t h a t ,  i f  we only  had s u f f i c i e n t  d a ta  a t  our d i s p o s a l ,  we 
cou ld  see t h a t  a l l  a l t e r n a t i v e s  bu t  one a re  cu t  ou t  l o g i c a l l y .  
This  i s ,  of c o u rse ,  a r e t u r n  to  the view t h a t  v/e have met
1. This  i s  g e t t i n g  n ea r  the  deep w a te rs  of the  ’ t im e le s s n e s s  
of t r u t h s .  Were the s ta te m e n t  to  be i n t e r p r e t e d  l i t e r a l l y ,  
i t  would be open to  the  o b j e c t i o n s  r a i s e d  e a r l i e r ,  
the  im m edia te ly  obvious sense i s  a l l  t h a t  i s  r e q u i r e d  h e r ^ .
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b e f o r e :  t h a t  •p o e s l b l l i t y ' i s  m ere ly  a name f o r  our i g n o ra n c e ,  
and t h a t  e v e r y th in g  i s  l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s a ry  or  im p o s s ib l e ,  ( i t  
sh o u ld  be n o t i c e d ,  to o ,  t h a t  i t  i s  a m is ta k e  to  t h in k  i t  nec­
e s s a r y  to  h o ld  t h i s  view a s ^ c o r o l l a r y  to  d e te rm in ism :  t h i s  i s  
an u l t r a  d e t e r m i n i s t  view, and the d e t e r m i n i s t  cou ld  p e r f e c t l y  
w e l l  r e j e c t  i t . )  Such a view i s  i n v u l n e r a b l e , f o r  i t  can never  
be d is p ro v e d  ( a t  l e a s t  u n t i l  somebody i s  bo ld  enough to  a s s e r t  
t h a t  he does know e v e r y t h i n g ) , and i n  s p i t e  of i t s  u n p la u s ­
i b i l i t y  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  i t  i s  l o g i c a l l y  q u i t e  t e n a b l e .
But the  case i s  a l t e r e d  when, in  su p p o r t  of what
1
I  am c a l l i n g  the  ’ r e l a t i v i s t ’ view of t r u t h  and f a l s i t y  we 
can adduce ,  no t  on ly  the  e lem ent  of con t in g en cy  i n  which one 
among p o s s i b l e  a l t e r n a t i v e s  a t  a g iv en  time becomes a c t u a l ,  
bu t  a l s o  the undoubted f a c t  t h a t  d i f f e r e n t  t h in g s  h o ld  good 
a t  d i f f e r e n t  t im e s ,  and t h a t  what ho ld s  good a t  one time does 
no t  h o ld  good a t  a n o t h e r .  That cannot i n  any way be e x p la in e d  
l o g i c a l l y .  The n o t io n  of change i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  i n e x p l i c a b l e  
to  a p u r e ly  s t a t i c  l o g i c :  to  say  t h a t  "A has x ,  and than  A 
has no t  x " , i s  n o t  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  because A has ’ changed’
( i n  the  lo o p -h o le  a f f o r d e d  by t h a t  o b l i g in g  'a n d  t h e n ’ ) i s  
the  mere p o s t u l a t i o n  of a new word to  d e s ig n a te  what can 
never  be g e n u in e ly  e x p la in e d  by l o g i c .  B radley  was undoubted­
l y  righl^when he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  change i s  no t  amenable to  l o g i c ;  
where ,  i t  seems to  me, he went wrong was in  denying change
1 .  Using t h i s  as a sh o r th an d  e x p r e s s io n  onlx*
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to  be r e a l  on t h a t  accoun t  - he would have done b e t t e r  to  
re sh ape  h i s  views of ’ r a t i o n a l i t y » .
This  im p c t ' f e c t ly  l o g i c a l  c h a r a c t e r  cannot be go t  r i d  
of i n  a way ana logous  to  the fo rm e r .  Though i n  the  fo rm er  case 
i t  cou ld  be h e ld  t h a t ,  i f  we knew e v e r y th in g ,  ’p o s s i b i l i t i e s »  
would be reduced  to  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  or  n e c e s s i t y ,  no such t r e a t ­
ment a v a i l s  h e r e .  The c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i s  much too b l a t a n t .  I t  i s  
no lo n g e r  a case of d i s c o r d a n t  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ,  but of d i s c o r d ­
a n t  a c t u a l i t i e s ,  and the j u g g l in g  which might save the  form er 
cannot  save the l a t t e r :  i t  i s  a b ru te  (and to  some te n d e r  
l o g i c a l  s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s ,  a b r u t a l )  f a c t  t h a t 'w h a t  i s  the  case 
a t  a g iv en  time may not a t  a n o th e r  time be the  c a s e .  And, in  
p a s s i n g  ( th e  p o i n t  w i l l  be r e tu r n e d  to  l a t e r  on ) ,  i t  may be 
remarked t h a t  the  use we make of time to  mask the c o n t r a d i c t i o n  
- no t  to  m ention  the f a c i l i t y  w i th  which we persuade  o u r s e lv e s  
t h a t  t h e r e  r e a l l y  i s  no c o n t r a d i c t i o n  a t  a l l  - i s  h ig h ly  
s i g n i f i c a n t .
The c leavage  between l o g i c a l  and n o n - l o g i c a l  which 
t h i s  view in v o lv e s  i s  i n  no way p a r a d o x i c a l  to  hold* We con 
s t a n t l y  d i s t i n g u i s h  between the  p l e a s a n t  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
t h e re  may be a l e t t e r  i n  the  morning, and the somewhat un­
i n s p i r i n g  n e c e s s i t y  e x h i b i t e d  i n  the d i s j u n c t i o n  "iLither t h e r e
1 . " I t  might seem that the successive presentation i "  time 
of Metaphysics” , p. 159.)
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w i l l  or t h e r e  w i l l  no t  be a l e t t e r  in  the m o rn in g .” 3 v3 n i f ,  
by a r i g i d  su p e r -d e te rm in i s m ,  we a t te m p t  to  show t h a t  the  
form er i s  as  n e c e s s a ry  as the l a t t e r ,  i t  i s  e v id e n t  t h a t  t h i s
ÎË  âS p y i g i n a l  be l i e f , bu t  i s  the p ro d u c t  of r a t i o n a l i  s a - 
t_iori. The onus p roband i  i s  on those  who would a s s e r t  i t ,  and 
u n t i l  th e n  we are  a t  l i b e r t y  to  h o ld  t h a t  th e re  i s  a genuine  
d i f f e r e n c e .  Then, s e c o n d ly ,  i t  i s  obvious t h a t  change in v o lv e s  
an i l l o g i c a l i t y ,  which no de te rm in ism  can e x p l a i n  away, f o r  
however l e a r n e d l y  we delve i n to  the 'c au ses*  of the change, 
and however z e a l o u s ly  we show t h a t  the change was de te rm ined  
and no t  * c o n t in g e n t  * ( i_n a d i f f e r e n t  sense  of * c o n t in g e n t  * , 
p l e a s e  n o t e ) , u l t i m a t e l y  we have to  face  the  f a c t  of change 
and c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  and of something which the laws of l o g i c  
can n ev e r  e x p l a i n .  1 h o p e , f i n a l l y ,  to  show t h a t  th e se  two 
f l o u t i n g s  of l o g i c  have the  same r o o t :  but  f o r  the p r e s e n t  i t  
i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  hope t h a t  enough has been s a i d  f o r  us to  take  
the c leavage  between l o g i c a l  and n o n - l o g i c a l  f o r  g r a n t e d .
The second main p o i n t  i s  t h a t ,  g r a n te d  t h i s  c le a v a g e ,  
the c o n t in g e n t  e lem ent  e n t e r s  in  w i th  a c t u a l i t y .  What do we 
mean by a c t u a l i t y ?  I t  would be f o o l i s h  to  expec t  an a n a l y t i c  
d e f i n i t i o n ,  f o r  t h i s  i s  one of  the  b a s i c  n o t io n s  from which 
we s t a r t ,  and which must always be p re su pp osed  i n  our spec­
u l a t i o n s .  S t i l l ,  i t  i s  e v id e n t  t h a t  i t  c o n t a in s  some
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r e f e r e n c e  to  time -  not t h a t  t h a t  i s  a  v e r y  good way of  ex ­
p r e s s i n g  i t ,  s in c e  i t  may m is le a d  us i n t o  t h i n k i n g  o f  t ime 
and a c t u a l i t y  as  l o g i c a l l y  s e p a r a b l e .  F e v e r t h e l e s s ,  to  say  o f  
som eth ing  t h a t  i t  i s  a c t u a l  i s  to  con n ec t  i t  w i th  th e  v e rb  
• to  h ap p en ’ -  w h e th e r  w i th  any p a r t i c u l a r  t e n s e  o f  t h a t  v e rb  
I  do n o t  h e re  i n q u i r e ,  f o r  t h a t  i s  a s ec o n d a ry  q u e s t i o n ,  which 
i s  . l o g i c a l l y  dependen t  upon t h i s  v e r y  n o t i o n  of  a c t u a l i t y .  
G ran ted  t h a t ,  when from p o s s i b i l i t i e s  we pass  to  a c t u a l i t y ,  a 
c o n t i n g e n t  e lem en t  e n t e r s  i n ,  may not  what we c a l l  ’ t i m e ’ be 
t h i s  c o n t i n g e n t  e le m e n t?
C e r t a i n l y  a l l  our c o n c lu s io n s  so f a r  would seem to  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  som ething  p e c u l i a r l y  and e s s e n t i a l l y  
a l o g i c a l  a b o u t  t ig ie .  I t s  c o n n e c t io n  w i th  change ,  and more p a r ­
t i c u l a r l y  w i th  t h a t  h i g h l y  d i s r e p u t a b l e  v a r i e t y ,  Becoming; 
i t s  f l e e t i n g n e s s :  i t s  u n re v e r s e d n e s s  -  a l l  th e s e  in v o lv e  t h a t ,  
ju d g ed  by the  s t a n d a r d s  of  a  s t a t i c  l o g i c ,  i t  i s  r i d d l e d  w i th
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s .  Take, f o r  exam ple ,  the  l a t t e r  c h a r a c t e r .  Can 
be
i t / d e a l t  w i th  by l o g i c ?  Not in  the  l e a s t .  A l l  t h a t  l o g i c  can 
do i s  to  p o s t u l a t e  t h a t  i n  r a t i o n a l  m echanics  (n o te  the  ad- 
j e c t i v e l )  a l l  o p e r a t i o n s  a re  r e v e r s i b l e . Now nobody o b j e c t s  
to  th e  r e v e r s i b i l i t y  of  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  l o g i c  and pure  mathe­
m a t i c s :  bu t  th e  m a th e m a t ic ia n  i s  no t  s a t i s f i e d  - ^  s e e ^  to
1 . Compare Schopenhauer ,  s p e a k in g  o f  n e c e s s i t y ,  p o s s i b i l i t y ,  
and a c t u a l i t y : -  "What keeps them a p a r t  i s  th e  l i m i t a t i o n  
of  our i n t e l l e c t  th ro u g h  the  form of t im e :  f o r  t ime i s  the  
m e d ia to r  between p o s s i b i l i t y  and a c t u a l i t y . "  ("World as  
W i l l  and I d e a " ,  3ng .  t r a n s .  i i ,  7 3 . )
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â££iZ Ms to t ] ^  world about him. That is  a very laud­
able endeavour, and i t  meets with a considerable amount of 
success. The correspondence between his calcu la tions  and the 
a c tu a l i ty  is  near enough to encourage him to proceed. But, by 
the nature of mathematics, he cannot r e s t  content with a gen­
e ra l  correpsondence, but claims tha t  i t  is  exact, or f a i l in g  
th a t ,  that  exactness is  in theory possible and only not a t ­
ta ined through experimental e r r o r . Logic is  absolute, and 
nothing short of ce r ta in ty  can su ff ice :  and in i t s  application  
to the actual  i t  pos tu la tes  an equal c e r ta in ty .  In th is  i t  
goes too f a r ;  the ideal of conservation is  a chimerical one 
as applied to a c tu a l i ty .  This l a s t  is  a bold statement, but I 
think the fac ts  j u s t i f y  i t .  Ho actual motion a t t a in s ,  though 
i t  may approximats to, tlis ideal of ’r a t io n a l ’ mechanics.
Take, fo r  instance, a typ ica l  example in Dynamics, which 
inv i te s  the student, given i n i t i a l  speed, weight, and so on, 
to calculate  the momentum of a t r a in .  In b rackets , almost as 
an afterthought,  comes the in junction: Neglect f r i c t i onl 
But such cavalier  treatment cannot always su ff ice ,  and some­
times among the data i s  a modest l i t t l e  note to the e f fec t  
tha t  the co -e f f ic ien t  of f r i c t io n  is  such and such. In sych 
circumstances, i t  is  claimed that an actual t r a in ,  set run­
ning under those conditions, would in fac t  have the momentum
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c a l c u l a t e d  f o r  i t ,  which was no t  the  case  as  long as  * f r i c t i o n *  
was n e g l e c t e d .  3 varybody i s  happy: the m a th e m a t ic ian  works 
ou t  h i s  p rob lem , and the  answwr i s  checked i n  p r a c t i c e ,  amid 
u n i v e r s a l  a d m i r a t i o n .  S u r e l y ,  t h e n ,  i t  may be s a i d ,  th e  i d e a l  
a c c u ra c y  o f  m athem at ics  has  been found  a p p l i c a b l e  to  the  p h y s ­
i c a l  w or ld?  A b a l l  i s  s e t  bouncing from a h e i g h t  o f  t h r e e  f e e t .  
How long  w i l l  i t  be, g iv e n  c e r t a i n  p a r t i c u l a r s  abou t  the  
* e l a s t i c i t y *  o f  the  b a l l ,  b e fo re  the  bouncing  c e a s e s ?  An answer 
can be q u i c k l y  g iv en  to  t h i s  p rob lem , n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i ^  no t  
obv ious  t h a t  som eth ing  has  happened which canno t  be r e v e r s e d ?  
The b a l l  on the  ground does n o t ,  jji  f a c t , s t a r t  bouncing h i g h e r  
and h i g h e r  back to  the  l e v e l  from which i t  was o r i g i n a l l y  
d rop ped .  That  i n  i t s e l f  sh o u ld  show us t h a t  he re  i s  som eth ing  
which a p u r e l y  * r a t i o n a l *  m echanics  can neve r  fa thom , and 
which i s  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  to  the  p e r f e c t l y  c o r r e c t  answers  t h a t  
the  m a th e m a t ic ia n  has  been g i v i n g .  The s o l u t i o n  of the  c o n t r a ­
d i c t i o n  i s ,  t h a t  i t  i s  the  n o t i o n  of f r i c t i o n ,  of  d im in i s h in g  
e l a s t i c i t y ,  of d i s s i p a t i o n  of  en e rg y  i n  the  form of h e a t ,  which 
the  m a th e m a t ic ia n  cannot  u n d e r s t a n d :  once i t  i s  p o s t u l a t e d  
t h a t  the  ' f r i c t i o n *  i s  so and so ,  he can co n t in u e  h i s  c a l c u l a ­
t i o n s  i n  p e r f e c t  p e a c e .  But the  c l a r i t y  of  the  n o t io n  of  I r i c -  
t i o n ,  jud ged  i n  te rm s of  a s t a t i c  l o g i c ,  i s  p u r e l y  v e r b a l :  
f r i c t i o n  i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  in co m p reh e n s ib le  on l o g i c a l  p r e m i s e s .
I t  i s ,  a t  bo t tom , on ly  a word f o r  the  ^ a n t i t y  of a b e r r a t i o n  
from what i s  c a l c u l a t e d :  w he the r  g r e a t  o r  s m a l l ,  i t  i s  an
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a b e r r a t i o n ,  and i n  a d m i t t i n g  i t ,  p h y s ic s  ad m its  t h a t  th e  i d e a l  
o f  a p u r e l y  m a th e m a t ic a l  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  the  w orld  has  a l re ad y -  
b roken  down. The a b s o l u t e  has  g iv en  p la c e  to  the  r e l a t i v e ,  and 
c o n t in g e n c y  has  e n t e r e d  i n .
While on t h i s  p o i n t ,  a  few words can be s a i d  abou t  
e n t r o p y ,  a  n o t i o n  which i s  v e ry  much to  the  f o r e  nowadays, and 
which has  been l i n k e d  by some p h y s i c i s t s ,  n o t a b ly  N dd ing ton ,  
w i th  t h a t  of t im e .  "W ithout any m y s t ic  a p p e a l  to  c o n s c io u s n e s s  
i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  f i n d  a d i r e c t i o n  o f  time on the  fo u r -d im e n s -  
i o n a l  map by a s tu d y  of o r g a n i s a t i o n .  L e t  us draw an arrow 
a r b i t r a r i l y .  I f  as  we f o l l o w  the  arrow  we f i n d  more and more 
o f  the  random e lem en t  i n  the  s t a t e  of  th e  w o r ld ,  th en  the  
a r row  i s  p o i n t i n g  to  the  f u t u r e :  i f  the  random e lem en t  de­
c r e a s e s  the arrow  p o i n t s  to  the  p a s t .  That i s  the  on ly  d i s -
1
t i n c t i o n  known to  p h y s i c s . ” And, "The p r a c t i c a l  measure of 
the  randon  e lem en t  which can i n c r e a s e  i n  the  u n iv e r s e  bu t  can 
n ev e r  d e c re a s e  i s  c a l l e d  e n t r o p y . . . .  The law t h a t  e n t ro p y  
a lways i n c r e a s e s  - the  second  law of  therm o-dynamics  - h o l d s ,
I t h i n k ,  the  supreme p o s i t i o n  among th e  laws of  N a t u r e .
The Second Law of thermodynamics i s  i n  e s s e n t i a l  o p p o s i t i o n
1. "Nature  o f  the  P h y s i c a l  W orld" ,  p . 69.
1 9 3 4 ,  p . 2 4 . )
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to  ’ b a l a n c e - s h e e t ’ t h e o r i e s ,  i n  t h a t  i t  p o s t u l a t e s  a c o n t i n u a l
running-down of the  u n i v e r s e ,  a  c o n s t a n t  d e g r a d a t i o n  of  en e rg y
i n t o  the  form of  h e a t .  Time, to o ,  i s  opposed to  such  t h e o r i e s :
and I t  IS no a c c i d e n t  t h a t  p h y s i c i s t s  l i k e  T dd ing to n  sh o u ld  s s e k
to  r e l a t e  the  two n o t io n s  of time and e n t r o p y .  But where i t  i s
p o s s i b l e  t h a t  Tdding ton  may b@ wrong i s  i n  making the  n o t i o n  of
time dependent  on t h a t  o f  e n t r o p y .  I t  i s  one t h in g  to  say  t h a t
e a r l i e r  and l a t e r  s t a t e s  cou ld  n o t  be d i s t i n g u i s h e d  in  p h y s i c a l
term s w i th o u t  making use of the  c o n c e p t io n  of  e n t r o p y :  i t  i s
q u i t e  a n o t h e r  to  say  t h a t  a l l  t h a t  * e a r l i e r *  and * l a t e r *  means
i s  more and l e s s  o r g a n i s e d  c o l l e c t i o n s ,  as  A ddington  i s  i n c l i n e d  
1
to  do. On the  c o n t r a r y ,  i t  i s  on ly  i n  time t h a t  we can t a l k  of
a c o l l e c t i o n  * becoming* l e s s  o r g a n i s e d ,  and the  n o t i o n  of  time
i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  p r e s u p p o s e d .  J3ddington may ba r i g h t ,  t h a t  when
e n t r o p y  i s  a t  a maximum, we lo s e  "time * s a r ro w " ,  meaning t h a t
t h e r e  i s  no p h y s i c a l  means of  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  between e a r l i e r
and l a t e r  s t a t e s ;  bu t  when he goes on to  i n f e r  t h a t  i n  such a
c a s e ,  " t ime i s  s t i l l  t h e r e ,  and r e t a i n s  i t s  o r d i n a r y  p r o p e r t i e s ,
b u t  i t  has  l o s t  i t s  a r ro w :  l i k e  space i t  e x t e n d s ,  but  i t  does 
2
n o t  *go o n , ' "  he seems to  be t a l k i n g  n o n s e n s e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
i n  s p i t e  of c r i t i c i s m s  of  d e t a i l ,  i t  i s  i n  the  h i g h e s t  d eg ree s  
s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  t h e r e  sh o u ld  be a s t r o n g  tend en cy  i n  modern 
p h y s i c s  to  i d e n t i f y  the  p assag e  of  t im e ,  w i th  such an o b v io u s ly
1 .  But i n  h i s  l a t e r  book, "New Pathways i n  S c i e n c e "  ( p p .5 2 - 4 ) ,
(Mind, 1929) .
2 . "Nature  of the  P h y s i c a l  World" p . 79.
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a l o g i c a l  c o n c e p t io n  as  t h a t  o f  c o n s t a n t l y  i n c r e a s i n g  e n t r o p y  -
a c o n c e p t io n  which i s  p l a i n l y  opposed to  the  o ld  i d e a l s  o f  
s t r i c t  c o n s e r v a t i o n  t h e o r i e s ,  and i s  no t  even i n  t h e o r y  r e ­
d u c ib le  to  them. What i s  more, th e  l in k a g e  of  time w i th  the  
i n c r e a s e  of a random e lem en t  must no t  be o v e r lo o k e d .  T h e o r ie s  
such a s  T d d i n g t o n ' s ,  however v u l n e r a b l e  on p o i n t s  of  d e t a i l ,  
y e t  emphasize the  e s s e n t i a l  a l o g i c a l i t y  o f  t im e ,  i n  c o n t r a s t  
to  the s p i n e l e s s  »t* o f  o l d e r  p h y s i c s ,  from which a l l  s p e c i f i c -  
a l l y  tem p o ra l  q u a l i t i e s  had been e l i m i n a t e d  i n  the  i n t e r e s t s  
of a s t a t i c  i d e a l  of  e x p l a n a t i o n .
I  have i l l u s t r a t e d  a t  l e n g t h  the  e s s e n t i a l  a l o g i c a l ­
i t y  in v o lv e d  i n  the  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  u n re v e r s e d n e s s  of  t im e .  The 
same h o ld s  good, to o ,  of  i t s  ’ becoming* and *f l e e t i n g n e s s *, 
b u t  i t  i s  no t  n e c e s s a r y  to  deve lop  t h i s  i n  d e t a i l ,  o r  to  add 
any more on t h i s  p o i n t  to  the  c o n c lu s io n s  re a c h e d  i n  e a r l i e r  
c h a p t e r s .
T h i r d l y ,  as  opposed to  the  a b s o l u t e n e s s  of l o g i c a l  
n e c e s s i t y ,  c o n t in g e n c y  i s  a r e l a t i v e  n o t i o n .  I t  i s  by no means 
synonymous w i t h  pure chance ,  and the  ad v oca te  of  co n t in g e n c y  
can p e r f e c t l y  c o n s i s t e n t l y  a g r e e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  g r a n t e d  
the  n o t i o n  of  * f r i c t i o n *  and the  d e p a r t u r e  from l o g i c a l  s t a n d ­
a r d s  which i t  i n v o l v e s ,  the r e s t  of  a problem of  dynamics may 
v e ry  w e l l  be s u s c e p t i b l e  oi e x a c t  m a th e m a t ic a l  t r e a t m e n t .  I t  
i s  w e l l  to  n o t i c e  t h i s ,  s in c e  to  b e l i e v e  the  c o n t r a r y  would be 
to  judge t h i s  view u n f a i r l y ,  a s  i t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  obvious t h a t
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mathematics  çag. a p p l i e d  to concre te  th in g s  l i k e  b r idg es  and 
r a i lw a y  e n g in e e r in g .  The p o in t  t h a t  I am t r y i n g  to make i s  n o t  
t h a t  the ex ac t  methods of lo g ic  and mathematics cannot be ap­
p l i e d  to  the a c t u a l  world ,  but t h a t ,  w i th  e x i s t e n c e  in  t ime, 
an o th e r  element b es id es  the p u re ly  l o g i c a l  one e n t e r s  i n .  C al l  
i t  chance, or con t ingency ,  or what you w i l l  - but the f a c t  
remains t h a t  i t  can never be e x p la in e d  w i tho u t  residuum in  
terms of l o g i c ,  and i i  we t r y  to do so, we are  fo rc e d  e i t h e r  
to  reco g n ise  t h a t  time i s  r i d d l e d  w i th  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , or to 
p o s t u l a t e  unknown x*s to c o r r e c t  our s t a t i c  balance s h e e t , and 
by m ere ly  v e rb a l  e x p la n a t io n s  to seek to  hide from o u rs e lv e s  
the l i m i t a t i o n s  of our method. But i f  we f r a n k ly  face  the f a c t  
t h a t  w i th  t im e,  an e s s e n t i a l l y  a l o g i c a l  element e n t e r s  i n to  
the world  ( i n s t e a d  o f ,  o s t r i c h - l i k e ,  h id in g  our heads from 
such u n p le a sa n t  f a c t s ) , some very  im portan t  consequences fo l lo w .  
F i r s t l y ,  i t  i s  p o s s ib le  to  see how i t  i s  t h a t  some sc ie n c e s  
should  be more advanced than  o t h e r s ,  so t h a t  i t  has seemed 
p l a u s i b l e  to many to a r range  them in  a h i e r a r c h i c a l  o rd e r .  
Secondly , we can e x p la in  the f a c t  - on any s t r i c t  d e te r m in i s t  
or n e c e s s i t a r i a n  view, a d i f f i c u l t  one - t h a t  w i th  d im inu t ion  
of e x t e n t  th e re  i s  g r e a t e r  s i m p l i c i t y  ( i n  the l o g i c a l  sense of 
being  s u s c e p t ib l e  to m athem atica l  c a l c u l a t i o n s ) , so t h a t  in  
the l i m i t ,  the i d e a l  of complete e x p la n a t io n  in  l o g i c a l  terms 
i s  in  th eo ry  p o s s i b l e . T h i rd ly ,  i t  accounts  f o r  the d i f f i c u l t i e s
1. This l a s t  p o in t  i s  mentioned here f o r  com pleteness :  i t  i s  
not  d i s c u sse d  u n t i l  the next  c h a p te r .
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and p e r p l e x i t i e s  t h a t  have accum u la ted  round  time and k i n d r e d  
t o p i c s  such as c a u s a l i t y ,  f r e e w i l l ,  and change,  when d e a l t  
w i th  from a p u r e l y  l o g i c a l  s t a n d p o i n t .
Take the  second p o i n t  f i r s t .  How i s  i t  t h a t  t h e r e  
sh o u ld  be convergence  to  s i m p l i c i t y  w i th  d im in u t io n  o f  e x t e n t ?  
f o r  t h a t  t h e r e  i s ,  nobody d o u b t s .
S c ience  does n o t ,  i n  p r a c t i c e ,  s e r i o u s l y  ad vo ca te  
the  complete  in te rd e p e n d e n c e  of  e v e r y t h in g  i n  the  u n i v e r s e .
I t  does no t  a s s e r t  t h a t  every^ime I  move, I  a l t e r  th e  c e n t r e  
o f  g r a v i t y  of  Mars, though i t  i s  t r u e ,  and th e  amount co u ld  
be computed. I t  s a y s ,  r a t h e r ,  t h a t  f o r  p r a c t i c a l  p u rp o se s  
th e  change i s  so v e ry ^ s m a l l  as  to  be n e g l i g i b l e . Again ,  i t  
does no t  i n  f a c t  assume, t h a t  e v e ry  e v e n t  i s  bound up w i th  
ev e ry  o t h e r :  r a t h e r  i t  makes a ssu m p t io n s  t h a t  c e r t a i n  m a t t e r s  
a re  i r r e l e v a n t .  Common sense  a g r e e s  w i t h  the  s c i e n t i s t  when 
he says  t h a t  a sneeze  i n  A u s t r a l i a  i s  i r r e l e v a n t  to  the  f e r ­
t i l i t y  of  c rops  sown i n  E n g la n d .  Yet the s c i e n t i s t  cannot  
know t h a t  i t  i s  i r r e l e v a n t :  he o n ly  t h i n k s  i t  i n f i n i t e l y
p ro b a b le  t h a t  i t  i s .
What i s  more, th e s e  judgments  a re  n o t  m ere ly  made
to  s i m p l i f y  c a l c u l a t i o n s ,  bu t  a re  e s s e n t i a l  to  s c i e n c e . P e r ­
haps th e  most obvious  d i f f e r e n c e  between s c ie n c e  and common 
sense  i s  t h a t  the  fo rm er i s  s e l e c t i v e .  I t  s e l e c t s  those  
e lem en ts  ou t  of  a t o t a l  s i t u a t i o n  which a re  ’ im p o r ta n t» ,  and 
n e g l e c t s  th o se  w hich ,  though p e rh ap s  more s t r i k i n g  on a
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s u p e r f i c i a l  view, a r e  'u n i m p o r t a n t * • For the  v e ry  f a c t  t h a t  
s c ie n c e  fram es  s t a t e m e n t s  of i n v a r i a b l e  c o n n e c t io n  (such  as 
t h a t  p r e s s u r e  v a r i e s  i n v e r s e l y  w i th  the  volume and d i r e c t l y  
w i th  the t e m p e r a t u r e ) , shows t h a t  i t  r e g a r d s  the  c o n n e c t io n  
between p r e s s u r e  and volume and t e m p e ra tu r e  as  being  more im­
p o r t a n t  th a n  the  c o n n e c t io n  between p r e s s u r e  and, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
the  c o lo u r  of  the  e x p e r i m e n t e r ’ s h a i r .  The assum pt ion  t h a t  
some c o n n e c t io n s  between e v e n t s  and s u b s ta n c e s  a re  i n t r i n s i c ,  
w h i le  o t h e r s  a re  e x t r i n s i c ,  i s  o f  the  g r e a t e s t  v a lu e  to  s c i ­
en c e ,  and i t  i s  no t  too  much to  say  t h a t  w i th o u t  i t  t h e r e  
c o u ld  be no s c i e n c e .  I t  i s  t r u e ,  t h a t  s c i e n c e  i s  based  on the  
o b s e r v a t i o n  of  u n i f o r m i t i e s ,  bu t  what i s  o f t e n  f o r g o t t e n  i s  
t h a t  s c ie n c e  i s  based  e q u a l l y  as  much on the  o b s e r v a t io n  of  
r e l e v a n t  d i f f e r e n c e s , and on the a ssu m p t io n  t h a t  p a r t s  o f  the  
u n i v e r s e ,  f o r  c e r t a i n  p u rp o s e s  a t  l e a s t ,  can be r e g a rd e d  as 
i s o l a t e d  s y s te m s .  Thus the  s c i e n t i s t  assumes t h a t  v e ry  l i t t l e  
t h a t  i s  happen ing  in  h i s  l a b o r a t o r y ,  and n o th in g  o u t s i d e  i t ,  
has  any e f f e c t  on e v e n ts  w i t h i n  h i s  t e s t - t u b e .  By s i m p l i f y i n g  
h i s  e x p e r im e n ts ,  and e x c lu d in g  f a c t o r s  w i th  which he i s  no t  
im m ed ia te ly  co ncern ed ,  he hopes to  d i s c o v e r  the i n t e r r e l a t i o n  
of the  two o r  t h r e e  f a c t o r s  i n  which he i s  i n t e r e s t e d ,  and to  
s t a t e  t h a t  r e l a t i o n  i n  the  form o f  a  m a th e m a t ic a l  f u n c t i o n .
For  w i th  the^ d im in u t io n  of  e x t e n t ,  t h e r e  i s  a l s o  d im in u t io n  
of the  f i i f f e r e n t  q u a l i t i e s  and p r o p e r t i e s  which make h i s  t a s k
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so much more c o m p l i c a t e d .  But,  I  s u g g e s t ,  t h a t  I s  n o t  a l l ;
I t  i s  no t^  m e re ly  a m a t t e r  o f  r e d u c in g  c o m p l i c a t i o n s ,  b u t  a l s o  
o f  e l i m i n a t i n g  d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  a  t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  o r d e r ,  
which e n t e r  i n  w i t h  t im e .  The c o m p le x i t i e s  o f  a  l a r g e  expanse  
o f  space c o m p l ic a te  the  c a l c u l a t i o n s :  those  of  t ime are  opposed 
to  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  auch a c a l c u l a t i o n .  Reasons have been 
g iv e n  f o r  su p p o s in g  c e r t a i n t y  of  p r e d i c t i o n  to  be l o g i c a l l y  
im p o s s ib l e ,  and t h a t  n e c e s s a r y  s t a t e m e n t s  can on ly  be made i n  
a b s t r a c t i o n  from t im e :  tWe p o s i t i o n  I  am now a d v o c a t in g  i s ,  
to  p u t  i t  c r u d e l y ,  t h a t  the  measure of  time i s  the  measure o f  
c o n t in g e n c y ,  and t h a t  w i t h  th e  d im in u t io n  of  tem po ra l  e x t e n t  
to  a  minimum we can r e n d e r  our s t a t e m e n t s  about  th e  b eh a v io u r  
of p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t s  i n d e f i n i t e l y  p r o b a b le ,  so t h a t  f o r  p r a c ­
t i c a l  p u rp o se s  th e y  may be ta k e n  as c e r t a i n .  But the  p r o v i s o  
’ f o r  p r a c t i c a l  p u r p o s e s ’ must n o t  be d i s r e g a r d e d :  we a re  m ere ly  
l a y i n g  up t r o u b l e  f o r  o u r s e l v e s ,  i f ,  f o r  our immediate con- 
v e n i e n c e ,  we deny the  r e l a t i v e  n a t u r e  of t h a t  c e r t a i n t y .  Some­
where we have to  p a s s  from a b s o l u t e  to  r e l a t i v e , and i t  m ight 
a s  w e l l  be done f i r s t  a s  l a s t ,  as soon as  time e n t e r s  i n .  In  
the  words of P r o f e s s o r  J . 3 .  B o o d in : -  ^Time c reep s  i n t o  our 
w o r ld  of  d e s c r i p t i o n  and n e g a te s  i t . "  But what i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  
to  see i s  t h a t  i t  i s  not an a b s o l u t e  n e g a t i o n ,  a s  I  t h i n k  
Boodin h i m s e l f  would a g r e e ,  bu t  adm its  of d e g r e e s .  The
1 .  "Time and R e a l i t y "  (Monograph Supplem ents  to  " P s y c h o lo g ic a l  
Review", 1904-5 ,  p . 2 4 ) .
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d i s c r e p a n c y  may be s m a l l  o r  g r e a t ,  and s t i l l  be a d i s c r e p a n c y .  
The aim of  s c i e n c e  i s  to  reduce t h i s  d i s c r e p a n c y ,  t h i s  con­
t i n g e n c y ,  to  a minimum, and so to  ap p roach  a s y m p t o t i c a l l y  to 
i t s  i d e a l / l o g i c a l l y  c e r t a i n  p r e d i c t i o n  -  an^  i d e a l  which de­
pends on the  e l i m i n a t i o n  of  t im e ,  and y e t  e s s e n t i a l l y  i n v o l v e s  
t im e .  Hence, the p r i n c i p l e  which W hitehead  c a l l s  t h a t  o f  con­
vergence  to  s i m p l i c i t y  w i th  d im in u t io n  of  e x t e n t  i s  no t  th e  
Jnere e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  u n n e c e s s a ry  c o m p l e x i t i e s ,  which co u ld  
t h e o r e t i c a l l y  (g iv e n  s u f f i c i e n t  knowledge) be t r e a t e d  as  s a t i s ­
f a c t o r i l y  as the  r e s t :  i t  i s  a l s o  the  e l i m i n a t i o n  of  the  i r ­
r a t i o n a l  and the  a l o g i c a l ,  o f  t h a t  which i s  e s s e n t i a l l y  i r ­
r e d u c i b l e  to  the  s t a n d a r d s  of  e x p l a n a t i o n  t h a t  l o g i c  and m athe­
m a t i c s  r e c o g n i s e .  E x p re s se d  s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t l y ,  the  p o i n t  
o f  W h i t e h e a d 's  p r i n c i p l e  i s  no t  on ly  i n  the e l i m i n a t i o n  of 
c o m p l i c a t in g  sam e-o rde r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ;  i t  i s  a l s o  i n  the  
e l i m i n a t i o n  of  c h a r a c t e r s  of  a d i f f e r e n t  o r d e r .
A gain ,  i f  we take  a v e ry  sm a l l  p a r t  of  th e  u n i v e r s e ,  
say t h i s  t e s t - t u b e ,  and t r e a t  i t  a s  i s o l a t e d ,  we may f i n d  an 
a p p a r e n t  d e te rm in ism .  But the  more a g iv e n  system  i s  t a k e n  i n
1. I  use ' d e te rm in ism '  i n  a v e ry  s t r i c t  s e n s e ,  as  " e x h i b i t i n g  
c o r r e l a t i o n s  which can be e x h a u s t i v e l y  f o rm u la te d  by s t r i c t ­
l y  l o g i c a l  means."  I am aware t h a t  t h i s  i s  u n u s u a l l y  r i g i d ,  
a n d ' t h a t  Boutroux used  "de te rm in ism "  as  d i s t i n c t  from n ec ­
e s s i t y .  But i n  any o t h e r  sense  the  a s s e r t i o n  of  ' d e t e r m i n ­
ism ' i s  i r r e l e v a n t  to  my usage of ' c o n t in g e n c y ' ,  which ca^  
o n ly  be c o n t r o v e r t e d  by t h i s  e x c e e d in g ly  h a r s h  senge_.
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d e t a i l  the  l e s s  i s  i t  s u s c e p t i b l e  of a complete d e t e r m i n i s t i c  
e x p l a n a t i o n .  Now t h i s  i s  r e a l l y  v e ry  quee r  from the view t h a t  
such an e x p l a n a t i o n  i s  in  th e o ry  p o s s i b l e ,  f o r  what i t  comes 
to  i s  t h i s  s t r a n g e \ s t a t e m e n t ; -  i t  i s  only  on the assum ption  
t h a t  the g r e a t  m a j o r i t y  of e v e n ts  in  the  u n iv e r s e  a re  i r r e l e v ­
a n t  to  happen ings  w i t h i n  a sm al l  p a r t  (which i s  t a k e n  as a 
c lo s e d  system) t h a t  t h e r e  i s  any appearance  of d e te rm in ism :  
y e t  t h i s  a s su m p t io n  i s  f a t a l  to  é'omplete d e te rm in ism .  But, i t  
may be o b j e c t e d ,  t h i s  on ly  p rov es  t h a t  th e r e  i s  co m p lex i ty :  i t  
does no t  prove t h a t  a f a c t o r  which i s  iji p r i n c i p l e  i r r e d u c i b l e  
has  e n t e r e d  i n ,  and we co u ld  s t i l l  v e ry  w e l l  h o ld  t h a t  w i th  
s u f f i c i e n t  know ledge, i t  would be t h e o r e t i c a l l y  p o s s i b l e  to  
make a complete d e s c r i p t i o n  in  m a th em a t ica l  t e r m s . The o b je c ­
t i o n  may be g r a n t e d ,  t h a t  no th in g  has been (n o r ,  we may add, 
can be) p roved  abou t  i r r e d u c i b i l i t y :  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  seems to  
me h i g h l y  p l a u s i b l e  to  suppose t h a t  more th an  mere added com­
p l e x i t y  i s  in v o lv e d  when we d e a l  w i th  l a r g e  s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l
' s l i c e s '  i n s t e a d  of s m a l l .
This  s u p p o s i t i o n  r e c e i v e s  added c o n f i r m a t io n  i f  we 
tu r n  to  the  f i r s t  p o i n t ,  t h a t  of a h i e r a r c h y  of s c i e n c e s  
a r r a n g e d  i n  o rd e r  of  i n c r e a s i n g  c o n c r e t e n e s s ,  b e g in n in g  w i th  
m athem atics  and end ing  w i th  s o c i o l o g y .  I n  Comte 's  words 
"S tep  by s t e p  we a t  l e n g t h  a s c e r t a i n  the  i n v a r i a b l e  h i e r a r c h y ,  
b o th  h i s t o r i c a l  a n d /d o g m a t i c a l ,  bo th  s c i e n t i f i c  and l o g i c a l ,
1 .  "P h y s ic s  i s  bu t  l o g i c  s p o i l e d . "  ( " C r e a t iv e  E v o l u t io n " ,  
p .3 38 .)
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of the  s i x  lu n d am en ta l  s c i e n c e s  M athem atics ,  Astronomy, P h y s i c s ,  
C hem is try ,  B io logy ,  S o c io lo g y .  The f i r s t  i s  the  n e c e s s a r y  and 
so le  s t a r t i n g - p o i n t ,  the  l a s t  i s  the  one e s s e n t i a l  go a l  of 
the whole P o s i t i v e  P h i lo s o p h y ,  which h e n c e f o r t h  i s  to  be r e ­
g a rd ed  a s ,  by i t s  n a t u r e ,  fo rm ing  a t r u l y  i n d i v i s i b l e  s y s t e m .” 
This  i d e a  of a h i e r a r c h y  i s  by no means c o n f in e d  to  Comÿê^.
Hlmila Boutroux ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  endeavoured  to  show t h a t  the 
d e te rm in ism  of the  p h y s i c a l  s c i e n c e s  was no t  the  same as l o g i c ­
a l  n e c e s s i t y  and was even in c o m p a t ib le  w i th  i t .  L o g ic a l  n e c e s s ­
i t y ,  as  e x e m p l i f i e d  in  m a th em a t ic s ,  i s  c o m p le te ly  fo rm a l  and 
a b s t r a c t ,  and th e r e  i s  no way in  which we can r e a c h  the  a c t u a l  
from l o g i c  and m a th em a t ic s ,  ex c ep t  by the  a d d i t i o n  of e lem en ts
t h a t  a re  not  f o r m a l l y  n e c e s s a r y  and can neve r  be j u s t i f i e d  by
2
pure l o g i c .  Thus, f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  though many o f th e  laws of 
p h y s ic s  c o n t a i n  m a th em a t ica l  e le m e n ts ,  t h e r e  rem ains  a res iduum  
i r r e d u c i b l e  to  m a th em at ic s :  chem ica l  laws cannot  be e n t i r e l y  
re d u ced  to  p h y s i c s :  w hi le  when we come to  p s y c h o l o g i c a l  and 
s o c i o l o g i c a l  law s,  the  d i s c r e p a n c y  i s  even more o b v io u s .  In  
o t h e r  words ,  the d i s c o n t i n u i t y  between the  s c i e n c e s  i s  fu n d ­
am en ta l  ^and i r r e d u c i b l e :  no t  even p h y s ic s  can c la im  the  com- 
p l e t e  n e c e s s i t y  t h a t  be longs  on ly  to  pure  l o g i c .  N e c e s s i t y  i s  
a b s t r a c t ,  d e te rm in ism  i s  a s s e r t e d  of c o n c re te  t h i n g s ,  and they
1. "D iscou rse  on the  P o s i t i v e  S p i r i t "  s e c . 73 .  ( B e e s ly ' s  t r a n s . )
2 .  Boutroux ,  l i k e  L e ib n iz  b e fo re  him, never  r e l a t e d  t h i s  
i r r e d u c i b l e  e lem ent  to  t i m e .
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s h o u ld ,u e  c l e a r l y  d i s t i n g u i s h e d : -  " N e c e s s i ty  e x p r e s s e s  the
i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of a t h i n g ' s  be ing  d i f f e r e n t  from what i t  i s :
de te rm in ism  e x p r e s s e s  the  sum t o t a l  of the  c o n d i t i o n s  which
1
ensu re  t h a t  the phenomenen/is s t a t e d  j u s t  as i t  i s . "  S ince  de­
te rm in ism  i s  d i s t i n c t  from n e c e s s i t y ,  a l th o u g h  i t  may be p e r fec t*  
l y  t r u e  t h a t  a phenomenon i s  d e te rm in ed  by c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
t h e re  i s  n o th in g  to  n e c e s s i t a t e  those  c o n d i t i o n s  - "There i s
n o th in g  to  prove t h a t  the  r e a l  su p p o r t  of s o - c a l l e d  m echan ica l
2
phenomena i s  i t s e l f  m echan ica l  and s u b j e c t  to  d e te rm in is m .^
Boutroux a l s o  o b j e c t e d  to  the  s u b o r d i n a t i o n  of f a c t s  to  law s,
and he i n s i s t e d  t h a t  the  fo rm er  a re  l o g i c a l l y  p r i o r : -  "Laws a re
the bed on which the  t o r r e n t  of f a c t s  f lo w s :  th e y  have ho l low ed
3
i t  o u t ,  a l th o u g h  they  fo l lo w  i t . "  Laws have no c o n s t r a i n i n g  
f o r c e ,  f o r  th ey  a re  no t  a b s t r a c t ,  and t h e r e f o r e  no t  n e c e s s a r y ,  
b u t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  i f  th ey  succeed  i n  sy n th îe s i s in g  the  f a c t s  
th e y  may y e t  be v a l i d .
I t  sh o u ld  be n o t i c e d ,  t h a t  B o u t ro u x 's  d i s t i n c t i o n  
between d e te rm in ism  and n e c e s s i t y  i s  by no means u n i v e r s a l l y  
a c c e p te d :  i t  i s  always open to  the  s c i e n t i s t  to  c la im  t h a t  
the  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i s  a n e c e s s a ry  one, though t h a t  makes de­
te rm in ism  c o r r e s p o n d in g ly  more d i f f i c u l t  to  h o l d .  But i t  i s  
v i t a l  t h a t  we sho u ld  not  q u a r r e l  abou t  t e rm in o lo g y  h e r e . The 
c rux  of B o u t ro u x 's  argument i s  n o t  m ere ly  t h a t  i n  p a s s in g
1 .  " N a tu ra l  Law i n  Sc ience  and P h i lo s o p h y " ,  (Sng. t r a n s . )  p . 90 .
2 .  I h i d .  p . 77.
3 .  "Da l a  Contingence des L o is  de l a  N a tu r e , "  p*39.
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th efrom one s c i e n c e  to  a n o t h e r ,  from the  more g e n e r a l  to  
l e s s  g e n e r a l ,  from the  a b s t r a c t  to  the  c o n c r e t e ,  we f i n d  o u r ­
s e l v e s  f a c e d  w i th  i n c r e a s i n g  co m p le x i ty ,  bu t  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a 
r e a l  d i s c o n t i n u i t y  between th e  s c i e n c e s ,  which a r e ,  so to  
sp eak ,  on d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s .  I t  i s  i r r e l e v a n t  to  o b j e c t  t o  .the 
d i s t i n c t i o n  between d e te rm in ism  and n e c e s s i t y ;  what we a re  con­
c e rn e d  w i th  i s  no t  p r e c i s e l y  where the  l i n e  i s  drawn between 
p r o b a b i l i t y  and n e c e s s i t y ,  a s  long  as  i t  i s  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  t h e r e  
ÎA such a d i s t i n c t i o n ,  and t h a t  we p a s s  from one to  the  o t h e r  
somewhere between l o g i c  and s o c io lo g y -  I t  i s  a l s o  i r r e l e v a n t  
to  o b j e c t  t h a t  t h e r e  may not be a l a r g e  number of  i r r e d u c i b l y  
d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s ,  a s  Boutroux s u g g e s t s :  a l l  t h a t  th e  view I 
am s u p p o r t in g  r e q u i r e s  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  sh o u ld  be one c l e a r - c u t  
d i s t i n c t i o n  between a b s o l u t e  and r e l a t i v e ,  between n e c e s s i t y  
and c o n t in g e n c y ,  and t h i s  hav in g  been once a d m i t t e d ,  a l l  the  
r e s t  may be a m a t t e r  of  d e g ree -  A l l  I  s u g g e s t  i s ,  t h a t  as soon 
as  a tem p o ra l  e lem en t  e n t e r s  i n ,  however g r e a t  the  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  
c e r t a i n t y  and l o g i c  a re  f o r  e v e r  b a n i s h e d :  and t h a t  t h i s  con­
t i n g e n c y  i n c r e a s e s  w i th  the im portance  of  the  tem pora l  e le m e n t .  
I n  dynamics,  our c a l c u l a t i o n s  a r e  n e a r l y  r i g h t ,  and th e y  can 
be c o r r e c t e d  w i th  a s l i g h t  a l low ance  f o r  f r i c t i o n :  bu t  when 
we g e t  to  p sy ch o lo g y ,  we have to  reck o n  w i th  f r e e - w i l l ,  lanemic 
c a u s a t i o n ,  and the  l i k e :  and as  f o r  h i s t o r y  and s o c io lo g y ,  
where the  tem pora l  e lem en t  i s  e s s e n t i a l ,  the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n
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the  way of  a  l o g i c a l  t r e a tm e n t  a re  overwhelming. Everybody 
a g r e e s  t h a t  p h y s i c s  i s  'more advanced '  th an  b io lo g y ,  and t h a t  
th an  s o c io lo g y  (even i f  t h e y  o b j e c t  to  d e t a i l s  o f  Comte o r  
B o u t ro u x ) ,  and t h a t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  my p u rp o s e .  I  su g g e s t  
t h a t  the  a d m i t te d  co m p lex i ty  of  the  more c o n c re te  b ran ch es  
knowledge i s  due to  the  d i f i i c u l t y  of  e l i m i n a t i n g  time ; 
and t h a t  t im e ,  ju d g ed  oy a s t a t i c  l o g i c ,  canno t  bu t  ap pear  
i r r a t i o n a l  and c o n t i n g e n t ,  and t h a t  i t  i n f e c t s  w i th  i t s  con­
t i n g e n c y  w ha tev e r  i t  has  to  do w i t h .  The d e n i a l  o f  t h i s  view 
can o n ly  be ac co m p lish ed  by the  a s s e r t i o n  t h a t  a l l  s c i e n c e s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  s o c i o l o g y ,  d e a l  w i th  the  ' n e c e s s a r y '  -  and t h i s  
s t a t e m e n t  i s  o b v io u s ly  f a r - f e t c h e d .  Of c o u r s e ,  i t  may be ob­
j e c t e d ,  even g r a n te d  t h a t  the  s c i e n c e s  can be a r r a n g e d  i n  o r d e r  
of the  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  t h e i r  s t a t e m e n t s ,  i t  has  no t  been p roved  
t h a t  time can be r e l a t e d  to  t h i s .  Th is  i s  so :  and I  h a s t e n  to  
add ,  t h a t  on my own p r i n c i p l e s ,  no such  l o g i c a l  p ro o f  i s  
p o s s i b l e .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  seems to  me v e ry  p ro b a b le  t h a t  the  
c o n n e c t io n  between the  tem p ora l  e lem en t  and the  f a i l u r e  to  
r e a c h  l o g i c a l  n e c e s s i t y  in  the  s c i e n c e s  i s  by no means a c c i d ­
e n t a l ,  and t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  go ing  too  f a r  to  say  t h a t  t ime i s  
the  c o n t i n g e n t  e lem en t  w hich ,  i n  the  p h ra se  of B o o d in 's  to  
which Gunn took  such a v i o l e n t  o b j e c t i o n ,  c r e e p s  i n t o  our 
w o r ld  of d e s c r i p t i o n  and n e g a te s  i t .  A f t e r  a l l ,  t ime i s  
u s u a l l y  and r i g h t l y  c o n s id e r e d  to  be bound up w i th  change,
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1
and when Boodin s a i d ,  "Time i s  t h a t  p r o p e r t y  which makes 
in c o m p a t ib le  judgm ents  n e c e s s a r y , "  he was bu t  s l i g h t l y  o v e r ­
s t a t i n g  the  e s s e n t i a l  i n c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y  of  time and change 
to  l o g i c .  The p o s s i b l e ,  the g e n e r a l ,  the  a b s t r a c t :  a l l  th e s e  
a r e  s u b j e c t  to  l o g i c a l  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s  -  b u t ,  as  L e ib n iz  so 
s t r a n g e l y  saw and y e t  d id  not  s e e ,  when we p a s s  from p o s s ­
i b i l i t y  to  a c t u a l i t y ,  when we come to  e v e n ts  happen ing  i n  
t im e ,  we have l e f t  t h a t  i d e a l  rea lm  of l o g i c ,  and have i n t r o  
duced a r a d i c a l  c o n t in g e n c y  i n t o  the  u n i v e r s e .
1 .  Op * c i  t . p « 2 8
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Tha d e n i a l  of  ' r e a l i t y '  to  t h i s  o r  t h a t  a p p a re n t  
c h a r a c t e r  of  our  e x p e r i e n c e ,  though i t  has  been a common 
p as t im e  among a c o n s i d e r a b l e  s e c t i o n  of  p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  has  n o t  
a lways been accompanied by a c o r re s p o n d in g  c l a r i t y  i n  what 
e x a c t l y  t h i s  d e n i a l  i s  supposed  to  i n v o l v e . I t  i s  e v i d e n t  t h a t  
R e a l i t y  i s  a fu nd am en ta l  concep t  which everyone must assume, 
w h a te v e r  h i s  m e ta p h y s ic a l  p o s i t i o n :  and j u s t  as  m e ta p h y s ic a l  
p o s i t i o n s  a r e  numerous, so t h e r e  a re  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  and u l t i m ­
a t e  d i f f e r e n c e s ,  a l l  the  more dangerous  because th e y  can n ev e r  
be e x p l i c i t l y  s t a t e d ,  between d i f f e r e n t  p e o p l e ' s  i d e a s  of  
what R e a l i t y  i s .  The same d iv e rg e n ce  a p p e a rs  i n  d i f f e r e n t  
views of  God - as  the  prime mover of A r i s t o t l e ,  the  Demiourgos 
o f  P l a t o ,  J e a n s '  pure m a th e m a t ic ia n ,  L e i b n i z '  h i g h e s t  monad, 
A le x a n d e r ’ s n i s u s  to  p e r f e c t i o n ,  the  Word which "was made 
F l e s h ,  and dw el t  among u s " .  The q u e s t i o n  what R e a l i t y  i s ,  
r e c e i v e s  as  many answers  as  the  q u e s t i o n  what God i s .  I t  
would , t h e n ,  be a h o p e le s s  t a s k  to  a t t e m p t  to  a s s e s s  a l l  the  
d i f f e r e n t  c o n c e p t io n s  of  R e a l i t y  by r e f e r e n c e  to  which time 
has  been ju d g ed  and, as  o f t e n  as  n o t ,  found  w a n t in g .  Never­
t h e l e s s ,  t h e r e  a r e  two v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  n o t io n s  t h a t  ap p e a r  i n  
u n ea sy  p a r t n e r s h i p  under  th e  word ' r e a l ' ,  and t h e i r  d i s t i n c ­
t i o n  may p e rh ap s  be a c o n s o l a t i o n  f o r  our i n a b i l i t y  to  make 
a more fundam en ta l  a n a l y s i s .  These two n o t i o n s  a re  th o se  of
e x i s t e n c e  and v a l u e .
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I t  has r a r e l y ,  i f  e v e r ,  been d e n ie d  t h a t  time i s  
r e a l  i n  the  sense  t h a t  i t  i s  an e lem en t  -  w h e the r  a  n e c e s s a r y  
one or  n o t ,  i s  no t  h e re  the  p o i n t  - o f  our e x p e r i e n c e .  Kant 
i n s i s t e d  t h a t  time was e m p i r i c a l l y  r e a l ,  and an i n d i s p e n s a b l e  
f a c t o r  i n  our e x p e r i e n c e ,  w h i le  B rad ley ,  though a s s e r t i n g  
t h a t  t ime i s  on ly  an a p p e a ra n c e ,  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  i t  i s  " r e a l l y  
a n ^  a p p e a r a n c e " .  P l a t o  s a i d  t h a t  i t  was on ly  the  "moving image" 
o f  Tt e r n i t y ,  bu t  n ev e r  d e n ie d  t h a t  i t  was an image: and 
McTaggart r e j e c t e d  the  A s e r i e s  and hence time as c o n t r a ­
d i c t o r y ,  but  s a i d  t h a t  though time i s  o n ly  a phenomenon, i t  
i s  a t  l e a s t  a  "phenomenon bene funda tum ."  To say ,  th e n ,  t h a t  
t ime i s  u n r e a l  i s  no t  to  say  t h a t  i t  i s  a mere h a l l u c i n a t i o n ,  
and t h a t  we have no grounds f o r  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  we p e r c e i v e  
t h i n g s  a s  i n  t im e :  what i s  o f t e n  d e n ie d  i s  t h a t  t h i s  way of 
p e r c e i v i n g  t h i n g s  has  any u l t i m a t e  s i g n i f i c a n c e • I  t h i n k  t h a t
t h i s  i s  the  r i g h t  way to  p u t  i t .
Th is  b r in g s  us to  the  second and much more im p o r t -
a n t  sen se  i n  which r e a l i t y  i s  l i n k e d  w i t h  v a l u e ,  and i t  i s  
t h i s  sense  which i s  the  d e b a te a b le  one .  To some, i t  i s  s e l f -
e v i d e n t  t h a t  R e a l i t y  i s  such t h a t  time i s  m ere ly  an a p p e a r ­
a n c e :  to  o t h e r s ,  i t  i s  e q u a l l y  s e l f - e v i d e n t  t h a t  R e a l i t y  i s  
an  i n c l u s i v e  Whole, which i n c l u d e s  t im e ,  a l b e i t  i n  an i n f e r i o r  
p o s i t i o n .  S t i l l  o t h e r s  have no immediate i n t u i t i o n s  on the  
m a t t e r ,  bu t  announce as  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h o u g h t ,  t h a t  t ime can
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o r  canno t  be r e a l ,  i n  acco rdance  w i t h  p re m ise s  which a re  to  
them beyond q u e s t i o n .  We a r e  back a t  the o ld  d i s a g re e m e n t s ;  
a l l  the  same, the  v a r io u s  views h e l d  reduce to  two, between 
which  th e r e  i s  fu n dam en ta l  o p p o s i t i o n .  These two views are
r e s p e c t i v e l y  th e  a s s e r t i o n  and the  d e n i a l  t h a t  time i s  ' r e a l '
1
i n  a  sense  c l o s e l y  co n n e c ted  w i th  v a l u e s .  I t  sh o u ld  be n o t i c e d
t h a t  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  does n o t  c o r re s p o n d  to  the  g e n e r a l  one
between i d e a l i s t s  and r e a l i s t s ,  s in c e  many who would be c a l l e d
r e a l i s t s  a f f i r m  m ere ly  th e  e m p i r i c a l  r e a l i t y  of  t im e ,  and a re
e i t h e r  i n d i f f e r e n t  to  the  q u e s t i o n  o f  v a lu e s  and u l t i m a t e
s i g n i f i c a n c e s  and w h a t - n o t s ,  or  ag re e  w i th  the  i d e a l i s t s  t h a t
time i s  i n  some s e n s e ,  i n  R u s s e l l ' s  w o rd s : -  "An u n im p o r ta n t
and s u p e r f i c i a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  r e a l i t y .  . . .  A c e r t a i n
e m a n c ip a t io n  from s l a v e r y  to  time i s  e s s e n t i a l  to  p h i l o s o p h ic
t h o u g h t .  . . .  To r e a l i s e  the  un im portance  of  time i s  the  g a te  
2
o f  wisdom." As a g a i n s t  t h i s ,  A lexander  r e t o r t s : -  " I  sh o u ld  
say  t h a t  the  im por tance  of any p a r t i c u l a r  time i s  r a t h e r  p r a c -  
t i c a l  th a n  t h e o r e t i c a l ,  and to  r e a l i s e  th e  im portance  of  t ime 
as  such i s  th e  g a te  of  wisdom." On the  o t h e r  hand, i d e a l i s t s
n o t i o n s ,  i s  i n d e f i n a b l e . Compare In g e ,  "God and the  A s t ro  
nom ers" ,  p . 175, who h o ld s  t h a t  v a lu e  and r e a l i t y  a re  
u l t i m a t e l y  i d e n t i c a l .
2 .  "Knowledge of  the  E x t e r n a l  W orld" ,  p p . 1 6 6 -7 .
3 .  "S pace ,  Time, and D e i t y " ,  i ,  36n.
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such as  Croce and G e n t i l e  i n s i s t  on the  im por tance  of  h i s t o r y  
and the  t i m e - p r o c e s s .  On the  whole,  though, i d e a l i s t s  a re  
much more s o l i d l y  a g a i n s t  the  u l t i m a t e  r e a l i t y  of  t ime th an  
r e a l i s t s  a r e  f o r  i t ,  and the  q u a r r e l  becomes one between them, 
and a s e c t i o n  who, f o r  want of  a b e t t e r  name, can be c a l l e d  
e v o l u t i o n i s t s .  These l a t t e r  a s s e r t  an i d e a l  of  p r o g r e s s  th ro u g h  
t im e ,  and h o ld  t h a t  time i s  i n d i s p e n s a b l e  to  the r e a l i s a t i o n  
o f  the  h i g h e s t  goo d s .  Bergson goes even f u r t h e r :  f o r  him, time 
i s  no t  on ly  the  medium o f  e v o l u t i o n ,  bu t  i t  i s ,  i n  some sense  
a t  l e a s t ,  i t s  f o r c e .  Time i s  i t s e l f  c r e a t i v e :  i t s  p a r t  i s  no t  
p a s s i v e  -  the  mere r e a l i s a t i o n  ' i n  t i m e ' o f  v a lu e s  - on the  
c o n t r a r y ,  the  é l a n  v i t a l ,  which i s  co n c e iv ed  a s  somehow con­
n e c te d  w i t h  t im e ,  d i r e c t s  the  cou rse  which e v o l u t i o n  s h a l l  
t a k e .  A gain ,  A lexander  co n c e iv e s  of a c o n t i n u a l  n i s u s  or  
s t r i v i n g  of  the  w orld  tow ards  D e i ty ,  and of  time as  b e in g ,  ^
" t h a t  p r i n c i p l e  of  impermanence which i s  the  r e a l  c r e a t o r " ,  
and i n  which v a lu e s  a re  p ro d u c ed .
The v a r io u s  views have been w e l l  b ro ug h t  ou t  by
2
B o san qu e t ,  from whom the  f o l lo w in g  q u o t a t i o n s  are  t a k e n : -  
"These are  the  two e x t r e m i s t  v iew s ,  b o th  r e p r e s e n t i n g  prim a 
f a c i e  demands of human n a t u r e . L e t  time be the  most r e a l  of 
r e a l i t i e s ,  and g ive  us a f i g h t i n g  chance o f  making over the  
u n i v e r s e  i n t o  something n e a r e r  to  what we tak e  to  be our
1 .  Op.c i t .  i i ,  48 .
2 .  "Value and D e s t in y  of  the  I n d i v i d u a l " ,  p p . 294 -6 .
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h e a r t ’ s d e s i r e .  Or l e t  time be a minor i n c i d e n t  o r  phenomenon 
i n  a w hole ,  p la n n e d  w i th  c e r t a i n t y  to  b r in g  us i n  the  end to  
our h e a r t ’ s d e s i r e ,  w he the r  on e a r t h  o r  i n  h e a v e n ."  To 
B osanq ue t ,  b o th  d o c t r i n e s  a l i k e  r e s t  on a r a t h e r  f a c i l e  and 
sh a l lo w  r e l i a n c e  on the  f u t u r e  - "Both o f  them use i t  as  a 
c o u n te r b a la n c e  which th e y  can r e l y  on to  t u r n  the s c a l e s  
a g a i n s t  any c o n c e iv a b le  amount o f  p a s t  and p r e s e n t  e v i l "  -  and 
he r e j e c t s  them b o th .  His own o p in io n  i s : -  "We c o n s id e r  t ime 
as  an appearance  o n ly ,  a p o s i t i o n  which the  fo rm er  d o c t r i n e  
d e n i e s ,  b u t ,  i n  o p p o s i t i o n  to  the  l a t t e r  d o c t r i n e ,  aa  an ap­
p e a ra n c e  i n s e p a r a b l e  from the  membership of  f i n i t e n e s s  i n  i n ­
f i n i t y ,  and t h e r e f o r e  from the s e l f - r e v e l a t i o n  of  a r e a l i t y  
which  as  a whole i s  t i m e l e s s .  We have th u s  to  a s s i g n  a p l a c e  
to  p r o g r e s s  w i t h i n  such a w hole ,  and as  i t s  m a n i f e s t a t i o n .  The 
t e s t  of  p h i lo s o p h y  i n  d e a l i n g  w i th  p r o g r e s s  i s  . . .  to  r e c o n c i l e  
the sense  of  c r e a t i v e  ach ievem ent  i n  the  s e l f  as  p rom otion  o f  
the  good c a u s e ,  w i t h  i t s  r e c o g n i t i o n  and ac c e p ta n c e  of a p e r ­
f e c t i o n  which i s  n o t  won b:. i t s  own f i n i t e  a c t i v i t y ,  though
r e p r e s e n t e d  in  i t . "  And . . . " W h a t  i s  l e f t  t h a t  our p ro b a b ly
we
l i m i t e d  f u t u r e . . .  can do f o r  u s ,  when % d i s c a r d  what I  c a l l  
m i ra c u lo u s  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  i s  to  i n c r e a s e  our g ra sp  of  the  whole,  
b o th  i n  p r a c t i c e  and th e o r y ,  and more e s p e c i a l l y ,  i n  con­
sequence of t h i s  f u l l e r  g ra sp  and a l s o  as a c o n t r i b u t i o n  to  
i t ,  to  a i d  us i n  a v e ry  p ro fo un d  and c o n s id e r a b l e  t r a n s m u t a t i o n
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of  v a l u e s . "  The main q u e s t i o n  a t  i s s u e  seems to  be w h e th e r  
v a lu e s  a r e  a b s o l u t e ,  and so opposed to  time which i s  incom­
p l e t e ,  o r  w h e th e r  the  g r a d u a l  r e a l i s a t i o n  of  v a lu e s  by an 
a s y m p to t ic  app roach  n o t  on ly  a l lo w s  f o r ,  b u t  even i n v o l v e s ,  
a t i m e - p r o c e s s .
Such, th en ,  a r e  some of the p o s i t i o n s  t h a t  i t  i s  
p o s s i b l e  to  tak e  up on t h i s  q u e s t i o n  of  the  u l t i m a t e  s i g n i f ­
ic a n c e  of t i m e . But b e fo re  we can a t t e m p t  to  dec ide  between 
them t h e r e  i s  v e ry  e v i d e n t l y  a p r i o r  q u e s t i o n  which must be 
f a c e d ,  and t h i s  q u e s t i o n  i s  "What i s  t im e ?" To t h i s  q u e s t i o n ,  
we, the  c h i l d r e n  and the  c a p t i v e s  of  t im e ,  can g ive  no f i n a l  
an sw er .  As long as  we a re  i n  t im e ,  i t  m a s te r s  u s ,  and i t s  
l i m i t a t i o n s  a re  ours  as  w e l l ,  so t h a t  we canno t  be su re  what 
to  a t t r i b u t e  to  t im e ,  and what to  the s p in n in g s  of our  own 
busy  b r a i n s .  As long as  we l i v e ,  t ime i s  w i th  u s ,  and on ly  
i n  d e a th  i s  t h e r e  freedom from i t .  i fh a te v e r  answer we g ive  
must be p r o v i s i o n a l ,  must be the r e s u l t  of  a p a r t i a l  and 
n e c e s s a r i l y  e g o c e n t r i c  s t a n d p o i n t ,  must h a l t  and f a i l .  A 
th o u san d  y e a r s  ago A ugus t ine  s a i d ,  "What th e n  i s  t ime? I f  
nobody a sk s  me, I know . . .  b u t  i f  I t r y  to  e x p l a i n  i t  to  one 
who a sk s  me, I do no t  know." Today W hitehead  s a y s : - " I t  i s  
im p o s s ib le  to  m e d i t a t e  on time and the  c r e a t i v e  p assage  of  
n a tu r e  w i t h o u t  an overwhelming em otion  a t  the  l i m i t a t i o n s
^ ' i r à t i l l ^ t ô  Ï Ï ^ d o n e !  i s ^ % u 2 l l y ° %  P la c e  t h e ^ e t e r n a l  
i n  t im e . "  ( H a l l e t t ,  " A e t e r n i t a s " , p . 324.)
2. " C o n fe s s io n s " ,  XI, 14.
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of human i n t e l l i g e n c e
But,  t h e r e  a re  two se n se s  i n  which th e s e  q u o t a t i o n s  
can be i n t e r p r e t e d .  The f i r s t  i s ,  t h a t  t ime i s  i n e x p l i c a b l e  
because  i n s e p a r a b l e  by us  from our e x p e r i e n c e :  the  second  i s  
t h a t  time i s  i n e x p l i c a b l e  because  of c e r t a i n  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
which a re  p e c u l i a r  to  i t .  These two s e n s e s  a r e  n o t  the  same, 
and i t  i s  e x t r e m e ly  u n f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  th ey  sh o u ld  e v e r  have 
been th o u g h t  to  be s o .  The f i r s t  view looks  on time as  fu n d ­
a m e n ta l ,  a s  som eth ing  o f  which v/e n e c e s s a r i l y  have bu t  a p a r t i a l  
and s u b j e c t i v e  view* the  second  view d e c r i e s  time by i m p l i c ­
a t i o n ,  and i n s i n u a t e s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  som eth ing  p e c u l i a r l y  i r ­
r a t i o n a l  ab ou t  i t .  I  am f a r  from denying the  l a t t e r  a l t e r n a t i v e ,  
b u t  my p o i n t  i s ,  t h a t  i t  i s  dangerous  to  assume t h a t  the  (ag reed )  
i n e x p l i c a b i l i t y  i s  to  be a t t r i b u t e d  w h o l ly  to  time r a t h e r  th a n  
to  u s .  To p ro c e e d  th u s  would be to  imply t h a t  we can make n e a t  
l i t t l e  d i v i s i o n s  i n t o  ’ t i m e ’ and ’u s ’ , which seems to  me h i g h l y  
u n d e s i r a b l e  s in c e  we o u r s e lv e s  a re  i n  t i m e . T h i s ,  and a l l  t h a t  
f o l l o w s ,  i s  o n ly  o p in io n ,  and canno t  be s u p p o r te d  by a rgum ents :  
b u t  i t  does seem to  me t h a t  the  fo rm er  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  i s  p r e f e r ­
a b l e ,  i n  so f a r  a s  we have to  choose between them. (This  does 
n o t  in v o lv e  t h a t  v/e cannot  a l s o  h o ld  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  som ething 
’ i r r a t i o n a l ’ abou t  t im e :  what i s  r e j e c t e d  i s  m ere ly  the  second 
1 .
”Concept o f  M ature" , p . 73.
2 .  S in c e ,  i n  K a n t ’ s l an g u ag e ,  a l l  our e x p e r ie n c e  i s  under  
the  form of t i m e .
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view as a b a s i s  f o r  d e c ry in g  the  f i r s t . )
A gain ,  i t  i s  e x t re m e ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  A ugus t ine  
s a i d ,  "What, t h e n ,  i s  t im e? When nobody ask s  me, know. " The 
n o t i o n  of  time i s  im m ed ia te ly  f a m i l i a r  to  us a l l :  i s ’ i n ­
e x p l i c a b l e  ’ as  b e in g  the  u l t i m a t e  datum from which we must 
s t a r t , no t  a s  be ing  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  which an e v i l  g e n i u s , such 
as D e s c a r t e s ’ mocking s p i r i t , d e s ig n e d  to  dog our p a t h . Time 
i s  fu n d a m e n ta l :  i f  i t  i s  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n ,  judged  i n  te rm s o f  
l o g i c ,  t h e n ,  i n  B road’ s v ig o ro u s  p h r a s e ,  so much the  worse f o r  
the  laws of l o g i c  I But t h a t  i s  a  d i f f e r e n t  p o i n t ,  to  be r a i s e d  
l a t e r .
These p r e l i m i n a r i e s  have been d i r e c t e d  towards  
e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h a t  the n o t i o n  of time i s  fundam en ta l  i n  our 
e x p e r i e n c e ,  so fundam en ta l  t h a t  i t  canno t  be s e p a r a t e d  from 
our e x p e r i e n c e ,  and h en c e ,  our a n a l y s i s  o f  i t  must a lways be 
i n c o m p le te .  On the  one hand ,  i s  the  danger  of  a t t r i b u t i n g  our 
s u b j e c t i v e  l i m i t a t i o n s  to  i t :  on the  o t h e r  hand ,  i s  the  op­
p o s i t e  and worse danger  o f  h y p o s t a t i s i n g  time i n t o  som ething
h a v in g  an in d ep en d e n t  e x i s t e n c e .  A l l  m e tap h y s ic s  must r i s k
1
t h i s  d an g e r ,  and A lexander  was q u i t e  r i g h t  when he s a i d : -  "To 
c o n s i d e r  Space and Time by th e m se lv e s ,  a b s t r a c t  and d i f f i c u l t  
a s  i t  i s ,  i s  no t  an i l l e g i t i m a t e  a b s t r a c t i o n ,  bu t  i s  i n  f a c t  
n o th in g  bu t  the  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  of  t h i n g s  and e v e n t s  i n  t h e i r
1 .  "Sp ace ,  Time, and D e i t y " ,  i . 3 9 .
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s i m p le s t  and most e le m e n ta ry  c h a r a c t e r . "  S t r i c t l y ,  even to
speak  of ’ t i m e ’ i s  a s u b s t a n t i a l i s a t i o n ,  i n  however s l i g h t  a 
1
d e g re e ,  b u t  we a r e  bound by the  e x i g e n c i e s  of  language to  do 
i t :  the  im p o r ta n t  t h i n g  i s  to  av o id  go ing  too f a r .
G ra n ted ,  t h e n ,  t h a t  time i s  ( i n  D r .  O ake ley ’ s p h ra se )  
an e s s e n t i a l  nerve  of  our e x p e r i e n c e ,  we cannot  hope to  g iv e  
a f i n a l l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  answer to  the  q u e s t i o n  " % a t  i s  t im e?"
We a re  bound, I  t h i n k ,  to  take  time as  an u l t i m a t e  datum, and 
to  take  a v e ry  s im ple  view of  i t  as  be in g  the  name we g iv e  to  
the  happen ing  of  e v e n t s .  A h ap p en s ,  and th en  B happens :  and 
b o th  ’h a p p e n in g ’ , and ’ and t h e n ’ a re  to  be r e g a rd e d  as  u l t i m a t e .  
F or  t h i s  v iew, many of the  problem s which have become a s s o c i ­
a t e d  w i th  the  n o t i o n  of time a re  pseudo ones ,  and a r i s e  from 
our  ten d en cy  to  s u b s t a n t i a l i s e  t h i s  v e r y  s im ple  and fundam en ta l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  of  h ap p e n in g n e ss  i n t o  an a l l - p e r v a d i n g  medium, 
a s e r i a l  o rd e r  s t r e t c h i n g  from the  i n f i n i t e  P a s t  to  the  i n ­
f i n i t e  F u t u r e . A g r e a t  d e a l  of harm has  been done by f a i l u r e  to  
see t h a t  w h e th e r  o r  no time i s  r e a l  i n  the  sense of  u l t i m a t e l y  
s i g n i f i c a n t  i t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  e m p i r i c a l l y  r e a l ,  and by consequen t  
d i s i n c l i n a t i o n  to  take  i t  as  a  g iv e n  in  e x p e r i e n c e .  I n s t e a d  of  
s t a r t i n g  from the  simple commonsense view of h a p p e n in g s ,  as  we 
sh o u ld  do, we ig n o re  i t ,  and b eg in  from a s o p h i s t i c a t e d  and sub- 
s t a n t i a l i s e d  view of time - and th e n  t r i u m p h a n t ly  p ro c la im  t h a t ,
1 .  I  am on ly  too  w e l l  aware how o f t e n ,  r e c e n t l y ,  time has  
been r e f e r r e d  to  as  " i t " .
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as we had th o u g h t  a l l  a lo n g ,  time i s  th rou gh  and th ro u g h  
c o n t r a d i c t o r y ^  We f i n d  i t  e a sy  to  d e t e c t  and lau g h  a t  the  
f a l l a c y  of  th o se  who r i o t e d  when the  c a le n d a r  was changed, and 
who c lam oured ,  "Give us back our e l e v e n  d a y s , "  bu t  t h i s  f a l l a c y ,  
i n  a more i n s i d i o u s  form , i s  s t i l l  ram pant-  I t  i s  u s e l e s s  to  
pay l i p - s e r v i c e  to  the  n o t i o n  of t im e ,  w h ile  we h o ld  a v iew 
t h a t  d e p r iv e s  i t  of  any r e a l  meaning, and an e x c e s s iv e  g l o r i ­
f i c a t i o n  t h a t  makes of  time a h y p o s t a t i s e d  a b s o l u t e ,  i s  as  un­
d e s i r a b l e  as i t s  n e g l e c t .  Only a v e ry  s im ple  view can be 
g e n u in e ly  s a t i s f a c t o r y .
But a l l  t h i s ,  though a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  time i s  i n ­
e x p l i c a b l e  because i t  i s  b a s i c ,  i s  no t  to  deny t h a t  time i s  
a l s o  ’ i n e x p l i c a b l e ’ i n  the  sense of being  i r r e d u c i b l e  to  pure  
l o g i c .  Time, however s im ply  i t  be r e g a rd e d  as a " t h i s ,  and 
th e n  t h a t " ,  cannot  g e t  away from the n o t i o n  of "and t h e n " .
Logic  might adm it  time i f  a l l  t h a t  i t  meant was happen ing  and 
e x i s t e n c e ,  b u t  th e r e  i s  a l s o  the "and t h e n " ,  and t h i s  a p u r e l y  
s t a t i c  l o g i c  can never  u n d e r s t a n d .  C o n s e q u e n t ly , t ime i s  fu n d ­
a m e n ta l l y  a l o g i c a l  -  no t  i l l o g i c a l ,  bu t  a l o g i c a l  in  the  sense  
t h a t  t h e r e  i s  som ething  e s s e n t i a l l y  in co m p reh e n s ib le  to  l o g i c  
i n  the  n o t i o n  of t i m e . With  i t ,  and i t s  d i s r e p u t a b l e  a s s o c i a t e s ,  
change ,  causatJLon, e n t r o p y ,  n o v e l t y ,  c o n t in g e n c y ,  chance e n t e r s  
i n t o  the  w o r ld .  I t  i s  h a r d ly  too much to  say  t h a t  a l l  chance i s  
t e m p o ra l ,  and t h a t ,  a s  Boodin i n s i s t s ,  wherever  t h e r e  i s  r e a l  
p r o c e s s ,  th e r e  i s  ch an ce .  To i d e n t i f y  time w i th  chance might
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be m i s l e a d i n g ,  bu t  the  a l o g i c a l  e lem en t  i n  the  n o t i o n  of  time 
does seem to  me fu n d am en ta l -  I t  i s  t h i s  q u ee r  l o p s id e d n e s s  of 
t im e ,  t h i s  s t r e t c h i n g - f o r t h  to  ever-new  fo rm s ,  and a l s o  t h i s  
t o p p l i n g  over  i n t o  r u i n  and d e a th ,  t h a t  r e l a t e s  i t  more 
e s p e c i a l l y  to  the  l i v i n g .  Bergson was fond  o f  c o n t r a s t i n g  
’ l i v i n g ’ time w i th  the  dead m a t t e r  of s p a c e :  and i n  A lex a n d e r ,  
t o o ,  t ime i s  co n ce iv ed  a s  a k i n  to  mind (o r  p e rh ap s  the  con­
v e r s e  would be the  b e t t e r  s t a t e m e n t )  , which i n f u s e s  d i s c r i m i n ­
a t i o n  in -4 o  the  bare b la n k n e ss  of  s p a c e .  I  am no t  s a y in g  t h a t
th e s e  remarks a re  to  be i n t e r p r e t e d  l i t e r a l l y  - in d e e d ,  the
1
f u n c t i o n  of  a c e r t a i n  type of  s p e c u l a t i v e  p h i lo s o p h y  i s  to  
e x p r e s s  i n  myth and metaphor i n t u i t i o n s  which a re  so p e n e t r a t ­
in g  t h a t  the language i n  which th ey  a re  s e t  i s  on ly  a f i n g e r ­
p o s t  p o i n t i n g  beyond the bounds o f  r e a s o n .  But i t  i s  s i g n i f i c ­
a n t  t h a t  time sh o u ld  have been c o n s id e r e d ,  by two of  the  most
em inen t  of modern p h i l o s o p h e r s ,  as an a logous  to  a c t i v i t y ,  to  
l i f e ,  to  mind, and in  v i r t u e  of  t h a t  v e ry  asymmetry and i n s t a b ­
i l i t y  which i s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i th  l i f e .
A gain ,  chem ica l  compounds a re  u s u a l l y  d iv id e d  i n t o  
o rg a n ic  and i n o r g a n ic  s u b s t a n c e s :  and the  p e c u l i a r i t y  of  the 
fo rm er  seems to  be i n  i t s  asymmetry. N a tu r a l  s y n t h e s i s  i s  a-  
s y m m e tr ic a l ,  f o r  the  l i v i n g  p l a n t  a p p a r e n t l y  p ro du ces  o p t i c a l l y  
a c t i v e  s u b s ta n c e s  w i th o u t  t h e i r  o p t i c a l  a n t i p o d e s ,  d i r e c t l y
1 .  P l a t o  i s  the  supreme example .
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from i n a c t i v e  m a t e r i a l s :  whereas  s y n t h e t i c  p r o d u c t s  a r e  a lways 
racem ic  s u b s t a n c e s  o r  e x t e r n a l l y  compensated m i x t u r e s .  I t  i s  
t r u e  t h a t  doubt has  been c a s t  on the  a b s o l u t e n e s s  of  the d i s ­
t i n c t i o n  between n a t u r a l  and a r t i f i c i a l  s y n t h e s i s ,  and t h a t  a t  
some f u t u r e  d a t e ,  improved methods may show i t  to  be u n fou nd ed :^  
nev e r ^ e l e s s ,  as  long a s  too  much m e ta p h y s ic a l  w e ig h t  i s  n o t  
a t t a c h e d  to  an e s s e n t i a l l y  s c i e n t i f i c  v iew, i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  
$ 0  see how l i v i n g  m a t t e r  i s  con ce ived  of  as  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  
from dead m a t t e r  by i t s  asyrame t r y  . I n s t a b i l i t y  i s  a  c h a ra .c te r -  
i s t i b  a l i k e  of  l i f e  and of t im e :  and a l th o u g h  l i f e  ends a t  
l a s t  i n  d e a th ,  and time p a s s e s ,  i t  would y e t  be a m is tak e  to
em phasize t h i s  a s p e c t  o n ly ,  and to  f o r g e t  the  c r e a t i v e n e s s  of 
2
l i f e  i n  t i m e . But w h ichever  of th e s e  we s t r e s s ,  w he the r  the
t r a n s i e n c e  of  time o r  i t s  i n v e n t i v e n e s s , i n  e i t h e r  case  time
rem ains  fu n d a m e n ta l ly  a l o g i c a l .  I f  I were to  a t t e m p t  to  answer
i n  a s i n g l e  s e n te n c e  the  q u e s t i o n ,  "What i s  t im e?"  the  answer
would be ,  "The a l o g i c a l  e lem en t  i n  the  u n i v e r s e " ,  w he the r
t h a t  e lem en t  i s  m a n i f e s t e d  under  the  form of change, o f  chance,
o r  of l i f e .  Boodin’ s rem ark ,  t h a t  " t ime i s  t h a t  p r o p e r t y
3
which makes in c o m p a t ib le  judgments  n e c e s s a r y ” , may be a l i t t l e
2. Alexander^particularly insists on this point. ("Space, Time, 
pie of Sufficient Reason", Bohn’s trans . p . o 2 . j
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too  s t r o n g ,  bu t  he i s  r i g h t  when he s a y s : g "The t i m e - c h a r a c t e r  
i n v o lv e s  p r e c i s e l y  the  r e l a t i v i t y  o r  f a l s i f y i n g  of any de­
s c r i p t i o n  which t r i e s  to  e x h a u s t  the  r e a l  s u b j e c t - o b j e c t . Time 
c r e e p s  i n t o  our  w or ld  o f  d e s c r i p t i o n  and n e g a te s  i t . "
G ra n ted  t h i s  fundam en ta l  a l o g i c a l i t y ,  what i s  to 
be done abo u t  i t ?  One way i s  to  s t a r t  from l o g i c  and d i s c o v e r  
t h a t  t ime i s  i r r e d u c i b l e ,  and th e n  lo o k  w i th  h o r r o r  on i t  as  
som eth ing  ’ i n e x p l i c a b l e ’ . The a l t e r n a t i v e s  seem from t h i s  view 
to  be :  i t h e r  t ime must be r e j e c t e d  because of  i t s  i n e x p l i c ­
a b i l i t y ,  o r  i t  must somehow be shown (by the  gene rous  use of 
o p t i m i s t i c  p o s t u l a t e s  and s p a t i a l i s i n g  l a n g u a g e ) , t h a t  a f t e r  
a l l  t ime i s  amenable to  l o g i c  -  i n  much the  same way, as  a 
c r i p p l e d  and p a r a l y s e d  man i s  amenable to  the  b e h e s t s  o f  h i s  
d o c t o r s ’. A l l  t h i s  i s ,  s u r e l y ,  a r a t h e r  s i l l y  p ro c e d u re ?  To 
b e g in  w i t h  a b s t r a c t  c o n s i s t e n c y  and to  a t t e m p t  to  p a s s  to  
time i s  s h e e r  d e f e a t i s m :  i t  i s  to  beg in  a t  the  wrong e n d .  The 
o n ly  s e n s i b l e  p ro c ed u re  i s  to  c o n s id e r  i f ,  i n  f a c t , we have 
any e x p e r ie n c e  of  t im e ;  and i f  so ,  to  a c c e p t  t h a t  f a c t .  True ,  
i t  i s  p e r f e c t l y  open to  us  to  a t t e m p t  to  e x p l a i n  away tem pora l  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  as  ' a p p e a r a n c e s ’ and n o t  ' r e a l '  -  h u t  t h a t  i s  
p a s s i n g  on to  the  second  q u e s t i o n ,  o f  the  u l t im a c y  of t im e .
I  s u g g e s t  t h a t ,  on the  l e v e l  o f  e x p e r i e n c e ,  no a t t e m p t  to 
e l i m i n a t e  time or  to  reduce  i t  to  a b s t r a c t  c o n s i s t e n c y  has
1. I  Old. p .2 4 ,
2 .  As McTaggart d i d .
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su cc eed ed ,  and t h a t  a p p a r e n t  s u c c e s s e s ,  on c l o s e r  I n s p e c t i o n ,  
s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y  make use of  n o t io n s  t h a t  a re  e s s e n t i a l l y  
tem p o ra l  to  b r id g e  the  gap from c o n c re te  to  a b s t r a c t .  That 
b e ing  so ,  i t  seems to  me i n f i n i t e l y  p r e f e r a b l e  to  s t a r t  from 
the  o t h e r  end ,  to  a c c e p t  time as  an u l t i m a t e  datum, and to  
p o s t u l a t e  i t  i n  the  v e ry  s im ple  sense  of  ’h app en i n g - n e s s ’ • 
When t h i s  i s  done, we can go on to  c o n s id e r  i t s  r e l a t i o n  to  
what we c a l l ,  f o r  s h o r t ,  ’ l o g i c ’ ; bu t  to  s t a r t  from l o g i c  and 
th en  to  condemn time ou t  of  hand,  i s  b l a t a n t l y  to  beg the  
q u e s t i o n .  Of c o u r s e ,  i t  w i l l  be s a i d ,  i t  i s  j u s t  as  bad to  
b e g in  w i th  time and th e n  to  r e j e c t  l o g i c .  This  may be so 
( though  I  doubt i t ,  s in c e  l o g i c  i s  no t  as  f a m i l i a r  i n  our ex ­
p er ience# :  e s p e c i a l l y  i n  ev e ry d ay  l i f e ,  as  time i s l )  bu t  t h e r e  
i s  no need to  take  the  extreme v iew . A l l  t h a t  i s  h e re  main­
t a i n e d  i s  t h a t  l o g i c ,  i n  the sense  of  a b s t r a c t  c o n s i s t e n c y ,
i s  s e r i o u s l y  i n s u f f i c i e n t  by r e a s o n  of  i t s  e x c l u s i o n  of  t i m e .
2
"So much the  worse f o r  l o g i c " ,  says  Broad, i f  i t  does no t
a l lo w  f o r  t im e ,  and h i s  c h a l l e n g e  may be echoed  h e r e . I f  ( p g i c
- i n  th e  sense  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  b ra n ch  of  s tu d y  -  can evo lve
3
a new organon of  th o u g h t  which can d e a l  w i th  ’ becoming’ as
1 .  Among which  I  would c l a s s ,  f o r  example,  R u s s e l l ’ s th e o ry  
o f  time as  expounded i n  the  "Monist"  of  1915, which d e a l s  
w i th  the  u n e s s e n t i a l  t h r o u g h o u t .
2 .  " S c i e n t i f i c  Thought" ,  p . 83.
3 . The cumbrous p h ra se  i s  u sed  d e l i b e r a t e l y , to  a v o id  r e ­
p e a t i n g  one word i n  so many d i f f e r e n t  s e n s e s .
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w e l l  as w i th  ’ b e i n g ’ , w i th  time as  w e l l  as  w i th  th e  l o g i c
t h a t  i s  a b s t r a c t  c o n s i s t e n c y ,  i t  w i l l  make a new and g r e a t
s t e p  fo rw a rd ,  and such a s t e p  i s  long  o v e r d u e •
I do n o t  t h i n k  t h a t  t h i s  i s  an e n t i r e l y  c h i m e r i c a l
n o t i o n ,  though i t  may w e l l  be long  b e fo re  i t  i s  r e a l i s e d ;  a f t e r
a l l ,  the  k in d r e d  s tu d y  of  m athem at ics  has  evo lved  a t e c h n i c a l
dodge by which r a t e  of  change can be e x p r e s s e d  i n  m a th e m a t ic a l
t e rm s .  But,  i t  may be o b j e c t e d ,  the  D i f f e r e n t i a l  C a lcu lu s
depends on the  n e g l e c t i n g  of v e ry  sm a l l  q u a n t i t i e s ,  and i n  so
d o in g ,  i t  f o r e g o e s  the  a b s o l u t e n e s s  of  pure  l o g i c .  G ra n te d .
But nobody d e n ie s  t h a t ,  d e s p i t e  the  r e l i n q u i s h m e n t  of  t h i s
A b so lu te  P e r f e c t i o n ,  m a them at ics  has  made a s t o n i s h i n g  p r o g r e s s
s in c e  i t s  i n t r o d u c t i o n ,  and t h a t  the  o ld  "Method of  F lu x io n s "
has  grown i n t o  an in s t r u m e n t  of  g r e a t  power and f l e x i b i l i t y .
S i m i l a r l y ,  Logic  would n o t  be what we mean by Logic -  i t  would
1
not  even be ’ l o g i c a l ’ i n  the sense  of  n e c e s s a r y  -  bu t  i t  m ight
2
n e v e r t h e l e s s  be of more i m p o r t a n c e . To an e x t e n s i o n  of t h i s  
k in d  a sane view of time i s  e s s e n t i a l ,  one which t r e a t s  of 
’ becoming’ as  u l t i m a t e  and s i m p le , n e i t h e r  making i t  a m i r a c l e ,
1 .  I t  may be as  w e l l  to  r e i t e r a t e  t h a t  t h a t  i s  the  sense  t h a t
has  been u sed  h e re  th ro u g h o u t  -  up to  now. The ’ b ranch  o f  s t u d y ’ 
sense  i s  p u t  i n  c a p i t a l s .  I t  i s  a  commentary on the  p r e s e n t  
s t a t e  of t h i s  b ranch  of s tu d y  t h a t  the  a d j e c t i v e  d e r iv e d  from 
i t  s h o u ld  u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y  be t a k e n  as  synonymous w i t h  ’n e c e s s ­
i t y ’ .
2 .  As a d m i t t i n g ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h a t  s c a n d a l  of the  o r th o d o x ,  
i n d u c t i o n .  A l l  i n d u c t i o n  p re su p p o se s  t i m e . I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  
to  s p e c u l a t e  w hethe r  i t  i s  the  ’u n c o m p le te d n e s s ’ which t h i s  
dependence on time in v o lv e s  t h a t  makes i t  i r r e d u c i b l e  to  l o g i c .
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n o r  o v e r lo o k in g  what i t  i n v o l v e s ,  n o r ,  f e e l i n g  t h a t  th e  whole 
a f f a i r  i s  r e a l l y  i n d e f e n s i b l e ,  d e c id in g  to  be hung f o r  a sheep 
as  w e l l  as  f o r  a  lamb, and f u r t i v e l y  s u b s t i t u t i n g  a s o l i d  
h y p o s t a t i s e d  Time f o r  th e  'a n d  t h e n '  o f  e v e n t s .  To c o n t in u e  
the  m etap ho r ,  i t  i s  no wonder i f  t h i s  prove too  toug lT Tor  the  
d i g e s t i o n  of m e ta p h y s ic i a n s  I
T h is  i s ,  however,  a s p e c u l a t i o n :  and a Logic t h a t  i s  
no t  l o g i c a l  and a l lo w s  f o r  t im e ,  may he on ly  a dream. A l l  the  
same, Logic  as  i t  i s  a t  p r e s e n t  u n d e r s to o d  co m p le te ly  f a i l s  
to  d e a l  w i t h  time a t  a l l ,  and though we a c c e p t  time as r e a l l y  
g iv e n  to  e x p e r i e n c e ,  we canno t  a c c e p t  i t  as  ’ r a t i o n a l ’ .
The second q u e s t i o n  to  be asked  concerns  the  r e a l i t y  
of t im e ,  where ’ r e a l i t y ’ i s  u se d  in  an a x i o l o g i c a l  s e n s e .  What 
i s  th e  r e l a t i o n  of  t ime to  v a lu e s ?  I s  th e  t im e - p r o c e s s  e s s e n t ­
i a l  to  the  r e a l i s a t i o n  of  v a lu e s ?  o r  i s  i t  a mere e p i s o d e ,  and 
an u n im p o r ta n t  one a t  t h a t ,  i n  com parison w i th  the  f u l l  g l o r i e s  
o f  i t s  t r a n s c e n d e n c e  i n  e t e r n i t y ?  As Gunn p u t s  i t ,  expounding 
Von H ügel ,  "We may r e t a i n  the  R e a l i t y  of Time, bu t  doubt i t s  
u l t i m a c y .  I t  i s  no t  the  l a s t  word ab ou t  r e a l i t y .  However much 
we s t r e s s  the  De v e n i r e , the  Becoming, i t  must be remembered /j 
t h a t  our l i f e  has  v a lu e  and s i g n i f i c a n c e  on ly  b e c a u se ,  and so 
f a r  a s ,  i t  r e a l i z e s  i n  f a c t  v a lu e s  which t r a n s c e n d  Time and 
Becoming, and a re  t r u e  a t  any time and f o r  a l l  t im e .  U l t i m a te ­
l y ,  p e r h a p s ,  on ly  B eauty ,  Goodness, T ru th ,  J u s t i c e , and Love
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a re  r e a l . "  On the o t h e r  hand ,  Tennyson a sk s  f o r  v l r tu J je  o n ly  
" th e  g l o r y  of  g o ing  on, and s t i l l  to  h e " .
I t  i s  g e n e r a l l y  a d m i t te d  t h a t  the  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a
v a l u a b l e  o b j e c t  i s  b e t t e r  th an  the mere im ag in in g  o f  i t ,  o r ,
as  Moore p u t s  i t ,  i n  a somewhat i joaestionable form, "We do 
t h i n k  t h a t  the  em o t io n a l  c o n te m p la t io n  of  a n a t u r a l  s ce n e ,  sup­
p o s in g  i t s  q u a l i t i e s  e q u a l l y  b e a u t i f u l , i s  i n  some way a b e t t e r  
s t a t e  o f  t h i n g s  th an  t h a t  of a p a i n t e d  l a n d s c a p e :  we t h i n k  t h a t
the  w o r ld  would be improved i f  we co u ld  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  th e  b e s t
2
works o f  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  a r t  r e a l  o b j e c t s  e q u a l l y  b e a u t i f u l . "  
A ga in ,  i t  i s  not  nonsense to  t a l k  of  v a lu e s  where t h e r e  i s  no 
q u e s t i o n  of  human e x i s t e n c e ,  and we can and do, as  Moore p o i n t s  
o u t ,  compare two wholes in  r e s p e c t  o f  v a lu e  even i f  n e i t h e r  of  
them can e v e r  be c o n tem p la ted  by men. L e t  us imagine one w or ld  
e x c e e d in g ly  b e a u t i f u l .  Imagine i t  a s  b e a u t i f u l  as you can:  p u t  
i n t o  i t  w ha tev er  on t h i s  e a r t h  you most admire -  m ou n ta in s ,  
r i v e r s ,  the  s e a ; t r e e s ,  and s u n s e t s ,  s t a r s  and moon. Imagine 
th e s e  a l l  combined, i n  the most e x q u i s i t e  p r o p o r t i o n s ,  so t h a t  
no one t h i n g  j a r s  a g a i n s t  a n o t h e r ,  b u t  each  c o n t r i b u t e s  to  
i n c r e a s e  the  b e a u ty  of  the  w h o le . And th e n  imagine th e  u g l i e s t  
w o r ld  you can p o s s i b l y  c o n c e iv e .  Imagine i t  s im ply  one heap o f
e s p e c i a l l y  Chap. V I I .
2 . " P r i n c i p i a  T t h i c a " , p . 195.
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f i l t h ,  c o n t a i n i n g  e v e r y th in g  t h a t  i s  most d i s g u s t i n g  to  u s ,  
f o r  w h a te v e r  r e a s o n ,  and the  w hole ,  a s  f a r  a s  may he,  w i t h o u t  
one redeem ing  f e a t u r e .  . . .  The o n ly  t h i n g  we are  n o t  e n t i t l e d  
to  imagine i s  t h a t  any human b e in g  e v e r  h a s ,  o r  e v e r ,  by any 
p o s s i b i l i t y ,  cam, l i v e  i n  e i t h e r ,  can e v e r  see and e n jo y  the  
b ea u ty  o f  the  one or  h a te  the  f o u l n e s s  of  the  o t h e r .  W ell ,  
even so ,  su p p o s in g  them q u i t e  a p a r t  from any p o s s i b l e  contem­
p l a t i o n  by human b e in g s :  s t i l l ,  i s  i t  i r r a t i o n a l  to  h o ld  t h a t  
i t  i s  b e t t e r  t h a t  the  b e a u t i f u l  w or ld  sh o u ld  e x i s t  th an  one 
which i s  ug ly ?  . . I  ad m i t ,  of c o u r s e , t h a t  our b e a u t i f u l  
w o r ld  would be b e t t e r  s t i l l ,  i f  t h e r e  were human b e in g s  i n  i t  
to  co n tem p la te  and e n jo y  i t s  b e a u ty .  But t h a t  ad m iss io n  makes 
n o th in g  a g a i n s t  my p o i n t .  I f  i t  be once a d m i t t e d  t h a t  the  
b e a u t i f u l  w o r ld  i t s e l f  i s  b e t t e r  th a n  the  u g ly ,  th en  i t  
f o l l o w s ,  t h a t  however many b e in g s  may e n jo y  i t ,  and however 
much b e t t e r  t h e i r  en joym ent may be th an  i t  i s  i t s e l f ,  y e t  i t s  
mere e x i s t e n c e  adds some t h i n g  to  the  goodness  of  the  whole:  i t  
i s  n o t  o n ly  a means to  our  end ,  bu t  a l s o  i t s e l i  a p a r t  t h e r e o f .  
E x i s t e n c e ,  t h e n ,  a c c o rd in g  to  Moore, has  i t s e l f  some v a l u e ,  
and t h i s  sh o u ld ,  I  t h i n k ,  be remembered when we a t t e m p t  to 
a s s i g n  to  time i t s  u l t i m a t e  p la c e  i n  the  scheme oi t h i n g s .  
D i f f e r e n t l y  e x p r e s s e d ,  the  I d e a l  Forms may be n o n - te m p o ra l ,  
b u t  a p a r t i c u l a r  o b j e c t  which  e x e m p l i f i e s  the  Id e a  of Beauty  
has  an a d d i t i o n a l  v a lu e  i n  t h a t  i t  e x i s t s .  But to  say no more
1 .  I b i d .  p p . 8 3 - 8 5 .
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would be to  beg the  q u e s t i o n :  f o r ,  a f t e r  a l l ,  i s  ’ e x i s t e n c e ’ 
n e c e s s a r i l y  e x i s t e n c e  i n  t im e? I t  i s  the  c h i e f  p o i n t  o f  i d e a l ­
i s t s  and m y s t ic s  -  a l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  of  men - t h a t  e x i s t e n c e  
i n  time i s  l i m i t e d ,  and t h a t  t h e r e  i s  a f u l l e r ,  t r u e r , e x i s t ­
ence t h a t  t r a n s c e n d s  t i m e . T rue ,  Moore’ s example co ncern ed  
e x i s t e n c e  i n  t i m e , and many would ag ree  w i th  him t h a t  an 
a d d i t i o n a l  v a l u e ,  however s l i g h t ,  i s  g iv en  by such e x i s t e n c e ,  
b u t  i t  i s  s t i l l  open to  the  c r i t i c  to  o b j e c t  t h a t  tem p ora l  ex ­
i s t e n c e  i s  n o t  u l t i m a t e . And t h i s  i s  the  im p o r ta n t  q u e s t i o n  to  
d i s c u s s .
I  am i n c l i n e d  to  t h i n k  t h a t  some of the  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
t h a t  ap p e a r  i n  t h i s  c o n t r o v e r s y  a re  the  r e s u l t  of v e r b a l  ob­
s c u r i t i e s :  the  com batan ts  f i r s t  r a i s e  a d u s t ,  and th e n  com plain  
t h a t  th e y  canno t  s e e .  F i r s t  of  a l l ,  i t  i s  i n  the  h i g h e s t  degree  
u n f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  ’ t i m e ’ has  so o f t e n  been u sed  as  the  o p p o s i t e  
of  ’ e t e r n i t y ’ , w i t h  a consequen t  d e p r e c i a t i o n  of tem pora l  ex­
i s t e n c e  by th o se  who b e l i e v e  in  the  a b s o l u t e n e s s  and e t e r n i t y  
of  v a l u e s .  Being and Becoming a re  too  o f t e n  r e g a r d e d  as  the  
o r i g i n a l  K i lk en ny  c a t s ,  engaged i n  a l i f e - a n d - d e a t h  s t r u g g l e . 
T h is  i s  a v e r y  s t u p i d  v ie w . I  have t r i e d  to  show t h a t  the  
n o t i o n  of t ime i n c l u d e s  b o th  ’h a p p e n in g ’ and ’ and t h e n ’ . (Of 
c o u r s e ,  ’ i n c l u d e s ’ i s  an u n f o r t u n a t e  word, s in c e  i t  s u g g e s t s  
the  v e ry  d i s p a r i t y  and two—n ess  which I  am t r y i n g  to  e l i m i n ­
a t e . )  What the  view I am c r i t i c i s i n g  amounts to  i s  an a t t e m p t  
to  s e p a r a t e  the  ’h a p p e n in g ’ from the  ’ and t h e n ’ , the  b e in g
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from the  becoming. The fo rm er  i s  c a l l e d  e t e r n i t y ,  the  l a t t e r  
t im e ,  and  n o t  u n n a t u r a l l y ,  t h e i r  r e l a t i o n  i s  found  to  p r e s e n t  
c e r t a i n  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  But i n  any fundam en ta l  view of  t im e ,  
b o th  time and e t e r n i t y  -  i n  the  n a r ro w er  sense  -  can be r e -  
g a r e d  as  ’ i n  t i m e ’ . This  i s  a p a rad o x :  we a re  accustomed to  
h e a r  t h a t  e t e r n i t y  t r a n s c e n d s  t im e ,  bu t  no t  t h a t  time t r a n ­
scends  e t e r n i t y ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i t  i s  no t  such a quee r  d o c t r i n e  
as  i t  so u n d s .  What i t  a s s e r t s  i s  m ere ly  t h a t  Being and Be­
coming a re  c o i m p l i c a n t ,  and t h a t  t o g e t h e r  th e y  form a whole,  
w h ich ,  w h e th e r  i t  be c a l l e d  Time o r  e t e r n i t y ,  i s  much more 
fu n dam en ta l  th an  e i t h e r  c o n s id e r e d  i n  a b s t r a c t i o n  from the  
o t h e r .  There i s  v e ry  l i t t l e  to  q u a r r e l  ab ou t  between t h i s  
view and t h a t  of  tho se  who, r i g h t l y  f e e l i n g  the  i n s t a b i l i t y  
and i m p e r f e c t i o n  of  Becoming, p o s t u l a t e d  a p e r f e c t  whole i n  
which t h i s  would be t r a n s c e n d e d  - and c a l l e d  i t  B t e r n i t y .
The v e r b a l  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  n o t  of  s i g n i f i c a n c e  e x c e p t  i n  so
f a r  as  the  h o l d e r s  of  t h i s  second view te n d e d  to  debase time
2
to  the  s u b o r d in a t e  p o s i t i o n  of Becoming, and to  d i g n i f y  Being 
-  e t e r n a l  i n  the na r row er  sense  - to  the  p o s i t i o n  which be ­
lo n gs  o n ly  to  the  un ion  of Being and Becoming, w he the r  t h i s  
be c a l l e d  Time o r  B t a r n i t y .  N e i th e r  usage i s  w h o l ly  s a t i s ­
f a c t o r y ,  s in c e  we a re  so accustom ed to  c o n s i d e r in g  ’ t i m e ’
1 .  I  a p o lo g i s e  f o r  the  la n g u a g e .
2 .  J u s t  as  Bergson g l o r i f i e d  Becoming a t  the  expense of 
B e in g .
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and ’ e t e r n i t y ’ i n  t h e i r  n a r ro w e r ,  a n t i p a t h e t i c  s e n s e s :  hu t  
’R e a l i t y ’ would be w orse ,  as  n e g l e c t i n g  o t h e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
t h a t  have n o th in g  to  do w i th  t im e ,  which can j u s t l y  c la im  to  
be a p a r t  of r e a l i t y .  On the w h o le , i t  seems b e t t e r  to  keep 
to  the  word ’ t i m e ’ h e r e ,  as  long  as i t  i s  r e a l i s e d  t h a t  i t  i s  
u se d  i n  a sense  t h a t  i n c l u d e s  b o th  ’ b e i n g ’ and ’becoming’ .
Before  p a s s i n g  on to  c o n s i d e r  w h e the r  t im e ,  so con­
c e iv e d ,  i s  u l t i m a t e ,  i t  w i l l  be a s  w e l l  b r i e f l y  to  d e fen d  the  
view t h a t  becoming and b e in g  a re  c o i m p l i c a n t ,  and to  show t h a t  
i t  i s  one which i t  i s  p l a u s i b l e  to  h o l d .
F i r s t l y ,  when a l l  i s  s a i d  and done, t h i s  c o n n e c t io n  
of  Being and Becoming, so i n e x p l i c a b l e  i f  i t  i s  n o t  t a k e n  as 
u l t i m a t e ,  i s  im m e d ia te ly  g iv en  to  e x p e r ie n c e  i n  the  s p e c io u s  
p r e s e n t .  We n o t  on ly  see a b l a c k  o b j e c t ,  but we see the  b la c k  
o b j e c t  as  a c t u a l l y  moving. This  was d e a l t  w i th  i n  Chapter  I ,  
and h e re  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  to  remind o u r s e l v e s  t h a t  a t  ev e ry  
moment o f  our l i v e s  we have e m p i r i c a l  c o n f i r m a t io n  o f  the
c o n n e c t io n  between Being and Becoming.
S eco n d ly ,  t h e r e  i s  the  l o g i c a l  problem of i d e n t i t y  
and d i f f e r e n c e .  How a re  we to  e x p l a i n  t h i s ,  w i th o u t  p r e s u p ­
p o s in g  th e  n o t i o n  o f  becoming? Among the  many im p o r ta n t  h i n t s  
i n  the  f i r s t  book of  "Space ,  Time, and D e i t y " ,  i s  th e  f o l l o w ­
i n g ; -  "The e lem en ts  o f  the  one r e a l i t y  which i s  Space-Time, 
and not e i t h e r  Space o r  Time a lo n e ,  owe t h e i r  d i s t i n c t n e s s
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i n  e i t h e r  k in d  to  the  complementary e l e m e n t .  We have n o t  y e t  
a r r i v e d  a t  an e x a m in a t io n  of  th e  n o t io n s  of  i d e n t i t y  and 
d i v e r s i t y .  But u s in g  th e se  term s i n  t h e i r  common s e n s e ,  e i t h e r  
o f  the  two we may r e g a r d  as  p l a y i n g  the  p a r t  o f  i d e n t i t y  to  
the  o t h e r ’ s p a r t  o f  d i v e r s i t y . "  This  h i n t  i s  f u r t h e r  d e v e lo p ­
ed l a t e r ,  and same- a n d - o th e r  i s  r e l a t e d  to  B eing .  " E x is te n c e  
i s  the  u n io n  o f  i d e n t i t y  and d i f f e r e n c e . But t h i s  d e s i g n a t i o n  
o f  u n io n  must he r e c e i v e d  w i th  c a u t i o n .  I t  i s  n o t  p r o p e r l y  a 
b l e n d in g  o r  m ix tu re  o f  i d e n t i t y  and d i f f e r e n c e :  nor  on the  
o t h e r  hand a r e  i d e n t i t y  and d i f f e r e n c e  to  be r e g a rd e d  as  i n  
r e a l i t y  o n e . The s p l e n d i d  image of  the  Timaeus i n  which thg  
Demiurge i s  r e p r e s e n t e d  as p o u r in g  the Same and the  O ther  i n t o  
a bowl and c r e a t i n g  Being (Ousia) from t h e i r  m ix tu re  i s  no t  
by us to  be u n d e r s to o d  l i t e r a l l y ,  i f  i t  was so u n d e r s to o d  by 
Timaeus.  . . .  Being i s  no t  som eth ing  new made up of  the  two,
2
b u t  i s  th e  same ta k e n  a lo n g  w i th  i t s  r e l a t i o n  of  o t h e r n e s s . "
I t  i s  e x t r e m e ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  t h a t  the  problem  of i d e n t i t y  and 
d i f f e r e n c e  sh o u ld  be co n n e c ted  i n  t h i s  way w i th  the  q u e s t i o n  
of  t ime and i t s  r e l a t i o n  to  s p a c e .  A lex an de r  h a s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
a s p e c i a l  m e ta p h y s ic a l  d o c t r i n e  to  m a i n t a i n ,  bu t  n e v e r t h e l e s s  
h i s  g e n e r a l  p o s i t i o n  i s  of i n t e r e s t  i n  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n ,  and 
h i s  t r e a tm e n t  of the  q u e s t i o n  i s  much more s a t i s f a c t o r y  th a n  
t h a t  o f  tho se  who a t t e m p t  to  reduce  e v e r y t h in g  to  bare  i d e n t ­
i t i e s  -  a m is ta k e  ana logous  to  t h a t  of n e g l e c t i n g  Becoming
1 .  Op.c i t .  i ,  6 0 .  2 .  I b i d .  i ,  1 9 7 - 8 .
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and o v e r -e m p h a s iz in g  B e in g .
The t h i r d  example I  s h a l l  take  concerns  a f a v o u r i t e  
m e ta p h y s i c a l  p u z z l e ,  which L e io n iz  and C la rk e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  
s e t  each  o t h e r .  Could Cod have c r e a t e d  th e  w or ld  any sooner  
th a n  He d id ?  I f  so ,  why d i d n ’ t  he? I f  n o t ,  how i s  t h i s  con­
s i s t e n t  w i th  His om nipotence?  L e ib n iz  s a i d : -  ’’To suppose t h a t  
the  u n i v e r s e  co u ld  have had a t  f i r s t  a n o th e r  p o s i t i o n  of  t ime 
and p l a c e ,  th an  t h a t  which i t  a c t u a l l y  had :  -and y e t  t h a t  a l l  
the  p a r t s  of the  u n i v e r s e  sh o u ld  have had the  same s i t u a t i o n
among th e m s e lv e s ,  as  t h a t  which th e y  a c t u a l l y  had :  such a
1
s u p p o s i t i o n  i s  an im probab le  f i c t i o n . "  Improbable  o r  n o t ,  the
q u e s t i o n  s t a n d s ,  bu t  L e ib n iz  was on f i r m e r  ground  when he added,
"Once i t  has  been shown t h a t  the  b e g in n in g ,  whenever i t  was,
i s  a lways th e  same t h i n g ,  the  q u e s t i o n  why i t  was no t  o th e rw is e
2
o r d a in e d ,  becomes n e e d le s s  and i n s i g n i f i c a n t ." Yet i t  was n o t  
u n t i l  the  F i f t h  L e t t e r  t h a t  L e ib n iz  found the  b e s t  a n s w e r : -  "To 
t a l k  abo u t  c r e a t i n g  the  w or ld  so o n e r ,  i s  making time a th in g  
a b s o l u t e ,  in d e p e n d e n t  of Cod, w hereas  time on ly  c o e x i s t s  w i th  
c r e a t u r e s ,  and i s  on ly  co n ce iv ed  by the  o rd e r  and q u a n t i t y  oi
3
t h e i r  c h a n g e s ."  ( A f t e r  t h i s ,  i t  was c u r io u s  t h a t  he a d m i t te d
1. L e t t e r  IV to  C l a r k e , P . 9 5 . ( (C orrespondence  of L e ib n iz  and 
C l a r k e " , London 1717^ 2 .  I b i d .  p . 101.
3 .  L e t t e r  V, p . 217. Compare a l s o  A u g u s t in e ’ s answer to  the 
q u e s t i o n :  What was Cod doing b e fo re  he c r e a t e d  the  w o r ld .  
P r e p a r i n g  H e l l ,  f o r  tho se  t h a t  p ry  i n t o  such m y s t e r i e s  I 
( " C o n f e s s i o n s " , XI,  12 .)
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i t  p o s s i b l e  to  £ o nce ive  o f  an e a r l i e r  c r e a t i o n ,  and s a i d  t h a t  
i f  i t  had  been r e a s o n a b le  Cod would have c r e a t e d  the  w orld  
s o o n e r .  ) There i s  no need to  adop t  the  p a r t i c u l a r  m e ta p h y s i c a l  
p o s i t i o n  t h a t  L e ib n iz  was u p h o ld in g  a g a i n s t  Clarke to  see the  
sound sense  o f  the  l a s t  s t a t e m e n t .  To a f f i r m  or to  deny t h a t  
the  w o r ld  co u ld  have been c r e a t e d  e a r l i e r  i s  to  t h i n k  of  t ime 
as  a h y p o s t a t i s e d  a b s o l u t e ,  a b s t r a c t e d  from the  w or ld  of  
e v e n t s ,  and as  somehow’go in g  on ’ , even i n  a vacuum- I t  i s  to  
t h i n k  of Becoming a p a r t  from a n y th in g  which becomes, and a p a r t  
from Being -  w hich ,  i n  s p i t e  o f  Bergson,  seems to  me an un­
d e s i r a b l e  c o n c e p t io n .
F o u r t h l y ,  the  a d o p t io n  of  t h i s  view of time as i n ­
v o lv in g  b o th  ’h a p p e n in g ’ and ’ and t h e n ’ g e t s  r i d  of  th e  r a t h e r  
s u p e r f i c i a l  view which c o n t r a s t s  t ime and e t e r n i t y ,  and w hich ,  
s e e in g  in  time on ly  becoming, e i t h e r  g l o r i f i e s  i t  by some 
e v o l u t i o n a r y  th e o r y  or e l s e  t r i e s  to  g e t  r i d  of i t  a l t o g e t h e r  
a s  i m p e r f e c t .  Of the  two, i t  must be a d m i t t e d  t h a t  the  ’ and 
t h e n ’ of becoming i s  more fu nd am en ta l  to  time th a n  the  fhappen­
i n g ’ o f  e x i s t e n c e ,  s in c e  th e  l a t t e r  can so e a s i l y  d e g e n e ra te  
i n t o  a s t a t i c  p a s s i v i t y  t h a t  i s  the  d e n i a l  o f  t im e .  N e v e r th e ­
l e s s ,  i t  i s  im p o r ta n t  t h a t  we sh o u ld  r e a l i s e  t h a t  h ap p en in g ­
n es s  ( o r  ’ i s  p r e s e n t ’ , o r  a c t u a l i t y ) ,  a l s o  p e r t a i n s  to  t im e ,  
and t h a t  i t  would be a m u t i l a t e d  view which ig n o re d  i t  and 
c o n c e n t r a t e d  on ly  on t h e ,  a d m i t t e d l y  im p o r t a n t ,  c r e a t i v i t y
1 . And, of c o u r s e ,  the  a l o g i c a l i t y  of  becoming r e m a in s .
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'  1
and t r a n s i e n c e  o f  t i m e .
What, t h e n ,  o f  v a lu e s  i n  r e l a t i o n  to  time so con­
c e iv e d ?  T h i s ,  a p a r t  o f  a s i n g l e  c h a p t e r ,  i s  n o t  the  p l a c e  to  
smhark upon a d i s c u s s i o n  of what v a lu e  i s  -  a v a s t  t o p i c  which 
has  f u l l y  o cc u p ie d  many l a r g e  boo ks .  I t  would be f o o l i s h  to 
a s k  how many u l t i m a t e  v a lu e s  t h e r e  a re  - t r u t h ,  g o o dn ess ,  
b e a u ty ,  and p e rh a p s  knowledge -  to  canvass  th e  c la im s  o f  the  
l a s t - m e n t i o n e d ,  to  i n q u i r e  w h e th e r  e v i l  and u g l i n e s s  a r e  p o s i t ­
ive  d i s - v a l u e s  o r  a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  n e g a t i v e ,  to  a sk  w hethe r  o r  
n o t  t r u t h  and the  r e s t  may no t  a l l  be r e d u c i b l e  to  a g e n e r a l  
con cep t  of  V a lu e .  Here i t  can  o n ly  be assumed t h a t  t h e r e  a r e ,  
i n  f a c t ,  s i t u a t i o n s  a b o u t  which we make judgm ents  of  v a lu e  
( u s in g  v a lu e  a s  a  g e n e r a l  te rm  to  in c lu d e  a e s t h e t i c  and e t h i c ­
a l  j u d g m e n t s ) • Are such  judgm ents  a b s o l u t e ?  o r  i s  what we c a l l  
( f o r  example) ’ b e a u t y ’ o n ly  a name f o r  our s u b j e c t i v e  p r é d i s -  • 
p o s i t i o n s ?  -  as  meaning, when a l l  f r i l l s  have been removed, 
"T h is  i s  what I  l i k e " ?  A h i g h l y  r e s p e c t a b l e  s e t  o f  s u p p o r t e r s  
can be found f o r  each  of the  opposed views (sometimes f o r  both) '  
The r e l a t i v i s t  p o i n t s  ou t  the  g r e a t  d iv e rg e n c e s  i n  a e s t h e t i c  
and m oral  judgm ents  between d i f f e r e n t  r a c e s ,  c r e e d s ,  s o c i a l  
o r d e r s ,  and c i v i l i s a t i o n s ,  and a rg u e s  t h a t  e t h i c a l  b e l i e f s  
a r e  c o m p le te ly  c o n d i t i o n e d  by env ironm en t  and by p ra g m a t ic  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  There i s  much to  be s a i d  i n  h i s  f a v o u r .
1 .  Th is  lan g u a g e ,  which s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e r e  a re  two ’ a s p e c t s ' ,  
i s  a p t  to  be m i s l e a d in g  - my whole p o i n t  i s  t h a t  t im e ,  as  
s im ple  ' h a p p e n i n g s ' , t r a n s c e n d s  b o t h .
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N 0 v e r th e l e s s ,  i t  i s  always open to  the c r i t i c  to  o b j e c t  t h a t  
a b s o l u t e  s t a n d a r d s  a re  p re sup po sed  th ro u g h o u t ,  and t h a t  we do, 
i n  f a c t ,  judge t h a t  one s e t  o f  b e l i e f s  i s  ’b e t t e r ’ or ’w o rs e ’ 
th a n  a n o th e r  s e t .  Mr. I .A .  R ic h a rd s ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  sco rn s  
" w i s h - f u l f i l m e n t "  l i t e r a t u r e ,  and t a k e s  i f  f o r  g r a n te d  t h a t  a 
p r e f e r e n c e  *for Shakespeare  i s  i n  some way more worthy  th an  one 
f o r  Miss Wil^o(K. I  am f a r  from impugning h i s  t a s t e ,  bu t  I r e a l l y  
do n o t  see how, on h i s  p r i n c i p l e s , he knows t h a t  i t  i s  ’ b e t t e r ’ 
th an  t h a t  of the  G i r l  i n  the  Bus. W ithout  i n  the l e a s t  i n t e n d ­
in g  to  s h i e k t  " m y s t i c a l  e n t i t i e s " , i t  does seem to  me a common 
sense  view to  t a k e ,  t h a t  we do, i n  f a c t ,  assume t h a t  c e r t a i n  
t h i n g s  j u s t  a re  b e t t e r  o r  worse th an  o t h e r s .  Nobody doubts  
t h a t  our judgments  a re  f a l l i b l e ,  and s u b j e c t i v e ,  and b i a s s e d  
by our  u p b r in g in g  - but  i t  i s  a f u r t h e r  s t e p ,  and one t h a t  i t  
i s  no t  l o g i c a l l y  n e c e s s a r y  to  t a k e ,  to  say t h a t  t h e r e  i s  n o th in g  
more to i t  than  t h a t .  A f t e r  a l l ,  we ^  say ,  "He meant w e l l ,  
bu t  he made a m i s t a k e " ,  o r  "C h i ld re n  have v e ry  crude t a s t e s ,  
but they  improve somewhat as. t h e y  grow up " ,  and we do c o r r e c t  
s u b j e c t i v e  and f a l l i b l e  e s t i m a t i o n s  by judgments which c la im  
a g r e a t e r  degree  of  o b j e c t i v i t y .  Of c o u r s e ,  i t  w i l l  be s a i d ,  
our c o r r e c t i o n s  a re  them se lves  s u b j e c t i v e :  what seemed to  me a 
m is tak e  may to someone e l s e  w i th  f u l l e r  in fo rm a t io n  about  the  
r e s u l t s  seem a b r i l l i a n t  s t r a t e g y ,  and so on. A l l  t h i s ,  how­
e v e r ,  i s  on ly  to  say  t h a t  we a re  no t  i n f a l l i b l e  and t h a t  our
1. " P r i n c i p l e s  of  L i t e r a r y  C r i t i c i s m "  ( e s p e c i a l l y  Chaps. VI & 
V I I ) ,  and " P r a c t i c a l  C r i t i c i s m " .
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judgments  a re  n e c e s s a r i l y  p e r s o n a l -  I t  i s  p l a u s i b l e  to  h o ld  
t h a t  however f a r  we push back our i n q u i r i e s  i n  the  end we 
a c c e p t  an a b s o l u t e  s t a n d a r d  of v a l u e .
B e l i e f  i n  the a b s o l u t e n e s s  of  v a lu e s  i s  u s u a l l y  
h e ld  to  in v o lv e  t h a t ^ v a l u e s  a r e ,  in  some sense ,  ’e t e r n a l ’ . I f ,  
i t  i s  a rg u e d ,  v a lu e s  change w i th  changing t im e s ,  th ey  cannot  
be a b s o l u t e :  c o n v e r s e ly ,  i f  th ey  a re  a b s o l u t e ,  th ey  cannot  
a l t e r  w i th  t im e .  Values so r e g a rd e d  a re  p r o p e r l y  no n - tem po ra l  
and no t  s u b j e c t  to  change; though the  s t a n d a r d s  of va lue  may 
v a ry  between d i f f e r e n t  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  n a t i o n s ,  and e r a s .  From 
t h i s  p o i n t  of view, p a r t i c u l a r  s t a n d a r d s  of va lue  a re* m ere ly  
c o p i e s ,  more o r  l e s s  im p e r f e c t ,  of the  t ru e  and i d e a l  Forms, 
which t r a n s c e n d  our incom ple te  tem pora l  e x i s o e n c e ,  but which 
n e v e r t h e l e s s  g ive  p o i n t  and meaning to  i t .  The B l i z a b a t h a n s , 
mourning e x t r a v a g a n t l y  f o r  t h e i r  dead la d y ,  swore t h a t  i n  h e r  
d e a th  Nature  had l o s t  the  ’’one p e r f e c t  mould", which co u ld  
never  a g a in  be a t t a i n e d  - a  q u ee r  p e r v e r s i o n  of P l a t o ,  whose 
whole p o i n t  was t h a t  the  Id e a s  were d i s t i n c t  from p a r t i c u l a r  
c o p ie s  o f  them, and were immune from the  change and d e a th  
t h a t  ends tem pora l  e x i s t e n c e . Thus, though the  la d y  d i e s ,  
beau ty  l i v e s  on: though j e s t i n g  P i l a t e  a s k s ,  "What i s  t r u t h ? "
w i th  r e s p e c t  to  t h e i r  ’v a l u e ’ .
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a t  rem ains  to  confound him: and goodness i s  more th an  a l l  
the s o p h i s t r i e s  of P r o t a g o r a s .  Such a view i s  open to  obvious 
o b j e c t i o n s  t h a t  i t  co nce iv es  of  Values as  hav ing  a queer  
m y s t i c a l  s u b s i s t e n c e  a lo ng  w i th  the  Id e a s  of  beds,  mud, and 
h a i r ,  and a s  be ing  mere h y p o s t a t i s e d  f ig m e n t s ,  i l l e g i t i m a t e l y  
s e p a f a t e d  from p a r t i c u l a r  examples of goodness ,  t r u t h ,  b e a u ty .  
We a re  back a t  the o ld  qu 'as t i  on of the  r e l a t i o n  between u n i ­
v e r s a l  and p a r t i c u l a r .  I t  may be g i a n t e d  t h a t  th ese  c r i t i c i s m s  
a re  t o  some e x t e n t  j u s t i f i e d ,  and a l s o  t h a t  cheapened i m i t ­
a t i o n s  of  t h i s  view, which e r e c t  t h e o r i e s  of  a e s t h e t i c s  on 
the b a s i s  of a p l e n t i f u l  su p p ly  of vague g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s  and 
a g en e ro us  use of c a p i t a l  l e t t e r s  (A r t ,  P o e t r y ,  Tragedy, and 
so on) a re  p e c u l i a r l y  i r r i t a t i n g .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  d i f f i c u l t  as 
i t  i s  to  f o r m u l a t e ,  and ea sy  as  i t  i s  to  debase w i th  s e n t im e n t ­
a l  p o p u l a r i s a t i o n s ,  th e r e  i s  an im p o r ta n t  t r u t h  i n  the  d o c t r i n e  
t h a t  v a lu e s  are  e t e r n a l  - a t r u t h  t h a t  i s  p a r t l y  obscu red  by 
m is u n d e r s ta n d in g s  over the word ’e t e r n a l * .  To say t h a t  b ea u ty ,  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i s  ’ e t e r n a l ’ , does not  mean t h a t  p a r t i c u l a r  
b e a u t i f u l  t h in g s  a re  e t e r n a l .  Quite  o b v io u s ly  they  a re  n o t :  
s t a t u e s  a re  b roken ,  p i c t u r e s  fade and the  c o u n t ry s id e  i s  
cove red  w i th  bungalows and a r t e r i a l  r o a d s .  ITor does i t  mean 
t h a t  t h e r e  a re  always b e a u t i f u l  t h i n g s  -  t h a t  when one 
p i c t u r e  f a d e s ,  a n o t h e r ,  e q u a l l y  b e a u t i f u l ,  i s  p a i n t e d  - and 
t h a t  th e  amount of b ea u ty  i n  the w or ld  i s  c o n s t a n t .  Hor, to
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a v o id  th e s e  o b v io u s ly  s i l l y  a l t e r n a t i v e s ,  i s  i t  n e c e s s a ry  to  
ru sh  to  the  o p p o s i t e  extreme of h y p o s t a t i s a t i o n ,  and co m p le te ly
to ig n o re  p a r t i c u l a r  b e a u t i e s  in  the  p o s t u l a t i o n  of an i d e a l  
B eau ty .  F o r ,  to  say  oi v a lu e s  t h a t  th ey  a re  e t e r n a l ,  i s  no t  to  
say  t h a t  th ey  endure th ro u g h o u t  unending t im e ,  but t h a t  th ey  
t r a n s c e n d  t im e ,  i n  the  nar row er  sense  of f l u x .
But what of t im e ,  i n  the  w ider  sense  of u n i t i n g  
Being and Becoming? What i s  i t s  r e l a t i o n  to  the  u l t im a t e  
v a lu e s ?  On the  one hand, i t s  e s s e n t i a l  i n c o m p le t e n e s s , no l e s s  
th a n  i t s  impermanence and t r a n s i e n c e ,  a re  opposed to  t h e i r  
r e a l i s a t i o n .  On the o t h e r  hand,  even i f  we imagined a p e r f e c t  
w o r ld ,  i n  which a l l  v a lu e s  were c o m p le te ly  r e a l i s e d ,  what co u ld  
the p assage  of time add f u r t h e r ?  N o th in g .  What need,  th en ,  
would t h e r e  be f o r  the  becoming of t ime? "Give h e r  the  g l o r y  
p f  go ing  on",  Tennyson asked  f o r  v i r t u e .  But t h a t  g lo r y  i s  i n  
an im p e r f e c t  w or ld ;  what g l o r y  cou ld  i t  add to  a p e r f e c t  one?
I t  would be i r r e l e v a n t  and t r i v i a l .  F a u s t ,  i f  a sked ,  would 
p r e f e r  an hour  of b l i s s  to  a minute of b l i s s ,  because he knows 
t h a t  b o th  must end and be fo l lo w e d  by to rm en t :  bu t  a b s o l u t e  
p e r f e c t i o n  - t h a t  f e a r s  no tomorrow’ s a n t i c l i m a x  - i s  h e e d le s s  
o f  d u r a t i o n .  A lexander  s a i d  t h a t  the  n i s u s  towards D e i ty  was 
n o t  the  mere t u r n i n g  of a s q u i r r e l  in  a cage :  n e i t h e r  i s  
D e i ty  i t s e l f ,  c o u ld  i t  be a c h ie v e d ,  the  s t a t i c  h i b e r n a t i o n  o f  
the  s q u i r r e l  th rough  a b lan k  and f e a t u r e l e s s  d u r a t i o n  - a
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t o r p o r  t h a t  i s  h a r d l y  d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e  from d e a th .  "The w orld  
was made to  en jo y  r a t h e r  than  to  l a s t " / s a i d  Samuel B u t l e r ,  
and d u r a t i o n  i s  o f  l i t t l e  account  i n  comparison w i th  V alue .  
That i t  i s  of any accou n t  a t  a l l  i s  a/i mark of an im p e r f e c t  
s t a t e  of t h i n g s ,  which a t t r i b u t e s  va lue  to  a p r o l o n g a t i o n  of 
h a p p in e s s  i n  the  t e e t h  oi i n s t a b i l i t y ,  and even ,  n e g a t i v e l y ,  
to  the  c u t t i n g  s h o r t  of u n h a p p in e s s .
A l l  t h i s  may be t r u e  : but however c a v a l i e r l y  we
t r e a t  d u r a t i o n ,  we cannot  n e g l e c t  B eing .  Gran ted  the  e x i s t e n c e
2
of a p e r f e c t  s t a t e ,  d u r a t i o n  may be ig n o re d  - bu t  such a s t a t e  
must f i r s t  e x i s t .  I t  i s  o f t e n  s a i d  t h a t  such a s t a t e  i s  t im e ­
l e s s  because i t  i g n o re s  d u r a t i o n ,  t h a t  i t s  e x i s t e n c e  i s  n o t  
tem pora l  e x i s t e n c e ,  bu t  t h i s  a g a in  i s  l a r g e l y  a m a t t e r  of 
w ords .  I f  we tak e  time as  i n v o lv in g  Being as w e l l  as Becoming, 
th en  i n  so f a r  as i t  i n v o lv e s  happen ing ,  e x i s t e n c e ,  a c t u a l i t y ,  
to  t h a t  e x t e n t  i t  p a r t a k e s  o f  v a l u e . Time i s  i n  t a n g e n t i a l  
c o n t a c t  w i th  R e a l i t y ,  the p o i n t  of c o n ta c t  be ing  t h a t  i n s t a n t  
which we c a l l  the  p r e s e n t .  In  t h i s  p o i n t  t h a t  a lone  i s , we 
can g l im p se ,  though f l e e t i n g l y ,  the s t a b i l i t y  and com ple teness  
t h a t  we s e e k .  I t  was no a c c i d e n t  t h a t  l e d  B oeth ius  to  t a l k  o f  
" the  n e v e r - f a i l i n g  now", and though the  Being t h a t  i s  t h i s  
p r e s e n t  moment i s ,  by com parison,  t r a n s i t o r y ,  i t  y e t  i s  and 
i s  the  o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  the  a c t u a l i s a t i o n  of v a l u e .
1 .  "n o tebo o k" ,  p . 17.
2 .  As i n  the s t o r y  of the  o ld  monk, who, t r a n s p o r t e d  by a 
l a r k ’ s song, was unaware of the  passage  of  the  c e n t u r i e s .
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But,  i t  does n o t  l a s t ,  f o r  time i s  a l s o  Becoming.
The c o lo u r s  i n  the  sky f a d e ,  and th e  n i g h t  comes, and memory, 
i n s t e a d  of  c o n s o l in g ,  may make the  c o n t r a s t  w i th  what has  been 
s t i l l  more b i t t e r .
"Beauty v a n i s h e s  -  Beauty p a s s e s  
However r a r e ,  r a r e  i t  b e ."
The t r a n s i e n c e  of  time makes i t  app ear  i n i m i c a l  to  v a l u e s ,  
and McTaggart v o ic e s  the o p in io n  of  many when he says  t h a t  i t  
i s  the  l a s t  enemy to  be overcome. Some, f o l lo w in g  P l a t o ,  deny 
t h a t  time has  any power over b eau ty  i t s e l f ,  and t h a t  though 
p a r t i c u l a r  b e a u t i f u l  t h in g s  v a n i s h  and p a s s ,  b e a u ty  remains  
and i s  e t e r n a l .  But the  q u e s t i o n  s t i l l  rem ains  - What then  we • 
a re  to  say of  the t h r e a t  of  t r a n s i e n c e  low er in g  over  the  p a r ­
t i c u l a r ?  Beauty i s  t i m e l e s s :  bu t  as soon as i t  i s  a c t u a l i s e d  
i n  time i t  becomes s u b j e c t  to  t i m e . Though time i s  i n  the  end 
powerless  a g a i n s t  V a lu e , i t  can i n f e c t  p a r t i c u l a r  v a lu e s  w i th  
i t s  own i n s t a b i l i t y  and im p e r f e c t i o n ,  and the r e l a t i o n  be­
tween the  u n i v e r s a l  Id e a  of Beauty and i n d i v i d u a l  o b j e c t s  
t h a t  a re  b e a u t i f u l  red uces  to  the  r e l a , t i o n  between Being and 
Becoming. Again ,  t h e re  i s  a n o th e r  way i n  which i m p e r f e c t io n  
i s  e v i d e n t ,  and t h i s  concerns  the  f r e q u e n t  c o n f l i c t s  of 
v a lu e s  which we e x p e r i e n c e .  The c o n t r o v e r s y  over what i s  
u s u a l l y  c a l l e d  "Art  f o r  A r t ’ s sake" e x e m p l i f i e s  t h i s ,  f o r  
w ha tever  the  s id e  we t a k e ,  w hethe r  t h a t  o f ’ a r t ’ o r  ’m o r a l i t y * ,  
the  o t h e r  must be f l o u t e d .  I t  i s  t em p t in g  to  suppose t h a t
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t h i s  c o n l l i c t  i s  a s ig n  of  our incom ple te  view of  va lue  -  an 
in co ra p le te n ess  which ,  s in ce  we a re  c r e a t u r e s  of t im e ,  w i l l  
n e c e s s a r i l y  p e r s i s t *
So much f o r  the d e b i t  s id e  of  Becoming. I t  would, 
however, be a m is take  to  s t r e s s  t h i s  too  much, to  the  e x c l u s i o n  
ol the  c r e d i t  s i d e .  Though Becoming f a l l s  s h o r t  of a b s o lu t e  
p e r f e c t i o n ,  so does t h i s  p r e s e n t  w orld  of Being, and Becoming 
has s t i l l  a u s e f u l  p a r t  to  p l a y  i n  t h a t  i t  makes p ro g re s s  
p o s s i b l e .  S o c i a l  re fo rm e rs  may dream of U to p ias  which a re  im­
p o s s i b l y  p e r f e c t ,  bu t  th ey  need ,  as w e l l  as a v i s i o n  of the 
u l t i m a t e  i d e a l ,  the c o n f o r t i n g  a s su ra n c e  t h a t  change and p r o ­
g r e s s  can be made, and f o r  t h i s  Becoming i s  n e c e s s a r y .  IVhat 
t r a n s c e n d s  Becoming can never  be r e a c h e d  by Becoming, but  an 
a s y m p to t ic  app roach  to  i t  may be made, and the  n i s u s  towards 
p ro d u c in g  eve r  h ig h e r  and h ig h e r  fo rm s,  though i t  can never  
r e s t  c o n te n t  w i t h  i t s e l f ,  i s  no t  on t h a t  accou n t  to  be 
d e s p i s e d .  On the  o th e r  hand, t h e r e  may be no p r o g r e s s ,  bu t  
d e g e n e r a t i o n  - bu t  t h i s  p o s s i b i l i t y  r a t h e r  i n c r e a s e s  than  
d e t r a c t s  from the  p r a c t i c a l  im portance  o f  Becoming. Where the  
p o t e n t i a l i t i e s  f c r  good or  e v i l  a re  g r e a t ,  t h e r e  i s  more l i k e l y  
to  be a c t i v e  e f f o r t .  Becoming, th e n ,  though i t  must t a l l  s h o r t  
of a t t a i n i n g  a b s o lu t e  v a l u e s ,  y e t  a l lo w s  f o r  t h e i r  p r o g r e s s i v e  
a c t u a l i s a t i o n  i n  i n c r e a s i n g l y  adequate  forms in  a way which
l l f e T î l l  ? S 'm e a f s  b y % h i : h % e  a p ^ ' S n d
L i f e " ,  p . 383.)
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a s t a t i c  w orld  cou ld  never  do.
To those  who r e j e c t  the  n o t io n  of  a b s o lu t e  v a l u e s ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  t h i s  i m p e r f e c t i o n  i s  no i m p e r f e c t i o n ,  and the  q u es ­
t i o n  f a l l s  a t  once; so t h a t  the  fundam enta l  t h in g  i s  o f  un- 
c e a s in g  p r o g r e s s  i n  t im e ,  and time i s  r e g a rd e d  as an i n t e g r a l  
p a r t  of r e a l i t y .  But any o th e r  view has  to  take  i n t o  accoun t  
the  tw ofo ld  c h a r a c t e r  of Becoming, i t s  c r e a t i v e n e s s  as well  as 
i t s  t r a n s i e n c e .  I  would u rg e ,  to o ,  t h a t  we have to  c o n s id e r  
t h a t  time in v o lv e s  ’h a p p e n in g ’ as w e l l  as ’and t h e n ’ , and must 
n o t  b l i n d l y  be c u t  o f f  from a l l  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  Being.
What, th e n ,  i s  t i m e , when a l l  th e se  f a c t o r s  a re  
remembered?The answer must be ,  i m p e r f e c t . The sum of  even and 
odd i s  a lways odd, and though the  p r e s e n t  moment of a c t u a l i t y  
has the va lue  which e x i s t e n c e  h a s ,  y e t  the  i n s t a b i l i t y  and 
i n h e r e n t  r e s t l e s s n e s s  of Becoming i n f e c t s  a l l  time w i th  i t s  
i m p e r f e c t i o n .  Time p a s s e s :  the  young grow o ld ,  and the  o ld  
d i e :  the hour of " s p le n d o u r  i n  the  g r a s s "  can neve r  be b rough t  
back:  p o e t s  and s o c i a l  r e fo rm e rs  and m a r ty r s  l i v e  and d ie  f o r  
a new w o r ld ,  and f i n d  i t  swarming w i th  demagogues and r e ­
f r i g e r a t o r s .  The E l i z a b e t h a n s ,  who w atched  the  t i d e  cover up 
t h e i r  l a d y ’ s name w r i t t e n  on the sand ,  and who d e f i e d  Time 
and Bate to  e r a s e  the  im p e r i s h a b le  g l o r y  which t h a t  name g a in e d  
th ro u g h  t h e i r  p o e t r y ,  saw in  time a p i t i l e s s  enemy, the 
d e s t r o y e r  of v a lu e s  -  y e t  p o w er le ss  i n  the  end a g a i n s t  Value*
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B ut,  though Bewton i s  dead ,  we have E i n s t e i n ,  and time i s
c r e a t i v e  as  w e l l  as d e s t r u c t i v e .  A t r u e r  view than  the d e f e a t ­
ism of  "Tout p a s s e , t o u t  c a s s e ,  t o u t  l a s s e " ,  t r u e r  th a n  t h a t  
which looks  upon the  E t e r n a l  Values as  a m e d ic in e - c h e s t  from 
which to  r e p a i r  the ravages  of o ld  B a th e r  Time (who i s  p o r ­
t r a y e d  as  lo o k in g ,  i n  b a f f l e d  d i s g u s t ,  a t  a sonne t  i n  which 
h i s  name i s  d i s r e s p e c t f u l l y  m en t ion ed l)  - i s  t h a t  which, 
f r a n k l y  a c c e p t in g  the  dynamic n a tu re  of t im e ,  sees  i n  i t  an 
o p p o r t u n i t y  f o r  a c t i v e  a t t e m p t s  to  approach  ev e r  n e a r e r  to  an- 
i d e a l .  As McTaggart p u t  i t ,  e t e r n i t y  i s  i n  the  f u t u r e ;  o r ,  i n  
Me i s t e r  E c k h a r t ’ s w o rd s : -  " I  charge you t h a t  ye g ive  thanks  
to  God w h i le  ye a re  s t i l l  i n  t i m e , f o r  hav ing  made you out  of 
naught  a u g h t , and u n i t e  y o u r s e lv e s  w i th  h i s  d iv in e  n a t u r e .
Once ou t  of  time and your  chance i s  g o n e ." Becoming i s
c r e a t i o n  as w e l l  as t r a n s i e n c e ,  and on ly  th rough  i t  i s  t h e re
a chance t h a t  t h i s  p r e s e n t  a c t u a l i t y  of Being can be t r a n s ­
formed i n t o  something more worthy of  P l a t o ' s  v i s i o n  of i d e a l
B e ing .
1 .  "Works", ( t r a n s .  3 v a n s ) . I ,  p . 352. I t a l i c s  mina.
b i b l i o g r a p h y .
l o t e *  While t h e r e  a re  f e r y  few hooks e x p r e s s l y  on t im e ,  n e a r l y  
e v e ry  hook t h a t  has  e v e r  been w r i t t e n  c o n ta in s  some r e f e r e n c e  
to  I t .  I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  to  a g r e a t  e x t e n t  a m a t t e r  of lu ck  
which r e f e r e n c e s  shou ld  seem i n t e r e s t i n g  to  which p e o p le ,  and 
v e ry  o f t e n  a g r a i n  o f  wheat i s  accompanied by a b ushe l  o f  
c h a f f .  On the  one a hand, a b i b l i o g r a p h y  on such a v a s t  s u b j e c t  
cannot  b u t  be s e r i o u s l y  in co m p le te :  on the o t h e r  hand, th e r e  
i s  the o p p o s i te  danger o f  i n c l u d i n g  works which a re  l a r g e l y  
i r r e l e v a n t .  To avo id  the l a t t e r ,  where on ly  a sm all  p o r t i o n  
of a work i s  r e l e v a n t ,  I  have i n d i c a t e d  the  im p o r ta n t  c h a p t e r .  
S ince many w r i t e r s  a re  concerned  m ain ly  or  w ho l ly  w i th  the  
p h y s i c a l  or  p s y c h o lo g ic a l  a s p e c t s  of the  s u b j e c t ,  I  have con­
s i d e r e d  i t  d e s i r a b l e  to  l i s t  th e se  s e p a r a t e l y  from the  main 
b i b l i o g r a p h y .  Uot a l l  o f  the  books and a r t i c l e s  m entioned a r e  
of  eq u a l  v a lu e :  the  most im p o r ta n t  works have been u n d e r l i n e d .  
Where an a r t i c l e  has  been l a t e r  r e p r i n t e d  in  a  book, I  have 
u s u a l l y  o n l y f ^ f e r r e d  to  the l a t t e r ,  to  a v o id  u n n e c e s sa ry  
d u p l i c a t i o n .
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